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ABSTRACT:
With the advent of economic globalization, the terms of debate over the political and
social conditions necessary to foster development in the Global South have shifted.
Examining technological development, one important aspect of economic development,
in China, I explore the prospects for and conditions conducive to development under
globalization. My main finding is that the developing world has significant opportunities
for development through combining the institutions of global capital, defined here as the
financial institutions of the advanced economies, with co-ethnic technologists returning
from abroad. Global capital serves to ameliorate the inefficiencies of China's financial
sector. The co-ethnic technologists establish hybrid firms that possess foreign finance
and a strategic commitment to develop core technological activities in China, a strategic
orientation commonly associated with domestic firms and not foreign ones. I call this
developmental path the global hybrid model.
Using two case studies from China's IT industry, I demonstrate that the hybrid firms
outperform both other foreign-invested enterprises and domestic firms in technological
upgrading. The domestic firms underperform the foreign-invested firms because the
Chinese financial system severely misallocates credit. Credit misallocation undermines
incentives for technological development among domestic firms. The hybrids and the
other foreign-invested firms rely on the institutions of global capital to allocate capital
more efficiently, but the hybrids contribute more to local technological development due
to their strategic commitment to China. The shared ethnic identity between the hybrids'
owners and the local economy provide these firms with the ideas and interests that
motivate them to pursue this strategic commitment to China.
The global hybrid path provides several insights on the problem of development under
globalization. By importing foreign financial institutions, the global hybrid model lowers
the institutional bar for development because developing countries need not have highly
capable states or well-functioning markets to develop. Yet, global capital alone is not
sufficient to achieve development because global capital has no serious commitment to
host country development. In place of the previously proposed solution of state
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discipline of foreign firms to create commitment, co-ethnic technologists provide the
motivation for hybrid firms to contribute significantly to developing host economies.
Thesis Supervisor: Suzanne Berger
Title: Raphael Dorman and Helen Starbuck Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One
Development under Globalization: Introduction and Framework
1. Preface
1.1 The Argument in Brief
Over the last decade, China has achieved remarkable economic development
success following a new path unknown, or at least unarticulated, by scholars and
policymakers alike. I call this developmental path the global hybrid model. The global
hybrid route relies on the institutions of global capital, defined here as the financial
institutions of the advanced economies, and a set of firms established by ethnic Chinese
entrepreneurs that I dub hybrids. Global capital serves to offset the inefficiencies of
China's financial sector. Hybrid firms combine foreign finance with a strategic
commitment to develop core technological activities in China. The hybrids take the best
of both worlds of foreign and domestic firms. Hybrids as foreign firms receive finance
and the concomitant financial discipline from global capital, an option that remains
generally unavailable to Chinese domestic firms. At the same time, hybrids also have the
commitment to local development more commonly associated with domestic firms than
foreign ones. This global hybrid path is important beyond China because it speaks to the
wider debates on globalization and development.
During the last several decades, there has been a fierce debate about the
appropriate policies for economic development between the Washington Consensus'
promoted by the major international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, and the revisionist political economists2. Followers of
1See Stiglitz (2002) for full explication of the Washington Consensus.
2 Major revisionist works include Stiglitz (2002), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), C. Johnson (1982), P.
Evans (1995), H. Chang (1994), V. Chibber (2003) and Woo-Cumings (1999).
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the former view advocate free and unfettered markets buttressed by institutions to protect
property rights. The revisionists challenge the Washington Consensus by arguing that
development involves social and political processes to create the necessary institutions
for economic growth.
Economic globalization, commonly understood as lower barriers to and increasing
flows of international trade and finance, has raised doubts about the prospects for
development in the developing world. In confronting globalization, the analytic and
prescriptive differences between the Washington Consensus and the revisionists remain,
but there is a new split among the revisionists. The Washington Consensus welcomes
globalization as a boon to developing countries through expanding the scope of market
forces, but the revisionists divide over the prospects for developing countries under
globalization. The optimists, such as Ernst and Saxenian, see transnational networks as
providing opportunities for developing countries to continue to learn the skills and
competencies necessary to further their progress.3 The pessimists, such as Stiglitz and
Strange, see globalization eroding the capabilities of the state or state-societal alliances
necessary for development.
Using the case of technological upgrading (one aspect of economic development)
in China's information technology (IT) industry, I demonstrate that opportunities for
development exist under globalization. China's IT industry has flourished under
globalization, but China's successful development does not conform well to any of the
three viewpoints in the current debate. The pessimists see a developmental dead-end
unless there is state intervention, but China's state lacks the capabilities to intervene
3 The two principal beneficial networks in the view of the optimists are global production networks (GPNs)
and transnational technological communities (TTCs).
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successfully in the economy (see section five of this chapter). The optimists see
transnational networks as the key4, but in China, the Chinese state's relationship to firms
structures the very ability of firms to take advantage of these network opportunities.
Thus, the route to development is not simply one of opening up to transnational networks.
The Washington Consensus would predict that the development of market institutions
explains China's success, but China's market institutions are at best incomplete. Most
damning to this market explanation is the very poor intellectual property rights (IPR)
regime in China in precisely the type of technology-intensive sector, IT, where IPR is
deemed to be critical for well functioning markets. Each of these three viewpoints offers
valuable insights into the process of development, but they fall short of offering a
satisfactory explanation of China's success.
The global hybrid model does offer an explanation that can account for China's
success. Hybrids are a type of firm that combines foreign finance with a domestic-
oriented strategy. They succeed in driving development because they combine the
market discipline from the institutions of global capital with social mechanisms to make
these market forces work to foster local development. The hybrid-led development thus
combines elements of both the Washington Consensus (market mechanisms) and
revisionist (social processes) camps.
Via foreign direct investment (FDI), China has imported market institutions in the
form of the functioning financial institutions of global capital. By importing financial
4 Some of the network optimists realize that taking full advantage of these networks requires extensive state
support of local participants in transnational networks (Ernst 2004ab). In effect, these scholars are not
much different from the pessimists although they predict a different outcome i.e. the state plus networks
equals development. This similar argument has the same problem that the revisionists have when
explaining China's development in that it conflicts with what this work and many others (see Section Five
of this chapter) have uncovered about the lack of capabilities of the Chinese state. In China, the effective
state support to take advantage of the networks is lacking.
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institutions, I mean the process of foreign-invested firms accessing foreign financial
institutions for the financing of their Chinese operations rather than using the domestic
Chinese financial system.5 These acts of borrowing from abroad bring capital, but also
the rules, understandings and other institutional practices that go hand-in-hand with the
loan of capital itself.
However, the incentives (market signals) coming from these foreign financial
institutions alone have not proven sufficient to spur China's impressive technological
upgrading. To achieve this upgrading success, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs6 have had to
interpret the market signals emanating from the foreign financial institutions. In China,
certain ethnic Chinese7 have interpreted these market signals differently from non-ethnic
Chinese foreigners (and even some ethnic Chinese). These ethnic Chinese have taken the
same market incentives as the foreigners, but have interpreted them in a way that leads
them to proceed on a different technology strategy, a strategy predicated upon an
intensive utilization and improvement of China's technology resources. By pursuing
such a strategy, these ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs advanced China's technological
development.
5 Thus, this importing of institutions constitutes a fundamentally different phenomenon than institutional
transfer or imitation where simulacra of foreign institutions are built within the domestic political economy.
Under imitation and transfer, there is a process of building domestic institutions using foreign ideas. Under
importation, the institutions remain located abroad while their influence begins to enter the domestic
political economy in which they are imported. See Jacoby (2000) on imitation and transfer of institutions.
6 Technically, some of these people running firms are not the original founders so they are not
entrepreneurs in the strict sense of the word. Here, entrepreneur is used as short hand for those who run
firms.
7 Saxenian and others argue that there are co-ethnic networks of technologists that span national
boundaries, transnational technological communities (TTC). One of the most vibrant of these communities
is the ethnic Chinese one that has a strong presence in many centers of IT, such as Taiwan and Silicon
Valley. Most members of this ethnic Chinese TTC are not nationals of the People's Republic of China i.e.
they are foreign nationals despite their Chinese ethnicity. The ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs that are driving
upgrading are linked to these TTCs. The role of these networks is discussed in Section Four of this chapter
and in Chapter Two.
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The implications of China's global hybrid model for developing countries
confronting globalization are two-fold. First, FDI dramatically lower the bar to
development. Countries need not have highly capable states or well-functioning markets
to pursue development. FDI can potentially offer the functioning market institutions
many developing countries lack. Second, FDI is insufficient to realize development. The
foreign-invested economic actors linked to these foreign market institutions need
something beyond mere market incentive to pursue the activities that will fully realize
host country development. Efficient markets are not sufficient to elicit a substantial
contribution to local development by foreign-invested enterprises. Many revisionist
political economists have been suspicious of FDI precisely because they feel foreign
investors will not contribute much to development, at least not without strong pressure
and discipline imposed by the host state. What the more state-oriented among the
revisionists did not anticipate were other means beyond state discipline to socialize FDI
to contribute to development. In China, the alternative is ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs
that link up with the FDI. In some developing countries, such as Russia and India,
entrepreneurs from co-ethnic transnational technological communities may play a similar
role. In others, if development via FDI is to be realized, alternative mechanisms to
motivate foreign-invested firms to commit to local development must be found.
1.1.1 Technological Upgrading in China: The Causal Mechanisms
From Marx's Das Kapital to contemporary endogenous growth theorists (Romer
1990; Helpman and Grossman 1991), most economists recognize that technological
upgrading is a major driver of economic growth. Economists and political economists
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examining cases of successful development have also recognized that technological
upgrading is critical to development (Khan 2000; Kim and Ma 1997; Pack and Westphal
1986; Amsden 1989, 2000; Amsden and Chu 2003). Even for those who view
technological development as merely a secondary cause of development s, technological
upgrading has obvious implications for international employment and trade patterns and
international power relations. Those nations better able to achieve technological
upgrading tilt these patterns and relations in their favor.
Empirically, successful technological upgrading has combined three features:
sources of technology, functioning financial institutions and motivation. For developing
countries, technology often comes from abroad and the main task initially is assimilation
and learning of these technologies by local firms and other institutions. Some local firms
also build up capacities to generate their own technologies, often on the basis of large and
growing economies of scale and scope (Amsden and Chu 2003; L. Kim 1997).9
Functioning financial institutions provide the means (capital) and incentives for wealth
generation. Even in the developed world, the precise institutions of finance vary.
Among successful developers, there have also been a wide variety of mechanisms that
function reasonably well. In developing Taiwan, a state-run banking system tight-fisted
with its capital was complemented by a variety of informal financial mechanisms. In
8 Dani Rodrik (2003) and other economists see technical improvements as being driven by three more
fundamental sources of growth, geography, trade and institutions. In short, upgrading is an intermediate
variable between the fundamentals and the outcome, growth. Practically, their argument is not really
different from the recent work on technological development as a source of growth. The recent scholarship
is aware that behind this technological development, there are institutions creating situations more or less
conducive to technological learning (Pack and Westphal 1986; Aoki et al 1997; Helpman and Grossman
1991).
9 The most comprehensive ideological framework for moving from assimilating from abroad to developing
homegrown technologies is the "three note chord" of technonationalism (autonomy, nurture and diffuse)
presented in Samuels' Rich Nation, Strong Army (1994).
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Korea during its developmental heyday, banks provided generous credit to certain firms
and rigorous state monitoring of the borrowers accompanied this easy credit. On balance,
the successful developers created mechanisms, no matter how opaque or incomplete by
developed world standards, to provide the capital and discipline for creating economic
value. Finally, motivation to locate productive technology activities in the developing
economy is necessary. Historically, firms in places such as Taiwan and Korea had a mix
of nationalist ideology, state monitoring and support and corporate self-interest to provide
this motivation. Foreign firms lack the nationalist commitment to development so many
scholars have assumed state monitoring and incentives for foreign firms have to be that
much greater to make up for this lack of patriotic purpose.
Since states historically have played a major role in all three areas, one might
expect states to continue to play a prominent role in upgrading. Alternatively, one might
anticipate global networks taking charge of development, particularly in countries with
weak policymaking capabilities like China. In China, one sees neither of these processes.
The state's efforts to direct upgrading have failed and even backfired. Yet, transnational
networks are not alone in the driver's seat either. Nor in China does one see that very
rare event in the developing world, well-functioning market institutions that keep market
failures to a minimum.
Instead two social institutional variables l°, state-firm relations and firm
operational strategies, create and shape the opportunities for upgrading in China.
10 By social, I mean those phenomena juxtaposed to purely economic phenomenon (e.g. supply and demand
or the profit motive). By institutions, I use North's broad definition encompassing of institutions as, "any
form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction (North 1990: 4)."
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State-firm relations determine which firms have access to what type of financial
institutions. Some firms are allowed to access foreign financial institutions while cut off
from the formal domestic financial system. Other firms are unable to access foreign
finance or are offered far more favorable terms from the Chinese state banking system. A
firm's operational strategy (OS) determines its motivation to upgrade in China as
opposed to doing so elsewhere. The OS is an interpretative lens for market signals.
Those firms that have a strong motivation to upgrade in China, a China-based OS, will
interpret the same market signals in a manner different from firms with a non-Chiba-
based OS. There is a social basis to the OS variable because those firms with a China-
based OS have this strategy because of the socio-cultural knowledge and ideas that are
part of their ethnic Chinese identity (see section 2.2). The state-firm relations determine
which firms can access functioning financial institutions and then the operational
strategies of individual firms determines if those firms accessing foreign finance interpret
the market signals in a manner more or less beneficial to China's development.
In China, the relationship of firms to the state determines their sources of finance
and these sources of finance in turn impact their ability to upgrade. Sources of finance
that provide credit with hard budget constraints give firms incentives to upgrade. Firms
have hard budget constraints when they do not receive free help in covering their own
financial obligations. With hard budget constraints forcing firms to meet their financial
obligations, firms have to remain competitive to survive. For technology firms", a
critical part of their competitiveness is their technology so they have every incentive to
l By technology firms I mean those firms whose products have a high technological-intensity i.e. the
scientific and technical knowledge required to create these products is high. I do not mean technology in
the broad sense of knowledge in general e.g. McDonald's has mastered the "technology" of running the fast
food business.
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improve their technologies to keep pace with competitors. Finance that provides credit
with soft budget constraints deprives firms of the incentives and even the capabilities to
upgrade. Firms have soft budget constraints when they do not have to pay for some or all
of their financial obligations themselves. These firms can rationally expect to survive
even if not competitive because others are willing to bail them out. Thus, they lack
incentives to upgrade. Worse, the absence of the threat of extinction encourages these
firms to become very lax so firm capabilities suffer. A third possibility is no source of
finance. Firms without financing will not be able to invest in technological development.
There are four types of firms in China: the favored domestic firms, the neglected
domestic firms, the hybrid foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the regular FIEs.
While globalization has presented most of these firms with access to technology through
transnational technology communities (TTCs), financing and motivation have varied
across firm categories. Due to different state-firm relations, FIEs rely on foreign finance
and domestic firms do not. Hybrid FIEs differ from regular FIEs because the hybrids
have a China-based operational strategy. This operational strategy (OS) is a mix of
interests and ideational factors that causes these firms to perceive China either as the vital
center of their operations (the China-based OS) or as just another location among many
(the non-China-based OS). Behind the hybrids' China-based OS is shared ethnicity with
the host economy that gives the entrepreneurs running these hybrids both the interests
and ideational motives to make China the vital core of their operations (see section 2.2)
although not all ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs adopt a China-based strategy. Thus,
variation in firm-state relations (finance) and operational strategy (motivation) determine
the variation in technological upgrading.
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This dissertation makes two claims:
1) In China's IT sector, FIEs (foreign invested enterprises) contribute significantly
more to China's technological upgrading than domestic firms.
2) In China's IT sector, a certain type of FIE, the hybrid FIE, contributes
significantly more to China's technological upgrading than the regular (i.e. non-
hybrid) FIEs.
I test these claims based on evidence from extensive interviews (over three hundred) with
industry participants as well as a broad review of the relevant secondary sources of the
industry. Both types of FIEs contribute more to upgrading in China than do the two types
of domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrid FIEs are more likely to contribute than
the regular FIEs. I measure the contribution to technological upgrading using two
metrics: 1) the total number of workers/suppliers to whom new technical skills and
knowledge are imparted and 2) the level of skills and knowledge passed on to
workers/suppliers.
The hybrids are the most successful upgraders because they have both disciplined
finance (i.e. credit with relatively hard budget constraints) from foreign financial
institutions and the motivation to upgrade in China due to their China-based OS. This
access to foreign finance is the result of the arrangement between the Chinese state and
FIEs to allow both types of FIEs to invest in China while limiting their access to the
Chinese state financial system. The successful upgraders obtain technology from TTCs,
but so do most of the firms that have failed to upgrade. Thus, technology flows from the
developed world are necessary but not sufficient to explain upgrading. The unsuccessful
domestic upgraders lack finance (neglected domestic firms) or financial discipline (the
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favored domestic firms) due to their particular relationships to the state. The favored
firms have a close relationship to the Chinese state, which provides them with state
finance and procurement without any effective state monitoring. The resulting soft
budget constraints undermine both firm capabilities and incentives for upgrading. The
neglected firms have a distant relationship with the state so they are unable to gain access
to the state financial system. Cut off from credit, they are unable to afford the costs of
upgrading. The regular FIEs have the capabilities to upgrade due to their financial
discipline and access to transnational technology networks, but undertake less upgrading
in China than the hybrids because they lack the China-based operational strategy.
In short, the state's relations to firms determine their sources of financing. In
turn, the sources of financing help determine the technological upgrading effort of the
firms. The upgrading effort only partly explains the commitment to pursue technology
activities in China, which is referred to as Technology Strategy in Figure 1 and Table 1
below. The foreign sources of financing send both types of FIEs the same market
signals, but only the hybrids' interpretive lens of a China-based operational strategy
processes these signals to mean that the firm should pursue technology activities in
China. The combination of the sources of financing and the operational strategy of the
firm together determine the Technology Strategy, which in turn determines the upgrading
outcomes in China. The thesis maintains that greater corporate technological efforts in
China will on average lead to higher technological contributions to China, and the
research found much evidence to support this contention. State-firm relations explain
why domestic firms fail to contribute to upgrading as much as foreign firms (Hypothesis
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One). The China-based operational strategy of the hybrids explains why hybrids
contribute more than regular FIEs (Hypothesis Two).
Figure 1 Causal Flow
Dotted line indicates
less deterministic
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Ethnicity
Sources of
Finance
(Hard/soft
budgets)
Incentives
and
Capabilities
for Upgrading
Technology
Strategy
(Interpretation
of Incentives)
I
Table 1 Factors Determining Contribution to China's Technological Upgrading
Firm Finance Technology Capabilities Operational Technology Contribution
Type Inputs and Incentives Strategy Strategy to Upgrading
(Follows to Upgrade (Motivation/ (Technology in China
finance) Interpretive Activities in
Lens) China)
Neglected Little No access to Low China-based Do not Low
Domestic Access to finance so no capabilities: OS but no pursue
Firms Finance access to No finance capabilities to upgrading
technology No undertake because of
inputs. technology technology low
activities feasibility
and high risk
Favored State banks Have access to Mixed China-based Generally do Low
Domestic and finance so have Capabilities OS but not attempt
Firms procuremen access to Access to disincentives to do
t offer technology finance to upgrade so technologica
unmonitore inputs. Access to motivation I upgrading;
d and lavish technology irrelevant. the few
financial Soft attempts are
support i.e. budgets poorly
soft budget undermine executed
constraints capabilities
Disincentives
because of soft
budgets
Regular Access to Same as above. High Non-China- Try to Variable
FIEs finance but Capabilities based OS so enhance (Low to
finance Access to lacks positive technologica Moderate)
offers finance bias of I capabilities
harder Access to interpreting but not
budget technology market necessarily
constraints High Incentives signals in in China
relative to Hard favor of
Chinese budget placing
state constraints plus activities in
banks/proc technology- China
urement based
competition
Hybrid Same as Same as above. Same as above China-based Try to High
FIEs above OS interprets enhance
market technologica
signals in a I capabilities
manner in China
favoring
activities in
China
To place the causal argument in terms of the discussion about China's
development under globalization, the hybrids are those firms receiving market signals
from foreign financial institutions but these firms influenced by their Chinese ethnicity
interpret those markets signals in manner (the China-based OS) that dictates that they
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adopt a corporate strategy conducive to pursuing technological development in the host
country, China. The regular FIEs receive the same incentives from foreign financial
institutions but their interpretative lens (the non-China-based OS) is decidedly different.
Their processing of these market incentives does not lead them to commit to utilize
extensively China's resources for their technology activities. Thus, they embark on a
technology strategy that at best only moderately contributes to China's development
despite using relatively functioning foreign institutions just like the hybrids. The
domestic firms fail to contribute because they operate under conditions of market
malfunction in the area of finance. Financial resources are not distributed according to
these firms according to which firms can maximize the return of the invested financial
resources. Instead, a political logic of state favoritism determines the allocation of
domestic finance.
The IT industry's modularity (the segmentation of production into narrow
functions done by specialized firms) serves as a background condition. By background
condition, I mean a condition that affects all the actors (in this case, firms) equally.
Modularity is important to the final outcomes because without modularity small firms
focusing on very narrow segments of the value chain could not thrive as they do in China.
In the absence of modularity, building firms with large scale and scope economies in
China would be necessary, but neither the state nor the technology firms are up to the
task. The state lacks the industrial policymaking capacity to create such firms as will be
discussed later in this chapter. The new firms that lead China's technological upgrading
would not be able to build the scale and scope necessary to compete in a non-modular
industry because of their small size. Thus, if the industry were not modularized, then one
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would expect much less upgrading across all firm types. The IT industry effects and their
applicability to other sectors will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
The findings of this research suggest that China theoretically faces three quite
different trajectories of technological development dependent on the three main types of
firms. If China allows hybrids to continue to function relatively freely in its economy,
China can expect a relatively rapid accumulation of technical knowledge and skills. If
for some reason hybrids did not exist (for example, there were no overseas Chinese to
found these hybrid firms) but regular FIEs were still allowed into the economy, China
could expect a slower pace of technological upgrading (labeled as Regular FIE-led
Trajectory in Figure 2). If China rejected foreign investment and tried to develop solely
through domestic enterprise, then China could expect an even slower pace of
technological upgrading (presented as Domestic-led Trajectory in Figure 2).
Figure 2 Three Technology Trajectories
Level of Technology
ed
ry
lar FIE-led
ctory
estic-led
ctory
Time
1.2 Research Methodology
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The primary research consisted of 323 semi-structured interviews with
government and business participants in China's IT industry. To check my interview
findings against broader trends and other information sources, I also conducted extensive
secondary research including Chinese news reports, commentaries by Chinese
economists and technology policy experts, and internal government documents as well as
Western news and industry sources. The bulk of the interviews (214) were conducted in
2001-2002. Thirteen were conducted in the summer of 1998 and the rest were conducted
in 2003-2004. All of the interviews were with people currently involved in business or
government in China or with knowledge about particular firms or government policies. I
conducted all the interviews by myself except for 5 interviews as part of a joint research
trip to southern Zhejiang I took with scholars from Ministry of Science and Technology
and universities in Hangzhou, 22 interviews conducted jointly with two MIT electrical
engineering professors and 1 interview conducted jointly with another American scholar.
I had conducted prior research that provided me with some understanding of the
global IT industry. Before my main fieldwork period of 2001-2002, two MIT electrical
engineering professors (Professors Akinwande and Sodini) and I had already a
framework to analyze the IT industry based on our research on the IT industry for the
Industrial Performance Center's Globalization Project. This framework helped me to
understand what activities firms were doing and estimate the technical sophistication of
their activities. Chapter Three explains this framework.
Given that much of my information was based on interviews and I do not have a
PhD in electrical engineering, how could I determine which firms were actually engaging
in real technological activities? Most firms in high-tech have an incentive to boast about
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their technological capabilities to outsiders. Furthermore, many firms in China are solely
doing illegal or legally dubious reverse engineering activities that they understandably
would be reluctant to admit to an outsider. I used my prior knowledge of the industry,
but this was insufficient given all the incentives for insiders to distort information to
outsiders. Much more critical than my prior knowledge was my ability to elicit
information from interview subjects about other firms they were familiar with due to
business connections. To confirm information about interviewed firms, I checked with
their suppliers because these firms knew what activities the customer firm could
undertake themselves. While one supplier's word is not sufficient since they too might
also want to inflate their own technical prowess at the expense of their customer, I
interviewed a number of suppliers to control for this incentive to boast. For example, I
interviewed the majority of the major Taiwanese hardware suppliers to Chinese computer
and telecommunications firms and received a consistent response confirming the lack of
technical skill among the Chinese firms with the exception of Huawei. I also interviewed
customers of the IT firms to understand what they could actually deliver. For example, I
interviewed a number of IC design houses about their experience with various Chinese
and leading Taiwanese foundries (manufacturing service) to check the claims of the
Chinese foundries. I also interviewed consultants to various companies because these
consultants were often privy to internal company information. Finally, I interviewed the
financiers, predominantly venture capitalists, about the specific companies where they
had conducted due diligence to assess the technological capabilities of the firms. The
venture capitalists were useful because they had technically trained staff with the greatest
incentive to learn about the details of potential investment targets. Similarly, I checked
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the claims government officials made about the efficacy of various policies with the
"consumers" of such policies, the firms. Given the networked nature of the industry,
many interviewed firms were simultaneously subjects of study in of themselves and
sources of verification about the claims made by their customers, suppliers and
government policymakers.
The geographic distribution of interviews (see Table 2) reflects the distribution of
China's IT industry with its main IT clusters in the Pearl Rover delta (Guangdong), the
Yangzi River delta (greater Shanghai) and the Beijing-Tianjin area. I had 1 interview in
Chengdu (Sichuan Province) and 2 in Xian (Shaanxi Province). Both of these cities are
located in western China and focal points for the Chinese government's Western
Development Project and have strong technical institutes of higher education although
their IT industry lags behind the coastal areas.
Table 2 Geographic Distribution of Interviews
Region Number of Interviews
Beijing 98
Shanghai 82
Guangdong 42
Taiwan 33
Jiangsu 32
Zhejiang 20
Tianjin 6
International 7
Western China 3
Total 323
Note: Interview data through March 31, 2005.
The breakdown by the type of interview subject is presented in Table 3.
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I interviewed a number of academics, but I did not count these interviews unless the
interviewed academic had in-depth knowledge to offer about a particular firm or had
served in a relevant government post.
Table 3 Interview Types
Interview Type Number of Interviews
Foreign Business 152
Domestic Business 80
Government 81
NGOs 5
Academia 5
Total 323
Note: Interview data through March 31, 2005.
1.3 The Globalization of the IT Industry in China
The IT industry closely approximates the ideal-typical globalized industry with no
trade barriers. This industry has relatively low tariff barriers due to the World Trade
Organization's Information Technology Agreement (ITA). The ITA by 2000 had
eliminated tariffs and duties in signatory nations'2, which by the terms of the agreement
had to comprise over 90% of the world's IT trade in 1997 when the ITA went into
effect.'3 There are also other international bodies in the IT sector pushing for open trade,
such as the World Semiconductor Council, which has succeeded in reducing tariffs to
12The developing nations signing the agreement are allowed longer periods of time to adjust their tariff
schedules. What is more, the nations that are WTO members but not signatories of the ITA still enjoy the
tariff benefits from the lowering of tariffs by ITA signatories, which include the Triad of advanced
economies, the EU, the US and Japan. Thus, this adjustment mechanism actually works in favor of the
developing world contrary to the predictions of the globalization pessimists.
13 The ITA should now encompass nations responsible for well over 90% of the world IT trade as China, a
large IT producer and trader, has recently become a member of the ITA following its WTO accession.
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zero in the dominant semiconductor-producing and consuming economies, the EU,
Taiwan, Korea, Japan and the US.
China has opened up to trade and investment. Albeit often unwittingly or
reluctantly, China has permitted large international financial inflows, with the strong
qualification that these flows have been FDI rather than "hot money" i.e. speculative
short-term loans.' 4 China's IT industry has extensive trade flows and is more open to
imports than some of China's sectors. 5 China's IT sector is also much more open than
some past developers, such as Japan. China's opening up to foreign investment in the
1990s culminated in 2003 when China became the largest national recipient of FDI for
the first time in history (NFZM, July 15, 2004).
1.4 Examining China's Basic Factor Inputs
It is common for economists to conceive of basic factor inputs (capital and labor)
as driving economic growth. In the case of China, do these basic factors explain China's
surprising ability to upgrade technologically?
Is it simply China's immense population that accounts for its rapid technological
upgrading? If population size alone mattered, why do other populous developing nations,
14 The Chinese state did not even let foreigners invest in the main Chinese stock markets, restricting them
to the small B share market, until 2004. Interestingly enough, stock investments have not been viewed as a
hot money problem. Consequently, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore actually ended their two-tier
systems of shares segregating foreign from domestic buyers in the wake of the 1997 crisis (Walter and
Howie 2003: 181). On the other hand, under its WTO accession agreement, China has committed to
opening part of its banking sector to foreign firms. In general, China has been quite open to FDI inflows,
but has not adhered to the Washington Consensus of unimpeded financial flows, which Stiglitz (2002) has
rightly criticized for bringing in the bane of hot money. In this dissertation, globalization is not meant to be
simply adhering to the Washington Consensus principles, but just the state of being in a situation of
relatively open financial and trade borders compared to historical experience.
15 In general, China's trade is open as the effective tariff rate is only 3.6%, which is lower than the nominal
rate of 1 1.1% due to the many exemptions and benefits enjoyed by firms in a variety of special industrial
zones in China (YF Tao 2003: 3).
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such as Indonesia, Pakistan or Brazil, not exhibit similar rapid technological upgrading?
India may have a similar phenomenon, but it appears to be on a rather smaller scale
(Clarke 2004). In any case, size alone clearly is not the determining factor as some of
these behemoths are basket cases and some rather small nations, such as Taiwan and
Singapore, have climbed all the way to the elite club of rich nations. Furthermore, if
population was the key, why did China only recently start rapid technological upgrading?
Is it simply the sheer size of the FDI? China's FDI flows have been enormous in
recent years, and are a much larger share of GDP than for the average developing
country. However, as a percentage of GDP, China's FDI flows are not much different
from a host of other FDI-welcoming developing nations. Malaysia has received an
enormous amount of FDI given the size of the nation and has a large IT sector, but
Malaysia has not undergone the extensive upgrading that China has (B. Ritchie 2002:
30). If one analyzes China's FDI, one quickly discovers that only a small amount goes to
the firms actively engaged in the most technological sophisticated activities. FDI alone
has not guaranteed the use of funds for technological sophisticated activities. Indeed,
what is truly startling is the much large number of firms upgrading in China compared to
other countries that are much richer. Mexico, Brazil and Malaysia on a per capita basis
are much better off than China; yet, they have not been able to generate the technological
activities that China has.
One factor in which China does stand out from the crowd is its absolute number
of educated people. In part, this is unsurprising given the large population of China, but
it is nevertheless impressive given the relative poverty of China compared to much of the
world. Having the appropriate human resources is undoubtedly a necessary condition for
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Table 4 Stock of FDI as Percentage of Gross Domestic Product
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2003 (New York: United Nations, 2003), pp. 197-198, 278-286.
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 GDP per
capita
2001 (US
dollars)
Mexico 3.6 10.2 8.5 14.4 16.8 22.5 24 5651.2
China 3.1 3.4 7.0 19.6 32.3 33.2 36.2 852.5
Malaysia 20.7 23.3 23.4 32.3 58.6 60.5 59.4 3856.6
Brazil 7.4 11.5 8.0 6.0 33.2 43.1 52.1 3181.1
Developing 4.9 6.2 8.2 8.9 16.5 17.9 18.7
World 
technological upgrading, but it is not sufficient to explain the timing of China's
development. China has been quite successful in educating people for several decades (D.
Zweig 2002: Chp. 4), but has only recently seen a spurt of technological upgrading in one
particular economic area, the foreign-invested sector. Furthermore, many of China's
educated have gone abroad and the returnees leading the upgrading have only recently
returned. Only under new circumstances generated by China's internal politics did
China's human capital begin to fulfill its promise for development.
Figure 3
Comparisons of major countries by economic size and PPP, GDP per capita, and tertiary
enrollment rates (1998 PPP)
Tertiary enrollment (gross, percent)
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2. The Independent Variables
2.1 First Independent Variable: State-structured Sources of Finance
2. 1.1 The State and Domestic Firms
A number of scholars have recognized that the Chinese state does not grant all
firms equal access to China's formal financial system. In Selling China, Huang (2003)
posits a political pecking order in which the state favors state-owned firms and
discriminates against private ones. The state-owned and private firms within Huang's
political pecking order of firms match closely the categories of favored and neglected
used here. The state-owned firms are showered with finance and the private firms are cut
off from the state-banks. In short, the state determines access to capital. This view is not
Huang's alone. Adam Segal (2003), Kellee Tsai (2002) and the International Finance
Corporation (Gregory et al 2000) also argue that private firms are cut off from the state
financial system that favors state-owned firms. We need, however, to recognize that
many firms that are not considered state-owned after these many years of enterprise
reform in China are still closely connected to the state and receive both financial and
procurement patronage. Indeed, Segal (2005) has recently pointed out that some private
firms, such as Lenovo, are clearly favored by the state. Thus, the conception of favored
domestic firms used here includes all domestic firms enjoying generous state finance and
procurement regardless of their formal designation as state-owned or private.'6 Those
firms that do not enjoy state favor, the vast majority of which are outside the formal state-
owned state, are neglected enterprises.
16 There is a large range of official and semi-official sub-categories of state-owned and private firms as well
as local state and quasi-private firms known as collectives. In any case, I argue that the official
designations do not matter. What matters is the relationship between the particular firm and the state.
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The state connections do not directly explain the technological strategies of
domestic firms. Rather, the state determines which firms receive finance and on what
terms. These financial arrangements directly explain the technological upgrading
behavior of domestic firms.
2.1.1.1 Favored Domestic Firms
This thesis accepts the notion of technological upgrading as entailing high risks
and high costs. The risk is high because learning or developing new technologies is
difficult. To learn or develop new technologies, a firm must invest human and financial
resources so the process is costly. Firms need financial resources to overcome the costs
and incentives for technological upgrading to overcome the risk. Larger profits than the
firm would enjoy in the absence of upgrading provide the incentive to upgrade (M. Khan
2000: 40-53) 7 .
Why are favored domestic firms, showered with easy credit and procurement
from the state, less likely to upgrade? Upgrading is inherently risky, but one could
plausibly argue that softening of budget constraints would free these firms to take greater
risks. Being less risk adverse, firms hypothetically would be willing to take on
challenging technological projects despite the inherent risk of new technology projects.
The evidence from other studies (Kornai 1995; Kornai et al 2003; X. Liu 2001) as well as
this one suggests that even when such firms are willing to try to undertake technological
17 Khan (2000: 47) notes that often in developing countries the financial markets are inefficient so that
government intervention is necessary to ensure rents for learning and innovation i.e. government lowers
some of the risk for entrepreneurs. He also mentions that efficient insurance markets would take out some
of the risk, but he then concedes that efficient insurance markets are a fiction even in the advanced
capitalist world. Thus, the problem seems to be the inefficient capital markets in the developing world. As
this dissertation will show, many of China's successful firms tap into the financial institutions of the
advanced economies.
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activities under soft budget constraints such as the Chinese state provides, they will not
conduct them in an effective manner. This is a probabilistic judgment rather than an
absolute one. These firms do not completely lack the capabilities to upgrade, but the
likelihood of their upgrading is low because of the curse of state favor. The state
undermines favored firms' ability to upgrade in three ways: bureaucratic goals, firm
incapacity and disincentives to upgrade.
The bureaucratic goals mechanism applies only to those favored firms that are
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bureaucrats do not run the other favored firms so these
firms escape this particular malady. In SOEs, the bureaucrat-manager is given many
goals other than profitability. Officials higher up the hierarchy set the goals by which the
bureaucrats-as-managers will be judged (Kornai 1995; Huang 2003: 137-140). Among
these goals are preserving the SOE and increasing the scale and perceived technological
prowess of the firm. Preserving the firm mitigates the desire to undertake anything risky,
such as learning new technical skills. Increasing the scale and perceived technological
intensity of the firm induces the bureaucrat-as-manager to buy expensive capital
equipment that makes the firm appear cutting edge and increases the apparent scale of the
firms as the new equipment (at least if properly used) increases productivity. The new
capital equipment also increases the fixed capital of the firm, another measure of scale.
These investments in capital equipment and increasing scale also serve the
purpose of promoting the survival of the bureaucrat's domain, the SOE, because the firm
becomes too large or too important (in the eyes of national planners) to fail. China did go
through a process starting in the wake of the Fifteenth Party Congress in the autumn of
1997 of continuing to support the large SOEs while letting go of the small-and-medium-
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sized SOEs (the "grasp the large release the small" policy or zhua dafang xiao). The
campaign and its aftermath only served to convince SOE managers that their firms should
look big though these incentives were implicit in the system prior to this policy.
In sum, the bureaucratic goals induce a policy of capital investment without skill
investment. Huang, Gilboy, Wu (1996) and Jefferson and his colleagues (1999) have
documented this tendency within Chinese SOEs. Wu Renhong points out that Chinese
SOEs spend one dollar on assimilation for every ten on technology acquisition. In
contrast, the Japanese and Koreans spend ten dollars of assimilation for each dollar spent
on acquisition. Assimilation is the process by which a firm learns how to use a
technology acquired. Jefferson and his colleagues (1999) present evidence that SOEs
invest less in skills even compared to other Chinese firms. They calculated that the
marginal productivity of TVE (township and village enterprises) technicians was 250
percent higher than that of the technicians in SOEs. TVE technicians had four times the
marginal productivity when new expenditures on productivity were incorporated into the
calculus.
In the firm incapacity scenario, the easy access to state finance and procurement
encourages all sorts of inefficiencies in the favored firms that prevent these firms from
doing much of anything well. These firms may attempt to do technological upgrading,
but their general inefficiency in operations make it difficult for them to upgrade
effectively. Liu Xielin (2001: 39 and 43) and Kornai and his colleagues (2003: 1105)
note this problem of soft budget constraints undermining upgrading. This problem
applies to state and non-state favored firms.
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Procurement by the state plays a critical role in determining the incentives for
upgrading among favored firms. State procurement encourages firms to forgo high risk,
high reward upgrading for the less risky if potentially smaller profits to be made from
feeding at the state's trough. With the opportunity to make profits with the skill set they
already have, these firms lack the incentives to upgrade their skill set to be competitive in
the marketplace. From the literature on China's industrial policy (see Section 5 of this
chapter), we know that the Chinese state does not monitor firms effectively. Without
effective monitoring, the favored firms can simply enjoy the state's bounty without
enhancing their performance in return. The firms are given ex ante rewards for
technological upgrading without any demand for ex post results of the hoped-for
technological endeavor. I will present evidence of how procurement undermines the
incentives to upgrade in domestic firms in the empirical chapters. Indicative of this
problem, a number of non-state firms covered in this study (including those exceptional
few foreign firms that have been able to link up with the Chinese state) have gone from
upgrading champs to procurement chumps. As soon as these firms started feeding at the
state trough, they stopped upgrading. This problem can affect state and non-state favored
firms alike though the state firms already suffer from both problems of bureaucratic goals
and firm incapacitation so the lack of incentives is the least of their problems.
Just as the state has showered financial favor on some firms, it has neglected
many other firms. This neglect creates a two-tiered structure of firms in China (Huang
2003; Gregory et al 2000). For the domestic firms that are not favored by the state,
financial sources are as limited as they are abundant for the favored firms. These firms
have difficulty acquiring loans from the state banking system (Huang 2003; K. Tsai 2002;
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Gregory et al 2000). This scarcity of capital prevents these firms from embarking on
technological upgrading as these firms do not have the means to do so despite whatever
ex post rewards for technological advancement they might enjoy. In short, the neglected
firms have too few financial resources to risk attempts at technological upgrading.
Huang presents data on the general barriers to growth faced by neglected firms. This
dissertation will provide evidence from neglected firms that the lack of financing has
stymied their attempts to upgrade.
2.1.2 The State and FIEs
The Chinese state has structured the entry of FIEs into China by denying them
easy access to the Chinese financial system while simultaneously allowing them access to
foreign finance. The state's gradual expansion of the scope of sanctioned activities for
foreign firms has been documented by a number of scholars (D. Zweig 2002; D. Yang
1997; Rosen 1999). This expansion eventually led to foreign firms operating in China
with very little influence and interference from China's financial system. Consequently,
the FIEs have avoided the pitfall of the favored domestic firms being undermined by the
easy credit from the state, and they have avoided the pitfall of neglected domestic firms,
the problem of credit scarcity.
The FIEs primarily borrow from the financial institutions of the advanced
capitalist nations, including the ECEs (ethnic Chinese economies of Hong Kong, Macao
and Taiwan). China does have some FDI from other developing countries, but the vast
majority is from the ECEs and the OECD (see chart below), the rich nations' club (Y.
Huang 2003). The financial institutions of advanced capitalism provide the FIEs with
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finance on terms quite different from those of either type of domestic firm. These
institutions, while by no means perfectly efficient in allocating credit, offer far harder
budget constraints for foreign firms than the Chinese state gives to favored domestic
firms. At the same time, foreign finance does not starve firms of capital as the Chinese
state does the neglected domestic firms. The claim here is simply that the foreign finance
that the FIEs access is harder than the credit offered by the Chinese state banking system
to the favored domestic firms. No claims are made that the foreign finance offers
anything approaching perfect distribution of credit that eliminates the possibilities of bad
loans or unfinanced creditworthy projects.
Figure 4
Source: China and the Knowledge Economy (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2001), p. 143.
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With access to credit, FIEs can feasibly undertake technological activities in
China. Under relatively hard-budget constraints, the FIEs' performance will not be
undermined by the problems of incapacitation and disincentives to upgrade that affect the
favored domestic firms. More efficient monitoring and allocation of credit alone does not
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however separate the technology strategies of the two types of FIEs. Efficient capital
allocation would only dictate that firms attempt to make the best use of the capital it has
borrowed. Technology firms compete at least in part on their ability to generate and
upgrade their technologies. Hard-budget constraints would push technology firms to
pursue technological activities somewhere in the world, but would not necessarily push
the firms to pursue those activities in China. Thus, the financing of the FIEs explains
why they pursue upgrading, but does not explain why they upgrade in China.
2. 1.2.1 The Process of Opening China to FIEs
For the foreign firms, the state has created openness by accident as much as by
design. Central-location relations determined the movement towards openness. Once the
central state began to open certain locations to international trade, the central state opened
the floodgates to every locale's demands to be one of the lucky ones enjoying preferential
policies. The policy of openness started with the creation of just four small SEZ (Special
Economic Zones) in 1979, but the opportunities for wealth generation proved too great a
temptation and unleashed a spiral of demands for similar privileges and the granting of
such privileges (see Table 5). The preferential policies offered economic growth through
increased foreign and domestic investment, freedom from control from higher levels of
administration and funds for infrastructure to the lucky locales that managed to obtain
them.
Zweig (2002) argues that the opening to trade made all local officials realize that
they had an interest in openness as they saw the benefits the SEZs received. D. Yang
(1997) stresses the role of organized regional interests in lobbying for greater
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liberalization. Zweig, however, points out that expression of these regional interests was
limited to sponsoring conferences and articles arguing their case. The real pressure for
liberalization arose from each individual locale looking out for its own interest (D. Zweig
2002: 82). As the incentives all pointed in the same direction, the individual localities
responding to these initiatives effectively exercised uncoordinated collective action
demanding liberalization in the form preferential policies for foreign firms, export-
processing firms and high-technology firms. High politics played a role in determining
the pace to which the state granted these privileges, but after 1996, there were no serious
calls to rollback the preferential policies (D. Zweig 2002).
The many government officials running various types of zones whom I
interviewed during 2001-2003 admitted that in terms of investment policies China's
regions have become quite similar. No particular zone or region could claim to stand out
on the basis of policy alone. The interior and the coastal areas all had the same tax
incentives granted by Beijing. In selling their zones, local officials stressed the ability of
their zones to implement the given policies and other geographic or infrastructural
advantages rather than the now quite widespread privileges granted by the central
government.
The competition between locales did not end with the spread of preferential
policies. As the central state placed greater and greater emphasis on the economic
performance of officials, they unwittingly provided incentives for the local officials to
collude with firms, foreign and domestic, by giving them unauthorized tax breaks and
other illegal benefits, such as free land (NFZM, November 3 2003; D. Zweig, Chp. 2 and
3). One central government official from one of the key economic ministries (prior to the
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2003 reorganization) discussed this issue at length and his assessment was that this
problem was very serious but insoluble (Interview 223).
Table 5 China's Preferential Policies
Source: David Zweig, Internationalizing China: Domestic Interests and Global Linkages (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 54 Table 2.1.
Dote Policy
January 1979 4 SEZs
May 1980 Opening of Guangdong ond hFuian Provinces
May 1984 4 OCCs with ETDZs
February 1985 Opening 3 river deltas
March 1988 Expanding open coostal economic rea
April 1988 Hainon estblished as fifth SEZ
Foal 1988 stablishment of Hoaidian highbech development zone as an experimental zone in Beiipn
June 1990 Opening of Pudong deepened in July 1992)
March 1991 Establishment of 21 SSTC new hightech development zones
1992 Additional 18 State Council EF)Zs estabished
June 1992 Opening of 28 harbor cities on Yongzi River
June 1992 Opening of 14 border cities
June 1992 11 State Council tourist vocation zones estoblished
1992-1993 Opening of 13 bonded warehouses
March 1993 Estabishment of another 27 SSIC NHTDZs
1994-1996 Inland regions receive greater authority inapproving fDI
March 2000 Investors inWestern hino get special tax breaks under the Western Chino Development
Strategy
The spread of preferential policies across China and the continued desire for
foreign investment by all levels of government resulted in lowered requirements for entry
in terms of access to foreign finance. Allowing foreign direct investment opened the
door for foreign financial institutions entering China as the FIEs borrowed from them,
and did not have much access to state banking system. However, foreigners as late as the
early 1990s generally regarded JVs as the only reliable way to invest in China. With
greater competition for FDI, barriers to operating WFOEs (wholly foreign owned
enterprises) fell by the wayside and WFOEs became the norm by the late 1990s (D.
Fuller 2003: 2; Sutter 2000: 2). Majority-owned JVs had already given firms the
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necessary corporate control to source capital from abroad without undue interference, but
due to the Chinese minority ownership, these operations came with a hidden tax as the
Chinese minority partners often required the JV to employ some of their workers or
requisitioned funds as payoffs for the continued operation of the JV or what some
Taiwanese businessmen referred to as "eating the capital" (chi ziben) (D. Fuller 2003).
With the move to WFOEs, FIEs were freed from this hidden taxation. Without a legal
framework for WFOEs, some of the FIEs would have been deterred from setting up shop
or expanding their operations in China given the extra hidden costs. Furthermore, FIEs
would be reluctant to upgrade the technological level of a JV due to inability to control
leakage of proprietary technology.
Liberalization still had its limits. The central state's interest in starting the
preferential policies was for economic development rather than an ideological attachment
to free trade. Pearson (1999: 162) differentiates full integration from partial integration
with the international economy. She views the Chinese government as seeking partial
integration in which the Chinese state obtains the practical economic benefits of
integration, but is still able to regulate the degree of integration. The central state
restricts foreign firms from investing and setting up sales networks in certain sectors. For
example, telecommunications services are limited to Chinese firms. A limited number of
licenses for mobile phone vendors have prevented smaller foreign vendors from being
able to sell their brands in China. In these areas, the local governments do not have as
much leeway to find loopholes in the regulations. However, given the problems of
control within the vertical ministries, loopholes can sometimes be found within the
central bureaucracy itself.
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The process of liberalization fueled by the demands of local governments did not
make China into a regulatory free-for-all for MNCs, but it did give foreigners incentives
to invest and the right to establish WFOEs, which allowed the firms complete freedom to
use foreign financial sources without payoffs to cooperative JV partners. Without
incentives to lure the foreigners to come in the first place and the freedom to source
capital from abroad, the foreign firms with operations in China would not have foreign
sources of capital that differentiate their behavior from the domestic firms.
2.2 Second Independent Variable: Operational Strategy
Operational strategy explains the difference in technological upgrading between
the hybrids and regular FIEs. Firms either have China-based strategies or foreign-based
ones. Firms with China-based operational strategies regard their Chinese operations as
vital to the firm's core competencies. The hybrids, possessing China-based operational
strategies, essentially see developing core activities in China as critical to their overall
success. The hybrid's operational strategy is to treat China as the core base of its
operations so the firm is intent on developing the core activities, which in the case of IT
firms are primarily technological activities, in China. Thus, these hybrids have a greater
incentive to upgrade their Chinese technological resources as these are the firm's core
resources. The regular FIEs do not see developing activities in China as critical to their
overall strategy. They do not base their choice of locating these activities in China on the
belief that it is a strategic imperative to foster their core competencies, including
technology, in China. Without such a belief, they, unlike the hybrids, have no preference
for conducting key activities in China.
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The regular FIEs, with their foreign-based operational strategies, have variable
incentives to upgrading in China ranging from low to moderate while they have the same
competitive pressures to enhance their competencies, including technological
competencies, somewhere in the world. Their incentives to upgrade in China could be
affected by a wide range of factors, such as their perception of the opportunities for cost
cutting through moving non-critical technology activities to China. One firm could see
lots of potential for certain activities in China and move such activities to China that
contribute to China's technological upgrading. Another firm might feel that moving
activities to China is not the solution and thus contribute little to China's technological
upgrading. In either case, such firms fall short of the strategic commitment of the hybrid
firms to develop their core activities, including technological activities, in China. The
regular FIEs have at best moderate incentives to upgrade in China that lead ceteris
paribus to at most only a moderate level of technological upgrading in China.
2.2.1 Explaining the Origins of the Hybrids' China-based Operational Strategy
The hybrid FIEs all have ethnic Chinese management.' 8 This is an empirical
finding of my research rather than an assumption of this project. Some concepts about
firm behavior borrowed from the nationality of multinationals literature help to explain
the propensity for firms with ethnic Chinese management to adopt a China-based OS.
18 1 use management because part of the ownership of these firms is from foreign financial institutions,
which may or may not be ethnic Chinese. Nevertheless, even in the case of start-ups where the majority of
shareholders (the venture capitalists) are often not ethnic Chinese, the teams of managers in charge of
running these firms are ethnic Chinese and have a significant equity stake. The managers sold investment
stakes of their firm on the basis of their China-based strategy so there is no reason to think that the non-
ethnic Chinese foreign finance will try to change the strategic orientation toward China of these hybrids. I
uncovered no instances of this and I heard reports of just the opposite, foreign venture firms attracted to
invest in hybrid firms precisely because these firms were "China plays." See A. Grimes (2004: BI).
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The nationality of multinationals literature argues that firms concentrate core
resources in their home bases. The nationality of multinationals literature grew out of
empirical observations of MNCs' behavior. Empirical research has shown that firms tend
to place and nurture more core activities in the firm's home base giving lie to the idea of
the truly multinational enterprise (Doremus et al 1998; Wade 1996; Hu 1992; Hirst and
Thompson 2001). Even research that bemoans the demise of national systems of
innovation due to the offshoring of R&D shows that more than 87% of all corporate
R&D among a large sample of the 500 largest MNCs is conducted within the home
borders. This research also shows that more than 70% of overseas R&D was
concentrated in three countries, Britain, Germany and the US (Patel and Pavitt 1998). 19
The explanations for this continued nationality of the firm vary. Some argue that
firms have developed competitive strengths that rely on the specific institutions of the
home economy (Hall and Soskice 2001). One could also make an alternative interest-
based argument on the limited information available to firms about foreign economies.
Firms generally have accumulated more knowledge about how to operate in their original
home base so they need to invest less time and energy in making sure these home
operations run smoothly than they do in foreign operations. An ideational argument for
the nationality of the firm could be centered simply on patriotism. Push come to shove,
'9 It should also be noted that Patel and Pavitt's work was concerned about the integrity of national systems
of innovation, but their main example of the strains on national systems came from Europe. Europe is
exceptional in that the EU itself is arguably becoming the home market. Thus, one would expect
individual European countries to have large R&D bases outside their national borders, such as Belgium
with two thirds of its R&D outside of its national borders. In contrast to European countries, the US and
Japan had well over 90% of the R&D in the home economy and the change from the early 1980s was not
dramatic. The US has increased foreign R&D by 2.2% and the Japanese has actually decreased global
R&D by .7 %. It should be noted that the main measure Patel and Pavitt used was the origin of US utility
patents by the Global 500. When the actual R&D budget is examined, the US had slightly more than the
average for MNCs at 1 1.9% and Japan had much lower than average at 2.1%. However, it is unclear if the
R&D budget is a better measure than the patents. In any case, under neither metric, are the two largest
national economies in the world very global in their core R&D functions.
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firms are run by managers of the same nationality and they do not simply make firm
decisions based on cold profit-maximizing principles if the decisions adversely affect the
home economy. Another ideational argument is that firms believe that their competitive
advantages are linked to distinct features of the home economy even if that belief is not
necessarily correct. A third could be that they have certain ideas about the just
distribution of resources within their home economy that dictate what activities should be
kept at home. Doremus et al (1998: 16-17) combine ideational and interest aspects in
their arguments of nationality of MNCs.
The connection between these ideas about the nationality of firms and the
hybrids' China-based OS is not a simple assertion that ethnic Chinese firms will act as
national Chinese firms. Indeed, there is evidence that some ethnic Chinese firms
forcefully reject a China-based OS. Taiwan's TSMC has been quite hostile to China (see
Chapter Five) and is not any less of an ethnic Chinese firm because of this anti-China
sentiment. Instead of assuming all ethnic Chinese will embrace a China-based OS, what
we can learn from the nationality of MNCs literature are the ways socio-cultural
knowledge and ideas possessed by ethnic Chinese are conducive to adopting a China-
based OS.
By drawing on their socio-cultural knowledge, ethnic Chinese firms have some of
the same informational advantages in China that MNCs have in their home markets.
They have lower information barriers vis-A-vis non-ethnic Chinese in understanding and
operating in China. Using the language of economists, they have advantageous
information asymmetries compared to non-ethnic Chinese foreigners when operating in
China. The ethnic Chinese firms do not just favor Chinese operations because of socio-
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cultural information. Socio-culturally informed ideas influence their behavior as well.
There is a nationalist/parochial component informing the decision to adopt a China-based
OS for some ethnic Chinese, just as there are nationalist/parochial motivations that
encourage MNCs to favor their home base.20 Finally, there is an element of ideas
influencing interest. These ethnic Chinese (perhaps due to ethno-nationalist pride) may
believe there are benefits to being China-based even when these advantages do not
actually exist.21 MNCs exhibit the same attitude when they insist that certain activities
must be done in the home country even when these supposed advantages are not
realizable. For the purpose of this work's argument, it is not necessary to decide whether
it is raw interest or ideas shaping interest that lead some ethnic Chinese firms to adopt a
China-based OS. It is sufficient that either motive points in the direction of encouraging
them to adopt this strategy.
There are important insights from the nationality of MNCs literature that are not
applicable to the China-based OS. The institutional comparative advantages of the
nationality of MNCs literature do not carry over well to the China-based OS. German
firms may know how to use the German social corporatist system to generate value better
than anti-union American firms do, but the knowledge residing in German firms has
accumulated over time and through practice. Hall and Soskice do not argue that there is
any socio-cultural element having to do with being German. Instead, these German firms
20 For some countries, one could argue that immigrants also adopt a nationalist bias toward their adopted
country, but China is not an immigrant country so the chance of this happening among non-ethnic Chinese
foreigners is quite low. For ethnic Chinese, it is a different matter. There is an ideology in China regarding
ethnic Chinese foreigners, so-called Overseas Chinese (Huaqiao), as fellow Chinese rather than as
foreigners. Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of modem China revered on both sides of the Taiwan Straits,
was a US citizen who learned about the Chinese revolution he supposedly started while taking a train in the
middle of the US.
21 One of the most interesting examples of imagination of economic interest as crucial to explaining social
behavior, even in the face of countervailing objective economic interests, is Yoshiko Herrera's (2005).
Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism.
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have co-evolved with German social corporatist institutions to allow the firms to create
competencies that generate value from social corporatist labor arrangements in Germany.
The hybrid firms in China simply have not had the time to develop such institutional
advantages. They have been in China for at most the same two decades (most of them
have been in China for substantially less time) as the foreign firms-hardly enough time
to co-evolve comparative advantages with local institutions. During these two decades,
the local institutions themselves have changed with great rapidity because China has been
in transition from a planned to a market economy. With rapid change, it would be hard to
conceive firms being able to build enduring and hard-to-replicate competitive advantages
based upon China's institutions.
Even if one does not accept the argument of the nationality of MNCs that firms
have a preference or bias towards their home base of operation generally, the evidence in
the dissertation will show that the hybrids in strategy and practice utilize China as the
main base of operations and the regular FIEs do not. The evidence shows the regular FIEs
to be less intensively utilizing China as a base of operations than the hybrids. As for the
hybrids, their OS has several characteristics (detailed in a later section) that differentiate
them from the OS of regular FIEs. None of these characteristics is simply an assertion of
their supposed Chinese identity, but all the hybrids are ethnic Chinese firms.
Another way to conceive of the China-based operational strategy is to view it
simply as a choice firms make to adopt a certain type of strategy that becomes in effect
part of the firm's practice and embedded in the firm's organization. Rather than hybrids
being basically Chinese firms with foreign finance, this conception views them as FIEs
that have chosen the China-based operational strategy. Jaeyong Song (1998) argues that
47
firms of the same nationality can have quite different strategies toward upgrading
operations overseas due to their internal corporate strategies. These strategies are ones
that firms maintain over time. Song documented such long-term strategies in upgrading
behavior of Japanese firms in Asia. Song found that certain Japanese firms over time had
a consistent international-oriented strategy that resulted in a much stronger propensity to
upgrade overseas operations than co-national counterparts that did not have this
international-oriented strategy.
Like the nationality of the MNCs argument, the cause might lie in either ideas or
interests or some combination of the two. Firms might believe that these strategies are in
the interest of the firm or pursue such strategies because of past firm practice.
Alternatively, the strategies could be profit-maximizing strategies because they make best
use of the internal firm competencies. Song does not explain the cause of these
strategies.
The problem with Song's argument is its lack of an explanation for what is behind
the adoption of a certain strategy. Empirically, not just any FIE adopted a China-based
OS, only ethnic Chinese firms did. This empirical finding strongly suggests that Chinese
ethnicity confers some incentive for ethnic Chinese firms to adopt such a strategy. The
nationality of MNCs literature provides us with some ideas about what these motivations
are whereas Song's concept of the importance of strategy does not explain the origins of
these strategies.
2.2.1 Measuring Operational Strategy
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That domestic Chinese firms have China-oriented operational strategies is not
surprising given the empirical evidence from elsewhere in the globe that suggests the
home base bias of even large MNCs (Hu 1992; Wade 1996; Hirst and Thompson 2001).
Unless evidence shows otherwise (the research conducted for this thesis did not), it is
safe to assume that domestic Chinese firms treat China as the home base. Determining
the operational strategy of FIEs is a much more complicated task. Measuring the
proportion of a firm's technology activities in China conflates the operational strategy
and the variable it affects, the technology strategy. It would be tantamount to saying that
firms that have more technological activities in China are more likely to upgrade, which
is true but begs the question of why they have more technological activities in China.
To assess the operational strategy of the firm, a wider net must be cast. Three
criteria will be used. Firms have to meet two of the three criteria to have a China-based
strategy. First, the firm must have a self-described China-based strategy. Second, the
firm's functional headquarters must be in China. By functional headquarters, I mean the
senior management and their support staff reside in China. Finally, the ethnicity of the
management/owners is a criterion. Firms with ethnic Chinese management/ownership
are more likely to overcome cultural barriers to maximize the potential of China and
ideologically are more inclined to create China-based firms than foreigners would be.22
Thus, Chinese ethnicity of the management/owners is the third criterion.
I should stress that the operational strategy argument does not privilege the
ideological reasons for a China-based strategy over the instrumental ones. The firms that
adopt China-based operational strategies attempt to maximize their utilization of China's
22 See the discussion in A. Segal (2003) about the entrepreneurs' motivations. They stressed that their
motivation was not simply to make money but to help China.
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resources because they believe utilization of these resources provides competitive
advantage. The hybrid firms do not maximize the Chinese resources directly and solely
out of a desire to help China. However, a China-based strategy makes more sense for
those attuned to the local culture. Furthermore, it would be foolish to ignore nationalism
as part of the motivation to embark on a China-based strategy because many ethnic
Chinese have stated that they returned to help build a prosperous and strong China.23
Empirically, ethnicity is a good indicator of a propensity to adopt a China-based strategy
as none of the firms that met the other two criteria were non-ethnic Chinese firms.
There are in fact two distinct subcategories of FIEs that often have China-based
operational strategies i.e. are often hybrid FIEs. The standards used to evaluate their
operational strategy differ slightly. One type is the returnee start-up. These small-scale
technology enterprises have been founded by mainland Chinese returning from abroad,
sometimes in conjunction with other ethnic Chinese. These firms usually have all of their
operational resources in China except perhaps for one or two high-level engineers based
abroad, usually in the US. They also all share a clear publicly articulated strategy to use
China's resources to create their core competencies.
The other type of hybrid is the ECE (ethnic Chinese economy i.e. Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Macao) hybrid. These firms are already established in one of the ECEs and
then move some operations to China. Thus, there is a bias if the returnee start-ups and
23 1 did not bring up the nationalist motivation in interviews due to the sensitive nature of talking about such
topics with a foreigner, but still some of the interview subjects confided that this factor was part of the
motivation. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that not all ethnic Chinese feel such strong desire to
help the People's Republic of China. 38% of ethnic Chinese in Taiwan supported the anti-China candidate
in the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan and just over 50% supported the same candidate in 2004.
Taiwanese businessmen I encountered in China often were strongly anti-China Taiwanese nationalists.
Still, for Hong Kongese and Taiwanese, the cultural barriers in China are obviously lower than they are for
non-ethnic Chinese foreigners regardless of which conception of nationality these ethnic Chinese from
outside of the mainland may ascribe to.
50
the ECE firms are measured by the same standard. As the new returnee firms have been
founded at least with the idea of concentrating operations in China, these firms do not
have large operations already built up outside of China when they create their China
strategy. In contrast, given that these ECE firms already have established mature
headquarters functions in their original home economy, it stands to reason that their
headquarters are in one of the ECEs rather than China. Thus, ECE firms are not required
to have their headquarters in China to be considered to have a China-based OS.
There is also a difference between measuring the self-described China-based
strategies of returnee and ECE firms. Whereas the returnee start-ups must embrace a
self-described China-based strategy, I only require the ECE firms to embrace a Greater
China strategy i.e. they want to utilize intensely the resources of their original ECE home
and mainland China. While there are examples from Hong Kong of firms simply
abandoning their ECE home for China (see Chapter Four), most firms embark on a
strategy to create "twin towers" (to borrow the phrase of Taiwan's Inventec) with one in
China and one in the home economy. ECE firms that describe their strategies as such
will be considered to have met the standard of a self-described China-based strategy.
Yet another factor is the regulatory barriers faced by ECE firms from Taiwan.
The Taiwanese government forbids the transfer of certain technologies to China. This
regulation often prevents hybrid ECE firms from making public their China-based
strategy. For example, the Taiwanese government has forbidden IC design houses from
investment in China. Although this regulation has failed to stem the flow of IC design
houses to China, IC design houses from Taiwan tend to keep a very low profile. Most of
them in fact change their Chinese names. For firms that are operating in China in
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violation of Taiwanese law, their self-described strategy may only appear in interviews
with China-based management rather than a public self-proclaimed China strategy. In
these cases, I will count self-described China-based strategies from interviews as
sufficient.
I should stress that non-ethnic Chinese firms were held to the same criteria.
However, they were not required to meet the standard of Chinese ethnicity. For
established MNCs, they only had to meet the standards that established ECE firms were
required to meet. For foreign start-ups, they had to meet the more stringent requirements
of the returnee start-ups.
Using these requirements, one could conceivably find a non-ethnic Chinese firm
that had a China-based strategy. Such a firm would simply have to have a functional
headquarters in China (if a start-up) and a self-described China-based OS. My research
uncovered no such firms. I did not even find a FIE with a self-described China-based
strategy. The dearth of such firms gives me greater confidence that possession of a
China-based strategy hinges upon the ethnic Chinese background of the firms that adopt
it.
3. Technological Upgrading: Defining the Dependent Variable
How does the concept of technological upgrading used here relate to the literature
on technological upgrading? Technological upgrading is a term widely used in the
business press and has just as wide variation in meaning.24 The general idea in the media
24 A Lexis-Nexis search on January 22, 2004 revealed that the top 25 citations for technological upgrading
were non-academic press reports. The academic journal citations that appeared were not in the top 25, and
the academic citations contained upgrading and technological, but they did not contain the phrase
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is some sort of technological improvement. Academics have used such terms as
innovation, learning, leapfrogging, upgrading and catch up (often attaching the words
technical or technological to these terms) to convey aspects of the term as used here.
This dissertation tries to capture a number of these concepts under the term technological
upgrading.
This dissertation defines upgrading as moving into either technically more
difficult parts of the production (technological upgrading) or moving into higher value-
added activities of the production process (economic upgrading). Production is used here
in the broadest sense of all the activities that make up an industry from definition of a
product to after-sales service. Technological upgrading encompasses two analytically
distinct types of upgrading, learning and innovation. Technological learning means
advancing into more technically difficult production activities without yet reaching the
technology frontier. Technological innovation means advancing into more technically
difficult activities that advance the technological frontier. The technological frontier is
the most advanced technical knowledge in the world for one particular activity. For
example, 90 nanometers (the lower the number of nanometers the more advanced the
technology in this case) is the current technological frontier of manufacturing-ready
semiconductor process technology. Firms that advance from 500-nanometer process
technology to 180-nanometer technology are conducting technological learning. The
firms that will reach 60 nanometers soon are conducting technological innovation as they
are pushing forward the technological frontier.
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"technological upgrading." The top six citations were all from Asian publications reporting events in
greater China.
By conceiving technological upgrading broadly as encompassing both learning
and innovation, I ensure that firms undertaking one of these activities will be counted in
the contributions to technological upgrading in China. Terms such as learning, catch up
and fast followership generally refer to what is defined here as technological learning.
Innovation generally refers to what is defined here technological innovation.
Leapfrogging often means one or the other, but conveys the sense of skipping phases of
past industrializers. Upgrading as used in a recent work on economic development
(Amsden and Chu 2003: 1) refers specifically to the catch up phase where countries
transition from middle-income to advanced economy status as they simultaneously move
from mid-tech to high-tech sectors. Technological upgrading incorporates both learning
and innovation. We do not assume that one or the other is the sole key to economic
development. Nor does the dissertation argue for a particular path or strategy of
technological learning. Leapfrogging implicitly connotes skipping phases. Fast
followership suggests building competencies by following closely behind the leading
firms. In developing countries, technical learning does in fact play a larger role than
innovation, which raises doubts about the utility of recent searches for innovation in
China.25 This dissertation remains open to the possibility of discovering innovation as
well as learning in China. The research uncovers some cases of technological innovation
though technological learning comprises most of the technological upgrading found.
25 Two recent works, G. Gilboy (2002) and A. Segal (2003), claim to be looking for innovation in China.
This research agenda is problematic because not finding innovation in a developing country does not mean
that the country's development prospects are bleak (Gilboy). On the contrary, the country may be learning
very quickly despite the lack of innovation. The research agenda is also problematic because innovation is
often used to mean learning, which simply leads to confusion when comparing China's activities to both
analytically distinct innovation and learning activities going on elsewhere in the world (Segal 2003).
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Thus far technological upgrading has been described at the level of the nation, but
technological activities are usually done within individual firms, universities and research
laboratories. Technology activities are ones requiring technical knowledge whether that
be process knowledge, knowledge necessary to carry out production, or product
knowledge, knowledge necessary to design or re-design products. The research
uncovered differences in the quality of technology activities at the level of the individual
firm. Along with firms, I examine technology activities in research institutes as well.
I use four steps to determining if a firm contributes to technological upgrading:
1) A comparison of the firm's technology to China's general level of technology
2) A comparison of the firm's technology to the international technology frontier
and to other LDCs
3) A check for the commercial viability of the firm's technology
4) A check for the embeddedness of the firm's technology.
Turning to the first step, the dissertation wants to understand in what ways China
as a country has succeeded in technological upgrading, but the research gathered data
from firms. How to square this circle to generalize from the firm to the nation? The
dissertation measures technological activities within the firm against the standard of
technology widely available in China regardless of whether or not the technology is new
to the firm. Thus, I do not count as upgrading domestic firms that only manage to
upgrade their technology to the Chinese average in their particular technology. The
dissertation does consider foreign firms bringing technology that is more advanced than
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China's general level as upgrading even if the technology is not the most advanced the
firm possesses.
To give an example, if a firm moves from making shoelaces to making shoes, one
could interpret this movement as technological upgrading for the firm. However, given
that China has thousands of firms capable of making shoes, this intra-firm upgrading
would not constitute technological upgrading for China as the technology of shoemaking
is widespread. On the other hand, if an electronics firm brings to China the technological
know-how to design notebook computers, this would be considered upgrading given that
China has few design capabilities in this area. It would be judged as upgrading even if
the firm had only brought the technology for mature generations of notebooks to China
i.e. from the firm's own perspective, it was not engaging in upgrading its overall
technical capabilities.
Another qualification is that the general level of technology is the general level
outside of the firm. Some firms are so large relative to the size of their sector in China
that expansion of their technological activities (e.g. training more workers in the same
technical skills) would not be an increase in the general skill level in the relevant
technology for China as a whole, but would count as an increase in skill level outside of
the firm. To control for large firms, the general level of technology used to measure
upgrading is the level of technology outside the firm under examination.
A nation could very well upgrade its level of technical skill, but not reduce the
number of possible competitors because many other nations also were able to improve
their technical skill level. One way to examine whether or not a nation has improved its
technology relative to the global community is to measure if firms in that nation have
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narrowed the gap between their own level of technology and the international
technological frontier, the most advanced technical knowledge in the world for one
particular activity.
As a second step to measuring technological upgrading, this dissertation measures
the gap with the international frontier for China while also attempting to make rough
comparisons with other developing nations that are attempting to develop an IT industry.
In this way, one can capture China's relative technological gains or losses both vis-d-vis
the developed world and the developing world in order to gain a sense of where China
has moved up the technological hierarchy of nations26. When I discover that the firm is
actually lagging further behind the frontier than in the recent past, then I discount the
upgrading. The reason to discount this upgrading is that this upgrading may simply part
of the general diffusion of technology globally (e.g. 100 years ago, few places had
electricity and now it is widespread even in the developing world) and suggests China has
not actually moved up the technological hierarchy of nations. I also compare the
upgrading in China against the technologies of other LDCs with any significant IT
industry presence to see if those countries have experienced a similar level of upgrading.
My general findings are that in those areas where China has narrowed the gap with the
technological frontier it has far outdistanced most of its LDC rivals. To research China's
LDC rivals, I primarily used on secondary sources though some interviews offered direct
evidence of the activities of LDC rivals.
!6 Moving up the technological hierarchy of nations means moving from those simple technologies that
every country possesses to more sophisticated technical knowledge that are dominated by smaller and
smaller oligopolies of nations and perhaps eventually to the apex of technological hierarchy where one
nation monopolizes a particular technology e.g. the US monopoly in CPUs via AMD and Intel.
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The third step is to determine if a firm's upgrading is commercially viable. The
dissertation only counts technological upgrading that might be commercially viable as
technological upgrading. By commercially viable, a firm or organization, such as a
research lab, has to be able to sell a service or good embodying the technology upgrading
in the marketplace and have a reasonable chance of earning a profit. This standard is
lower than showing that the product or service is already enjoying a positive return
because this dissertation accepts that markets are not always efficient in the short-term.
With these short-term market inefficiencies, a firm with a competitive product still may
struggle in the near term and firms hone their competencies over time through
marketplace competition. In a developing country with many firms struggling to learn
new skills, immediate profitability would be too high a bar that would cut out many
potential winners from the purview of this study.
How to discern which firms' technological upgrading might plausibly become
commercially viable? The method used here is a process of elimination. Those firms
that have not sold a good or service in the competitive marketplace or have sold goods
and services in the marketplace only at a loss over time are not considered to be
commercially viable. I also eliminate those firms that have a commercial presence only
through the support of state subsidies i.e. firms that without state subsidies would have
had to sell at a loss in order to remain in the commercial marketplace over time.
Information about subsidies is often hard to come by (especially in China), but the rule of
thumb used here is that those firms that consistently sell more than fifty percent of their
output to the Chinese state over time are considered to be subsidizing their commercial
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presence through government procurement.27 Such firms are not considered to be
competing in the commercial marketplace. This process of elimination does not discount
the potential of new firms, but eliminates the obvious commercially unviable. I exclude
those firms that are under one-year old and do not have any products (commercial or
otherwise) from consideration because it is too hard to tell whether their failure to create
products is due to their newness or incompetence.
By restricting technological upgrading to potentially commercially viable
projects, I narrow the focus to technological upgrading that has at least the potential to
have a positive impact on economic development. The basic assumption in the accounts
on technological upgrading as a critical component of economic development in the
developing world (Westphal and Pack 1986; Kim and Ma 1997) is that the technological
upgrading is done on under conditions of economic efficiency. The standard of economic
efficiency used may be longer-term dynamic efficiency, the net social benefits (firm
profits plus positive externalities) discounted over time are greater than the net social
costs (firm losses plus negative externalities) discounted over time (M. Khan 2000:50),
rather than short-term static efficiency in which markets clear (price of a good and costs
of production of the good are in balance) almost immediately. Thus, these accounts focus
on organizations, usually firms, working to commercialize technology under the
assumption that non-commercial technological upgrading, such as R&D for national
27 Using only procurement to control for subsidies actually is setting the bar low for state favored firms
because many of these firms have subsidization through loans. Unfortunately, exact information about how
much state finance subsidizes the commercial losses of state favored firms is hard to find. Furthermore, the
bar of procurement itself is quite low because globally few IT firms of any size sell 50% of their products
to the domestic state. There are two reasons for this. First, many IT products have global scale i.e. one or
two plants per firm can meet worldwide market demand (Erica Fuchs, forthcoming). Second, most IT
products are direct and intermediate inputs for consumer products where the state usually is not a major
customer. The major exemption is telecommunications infrastructure equipment although most countries
with large telecommunications markets now have private firms competing in service provision rather than a
state monopoly or state oligopoly that China has.
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defense systems conducted in military research institutes, could very easily be
economically inefficient.
In the context of China's great asset destroying machine of state-run banking,
commercially unviable technological upgrading is even more likely to be economically
inefficient. Wu Jing-lian (2002: 7) a prominent Chinese economist, recognizes the
dangers of pursuing technological upgrading without concerns for efficiency in China's
own state-led technology efforts when he warns:
[A] commonly seen mistake is to consider that only high amount of
R&D investment and the construction of enough large scale enterprises
is enough to push speedy development of high-technology. This is the
kind of mistaken concept created under the centrally planned economy.
As soon as one says develop high-technology, the first thing that one
thinks of is rolling out the welcome mat [of policy], creation of projects
and expanding of research organizations and industrial firms. In fact,
this [method] does not grasp the root of the matter. The result is that
the investment is high, the efficiency is low, there is tremendous waste
of precious resources, but one cannot see any big [positive] results.
[Author's translation]
A firm may appear to be contributing to China's technological upgrading because
its technology activities in China are closer to the technological frontier than typical for
China, but this dissertation argues that this evidence alone is insufficient to prove that a
firm is actually contributing to China's technological development. A firm could
conceivably have operations in a developing country, but have the technology remain in
control of foreign expatriates. If such a firm withdraws from its host developing country,
the firm's technology goes as well. Jomo and Felker (1999) argue that Malaysia's
development lags because foreign firms have not allowed technology to flow to locals.
To resolve this predicament, Jomo and Felker see indigenization, the control of
technology by local firms, as the only way a nation can ensure continued development.
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Amsden (2000) and Chu (with Amsden, 2003) make similar arguments for other past and
present developing nations. China is not immune to this problem of FIEs restricting the
flow of technology. I have seen foreign firms that operate in China with very shallow
technical links to the host economy.
To measure the ability of the host economy to capture technology, this thesis uses
the concept of embeddedness. Embeddedness has essentially two dimensions: the
channels by which a firm's technology flows to the host economy and the institutions that
work to ensure that the technology once inside the host economy will continue to thrive.
To measure the first feature, I look at how individual firms transfer knowledge to the
Chinese economy. As for the second, the institutional feature has nothing to do with
individual firms' behavior. Instead, it is a question of the larger economy having
institutions that encourage continued utilization of the technical knowledge contributed to
the economy by firms. I will present evidence of the existence and workings of such
institutions in China in the empirical chapters. As the test for institutional embeddedness
deals with the economy rather than individual firms, I consider firms that have
technology channels to the host economy as having contributed to technological
upgrading. In other words, there is no need to test for institutional embeddedness at each
individual firm because the wider institutions in the economy determine institutional
embeddedness.
Examining the first feature of embeddedness, the two main channels embedding
firms' technology in a host economy are utilization of local technical personnel and local
suppliers to carry out the technology tasks. Firms embed their technology only when they
increase the technical knowledge of its employees or suppliers in the host country and,
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consequently, come to rely on the local employees or suppliers for some technology
activities. Non-embedded upgrading consists of firms bringing in knowledge necessary
for technology activities that are more advanced than the current domestic level, but
making no effort to train local employees or suppliers to be able to take part in the
technology activities.
I draw these two main technology mechanisms from the findings of the large
empirical literature on technology transfer in developing countries2 8 and from my
empirical research in China. There may be alternative mechanisms, but I have not found
any in China. In fact, I also have found little evidence of foreign firms upgrading local
suppliers.
To give some examples from the research, young women from the countryside
taught how to pick and place parts into a printed circuit board are not considered as being
technically trained as the knowledge passed to them is very limited (they are simply
taught how to put one particular component into the board or other equally simple tasks)
and such knowledge is easily taught and widely available among the millions of women
who have worked in electronics factories across China. Training an electrical engineer
how to use EDA (electronic design automation) tools to take part in the design of
manufacturing- and product-ready computer chips is considered the transfer of technical
knowledge to the locals and upgrading because such skills are not common even among
engineers in China. Thus, EDA training meets the standards of being upgrading and
being embedded.
28 The literature is too large to do full justice to, but the following works detail these mechanisms:
Kawakami (1996), Ritchie (2002), McKendrick et al (2000); Lindsey (1986); Fosfuri et al (2001) and
Markusen (1991).
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Technological upgrading has to be embedded institutionally as well. The training
of local workers and local suppliers to do progressively more sophisticated technical
activities alone does not guarantee that the activities will stick in the domestic economy if
the firms training them leave or die. What guarantees the continued use of these
accumulated technical resources in China is an institutional framework that encourages
foreign investment and new firm creation. In other nations, foreign investment would not
be necessary because domestic investment could finance the technology activities, but in
China, domestic investment is skewed to inefficient firms with political connections.
Thus, foreign investment becomes critical to investment in technological activities and
new firm creation. Surprisingly, China has such a set of institutions despite the failures
of China's strategic or targeted industrial policies. The Chinese central government
opened up the space for local governments to attract foreign investment, and the local
governments have responded with alacrity. Local governments compete vigorously for
foreign investment, and shrinking the space for foreign investors would kill any chance a
locale has for success. In addition to wooing foreign capital, the central and local
governments in China are increasingly aware of the importance of fostering new firm
creation (A. Segal 2003). In fact, local governments have come to view foreign capital as
essential to the generation of new firms. Consequently, local governments have sought
foreign venture capital and foreign incubators to aid in this endeavor. Finally, the central
and local governments in China all want to boost exports and have opened hundreds of
export-processing zones to promote this endeavor. The zones in and of themselves may
be problematic for fiscal reasons (Po and Pun 2003), but they have helped to create
international institutional support for continued generation of technology enterprises and
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activities in China by linking the firms in China with the global IT industry. The global
IT industry outside of China now has set up the supply chains and concomitant
infrastructure to source from China that will help to ensure that firms in China have
outlets to the large global marketplace. The final chapter, Chapter Six, will provide a
detailed assessment of the institutions embedding technology activities in China.
4. Returnees: The Mechanism for Upgrading
Politically structured financial arrangements and operational strategy explain
which types of firms are likely to upgrade, but they do not show the precise mechanism by
which firms in China upgrade. The mechanism is returnees bringing knowledge back
from centers of innovation. This mechanism has been well documented in the literature on
transnational technological communities. In this section, I will first discuss how returnees
help firms upgrade in China.
4.1 The Role of Returnees in Upgrading
Technological upgrading occurs when firms acquire new technical skills. Several
inputs play a role in this acquisition of new skills. Firms need capital to pay for the
process of skill acquisition 29 and they need inputs of codified (or explicit) and tacit
knowledge. Cook and Brown (1999: 381) nicely frame the distinction between explicit
and tacit knowledge in their review of the literature on tacit knowledge, "[E]xplicit
knowledge is treated as knowledge that can be spelled out or formalized, and tacit
knowledge as that associated with skills and 'know-how."' Codified or explicit
29 Some may argue that a firm can receive technology for free by learning from another firm. However,
even in such situations when a lead firm transfers technology to a supplier, the supplier incurs costs to learn
the technology in terms of man-hours spent and machinery acquired.
64
knowledge is embodied in blue prints, manuals and capital equipment, but codified
knowledge by its very nature is generally available to those with the money to buy it, so
relying on codified knowledge alone does not separates one's firm from the multitude of
would-be competitors.
In the IT industry in particular, a number of authors (Bresnahan, Gambardella
and Saxenian 2001 hereafter referred to as BGS; Saxenian 2002; Saxenian and Hsu 2002;
Ernst 2004ab; Saxenian and Li 2003) emphasize that tacit knowledge is the critical
knowledge needed to thrive in the sector. BGS view the common key to the success of
Ireland, Israel, India and Taiwan in the IT industry as a process of knowledge acquisition
in which educated local workers acquired tacit knowledge. According to BGS, these
societies originally had electrical engineers and computer scientists, but these engineers
needed to acquire the tacit knowledge beyond the electrical engineering textbooks. The
engineers gained tacit knowledge from training within the local branches of MNCs and
from returnees from established clusters of the IT industry, such as Silicon Valley.
The precise mechanism of technological upgrading in this dissertation is the
transfer of knowledge carried out by ethnic Chinese technical personnel (the returnees)
and other technical personnel from abroad (though in both numbers and importance the
ethnic Chinese predominate). This transfer of knowledge can be carried out in
conjunction with other important inputs, such as importation of the necessary capital
equipment for a given task, but it is the transfer of the knowledge that is the critical factor
to achieve the process of technological upgrading. Capital equipment can be imported
and let sit idle because of insufficient knowledge of how to operate it. The technical
personnel from abroad transfer those tacit skills that cannot be easily transferred other
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than by the means of practice of the skill under the supervision of those who possess the
skill. If such skills were easily codified, then bringing in skilled technologists to train
workers would not be necessary for the transfer of these skills. Without cookbooks of
codified knowledge, real people honed in the given tacit skills are necessary to guide
along the green recruits into the mysteries of the particular skill as Teece, Pisano and
Shuen (1997: 277-78) have observed:
Only in those settings where all the relevant knowledge is fully codified
and understood can replication be collapsed into a simple problem of
transfer...Indeed [,] replication and transfer are often minimized if
investments are made to convert tacit knowledge into codified
knowledge. Often, however, this is simply impossible to do.
The returnee scholars (BGS2001; Saxenian and Hsu 2002; Saxenian 2002;
Saxenian and Li 2003) emphasize that the knowledge provided by returnees from centers
of innovation is not simply technical knowledge. They emphasize knowledge of the
relevant marketing skills, contacts, capital, and information on new opportunities and
new markets (Saxenian 2002: 189; BGS 2001). Returnees do not just provide a single
lump sum contribution of knowledge to the local economy. They also create
transnational technological communities that serve as conduits of tacit knowledge from
centers of innovation in the developed world. These communities are networks of
technologists connecting the returnees to technologists in industrial clusters abroad.
These networks serve to renew and refresh the knowledge of the returnees and pull local
technologists into these networks. Without continual contact with those involved in
industry abroad, the returnees' knowledge of technology, markets and contacts might
become obsolete. The returnees do not monopolize these connections, but share them
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with locals in their network of associates, partners and employees to realize mutual
benefit. Improving the knowledge of their local business network helps the returnees as
much as it does the local technologists.
I build on the conception of the returnee networks bringing a whole array of
information and skills to the local economy, but I emphasize the centrality of one bundle
of assets, the technical and quasi-technical managerial skills brought to China by
technical experts (primarily returnees), to the process of technological upgrading. This
emphasis emerges as a finding of the research rather than a prior assumption of centrality
of technical knowledge to technological upgrading.
If returnees are the key to the mechanism of technological upgrading, what
explains their interaction with the different types of firms found in China? I did not
attempt to conduct a comprehensive survey of returnees' motivations, but the interview
data revealed that very few returnees chose to go to neglected domestic firms. Also,
many returnees interviewed offered their views on why they and other returnees would
choose one firm over another. Inductively inferring from the interview data showing a
lack of returnees in neglected domestic, I found two factors critical in determining which
firms returnees join. These inferences were bolstered by interview subjects' own
evaluations of their own and fellow returnee's choice.
The relationship of the different types of firms to the state explains both which
firms returnees go to and which firms can effectively utilize the returnees. Returnees
face the choice of which firm to enter to when they return to China. Their decision is
influenced by two factors: ability to retrieve their wealth if the firm becomes successful
and the initial prospects of the firm. Simply put, returnees want to join firms from which
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they can receive some of the revenue they helped to generate, and they want to join firms
they believe will have a chance to be successful. Neglected firms are cut off from access
to capital so their prospects are not good, and it is hard for these firms to list on the stock
market so the chance of the returnee being able to retrieve his wealth is not high. The
state controls both access to finance through the state banking system and access to the
stock market through its approval mechanism. Thus, the state has structured the system
to neglect these firms and thereby makes them unattractive to returnees. The other three
types of firms (domestic favored, hybrid FIE and regular FIE) offer better prospects
because they have access to capital, and they offer a way to retrieve capital through share
distributions and stock listings.30
An earlier study of the choices of returnees over the course of the 1990s (based
on surveys done in 1992, 1995 and 1998) actually found slightly more returnees returned
to domestic enterprises than foreign ones (X. Liu 2001: 204-206).31 This study does not
differentiate between types of domestic enterprises. Given the low status of private and
even collective enterprises in China throughout much of the 1990s, it is unlikely that the
returnees were going to domestic enterprises that were not state-owned i.e. favored
domestic enterprises in my typology. My findings differ somewhat from this early study.
I uncovered a significant number of returnees across the hybrids, regular FIEs and
30 Until this year, both FIEs and Chinese domestic firms were restricted in their ability to grant employees
stock. They were prohibited from giving employees equity in firms listed abroad (including Chinese SOEs
listed abroad) though this restriction was easily circumvented. SOEs could issue stock from domestic
listings to employees, but the stock could not be sold outside the firm. Even this seemingly onerous
restriction could be circumvented by setting up companies in Hong Kong without approval for listings by
the Chinese state (the so-called red chips) and then granting employees (usually only upper management)
stock from these firms.
31 The data presented in Liu Xielin's work for returnees in 1998 actually shows most returnees returning to
non-commercial organizations, such as universities (44.1%) and research centers (14.1%). Slightly less
than a third went to commercial enterprises in all three surveys (1992, 1995 and 1998).
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domestic favored firms though the FIEs generally attracted more returnees than the state
firms. The difference may be a time lag effect. During the 1990s, there were not many
foreign or hybrid firms pursuing technology activities in China, so the realistic alternative
for returning technologists was state enterprises. In any case, my research found that
favored domestic firms attracted enough returnees to make technological upgrading a
possibility.32
One can overlay this typology of inputs (capital, codified and tacit knowledge)
necessary for technological upgrading onto the typology of firm types (Table 5) in China.
The neglected domestic firms are starved of capital and thus cannot acquire even much of
the codified knowledge such as capital equipment let alone attract or buy offers of
cooperation with MNCs or entice returnees to join their firm. The three other types of
firms have capital so they can presumably attract or buy inputs of tacit and codified
knowledge.
If the returnees from abroad are the key mechanism of upgrading, then what
differentiates these three types of firms is their utilization of returnees. In turn, their
relationship to the Chinese state affects their ability to use returnees effectively. The
favored domestic enterprises suffer from bureaucratic management, general inefficiencies
and disincentives to upgrade that prevent them from effectively utilizing the returnees.
32 There are two reasons that domestic favored firms have had reasonable appeal beyond a simple economic
calculus for returnees. The patriotic appeal of working for what some returnees regard as the truly Chinese
firms was mentioned by several returnees who spurned FIEs to go to work for domestic firms (Interviews
147, 267). The other appeal is the appeal of working for a member of the guojia dui (national team) of
firms promoted by the Chinese state. This appeal contains a more complex political calculus that the
Chinese state will regulate the market to ensure that these firms win out over foreign competitors in the end
so it is an economic calculus but one that incorporates a belief about the importance of political connections
for success in China.
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The dissertation presents many examples of how returnees or other technical personnel
from abroad have been underutilized by firms suffering from the curse of state favor.
Table 5 Access to Inputs of Upgrading by Firm Type
Firm Favored Domestic Neglected Hybrid FIE Regular FIE
Inputs \ _ ___ Domestic
Finance Yes No Yes Yes
Codified Yes No Yes Yes
Knowledge:
capital equipment,
blueprints,
manuals
Tacit knowledge: Yes No Yes Yes
training from
returnees or in
MNCs
The FIEs operate under harder budget constraints and thus escape the inefficiencies
engendered by state favor. Thus, they are better able to utilize the returnees that come
their way.
5. The Dog That Didn't Bark: Strategic Industrial Policy in China
Strategic industrial policies are those policies to shift resources to a particular
sector in order to achieve outcomes that are economically efficient for the economy as a
whole (H. Chang 1994: 60).33 Efficiency can include dynamic efficiency in which the net
social benefits outweigh the net social costs over time in addition to static efficiency
where the immediate benefits outweigh the immediate costs (M. Khan 2000: 50). The
revisionist political economists of development, including some economists34 , expect or
33 This definition paraphrases Ha-joon Chang's (1994: 60) definition while omitting the perception of the
state from the definition, as the state could perceive something as efficient that is in fact not efficient.
34 H. Chang (1994), M. Khan (2000), Aoki et al (1997) and Stiglitz (1998) are some of the economists who
argue that such policies are feasible and helpful for development.
70
advocate such policies as part and parcel of the process of successful economic
development. The fact that China has been able to upgrade technologically in the IT
industry without successful strategic targeting policies is even more surprising. One
would expect developing countries to pursue industrial policy in the IT industry as part of
an effort to move out of low-technology sectors and into technology intensive ones.
Mathews and Cho (2000) examined successful cases of developing IT in East Asia and
found similarity in state strategic industrial policies to foster the industry despite
differences in the precise mechanisms used. Where then is the strategic industrial policy
in China's IT industry?
If China does not have successful strategic industrial policy, it is not for the lack
of trying. Many cases of failure will be addressed in the body of the dissertation. In this
section, I will present an overview of the failure of China's strategic industrial policy.
From a broad policy perspective, as early as the 1960s, foreign scholars (F. Schurmann
1968) identified what the Chinese called the tiao tioa kuai kuai jurisdictional conflict
between the vertical lines of the authorities descending from the central ministries (tiao
tiao) and the horizontal lines of authority emanating from the regional or local
governments (kuai kuai). The central Chinese state has a very hard time establishing
priorities (Lieberthal and Lampton 1992) and the horizontal authority versus vertical
authority conflicts undermine any priorities established. On top of these already severe
control problems is what Lu and Tang (1997) call the soft authority constraint meaning
that Chinese officials interpret and stretch the laws any which way to suit their desires.
As for the regulation of economic activity in China, the general picture is a grim
one of a China in which state actors collude with private ones for rent-seeking rather than
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wealth creation. Gilboy's (2002) China is one in which particularistic networks vie for
spoils from the state. Yi-min Lin (2001) tends to agree with Gilboy. He depicts the
Chinese economy as full of state agents and private actors engaged in a horse-trading
state favor for personal gain. Although, these detail rich narratives do depict the
malfeasance in the system, Huang (2003) and Whiting (2001) both convincingly show
through more aggregate level data that the state does not eventually favor all firms
equally (the outcome of Yi-min Lin's account) nor intermittently favor firms, the
presumed outcome of particularistic networks continually vying against each other for
state resources in Gilboy's account. Instead, Huang and Whiting show the state
consistently steering resources toward a favored set of firms while ignoring most of the
private sector. Collusion exists, but the collusion takes place between a relatively defined
and stable set of participants. Particularism exists, but it is consistent particularism. This
prevents the state from disciplining firms that do not meet the expectations of the
industrial policy by cutting off their credit. Even if Lin and Gilboy are correct, the
outlook for conducting industrial policy is bleak. The incentives meant to encourage
certain behavior will be given to the highest bidder rather than to the firm with best
performance.
In the area of strategic industrial policy, the consensus is even stronger. Recent
accounts of strategic industrial policy (T. Moore 2002; Huang 2003; D. Zweig 2002; D.
Perkins 2002) in China describe the Chinese state's deficiencies in carrying out such
policies. Huang (2003:138-140) points out two severe problems with the state's
management of industrial policy as regards the favored firms, which in his account
consist solely of SOEs. Harkening back to the problem of priorities, Huang finds the
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state has many goals and maximizing firm profits is not the exclusive goal.
Compounding this problem of multiple goals, the state does not have an accounting
mechanism to reconcile the different and conflicting goals. Chinese SOEs also violate
the efficiency condition that the owner of the rights of control also be the owner of the
rights of revenue. The rights of revenue do not belong to the officials controlling the
firm or managing the state-owned banks and the officials bear none of the financial
consequences if the revenue streams disappear or turn negative. In short, the state
officials have no incentive to monitor the firms' properly, and do not have the incentives
to discipline firms to achieve static efficiency let alone the greater capabilities needed to
monitor firms to ensure dynamic efficiency.3 5 A consequence of these dynamics is a
tendency to regard heavy capital investment and investment in physical technology in and
of themselves as the solution to firm problems and a corresponding de-emphasis on
developing better business strategies and the knowledge and training needed to utilize the
technology (Huang 2003: 224-225).36 Steinfeld reported finding a similar phenomenon
where SOE mangers repeatedly complained about the severe lack of capital (zibenji bu
zu) as their core problem despite the fact that they were in precisely the type of firm that
had access to capital.37
Zweig's analysis of the policies of economic openness for rural TVEs exemplifies
the problem of local governments undermining central government industrial policies. In
this particular case, the local governments undercut the central government's efforts to
35 M. Khan (2000: 50-53) points out that developing countries need to award subsidies for learning before
firms will take up that task so the capabilities needed to monitor the firms over time are that much greater
as the rewards are given out prior to firm performance.
36 Gilboy (2002) found exactly the same type of mentality among Chinese mangers he interviewed.
37 Epoch-IPC Globalization Conference, July 2000, Taipei, Taiwan.
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limit foreign access to Chinese markets as part of an infant industry strategy. In reference
to a county in Suzhou, Zweig (2002: 153) states, "...officials in Zhangjiagang sold out
the national interest and became a transnational linkage point through which foreigners
accessed China's domestic market on more favorable terms than the central state
preferred." Zweig presents another example involving the state's foreign trade
corporations. Rural industries worked with horizontal state organizations, the foreign
trade corporations, to approve JVs that circumvented state controls on trade, controls
designed to protect domestic industry (Zweig 2002: 160).38
Moore's (2002) China in the World Market analyzes the deficiencies of the
China's industrial policy capabilities more comprehensively. There are two main
problems that prevent China from following the path of state-interventionism of the East
Asian Trio (Taiwan, Korea and Japan). He argues that the nature of government-industry
relations (he purposely avoids government-business to emphasize the public ownership of
many of the business in China) and the organizational structure of the state are powerful
restraints to implementing strategic industrial policy successfully.39 Moore (2002: 285-
286) suggests that Chinese government-industry relations are marked by industrial
paternalism in which state agents take care of the firms under their purview rather than
38 This outcome was negative in the sense of the state being unable to pursue an effective infant
industrialization strategy and the inability to have continued leverage over local firms once they allied with
foreign business. Zweig (2002: 157-158) quotes P. Evans (1995: 16) approvingly on this point of the local
firms selling out state-generated rents for rents in terms of technology and global market from their foreign
partners. Evans' judgment is that this arrangement will lead to a developmental dead-end. On the other
hand, Zweig also finds that the circumventing of the foreign trade corporations' control over exports was
economically efficient though the control of exports is not good strategic industrial policy in any case.
Rather, this policy of restricting exports during the 1980s shows the problems of trying to conduct strategic
industrial policy while dealing with the legacies of the socialist planned economy, in this case the legacy of
the idea that international trade on open markets was inherently exploitative and to be avoided.
39 Moore calls strategic industrial policy administrative guidance as he borrows from C. Johnson 1982. He
emphasizes the same key concept of policy shifting credit towards promoting competitive industries
(Moore 2002: 286-87).
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exercising discipline over them. With soft budget constraints, there is dual dependency
with the state agents exercising paternalistic tendencies toward the firms and the firms
demanding such paternalism. Borrowing from Kornai, he argues such paternalism can
only be broken by instituting hard budget constraints. Without bureaucrats subscribing to
the more universalistic principles of developmental discipline, coherence and discipline
of policy cannot be maintained in the face of the desire to protect one's network in China.
In terms of state structure (Moore 2002: 279-281), fragmented authoritarianism prevents
China from pursuing policies requiring coordination across the relevant bureaucracy.
Central control over a single vertical hierarchy of a ministry is difficult enough let alone
coordinating control across ministries and localities.
Moore's review of a range of major state initiatives targeting specific industries
concludes that the results have been poor across the board (Moore 2002: 302-305). The
basic problem is the inability to "impose strict performance requirements and other
disciplinary measures as a condition of government support (Moore: 305)." Moore
ventures the hypothesis that the industries that lag furthest behind are precisely those
previously targeted by the government though he concedes he may be overstating the
case. He suggests that perhaps the government endangers successful industries by co-
opting them, but he subsequently backtracks to talk about the danger of the state
showering favor on specific firms, the good firms gone bad scenario mentioned in
Section 2.1 of this chapter.
Reviewing the potential for industrial policy in China and Vietnam, Dwight
Perkins reaches similar conclusions. Perkins points out the obvious but overlooked fact
that China's immense size creates difficulties in managing industrial policy. Contrasting
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it with Park's Korea in the 1960s, Perkins notes that negotiating with enterprises in China
would involve thousands not dozens of participants as it has in Korea. He sees three other
general reasons why neither China nor Vietnam could successfully implement strategic
industrial policy. The tradition of central planning means the bureaucracy in these
countries is geared towards commandism (orders backed up by direct control of inputs)
rather than strategic guidance that makes use of the market forces and the private sector
as well as the state. Political interference in economic decision-making prevents
industrial policy from being implemented as planned. Finally, corruption is rife in both
countries at levels not seen during the heyday of Japan's MITI or Park's Blue House in
the 1960s and 1970s.
Thun's forthcoming work examines the results of Chinese industrial policy in the
auto sector. He is principally interested in explaining regional variation across China.
Thun argues that Shanghai has been able to become the dominant source for auto parts
for foreign assemblers in China. He believes that the key to Shanghai's success lies in
local state policy. However, Thun does not view this cultivation of Shanghai's auto parts
base as an industrial policy success story if the standards used to judge it are those of
embedded technology upgrading. Shanghai's principal suppliers are all JVs with foreign
partners and the generation of technology remains in foreign hands abroad. The JVs
themselves are capable of making the requisite current parts models but they are not able
to generate the next models themselves. Simply put, the critical technologies have not
been captured by local firms or local personnel in foreign firms.40
40 This paragraph is based on a discussion with Professor Eric Thun concerning his forthcoming book from
Cambridge University Press.
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Are there major challenges to these arguments about the Chinese state's
incapacity to conduct strategic industrial policy? There is only one recent academic
work 41 that broadly champions the use of strategic industrial policy in China, Peter
Nolan's China and the Global Business Revolution. Nolan does argue persuasively that
many domestic Chinese firms are weak compared to the global lead firms across a wide
set of industries. He argues less persuasively that the source of some of this weakness is
neglect from the Chinese state. This neglect is common among private firms, but Nolan
mostly concentrates on large firms that are regarded as members of the national team
(guojia dui) of supposed industry champions. These are precisely the firms that are at the
top of the political pecking order of firms. However, in calling for strategic industrial
policy to rectify this situation, Nolan does not offer hard evidence that such a policy has
worked. He offers the case of an aerospace firm as a potential winner that the
government abandoned and he argues that one SOE steel conglomerate has exhibited a
lot of potential through state support. In Steinfeld's Forging Reform in China, state
support for these SOEs is precisely the path to perdition, as continued lavish support
undermines any incentives to continue to improve firm performance. Nolan agrees with
the pessimist revisionist arguments that development is well nigh impossible if one does
41 There is a growing literature on the economic policies of Chinese localities and some of this literature
makes broad claims about local state capacity. However, none of these claims really constitutes strategic
industrial policy as we have defined it. Belcher and Shue (2001) go so far as to say that there is a local
developmental state in China, but their example really consists of state provision of public goods and does
not include state-led upgrading of the industrial structure of the locality from lower technology to higher
technology industries. Similarly, the local state corporatism literature exemplified by Jean Oi (1999)
primarily focuses on localities that originally owned as well as managed their local firms. These localities
did not pursue strategic industrial policy in the sense of getting the prices wrong to upgrade industry.
Rather, the TVEs (township and village enterprises) of these locales conformed to the market signals sent
by the wider economy. Finally, these works focus on such a low level of government, county level and
below, that it is unrealistic to expect these governments to muster the necessary resources to upgrade the
industrial structure of the local economy in a significant manner. The fact that no serious IT industrial
projects have been undertaken by the local governments at the county level and below suggests that they
are indeed too financially strapped to do so.
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not pursue strategic industrial policy, but he disregards the notion that such industrial
policies require state capacities for coordination and monitoring that are not widely
available to all developing nations (Haggard 1990; M. Khan 2000; P. Evans 1995).
While presenting a passionate description of the odds stacked against developing firms in
international competition and containing rich narratives derived from Nolan's deep
knowledge of Chinese firms, Nolan's work does not analyze the problem of China's
capacity to conduct industrial policy. Fortunately for China, the choices are not as stark
as Nolan presents. This thesis provides accounts of development without successful state
industrial policy.
6. Industry Selection: The IT Industry as the Case
There are several reasons for selecting the IT industry as a case. The IT industry
is both a representative case and a critical case. By representative case, we mean a case
that potentially represents a wider number of similar cases. A critical case is one that has
broad implications despite not being representative. A critical case can be one in which
the previous theories predict the polar opposite outcome from the actual one. Or a critical
case can be one in which the case itself is of such great import that its singularity by no
means diminishes its importance.
The IT industry is a representative case of a growing number of industries that are
modular (the production chain is segmented into narrow functions) and have rapid
technical change. As I will examine in Chapter Three, there is growing evidence that
firms in the developing world can take advantage of these industry attributes to become
important players in the modularized industrial production chains of these industries.
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These opportunities to become major firms within the industrial production chains, in
turn, offer developing countries opportunities for economic development (Sturgeon and
Lester 2003; Ernst and Kim 2002). Thus, if China can develop the IT industry in this
manner, perhaps China and other developing countries can develop a number of other
industries in the same way.
The IT industry is also a critical case for two reasons. First, the IT industry is
considered one of the critical technologies or general-purpose technologies of the current
era (Dahlman and Aubert 2001; Yusuf and Evenett 2002; M. Trajtenberg 2002; Steil et al
2002) and important for the development of future technology areas based in part on IT
technology (Miranda-da Cruz 2002; Anton et al 2001; M. Trajtenberg 2002). It is also a
critical case because China experienced upgrading without successful state industrial
policy, which is contrary to most theories of development, such as those of the GPN
School and the revisionist political economists. State neglect of this sector is highly
unlikely to be the cause of the failed industrial policy. The IT industry is one of the
Chinese state's pillar industries, industries the state considers most important to develop,
and an industry that the Asian neighbors China usually looks to emulate (Korea, Taiwan
and Japan) (Moore 2002: 303)42 have developed successfully. Examining this area may
reveal much about how Chinese state policy affects industry.
7. Domestic Firms and Foreign Firms
The division between foreign and domestic firms is not as absolute as I have
presented it. A more appropriate terminology might be foreign-linked and domestic-
42 Moore claims that China usually publicly does not want to emulate Taiwan, but that simply is not true in
the IT industry.
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linked firms because in the course of research I discovered a few cases of foreign
registered firms linking up with the Chinese state and one case of a domestic firm that
was in the process of receiving venture capital which would turn it into a FIE. In the
cases of FIEs linking up with the Chinese state's capital, these firms suffered the same ill
effects of the state's favor as domestic firms. In the case of the one neglected domestic
firm discovered by the foreign venture capitalists, the firm acted like and eventually
became a hybrid.43 The firm had a China-based strategy, but the venture capitalist
wanted foreign registry and a future foreign IPO in order to be assured of being able to
exert control over its investment. As these cases are exceptions to the general population
of firms, I will refer to foreign-linked and domestic-linked firms as foreign and domestic
firms.
8. Alternative Explanations
Other than the explanation offered here, what other explanations could exist for
the differences in upgrading performance among firms in China? The literature does not
address my argument directly because my typology of firms is different than any in the
literature, but some scholars offer plausible counterarguments.
8.1 Tax Favoritism for FIEs
This dissertation accepts the general premise of Huang (2003) that many private
firms are kept down by the state and the ones favored by the state are not performing well
43 The actual story behind this firm is more complex. The VC appears to have only gained interest in the
firm when foreign-based technologists were willing to provide the firm with technology inputs and when
the VC realized it could take the firm's human capital and place it in a new foreign-registered firm.
Without the access to a foreign technology firm, the VC would not have been interested in investing in this
local firm.
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due to this favoritism. Others (J. Fu 2000) would go so far as to argue that foreign firms
have received excessively beneficial treatment by the Chinese state, particularly in the
area of taxation. Simply put, the domestic firms are being taxed to death or at least to
innovative inertia while the foreign firms receive all sorts of tax breaks. Huang (2003:
87-89) acknowledges that the FIEs have received more generous treatment than local
firms historically though he also notes that reforms in the tax treatment of domestic
enterprises have decreased this bias.
The main counterargument is that is simply not true. FIEs may on paper still
have slightly favorable terms of taxation but the reality of effective taxation (the
percentage of profits actually paid in taxes) is actually in favor of domestic firms.
Domestic firms have a lower effective tax rate than foreign firms (Eun Choi,
forthcoming). The second problem with this argument is that the nationality of firms in
the technology sector does not seem to matter. The technology firms examined in this
dissertation more often than not have benefited from a variety of preferential tax
treatment regardless of their nationality. My visits to more than thirty different industrial
zones, parks and incubators in China indicate that the foreign firms and domestic firms
both enjoy low rates of taxation. In none of these zones were the preferential policies
limited to foreign firms. In some of the zones, local firms actually predominated. Third,
as Huang (2003: 89) has pointed out, the enterprises favored by the state have received
preferential financial treatment far outweighing tax disadvantages. Finally, the few
foreign firms that have become state favorites have exhibited the same poor upgrading
performance as the favored domestic firms. Their tax status does not account for their
poor performance.
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8.2 Technological Level of the Firm: The FIEs' Higher Level of Technology
Determines Their Higher Contribution to Upgrading
One could plausibly argue that foreign firms contribute more simply because
these firms generally have more technology than local firms. However, many of the
hybrids, the very firms at the forefront of upgrading in China, are brand new firms.
These firms do not have an archive of technology. The only technology they have is the
tacit knowledge brought by the employees and codified knowledge that they buy. Thus,
they are not at an advantage over state favored firms that lure those with tacit industry
knowledge and have the means to buy codified knowledge. Nor are the newly founded
hybrids at an advantage against large regular FIEs in the same industry segment. If it
were simply the technology embodied in the firm, one would predict that the large
regular FIEs in the same industry segment would contribute far more to technological
upgrading than the hybrid newcomers. In reality, hybrid start-ups generally contribute
more to upgrading than the regular large FIEs in terms of the level of technology and
often even in terms of local technical staff trained despite the much smaller size of most
hybrids.
8.3 Ethnic Network Argument
A third counterargument is that ethnic networks determine which firms upgrade in
China. One could imagine such an argument as an extension of Hsing's (1998)
magisterial work on the importance of ethnic connections for the operations of Taiwanese
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firms operating in southern China.44 This dissertation recognizes the role of ethnicity in
recognizing the role of returnees and firms from ethnic Chinese economies, but ethnicity
alone does not determine the upgrading outcomes. If Chinese ethnic connections were all
that was required for upgrading, then the domestic firms would be on an equal footing
with the returnees and the ethnic Chinese from abroad. Finally, there would be no
differentiation between those ethnic Chinese firms that were simply regular FIEs and
those hybrids that adopt a China-based operational strategy.
8.4 The Sheer Weight of the Foreign Sector
Another plausible counterargument is the relative weight of foreign firms. The
FIEs dominate the Chinese IT industry sector in aggregate value of production so it
would be natural that they would contribute more to China's upgrading. The problem
with this argument is that it ignores the fact that the majority of production value of the
IT sector in China is in low technology manufacturing in both foreign- and domestic-
owned plants.4 5 If one looks to the areas where significant upgrading has taken place,
such as ICs (integrated circuits), only in the last five years has there been significant
foreign firm participation after years of local firm dominance. Thus, in the truly
technology-intensive segments, the playing field is much more level than the aggregate
statistics on production value would lead one to assume.
44 For a more popularized account of the importance of Chinese networks, see Weidenbaum and Hughes
(1996).
45 One indicative fact of the low technology, assembly-intensive nature of most of Chinese IT production is
the low value-added of consumer electronics production in China, which is estimated to be as low as 15
percent (FT, May 24, 2005: 17).
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8.5 The Returnees as the Only Determining Factor
One could argue that the only factor that really matters in determining
contribution to upgrading is the number of returnees flocking to firms of a certain type.
The FIEs have been able to attract more returnees than the domestic firms and this
attraction determines their success. There are several problems with this argument. First,
the returnees regularly went to domestic enterprises more often than domestic ones
throughout the 1990s based on survey evidence for returnees in 1992, 1995 and 1998 (X.
Liu 2001: 204). If returnees alone were the key, then one would expect better
performance from domestic firms than from FIEs during the course of the 1990s. The
research for this dissertation was primarily from post-1998, but one would expect some
of the better performance due to greater numbers of returnees in domestic firms to
continue, especially since the critical role of returnees is to train local engineers within
the firms they enter. Moreover, to explain the lack of upgrading by domestic firms
despite the fact that returnees initially preferred them, the argument would have to
assume some sort of tipping point. The explanation would be that returnees went to local
firms, but they simply did not go to these firms in sufficient numbers to create
technological upgrading. Many of the successful contributors to China's upgrading were
in fact small firms with only a handful of returnees so the tipping point argument is
implausible. Even for firms of a larger scale, such as IC foundries, evidence from the
development of Taiwan's foundry industry suggests that the level of returnees needed is
not large. Taiwan simply recruited a few technical people over to Taiwan each time it
needed to move to the next generation of wafer processing (D. Fuller 2005).
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Other evidence also suggests that something beyond recruiting the returnees is
critical. Some returnees interviewed, who had worked for very unsuccessful local firms
and achieved little, then went on to contribute greatly to China's technological future.
For example, one of Lucent's consultants charged with the task of transferring both IC
design know-how and management skills to Huajing, an unsuccessful state firm, then
went on to train engineers in IC design and product design skills in two FIEs, one of them
one of the few major IC firms with design activities in China and the other his own
startup. In each case, he operated with only a handful of other returnees. In the two
foreign cases he succeeded whereas in the state favored firm he failed to achieve much.
Finally, there is the problem that this returnee-only explanation fails to
differentiate between the performance of the hybrids and the regular FIEs. Both sets of
firms were able to attract returnees in large quantities, but as this dissertation will
demonstrate, one type of firm contributed more to technological upgrading.
9. The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter Two will review the literature on development under globalization.
Chapter Three will present a study of the implications of the IT industry's structure for
development. This chapter will argue that the modularity and rapid pace of technical
change in this industry offer real possibilities for development and these possibilities may
emerge across a widening span of industries. Chapter Four will examine the Chinese IT
hardware end product segment, primarily telecommunication and computer equipment.
This chapter will offer evidence for the greater contribution of FIEs, particularly hybrids,
tlo technological upgrading. Chapter Five will look at the Chinese integrated circuit (IC)
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industry, as ICs are one of the core technologies of the IT industry. Contrary to
expectations, this core technology area is the one where the most upgrading has occurred
in China. The upgrading in ICs has occurred almost entirely in hybrid FIEs. This chapter
provides more robust evidence of the superior upgrading performance of hybrids over
regular FIEs than offered by the hardware end product segment covered in Chapter Four.
Chapter Six will consider both the sustainability of the differential behavior (will hybrids
continue to outperform other FIEs and will FIEs continue to outperform domestic firms)
and the sustainability of the institutions that help embed the technological upgrading in
China.
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Chapter Two
The Three Worldviews of Globalization and Development
1. Introduction
John Williamson, an economist in the Institute of International Economics, coined
the term Washington Consensus in 1989 in the wake of the policy discussions of how to
deal with the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s. Yet, the neoliberal ideas of free
trade, private enterprises and fiscal discipline (which in practice means smaller
government) encapsulated in the Washington Consensus were already gaining adherents
in the international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF, during the 1970s. The
rise of neoliberalism led by Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980s resulted in the triumph of
Washington Consensus ideology before it had even acquired this name (A. Escobar 1995:
93; Stiglitz 2002: 13).46 Williamson simply created a new name for the already coherent
neoliberal ideology of development embraced by the IFIs.
The Washington Consensus was not just a direct reflection of the demise of
Keynesianism and the rise of neoliberalism in the West (A. Escobar 1995). The
Washington Consensus was also a critique of a set of import-substitution industrialization
(ISI) policies adopted by a large part of the developing world in the post-war period.
Developing countries from Latin America to South Asia were all concerned about the
problem of economic dependency, the unfair terms of trade for non-industrialized goods
and perpetual lack of industrialization that they thought inevitably went hand-in-hand
with free trade. Neoclassical economists pointed out that ISI policies actually
46 Escobar argues the clear turn toward the Washington Consensus should be dated from Reagan's "magic
of the market" speech at the North-South conference in Cancun in 1981.
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exacerbated the very terms of trade problems that concerned developing countries
(Fishlow 1985). Economist also pointed out that ISI policies routinely failed to
encourage the superior rates of growth that they were supposed to achieve even as they
created enormous and enormously inefficient rents captured by local business groups
(Balassa 1981: Krueger 1974; Krueger 1990; Bhagwati and Desai 1970). In spite of the
rise of neoliberalism, the dependency theorists, who trace their intellectual roots to the
thinking of Prebisch and Baran among others47, continued to argue that the problems of
the developing world were still due to dependency on the industrialized core of advanced
economies. Whatever industrialization had taken place in the developing world, it had
been in conjunction with and dependent upon international capital so the result was still
dependency (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Amin 1976; Evans 1979).
Despite the growing intellectual and political power of neoliberalism, a different
set of ideas concerning development were gaining prominence at the same time.
Rejecting both the pessimism of dependency theory and the free market prescriptions of
neoliberalism, these revisionist ideas favored state involvement in managing and guiding
economic development. The revisionists, drawing upon earlier work by List (1885) and
Gerschenkron (1962), believed that the state could intervene to shape the very industrial
structure of the nation and even individual firm strategies. Using country case studies,
Chalmers Johnson (1982), Alice Amsden (1989) and Robert Wade (1990) demonstrated
that Japan, Korea and Taiwan, respectively, were practicing state-led development during
their economic miracles rather than following the neoliberal proscriptions of the IFIs.
47 The intellectual roots of dependency are contested. Escobar (1995:81-82) suggests that Baran
contributed more and CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America) under Prebisch contributed less
to dependency theory whereas Evans (1979: 26-27) suggests that Prebisch, Baran and many others were the
intellectual progenitors of dependency theory.
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In the following decades, revisionist scholars added nuance to this state-led
explanation. Starting with Thomas Gold's State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle
(1986), scholars began to recognize that the state-centric explanations of development
overstated the state's role vis-A-vis various societal forces. Along with this recognition,
there came a critique of the politics of the statist or development state explanation.
Scholars of Japanese politics4 8 began to point out that the state did not operate without
checks in the domestic political economy. Among others, Daniel Okimoto (1989) and
Richard Samuels (1987) suggested that the state had to negotiate with other key actors,
such as big business, rather than roughshod over everyone in the creation of national
economic policy.
Building on this political critique, a number of scholars began to make an
argument for state-societal alliances for development. Dubbed alternatively the neo-
developmental state (V. Chibber 2003) or embedded development (P. Evans 1995), these
scholars argued that the true effectiveness of these efforts was due to the ability of the
state to work with and cooperate with societal agents, primarily the capitalist class.
While they conceded that the state still operated from a relatively powerful position in
cooperating with society, they also argued that without societal involvement the state
policies would have failed. The two primary grounds for failure have been the state's
lack of information about firm activities and the investment veto of the capitalist class.
Lack of information undermines state efforts to reward and punish firms based on their
economic performance and cuts off the state from receiving new information about new
markets to exploit and private evaluation of the effectiveness of state policies. The
48 There were economists who critiqued Johnson's claims on economic grounds. See Patrick (1986) and
Saxonhouse (1982).
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investment veto undermines the whole developmentalist project because without
corporate investment the plan of channeling massive resources to new sectors with
greater economic returns would be starved of the capital to succeed.
Another stream of revisionist scholarship emphasized the role of international
systems of production in the rise of East Asia. Whereas world systems theory had
originally argued that the countries on the periphery faced a near impossible task of
upgrading49, in the face of East Asian development, a group of sociologists sympathetic
to the world systems approach proposed that global commodity chains offered both
opportunities and constraints on development in East Asia. They argued that one had to
look at which global commodity chains countries interacted with to understand their
development trajectories and not simply focus on domestic policies (Gary Gereffi
1996ab; Gereffi and Wyman 1990). The revisionist optimists of the global production
networks (GPN) school are the direct descendants of this line of scholarly inquiry. The
revisionist optimists of the transnational technology communities (TTC) school also build
upon the global commodity chain literature for the idea of informal transnational
institutions structuring development.
This chapter will examine three main current theoretical viewpoints on the
prospects for the developing world under globalization: the Washington Consensus, the
pessimist revisionists and the optimist revisionists. First, the strengths and weaknesses of
each will be assessed. Then, the chapter will compare the three frameworks to the global
hybrid development framework.
49 See for example, Peter Evan's (1979) Dependent Development where he argued that the even the lucky
few industrializers on the periphery were essentially stuck in a dependent relationship with the
industrialized West, "For all the TV sets it may import from Taiwan, the United States remains firmly in
the center of the international system and Taiwan remains on the periphery (Evans 1979: 15)."
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2. Three Perspectives on Development under Globalization
What fundamentally differentiate the three worldviews on development are the
perceived scope of market failure and the solutions for such market failures. The
Washington Consensus views market failures as limited in scope whereas the revisionists
view market failures as widespread. The revisionists split over what solutions to market
failure are viable under globalization.
There are two broad types of market failures: failure to achieve static efficiency
and failure to achieve dynamic efficiency. Conventional neoclassical thinking on market
failure focuses on the failure to achieve statically efficient outcomes. Static efficiency is
the state of market clearance i.e. the cost of producing the last unit is exactly equal to its
price. In this equilibrium state, the net social benefit (the profits and positive externalities
over the costs and negative externalities) is maximized. Static efficiency is measured at a
given point in time rather than over time. Thus, market failure in the static context is
when this market clearance is not achieved. The net social benefit is not maximized
because the costs and benefits of a given economic activity are not accurately priced in
the marketplace. Dynamic market efficiency is the maximization of net social benefit
over time. In other words, dynamic market efficiency recognizes that some activities
judged at a given point in time may not appear to maximize net social benefit. Over a
longer period of time, these activities do maximize net social benefit because over time
these activities create additional value not realized at the initial investment stage or
shortly thereafter. Failure of dynamic market efficiency is simply the failure to realize
this additional value. This failure could be due to the pursuit of static market efficiency
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because dynamic efficient activities often entail more short-term social costs than
benefits i.e. they are often statically inefficient.
To give a concrete example of static market failure, a developing country may
have all the proper factor endowments to enter garment making (lots of manual labor, a
little capital and basic knowledge of garment making), but fail to produce the quantity of
garments that its factor base should allow. This failure to maximize the net social benefit
of making the amount of garments expected, in turn, could be the result of the price of
capital being too high relative to actual supply and demand. This higher than market-
clearing price of capital would result in fewer investments in sewing machines than
ideally would be the case given the country's potential in garment-making. Actual
developing countries are plagued by such incorrectly priced capital (Sanchez 2003) and
even the inability to turn hard assets into liquid capital (de Soto 2000) among many other
market failures.
Statically efficiency outcomes may be inefficient when viewed over the long
term. For example, with their given present resource set, the static efficient outcome for
many developing countries would be to concentrate on low value-added textiles and
apparel as they are labor-intensive, capital poor economies. However, with state
intervention, these countries may successfully enter more capital-intensive, higher value-
added sectors, such as petrochemicals or steel. In a short-term sense, the net social costs
may outweigh the net social benefits as the subsidies to encourage entry may cost more
than is justified by the short-term value of the steel or petrochemical output. From a
longer-term point of view, this intervention could be dynamically efficient because the
50 The discussion of static and dynamic efficiency draws heavily form Mushtaq Khan (2000:21-70) and Ha-
joon Chang (1994: 70-79).
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accumulated profits and positive externalities (the social benefits over time) outweigh the
cost of investment and negative externalities. This is not simply a theoretical example
because Korea, Japan and Taiwan intervened in precisely this manner to shift their
industrial production from light, labor-intensive manufacturing to heavy, capital-intensive
manufacturing.
2.1 The Washington Consensus
The Washington Consensus believes that developing countries can achieve
development by adhering to sound fiscal and monetary policies coupled with free
markets. A critical component of these free markets is free trade with other nations. Free
trade increases growth opportunities because the free traders simultaneously have access
to goods at the best possible price and eliminate inefficient rents that appear under
protection or other interference in free markets. Some Washington Consensus
economists have even claimed that there are equitable gains for all under economic
openness (Dollar and Kraay 2000).
Acting as the great apostate of the Washington Consensus faith, former World
Bank chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has offered a series of trenchant critiques of the
neoliberal policies imposed on the developing world by the World Bank and IMF.
Reading such critiques as Stiglitz's (2002) Globalization and its Discontents, one would
wonder whether the Washington Consensus had any merit at all. In fact, the Washington
Consensus does provide some important insights into the problems of development even
if one accepts the critiques of it as a flawed blueprint fro development.
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First and foremost, the Washington Consensus encapsulates cogent arguments for
the negative effects of government intervention in the economy, the government failure
argument. Going back to Adam Smith, there have been arguments about the stifling
effects on wealth creation of government interference in the operation of markets. What
the economists who contributed to building the Washington Consensus offered beyond
the original defense of laissez-faire policies are counterarguments to those advocates of
protection and industrial policy to foster industrialization. These arguments center on the
tremendous costs of these policies irrespective if they actually create gains through
increased scale economies or positive externalities. Essentially, these economists point to
the fact that interference in markets creates rents and concomitant opportunities for rent-
seeking. Buchanan (1980: 3) defines rents as "that part of the payment to an owner of
resources over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative
use." Buchanan (1980) and Krueger (1974) convincingly argue that the existence of
these rents can be welfare reducing because resources are misallocated from productive
activities to rent capture.5' The activity of rent-seeking undermines the legitimacy of the
market and invites further state intervention and thus further rent-seeking (Krueger 1974:
302). Thus, any benefits of ISI industrialization or other state intervention may be
overwhelmed by the negative consequences of the rent-seeking generated. To be fair to
the Washington Consensus economists, there is enough evidence of these problems in
various parts of world, such as Turkey, India and Latin America, to lend empirical
credence to these arguments (see Bhagwati 1993; Ahluwalia 1985; Krueger 1974;
S' This does not apply to all rents as monopoly rents acquired by technological innovation are welfare
enhancing because the resources are spent to create knowledge embodied in the monopoly rent (Khan
2000: 41-50) or because competition exists which quickly drives down the monopoly rents at the same time
that new knowledge has been created (Ha-joon Chang 1994: 28).
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Balassa 1984). Stigler's (1975) theory of regulatory capture contributes another reason to
fear rent-seeking by firms. In his view, current market players lobby for regulations to
suppress competition and create rents.
Another set of arguments related to the Washington Consensus also pointed to
problems of state capabilities. State intervention was supposed to solve problems of
market failure in the developing world. As the ISI and developmental state advocates
both viewed the problem, allowing the market to allocate capital in developing countries
would lead to underinvestment in those sectors that promised higher long-term returns.
The Washington Consensus economists pointed out that there were legitimate reasons to
think that the state would not be able to resolve these problems due to information
asymmetries between the state and individual firms. A good example offered of these
problems is the persistence of firms receiving infant industry protection for the long haul
despite the fact that firms are supposed to grow out of their need for such protection (Bell
et al 1984).
The main problem with the Washington Consensus prescriptions is that their
assumption that market failures are not widespread appears untenable in the light of
evidence from the very countries, principally Latin American ones, that have
implemented their prescriptions (O. Sanchez 2003). The most damning critique is that
the very embrace of economic globalization entailed in the Washington Consensus
actually undermines the very market institutions and supposedly superior market-driven
economic performance that the Washington Consensus envisions. As Sanchez points out
for Latin America, the very economic openness the IMF and World Bank demand seems
to undermine the institutions for encouraging and channeling domestic savings to
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productive uses. Sanchez cleverly shows that both dependency theorists and the
Washington Consensus thinkers overemphasize the role of the external environment. The
dependency theorists told Latin Americans that trade with the First World kept them
down and the Washington Consensus similarly exaggerates trade integration as a panacea
for the developing world. The political outcome is governing elites in the developing
world overlook the critical domestic institution-building that is necessary for good long-
term performance of markets (Sanchez 2003).
In conjunction with this problem is the evidence that at least some states have
been able to intervene in their economies to create dynamically efficient outcomes (long-
run net social benefits outweigh net social costs) despite fears of incapable states and
rent-seeking. This finding in combination with the evidence about widespread market
failures suggests that states should intervene more often to rectify market failures than the
Washington Consensus prescribes. What the Washington Consensus has missed is that
development involves active institution building to solve market failure in addition to
efficient usage of inputs of labor and capital. Thus, the Washington Consensus provides
good warnings about possible dangers of non-market solutions and a cogent defense of
market mechanisms, but it falls far short of offering a good blueprint for development.
What about the Washington Consensus in light of globalization? The
performance of countries adopting Washington Consensus neoliberal policies under
globalization has not been encouraging (Stiglitz 2002; Sanchez 2003). While the
enormous international flows of capital under economic globalization, the rules of the
WTO and the dictates of the IFIs may constrain state actions in the current era, the
reliance on economic openness (i.e. globalization) has not worked well either, as the
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experiences of many developing nations that embraced globalization demonstrate. What
the revisionists and dependency theorists both realized is that foreign capital by itself will
have insufficient motivation to foster local development. To place it in the language of
static and dynamic efficiency, foreign capital when investing in developing host
economies more often than not settles on the static efficiency equilibrium (how to realize
the maximum rates of return today) and foregoes the dynamic efficiency equilibrium
(how to realize maximum rate of return in the mid-to-long-term). 52 To rely on foreign
capital and financial institutions alone remains a less than satisfactory solution under
globalization.
2.2 The Pessimist Revisionists: The Difficulties of State Intervention under
Globalization
Scholars in the revisionist political economy of development like Johnson (1982),
Wade (1990), Amsden (1989; 2000; 2003 with Chu), Woo-Cummings (1991, 1999) and
Evans (1995) see the state or state-society partnerships as the most effective or even
essential53 political force to achieve economic development. While these authors have
created a variety of counter-claims to mainstream economics, their claims all rest on the
basic claim that markets in developing countries fail to work effectively enough to spur
52 While revisionists often talk about static and dynamic efficiency in terms of the net social benefits over
social costs rather than the rate of profitability of firms today or over time, the same authors would be the
first to point out that profitability of firms have to be enhanced to gain the long-term dynamic efficiency. If
such increases in profitability were not available, then the firms simply would not cooperate to realize the
outcome (Ha-joon Chang 1994; Khan 2000; V. Chibber 2003).
53 Some of the revisionists may have argued that the state's involvement was merely conducive to
development or very effective in the case of particular countries, but did not go as far as to say that the state
or a state and local capitalist alliance was absolutely necessary for developing nations. Later revisionists
have been willing to make or at least imply broader claims of the necessity of such political structures for
economic development (Wade 1990; Evans 1995; Amsden 2000; Amsden and Chu 2003). Some
economists, notably Joseph Stiglitz, have embraced this concept and Stiglitz (1998: 7) goes so far as to
claim that all the most successful developers (those nations that have achieved the status of advanced
economies), including the US, have had governments play a significant role in their development success.
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development. There are two basic perspectives on this claim of widespread market
failure. One perspective sees market failure as rife so a state or state-societal alliance to
rectify this failure is necessary to realize growth (Amsden 2000, 2003; Stiglitz 1998,
2002; de Soto 200054). The other sees market failure as a long-term problem in so far as
markets alone will achieve short-term static efficiency but fall short of achieving long-
term dynamic efficiencies (Ha-joon Chang 1994; M. Khan 2000; Rodrik 1996: Ferris and
Gawande 2003; Sauer, Gawande and Li 2003; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1989). For
these scholars, developing countries could grow without state intervention, but they
would miss many opportunities to grow faster over the long-term without state or state-
societal intervention in static market outcomes.
What the revisionists have contributed to the debate on development are empirical
examples of (Johnson 1982; Gold 1984; Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Haggard 1990;
Evans 1995) and theoretical justification (Ha-joon Chang 1994; M. Khan 2000; Rodrik
1996: Ferris and Gawande 2003; Sauer, Gawande and Li 2003; Murphy, Shleifer and
Vishny 1989) for state or state-societal involvement in development to correct the
widespread problem of market failure. These twin contributions provide the most
compelling counterargument to the Washington Consensus' celebration of the market.
The revisionists' critique points out how irrelevant the ideal of the efficiently functioning
market is for the project of development in the real world. The empirical cases also show
54 De Soto's (2000) The Mystery of Capital is interesting in so far as he embraces much of the Washington
Consensus belief in markets in conjunction with adequate property rights, but believes that the main
challenge is a social and political one of creating a property rights regimes that encompasses the existing
informal rights practices of the majority of the people in the developing world. Thus, he buys the
Washington Consensus market-based growth arguments, but points out that without political and social
change in the property rights regimes market-based growth will not be realized.
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that effective state interference is possible despite the theoretical arguments for
seemingly inevitable government failure made by neoliberal economists.
There are also several flaws and limitations in the revisionist view of
development. The most critical limitation is the amount of state capacity necessary for
coordinating, monitoring and disciplining economic agents to intervene successfully to
rectify market failures and capture dynamic efficiencies. While several revisionists have
argued that these interventionist development projects can be widely adapted with
success (Amsden 2000; Woo-Cumings 1999; Ha-joon Chang 1994), others recognize that
the precise political arrangements needed to successfully implement such policies are
rarely found (M. Khan 2000; Haggard 1990, 2003). The bare minimal requirements for
conducting such policies are government control of the conditionality of rents (i.e. the
government can credibly take away policy benefits from firms) through the government's
ability to monitor firm performance and reward firms accordingly (Haggard 2003; World
Bank 1993; Khan 2000; T. Moore 2002; Amsden 1989; K. Fields 1997; Schneider 1998;
V. Chibber 2003; Wade 1990; H. Chang 1994). Others add additional requirements such
as internal bureaucratic coherence based on meritocratic recruitment and advancement
(Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 2000; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990) and a coherent shared
developmentalist ideology within at least the governing elite and perhaps the nation as a
whole (Johnson 1982; Wade 1990; Woo-Cumings 1991, 1999). Some also see the need
for broad representation of business through peak or sector-based business organizations
(Campos and Root 1996; Kang 2002; V. Chibber 2003).
Leaving aside the additional requirements, few countries appear to be able to
monitor and reward firms according to their performance i.e. maintain conditionality in
99
the face of firm demands for benefits. This empirical finding is not limited to neoliberal
economists, such as Krueger and Buchanan, who are ideologically opposed to state
intervention. Mushtaq Khan (2000), who finds merit in the revisionist approach for
certain countries, such as Korea, still critiques state intervention as inappropriate for most
countries because they do not have the domestic political configurations to monitor and
reward firms effectively. He and others (Jomo 2000; Gomez 1991; Jomo and Gomez
1997; Jomo and Gomez 2000) argue that even Malaysia, commonly seen as the most
developmentalist of the Southeast Asian countries excluding Singapore, lost its ability to
distribute rents in an efficient, market-enhancing manner over time. As Haggard (2003)
has observed, the debate over industrial policy has devolved into a debate over what
unique institutional or political configurations in East Asia prevented the type of
government failure that occurred nearly everywhere else state intervention was
attempted. If a policy appears to have worked only in a few countries, then its utility for
the wider developing world is in doubt.
The revisionist model also overestimates the scope of static market failure just as
the Washington Consensus underestimates the scope of market failure. This
overestimation of market failure in turn allows for a relative underestimation of the
problem of government failure. Using cases in South and Southeast Asia, Khan argues
countries that fail to develop industrial policies, such as Thailand, are better off than
countries that pursue industrial policymaking without the state capacity to monitor and
control the rents generated, such as all of South Asia. This argument embraces the idea
that developing countries like Thailand have developed through pursuit of static
efficiency. Obviously, if Thailand could have successfully realized dynamic efficiencies,
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it would have been preferable, but it still did okay without achieving these (Khan 2000;
Doner and Ramsay 2000). In contrast, South Asia suffered from widespread government
failure (Khan 2000; Bhagwati 1993; Ahluwalia 1985). In other words, market failure is
not as widespread and complete as some of the revisionists would presume so countries
should be concerned about avoiding government failure. Countries can at least achieve
static market efficiency without much effective state intervention.
There is another tack on the same problem. Rather than an overestimation of
market failure leading to an underestimation of government failure, government failure
itself may be hard to avoid over time. Countries that have witnessed brief or more
sustained periods of successful government intervention can through their very policies
create opportunities for government failure. Malaysia is an example of a country that
enjoyed only brief success (Jomo 2000; Gomez 1991; Jomo and Gomez 1997; Jomo and
Gomez 2000) before government failures caught up with its industrial policymaking
ambitions. Korea has a much longer track record of successful state intervention, but its
recent history suggests that the state-society partnership began to create as many net
social losses as benefits in the 1990s.
A final problem in the revisionist view is the lack of consideration of alternatives
to state or state-societal intervention in the economy. Even under conditions of domestic
market failure, there plausibly could be international alternative to state intervention to
correct market failure. Starting with Gereffi's global commodity chains framework,
scholars began to recognize the opportunities that the international organization of
production offered local firms. This dissertation offers a different alternative, the
importing of market institutions from abroad via FDI.
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The revisionists have a convincing critique of FDI-driven development. Foreign
firms only contribute to development when they are forced to do so by effective state
intervention (Mani 2004; Jomo and Felker 1999; Fosfuri 1999). Singapore is the sole
case where FDI played a central role in technological development and Singapore's
policies were geared toward leveraging technology from these FIEs (Mani 2004).
However, the revisionists do not consider the possibility that there could be an alternative
manner to discipline MNCs to contribute to host country development. Drawing on the
transnational technology community scholarship, I have uncovered co-ethnic
entrepreneurship as an alternative mechanism to provide the motivation needed to foster
local development.
The state-oriented revisionists become pessimists because they doubt the
feasibility of this interventionist approach in the current era of globalization. Even those
who hold out hope for the continued efficacy of the state or state-society partnerships in
pursuing development are discouraged by the inability or reluctance of the developing
world to confront the forces of globalization. The most pessimistic are those who believe
that the developing world is doomed because the domestic state cannot resist the forces of
economic globalization (Milanovic 2003; S. Strange 1996; Vernon 1998; Evans 199755).
Others add a political twist to the argument of the state's diminishing capacity under
globalization. They argue that there are domestic and transnational political forces, such
as Al Qaeda, that deem the nation state as antiquated and ill equipped to meet their
demands (Clapham 2002; Stiglitz 2003). Another group of pessimists believes that the
developing economies can reject globalization but the states more often than not accept
55 Evans argues that the current globalization keeps the state down because of the current globalization's
neoliberal ideology. With a change of ideology in the institutions of globalization, there could be a
resurgence of state power.
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economic openness as inevitable. These pessimists see this acceptance as one of the
chief culprits keeping the developing world mired in poverty (Stiglitz 200256; Sanchez
2003; Nolan 2001). Others see the persistence of the North-South divide despite the
industrialization of the South, but they also see possibilities for the destabilization of the
current inequitable global hierarchy (Arrighi et al 2003).
Some of the state-oriented revisionists are not at all pessimistic and believe that
the state or state-societal alliances can continue to foster development. Alice Amsden
(2003) in a recent critique of the pessimists declared their stance to be a return to
dependency theory thinking and claimed that developing countries could still develop
through state-sponsored industrialization. Others have found that the capacities of states
in the domestic arena simply have not diminished very much under globalization (Gilpin
2000; L. Weiss 1998).
There are two reasons that we will discount this argument for continued state-led
development under globalization. In the case at hand, China, the state clearly is not
effective at conducting industrial policy (see Chapter One Section 5). Thus, the general
case of the state's capacity under globalization is irrelevant to the Chinese situation. The
second reason is the problem of the scope of state-led development. If state-led
development requires levels of state capacity that only a few developing countries
possess, then we should consider alternative policies for the rest of the developing world.
This need for policy alternatives is true even without the advent of globalization. In any
case, the majority opinion among the state-led growth school is that globalization
seriously compromises this route to development.
56 Stiglitz believes that acceptance of neoliberalism is a problem, but he also recognizes that it is hard for
developing countries to throw off given the support of the Washington Consensus by the West.
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2.3 Revisionist Optimists:The Transnational Networks for Development
The optimists recognize that development does not simply happen because of
lower barriers to trade and financial flows.57 Networks of production provide
information, market opportunities and capital that can facilitate development. While the
optimists do not talk in terms of resolving market failures, the networks provide the
information and knowledge to solve many of the market malfunctions discussed in the
development literature. The networks lower the knowledge barriers to entry for firms
from the developing world because much knowledge is available within the networks.
The networks also free firms from domestic coordination requirements where firms in
different sub-sectors or even different sectors must co-invest to realize the full benefits of
their investments. Ensconced in international networks, firms can draw on the
international industrial infrastructure and markets instead of reliance on the industrial
infrastructure and markets of their home economy. Engaging in networks allows firms
and countries from the developing world to move from the static efficiency equilibrium
to the high growth dynamic efficiency equilibrium.
There are two main streams of the transnational networks of production. The
global production network (GPN) theorists that argue MNC-organized networks of
production offer opportunities for learning and growth for the developing world. The
scholars of transnational technology communities (TTCs) view co-ethnic transnational
networks of technologists as driving much of the learning and technological development
57 Here we only deal with those optimists that accept some social or political conditionality on the
opportunities for globalization, and dismiss those optimists who accept a borderless world as a priori the
best of all possible worlds (K. Ohmae 1999; W. Lewis 2004). In the case of China, Guthrie's (1999)
Dragon in a Three-Piece Suit comes closest to this latter type of optimism concerning globalization with
his argument that corporate practice of Chinese firms is seamlessly converging with those best practices of
the developed capitalist world.
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in the developing world. These two streams are not completely separate as each
acknowledges the existence of the other (Ernst 2004b; Saxenian 2002), but the emphasis
of each remains distinct.
Turning to the TTC literature, Saxenian (2002) and others (J. Hsu 1997; Hsu and
Saxenian 2000, 2001; Bresnahan, Gambardella and Saxenian 2001; Saxenian and Li
2003) discuss the critical role of transnational networks of co-ethnic technologists who
serve as bridges to channel the flow of technology from the developed world to their
ethnic homelands. The implicit theoretical underpinning of the TTC scholarship is the
sociological literature on networks, which portrays networks as an alternative form of
economic organization fundamentally different from the traditional ones of markets and
firms (Powell 1990; Castells 1996).58
The TTC scholarship conceives of the returnees to the developing world tapping
transnational networks that ease the flow of information. The returnees are individual
cogs in the wheel of larger networks of technical, managerial and market information as
well as capital. Through iterative interaction, the co-ethnic technologists create these
networks. Saxenian's work (2002) comparing India, China and Taiwan also implicitly
assumes that there is a tipping point requiring a certain number of returnees for networks
to flourish. The game of network development is a conceptually simple one. Countries
must attract enough returnees back from the centers of innovation in the developed world
while at the same time encouraging these returnees to maintain contacts with those
advanced industrial clusters. If not enough returnees come home, then the links to
58 In the four returnees pieces cited, there is only one citation to back up their claims that co-ethnic
networks facilitate knowledge transfer and create transnational technology communities. The citation is
Portes (1996), which documents co-ethnic transnational networks, but is not a theoretical piece concerning
network forms of organization.
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transnational networks will be weak or nonexistence and the flow of information will be a
mere trickle.
No specific sociological or cultural norms are necessary to have these networks
up and running. Saxenian and Hsu (2000) make this clear by rejecting the cultural norms
case for ethnic Chinese networks. There is a large literature (Hsing 1998; Hamilton
1996; Yeung 1998; Kao 1993) explaining Chinese networks as functioning according to
the reciprocal and fluid norms of guanxi (the approximate translation for this term is
relations/relationship). Capitalism in ethnic Chinese economies and transnational
connections between ethnic Chinese have often been referred to as guanxi capitalism. In
the case of ethnic Chinese transnational technology communities, Saxenian and Hsu
claim that guanxi is not the main driver. People are not allowed into the networks solely
on the basis of whom they know, the main means of networking under the rules of
guanxi. They must bring some industrial skills to the network or they do not gain
admittance. Furthermore, without technical skills, they cannot upgrade their firm's
capabilities within these networks. Given that the transnational technology communities
are based on shared ethnicity, some shared cultural understanding may be necessary for a
network to work effectively. Beyond the claim for common cultural identity, there are no
common norms required for these networks. Indians and Irish can create these networks
as effectively as Taiwanese and Chinese just as long as technologists return to the home
country (Saxenian 2002: 200).
What brings the returnees home are business opportunities fostered by public
policies. Saxenian (2002) recognizes that developing countries' policies towards
recruitment of co-ethnics to return home are critical to building these bridges to the
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developed world. She argues that the relative success of Taiwan and China compared to
India in building these transnational networks is due in part to more active state
recruitment policies of Taiwan and China. In particular, she cites the pool of potential
returnees created by the previous brain drain to the advanced world, programs to support
technical and business exchanges, projects to encourage returnee entrepreneurship and
active government recruitment as the means to bring returnees home. She also mentions
rapid economic development in the home economy, which arguably is partially the result
of state policies. Through public policies, the state lures returnees home and the
transnational technological community emerges.
The scholars (Ernst 2004ab; Ernst and Kim 2002; Rugman and D'Cruz 2000;
Borrus et al 2000;) of the Global Production Networks (GPN) also draw on the literature
on networks. They argue that the reach of global production networks have grown to
displace the individual firm as the way to organize industry and have served to diffuse
international knowledge to the developing world by bringing local suppliers from
disparate parts of the developing world into their networks. Globalization is what in
large part caused these networks to arise. The driving forces have been liberalization,
increasing competition and the spread of IT (Ernst and Kim 2002: 1419). The first two
are usually considered aspects of economic globalization and the latter is often seen as a
facilitator of globalization (M. Guillen 2001). Thus, for the GPN scholars like the
Washington Consensus scholars, globalization has facilitated rather than retarded
economic development.
Where the Washington Consensus and GPN theory part ways is the problem of
development. The GPN scholars are clearly intellectual descendants of the original
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revisionist political economists of the 1980s in their recognition that markets alone will
not adequately foster development. Given their heavy focus on networks of production in
relatively technologically intensive goods, the GPN theorists emphasize the old problem
of underinvestment in R&D that Arrow (1962) delineated. Essentially, since R&D
creates positive externalities, firms on their own will underinvest in R&D. This problem
is true even in the developed world, but is magnified in the developing world (Mani
2004; Ernst 2004b). In addition, the developing world does not have the complete set of
science and technology infrastructure fostering thought necessary to create cognitively
and organizationally complex knowledge. Without an institutional mechanism to acquire
knowledge outside the domestic systems, the domestic economy would be incapable of
generating sufficient new knowledge to catch up. The GPNs provide the knowledge and
markets to allow developing countries to grasp the dynamic efficiencies of innovation
(Ernst 2004b: 9-10).
The key contribution made by the GPN and TTC optimists is to demonstrate the
continued role of transnational informal institutions (i.e. not IFIs) in shaping the global
economic landscape. Even under globalization, the debate should not be solely between
the vanishing state and the triumphant market. Markets themselves are shaped and
constrained by the organization of production including the production of diffusion of
knowledge. Both the Washington Consensus and the state-oriented revisionist pessimists
miss the vital role TTCs and GPNs can play in the critical spread of knowledge.
The main problem with the optimists is that they do not go far enough in
recognizing the domestic environment's importance in its interaction with transnational
structures in determining the possibilities for development. Saxenian and Bresnahan et al
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recognize the policies to encourage the return of co-ethnics as critical and Ernst and
Linsu Kim mention a plethora of policies as important in fostering the competencies that
the GPNs demand. Unfortunately, there is no strong empirical analysis of which policies
are effective. Their analysis contains the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy of assuming
any good outcome with policy support is a result of that policy support.59 What follows
from this uncritical examination of local policies is a lack of recognition of how the
contours of domestic political economy shape the outcomes. Local conditions underpin
the possibility of creating a transnational community or successful local participants in
GPNs.
In the case of China, neither set of theories anticipates the domestic factors of
financing and firm operational strategy as having an impact on the operations of the
GPNs or transnational technology communities. In the empirical chapters, I will
demonstrate that the finance and operational strategies of firms in China mediate the
effects of the GPNs and transnational technology networks on technological upgrading.
The TTC literature is especially problematic in not anticipating the effects of the
domestic environment. The TTC literature expects a transnational community to emerge
regardless of the characteristics of the domestic firms.60 If firm type is critical, then we
need to look beyond the predictions of the TTC literature to understand technological
upgrading. I will present evidence of returnees with extensive contacts with other
technologists at home and abroad that could not upgrade their firms because their firms'
close relationship with the state made it extremely difficult to pursue upgrading. These
;9 This is a common problem in analysis of industrial policymaking as Haggard has demonstrated (Haggard
2003).
60 The one partial exception to this observation is the finding in Saxenian and Li's (2003) article that certain
Taiwanese VCs invest differently given their local partners.
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returnees were as much members of the transnational technological community as
anyone, but their links to these networks had no effect on their local firms. Rather than a
ubiquitous positive effect of transnational communities, the process of returnee-supported
upgrading is better conceived as one in which the local state-imposed constraints on firms
determine how effectively returnees can draw upon their network of contacts to upgrade
the firm's technological capabilities. The TTC school would also predict that
transnational communities are created as soon as enough returnees come home.
Although the exact number of returnees necessary is unspecified in the TTC literature, a
significant number of returnees returned earlier in the 1990s (X. Liu 2001: 204;
dissertation interviews), but no vibrant firms with returnees emerged before 2000. Even
after the turn of the new millennium, what differentiated firms that upgraded from firms
that did not was the different relationships to the Chinese state. In short, networks of
technologists are only as effective as local circumstance allows.
3. The Global Hybrid Model and the Three Worlds of Globalization
The global hybrid path to development combines the institutional advantages of
global capital with the strategic commitment of quasi-domestic firms. Through reliance
on foreign finance, the hybrid firms benefit from operating under the relatively efficient
(measured in terms of credit allocation) institutions of global capital. The hybrid firms
combine this institutional advantage with co-ethnic ties to the host economy that lead
them to make a commitment to developing their strategic assets within the host country.
This strategic commitment to the host country drives these firms to contribute to local
development even without a capable state to monitor and discipline them.
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What does the global hybrid model borrow from the Washington Consensus, the
revisionist pessimists and the transnational network theorists? From the Washington
Consensus, the hybrid model borrows a respect for market efficiency and recognition that
government failure may be as common in the developing world as dynamic market
failure. The global hybrid model makes explicit what the Washington Consensus leaves
implicit. Openness to foreign trade and capital is not simply a mechanism to access goods
and finance more cheaply, but a means to import institutions to enhance market
efficiency. In the case of China, openness to FDI has given certain China-based firms the
opportunity to access better functioning financial institutions than the domestic economy
offers. Where the global hybrid-model differs from the Washington Consensus is in a
recognition that markets alone, particularly reliance on accessing market discipline
through economic openness (the prime Washington Consensus prescription), can lead to
at best statically efficient outcomes. As for the pessimist revisionists, the global hybrid
model builds on their ideas of wide scope of market failure in the developing world and
the lack of commitment of FIEs to host countries. The global hybrid model diverges
from the revisionist pessimists by recognizing that there are other ways to solve market
failures and lack of FIE commitment other than state or state-societal intervention in the
marketplace. From the transnational networks literature, the hybrid model takes the
concepts that these transnational networks help to diffuse knowledge and that this
diffusion can help overcome barriers to realizing dynamic efficiency. However, the
hybrid model takes issue with their assumption that these transnational networks operate
with relatively similar efficacy across different firms within and nations. The table below
shows the difference across the four paths of development.
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Table 2.1 The Four Paths of Development
Paths of Problems of Solutions Prospects under
Development Development Globalization
Washington Government failure Government failure Bright prospects under
Consensus looms large solved by keeping globalization because
Market failures are not government's role in the the lower barriers to
widespread economy to a minimum trade and capital flows
Free markets lead to a greater role for
flourish without much free markets in the
help from the state developing world.
Revisionist Static market failure is State or state-societal To the extent that
Pessimist a problem alliances create the globalization weakens
Dynamic market institutions to align the capabilities of states
failure is rampant incentives properly in and societal forces to
Government failure is the face of failed create these institutions
less costly and less likely markets. to solve market failure,
than market failure globalization limits the
development potential
of the South.
Revisionist Dynamic market failure is Transnational To the extent that
Optimist rampant because networks solve the globalization plays a
Developing countries problem of dynamic role in broadening the
do not have the institutional market failure by scope for the operation
infrastructure to create providing the of these networks in the
technology technological resources developing world,
The standard Arrow upon which local firms globalization is a boon
problem of private can build their own to the developing world.
underinvestment in technical capabilities.
technology due to inability States can play a
of complete rent capture limited role in
encouraging local firms
to engage transnational
networks.
Global Hybrid Government failure Importing foreign Bright development
can be a problem (serious institutions of finance prospects for those
problem in China) solves static market countries without the
Both types of market failure state capacity to
failure can be a problem The host-based intervene to correct
operational strategy of market failure without
the hybrids solves inducing equally or
dynamic market failure more costly government
Solving market failures. However,
failures through hybrids solving dynamic market
and foreign institutions failure through FDI in
avoids the problem of the absence of effective
government failure state monitoring is only
open to those countries
with the potential to
develop transnational
technology
communities.
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Chapter Three
Digitization and the Rise of the Modular Model in the Global IT
Industry: Increasing Opportunities for Developing Nations
1. Introduction
This chapter 61 discusses the IT industry effects that help structure the
opportunities available to IT firms in the world and how this opportunity structure affects
IT firms in both developed countries and developing countries such as China. The
chapter argues that technical changes and increased standardization have reorganized the
IT industry into a modular organization in which firms can focus on quite narrow
competencies while drawing on outsiders from around the globe to supply. This
modularity (defined below) has opened up great opportunities for small, de-verticalized
and spatially dispersed firms to compete in the global IT industry. These effects are not
limited to the IT sector, however. The chapter concludes by arguing that the
modularization found in IT has spread to other industries.
The chapter has four sections. First, there is an introduction to the literature on
the IT industry and modularization. Then, I explain how modularization has fostered
reorganization and re-location in the IT industry. A third section offers a variety of cases
of these two phenomena mainly focusing on non-Chinese cases because the rest of the
dissertation will provide examine Chinese IT firms in detail. Finally, the fourth section
looks at the opportunities for firms from the developing world and places the IT industry
in comparative industrial context.
61 This chapter is based in part on a paper written by the author and Professors Akintunde I. Akinwande and
Charles G. Sodini of MIT's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. The author has
received permission of his co-authors to incorporate material from that paper into this chapter and would
like to take the opportunity to thank Professors Akinwande and Sodini for their generosity and
encouragement.
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Over the last decade, the electronics industry has undergone immense change
through twin processes of reorganization and relocation. While these processes started in
the 1980s, they accelerated rapidly during the course of the 1990s. Academics during
the 1990s began to recognize the massive changes in the electronics industry. Langlois
and Robertson (1995) recognized de-centralization, but their scope confined such de-
centralization to recognition of component suppliers that exist outside of the
organizational hierarchy of the lead firms. Sturgeon (2002) expanded the scope of this
de-centralization to include the use of external manufacturers. Some studies concentrated
on particular industry segments, such as PCs (Dedrick and Kraemer 1998) or hard disk
drives (HDD) (McKendrick et al 2000). Others in management studies advocated
outsourcing, but did not take a specific industry angle (Fine 1998). Many confined their
research to such processes in the US (Best 2001), which is understandable as the US has
been the driver of such networks, or to the influence of American modularity on Asia
(Borrnus 2000; Lester and Sturgeon 2003).
While all of these studies contributed immensely to scholarly understanding of
the changes taking place within the electronics industry, more recent studies have
expanded the explanatory scope about how the standardization and codification of
knowledge have led to the disintegration and modularization of the electronics production
chain. Sturgeon (2002) presents evidence of the disintegration of production process as
the manufacturing module was increasingly outsourced to contract manufacturers in the
US. Sturgeon and Lee (forthcoming) extend this analysis of the modularization of
manufacturing to a comparison of the US contract manufacturers and the Taiwanese
ODMs (original design manufacturers). Langlois (2003) sees this modularization of
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production becoming widespread in the post-Chandlerian new economy resulting in
increasing marketization of production relations or buffering through markets as opposed
to buffering through integration and management.
This study aims to extend the research on the transformation of the electronics
industry to demonstrate the extension of modularity over virtually the entire value chain
and the consequent impact on the organization of production for both products and
components. This chapter will also examine the geographic reach of these changes and
demonstrate that modularization is a global trend that both reorganizes national industries
and opens up new geographic spaces in which electronics industry activities may take
root. In short, this chapter argues that modularization has driven twin processes of
reorganization and relocation affecting the entire global electronics industry, not simply
one country or simply one particular segment.
The modularity described here is the modularity of production in the broad sense.
The term module is used to denote entire functions (design or manufacturing) in the
production process that can easily be connected informationally to other functions to
allow the flow of production. This modularization should not be confused with the
modularization of design in which firms acting independently of each other design parts
of a system following the same set of design rules (Baldwin and Clark 2000). Indeed,
Baldwin and Clark (2000: 12) acknowledge that modularity in design differs from
modularity in production.
Over the past decade, the digitization6 2 of information needed to produce
electronic industry goods has driven a profound re-organization of the value chain of
62 Digitization of information is the ability to transmit information electronically.
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electronics. Digitization has enabled the modularization of electronics value chain.63 The
basic idea of modularity is that value chains can be broken down into parts (modules)
with clearly defined (a) functions and (b) interfaces between the different functions.
These clearly defined interfaces simply hand-over processes from one function to the
next. This modularization has in turn led to segmentation of the value chain because
modularity allowed for clearly defined functions and the accompanying codification of
the necessary information needed to establish an information interface between functions
in the value chain.
The re-organization of the industry has interacted with new influences, such as the
rise of new sources of human capital, and old ones, such as the lure of low-cost locations
and jumping trade barriers, to cause a re-location of many of the electronics industry's
activities. Scholars of GPN (global production networks) (Ernst and Kim 2002) have
correctly pointed out that liberalization and deregulation of trade and investment have
facilitated relocation of industrial activities, but these factors alone would not allow the
possibilities of relocating specific activities without the reorganization of production e.g.
before the separation of design from fabrication in ICs, one could not expect the rise of
fabless suppliers in new locations around the globe. Furthermore, liberalization and
deregulation have been followed by re-regulation and other policies that are often beyond
the bounds of international agreements. For example, a variety of NTBs have been used
to keep markets protected despite entry into the WTO.
This chapter has two main points. First, digitization combined with competitive
pressure derived from utilizing this digitization to enhance the core competence of the
63 Modularization could technically be made without digitization, but there would not be clean clearly
defined interfaces so the costs of modularizing production would probably outweigh gains from focus on
core competency (see footnote two).
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firm have driven firms around the globe to re-organize along modular lines in order to
survive.64 Secondly, modularization also allows for new de-verticalized type of re-
location of the electronics industry. Modularity in conjunction with better
communications technology has allowed for spatially dispersed, de-verticalized activities
whereas in the past spatially dispersed activities could only be managed by the vertically
integrated firm. With the possibility of dispersed and de-verticalized activities, barriers
to entry have come down dramatically. New entrants from parts of the world previously
neglected by the global electronics industry have pushed re-location of certain industry
functions. When placed in a comparative industrial context, modularization combines
with rapid technical change to cause this opening of opportunities for spatially dispersed,
de-verticalized activities, but, given that the IT industry itself had a high rate of technical
change before modularization, this factor of pace of technical change is not obvious from
examining the IT industry in isolation. The final section will develop this comparison in
greater detail.
2. Processes of Reorganization and Relocation
2.1 Reorganization
The causal chain from digitization of information to segmentation of the
electronics value chain works as follows. Digitization has enabled modularization of
electronics products, which in turn has led to segmentation and codification (well-defined
interfaces or hand-offs between modules) of the value chain. Others (Sturgeon 2002)
have argued that digitization and standardization were equally necessary to create the
opportunities for modularity in the electronics industry, but digitization accelerated and
'4 For core competence, see Prahalad and Hamel (1990).
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enabled much of the standardization. Simply put, without digitization, standardization
would not have gone very far. Thus, to the extent that standardization can be
differentiated as something other than an outcome of digitization, standardization is a
necessary but not sufficient factor.
The technical innovation of digitization makes modularization feasible, but
technical innovation alone is rarely the determining factor for industrial re-organization.
Firms adopted modularization because it enabled them to hone their core competency. In
areas where there is little value to be generated by modularization, modularization is
unlikely to be pursued.65 As Steil et al (2002) and Fine (1998) among others have
pointed out, industries with faster paces of technological change are more likely to be de-
verticalized both due to lower returns to scale (Utterback and Suarez 1993), including
negative returns to scale (C. Christensen 1997), and fewer opportunities to add much
value by concentrating on particular segments.
Modularization has allowed for whole new models of organization, such as the
rise of contract manufacturers (Sturgeon 2002), which have re-defined the scope of core
competency in the electronics value chain. Firms re-defined their core competency in the
context of the opportunities and competitive pressures offered by the evolving new
organizations of the electronics industry. For example, IDMs (integrated device
manufacturers i.e. vertically integrated firms) in the IC (integrated circuit) industry have
65 This prediction assumes vertical integration prior to the digitization that affords easy modularity. Thus,
in those areas, such as the Third Italy, where social norms and historical institutional trajectory made de-
verticalized industry the norm before digitization, one would not expect modularity to have much effect on
industrial structure although it would still have the profound effect of opening up the opportunity of
sourcing or supplying certain functions from suppliers or to customers geographically distant from the
industrial district. The digitization hypothesis makes no prediction about firms that for social normative
reasons want to be modular. The areas with the most modularized industry before digitization, the Italian
and German industrial districts, are not centers of electronics so their experiences are outside the scope of
this study, see Sabel and Piore (1984).
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begun to dramatically re-define their core competency towards design plus some
manufacturing in light of the maturity and cost pressures of the leading pureplay
foundries. Similarly, branded PC firms have begun to shed manufacturing while re-
focusing on marketing, distribution and after-sales service. Firms or even whole societies
that have resisted the new re-organization have suffered from a loss of competitive
advantage as the new organization has taken away their core competence. The Japanese
electronics industry has been the most reluctant to embrace this model, but the costs of
this reluctance have forced even Japanese firms to begin to adopt the new segmented
approach to organization.
Modularization has created new industry structures that have allowed for new
firm entry as firms take advantage of the lower cost of entry in narrowly defined niches in
the reorganized industrial structures. One example is IC design. Design firms arose well
before the modularization was complete, but they faced difficult barriers to coordinating
production and technological barriers. IC design houses can access an array of services
that have arisen with re-organization. Reorganization may even cause a virtuous cycle of
new firm creation as firms think of new ways to focus on a segment or functions of the
value chain, and look for partners to help them to facilitate this strategy. For example,
the rise of the pureplay foundries helped to drive the rise of the ASIC (application
specific integrated circuits) vendors, firms that offer design services for the backend chip
design, as foundries looked to partner with ASIC vendors to enhance the services offered
to their design house customers. Critically, the facilitation of entry of new firms goes
hand-in-hand with re-location as many new firms filling new niches appeared in parts of
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the world with previous little experience in those activities, such as the rise of foundry
fabrication in Taiwan and Singapore.
Intellectual property (IP) protection is critical for the process of reorganization to
work. Moving to segmentation is not a seamless and riskless transition. Focusing on a
narrow segment is itself fraught with risks. Dependence on those outside the firm
hierarchy is increased dramatically. Obviously, the transaction costs in terms of
information flows have decreased dramatically with digitization, but there are risks
inherent in sharing this information. The vulnerability of one's IP increases even as the
digitization makes the information flows less costly. Thus, IP protection is critical to the
functioning of this new system because without adequate protection the costs of the new
organization of the electronics industry vastly outweigh the gains reaped from focusing
on the firm's core competency. The ability to protect a customer's IP has become one
way to create a competitive edge over one's competitors in the electronics industry as
will be discussed below in the pureplay foundry example.
2.2 Relocation
Modularity combined with better communication at lower costs opens up
opportunities for de-verticalized, spatially dispersed activities. In the past, only large
vertically integrated enterprises had the ability to spatially disperse their activities
because hierarchy was needed to overcome the coordination and communication
problems (Saxenian 2000: 259). Small firms at the very least needed to be in the vicinity
of other firms to make use of the external economies of scale and scope, the industrial
district model, because they did not have the capabilities to do everything in house and
120
they could not control outsourced activities at a distance. Today, fabless design houses
around the world make use of the foundries of Taiwan and Singapore. Likewise, the
branded electronics firms from the advanced economies make use of CEMs (contract
electronics manufacturers), brandless firms that offer manufacturing services, and ODMs
(original design manufacturers), brandless firms which offer both manufacturing and
product design services. The CEMs and ODMs are headquartered primarily in the US
and Taiwan, respectively, but they have manufacturing facilities around the globe.
However, the plants of the Taiwanese ODMs are much more concentrated in developing
East Asia than the plants of the more global CEMs operating from the US (Sturgeon and
Lee, forthcoming). The production facilities do not need to be near the contract
manufacturer's headquarters nor near the branded firm.
What is different about the new relocation of the global electronics industry is the
role of small and new technology enterprises. New entrants seizing the opportunities
afforded by the reorganization of the global electronics industry have pushed the
geographic boundaries of the industry to encompass more and more of the world.
Generally, occupying relatively high value-added functions along the value chain, these
new entrants have placed their home location on the global electronics map rather than
waiting for MNCs to take advantage of the opportunities of reorganization to promote
new locations in the developing world. MNCs tend to be first movers in those areas
where they are looking to unload lower value-added functions just as they were in past
relocations. For example, domestic entrants in Taiwan created the whole ODM model
and thereby drove the relocation of electronics manufacturing and, more importantly,
design to the new site of Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s. When electronics hardware
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manufacturing became relatively commoditized in the late 1990s, the Taiwanese ODM
and US CEM firms moved low-end box manufacturing to China, but the Taiwanese
ODMs retained most of the value-added design and service functions at home. However,
the Taiwanese have begun to move some design functions to China.
Along with modularity and better communications, the other new critical factor in
determining location is human capital. Human capital has always been necessary to
develop sophisticated technology-intensive products. The interaction between the
increasing demands for skilled personnel and the ability to utilize such personnel over
great distances without necessarily paying the cost of setting up operations in the distant
locale is new. This interaction gives rise to a pressing incentive to relocate and has given
rise to new industries in new locations, such as the software industry in Bangalore, and to
the concentration of certain functions in old locations, such as innovative IC design
clusters in the US.
Other old factors still play a role in shaping locational decisions in the new global
electronics industry. States still subsidize various activities in order to encourage those
activities within their borders. Lower labor costs still attract firms making location
decisions. Even with the WTO and ITA, trade barriers and regional trade pacts influence
locational decisions. Managing geographic risk has always been a concern and has
become even more of one now that activities are often located so far from the home base.
The classic new electronics industry example of this concern was the call for Taiwanese
foundries to set up more operations outside of Taiwan in wake of the Taiwanese
earthquake in 1999 despite the fact that the Taiwanese foundries were able to resume
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production within a few days. More recently, firms have begun to reassess the
concentration of manufacturing in China in the wake of SARS.
3. The Segmentation of the Component and Product Value Chains
Figure 3.1 Electronic Component Value Chain Mlodel
The Electronic Component Value Chain depicted in Figure 3.1 shows the specific
functions that have emerged through the reorganization of the electronics components
chain. We will explain the component value chain using the integrated circuit (IC) as an
example since the IC is clearly the dominant key component in most electronic products.
I will discuss each segment and give an example from the IC industry. Before designing
a component, firms often attempt to define the component to meet or create a new market
demand. This component definition could be considered a form of proactive marketing.
Some IC firms interact closely with product houses to determine what types of new ICs
they need and then design to these specifications. For example, engineers at ST Micro
spend significant amounts of time interacting with product engineers at Nokia to create
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the ICs that meet Nokia's specifications for new generations of cellular phones. The
component definition function is the link between the electronic products and the key
components it requires. Component definition is performed by both electronics products
companies and by component companies.
The component definition is rarely done in isolation as the single function
undertaken by a company. While both product companies and component companies do
this function, this function differs from others in that the digitized interface does not flow
in both directions. The component definition module has a clean, digitized interface with
component design, but lacks such an interface with the product definition or design, the
functions in the product value chain (see below), with which component definition
interacts. Thus, product companies that outsource for non-standardized components must
work with the component providers closely during the process of component definition as
in the ST Micro and Nokia example above. Another way to overcome this digital divide
between the product and component value chains is for the component definer to provide
all necessary information to aid the product producer to design and manufacture to the
component specifications. In this case, the component definer has already designed the
component before the close interaction with the component customers occurs. Intel's
large support staff that aids firms that design and manufacture PCs to design and
manufacture for Intel's CPUs is a prominent example of this type of interaction.
The design function contains both Innovative and Detailed Design. The
innovative design function captures the higher value design skills where the design
engineers must have a deep understanding and experience in silicon circuit and system
design to translate the component definition into custom analog or digital circuits.
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Designers capable of performing this function require significant training and mentoring
and usually have at least a MS degree in electrical engineering. Therefore it has been
difficult to find engineers with these skills in emerging economies. This function is
highly valued and can often provide a high barrier to entry. Detailed design consists of
the relatively less complex tasks of translating the component definition or the innovative
IC design into data that is ready to be sent to wafer fabrication. This data is called "mask
data" referring to the detailed digitized drawings that will appear as layers in the silicon
fabrication process. IP vendors, such as Artisan and ARM, and EDA tool providers, such
as Cadence and Synopsys, provide much of the technology for both Innovative and
Detailed IC design. Some fabless design houses, such as Broadcom and Silicon Labs,
concentrate on the higher valued innovative design function, but generally perform
detailed design as well. Others, such as ALI, are taking advantage of this design
segmentation by performing the detailed designs in lower skilled/lower cost locations,
such as China, while retaining innovative design in Taiwan and the US.
There is significant know-how at the interface of the design functions and the
wafer fab functions. The IC fabrication process and resulting device specifications are
captured in a sophisticated set of models that are provided by the wafer foundries. These
models capture the detailed physics of the transistors so that the designers can simulate
the operation of the circuit before fabrication. The successful wafer foundries have
considerable expertise in making this interface user friendly with the aid of web-based
tools for easy information transfer. Wafer fabrication takes the IC design and creates
actual circuitry on a silicon wafer. Process tools, the capital equipment used by wafer
fabs, embody most of the process technology. Thus, the process technology R&D is
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carried out by the process technology firms, such as Applied Materials, Nikon and
ASML. In terms of process R&D, the IDMs and foundries carry out the process
integration from machine to machine and the interface back to design. The assembly and
test function adds the packaging that allows the chip to interface with other electronic
components and then tests the packaged IC. Some firms do both processes, but many
firms do solely assembly or testing. Marketing and distribution of ICs is an important
function of the component value chain as these components have in some cases become
brand names, such as Intel's CPUs. Specialized distributors also do the marketing and
distribution function.
IDMs perform all 5 functions though they often outsource assembly and test.
They attempt to do value-added processes in wafer fabs and capture systems design of
products in silicon. Many IDMs are following a fab-light strategy that follows in line
with the progressive abandonment of in-house assembly and test operations.
Foundries perform only the fabrication function. While much of the technology is
captured in fab tools, foundries do have large and growing R&D departments for process
technology and also capture value by being more efficient in fabrication due to their
focus and flexibility. Competing with flexibility, multiple processes and multiple
products share the same fabrication facilities and even the same wafer as in TSMC's
MPW (multi-product wafer) production. Foundries also compete on the service elements
of fabrication by trying to provide ever more detailed information about the timing and
quality of production to their customers via the Internet. At the leading foundries,
customers can receive real-time data on their wafers as they are being fabricated.
Critically, the need for a design firm to reveal IP to foundries in order for the foundry to
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be able to fabricate the chips necessitates that foundries strive to protect customer IP in
order to keep clients and attract new ones.
R
S
Figure 3.2 Electronics Products Value Chain Model
The Electronics Product Value Chain stretches from defining what the product is
to marketing and distributing the product, which includes provision of services to end-
users of the product. Product definition consists of trying to create a product concept that
will sell in the market. This function requires both sophisticated knowledge of the
market demands, extant (Market Pull) and latent (Market Push), coupled with highly
valued design engineering to define the product. Design is the creation of a product
blueprint that matches the specifications of the product definition. Manufacturing and
test turns these designs into the physical products and tests them. Marketing and
distribution maintains brand image, identifies and creates consumers for the products and
manages the complex logistics of delivering to them. Marketing and distribution has
become one of the key value generating functions of the electronics product value chain
as manufacturing know-how has spread and become increasingly commoditized. Large
retail firms, such as Walmart, within the marketing and distribution function play a
significant role by sending feedback to the firms in the product definition and product
design functions as the large retailers send volume orders for products with certain
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specifications. Given that these large retail chains are dealing with products with very
large volumes, commoditized products, and lack any R&D capability to generate new
products based on new technologies, they are sending signals to the product design
function for an evolutionary change. For example, the large retailer sends orders for a 2
MP (mega-pixel) digital camera with removable storage card. This feedback rarely
results in a new product definition where the goal is to create new products differentiated
from the competitors. The services provided to the end-user as part of the purchase of the
product are becoming a critical value generator, which will be highlighted in the case
studies.
In the product value chain, large MNCs tend to be strong in product definition,
marketing, distribution and service, which constitute the core activities of maintaining a
brand. While these MNCs may constitute flagship enterprises (Rugman and D'Cruz
2000: 84; Ernst and Kim 2002:1422) in the sense of having extensive influence over the
other activities in the chain, these branded firms do meet their match in terms of suppliers
of critical, technology-intensive activities that exercise reciprocal influence with the
branded MNC e.g. Qualcomm and cellular phone brands or Intel and PC brands.
Vertically integrated firms are now a rarity though some large firms are developing new
business models in which they perform multiple functions that are not contiguous in the
value chain. For example, there are companies that define products, market them and
have a service component. Others attempt to straddle the component and product chains
by defining products and then capturing the concept in silicon. Detailed design and
manufacturing are often sub-contracted. ODMs do design and manufacturing in an
attempt to add value through detailed design, and CEMs do just manufacturing.
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The electronics value chain was not always organized into two distinct chains
separating components and products. Often, the two chains were integrated within the
firm. Macher and hi colleagues note in US Industry in 2000 that the so-called merchant
IC firms, what would later be called IDMs, were a type of firm particular to the US and
that IC activities in Europe and Japan tended to take place within the vertically-integrated
box manufacturers (Macher et al. 1999). Even in the US, a number of firms, such as
IBM, were integrated in this fashion. A number of firms still contain many or all of the
functions of these two chains within the firm even if they do not necessarily rely on their
in-house activities. For example, IBM has a significant IC components group and a
computing systems group, but the computing systems group does not necessarily procure
its ICs from the IC group. Given these historical roots, a significant number of firms try
to straddle these two chains even as they react to pressures to focus.
4. Case Studies
4.1 Component Chain
4.1.1 TSMC: The Rise of the Pureplay Foundry and the Reorganization of the
Global IC Components Value Chain
When the Taiwanese first started to create private IC firms in the early 1980s,
integrated device manufacturers (IDMs) dominated the global IC industry. IDMs
vertically integrated the production of ICs from the design segment to fabrication through
to the test and assembly stages. Led by a returnee from the US, Morris Chang, TSMC
experimented with a new type of firm organization for the IC industry that took
advantage of several emerging technological opportunities. Chang conceived of a firm
that would focus on fabrication of the ICs leaving the design and the test and assembly
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stages to other firms. While many IDMs had served as foundries for chip designers as a
sideline to their own business, this new model was called the pureplay foundry model
because it would focus solely on being a fabrication foundry for its customers and
undertake no other activities. This decoupling of the IC design and fabrication functions
was demonstrated initially by some university and DARPA projects in the US, and led to
the formation of MOSIS, which essentially provided technical proof of the concept of a
digital interface of design and fabrication. However, no one had proven that this concept
would work in actual IC production. The decoupling of the IC design and fabrication
stages was made possible by the ability to codify knowledge of device characteristics in
computer models using CAD (computer aided design) technology. TSMC actually may
have over-anticipated this trend by trying to use this model in the late 1980s while
sufficient computer modeling of the interaction was not possible until about 1993-1994.
Nevertheless, TSMC definitely reaped the advantages of being the first mover in this
field as the technological trends justified this new type of fabrication-only firm, the
pureplay foundry, and TSMC outstripped its Taiwanese rivals to become the largest IC
producer in Taiwan in 1993. TSMC's sales revenues were 475 million USD in 1993 and
grew to roughly 5.3 billion USD in 2000, an increase of over 1100 percent (TENS 2001).
From the beginning of TSMC's invention of the pureplay foundry model, TSMC was the
largest pureplay foundry and remains so today.
One example of how difficult it was to manage a fabless design house before the
emergence of TSMC and its pureplay foundry model is the operational tight-rope act that
Crystal Semiconductor, one of the early American fabless design houses, had to carry out
to ensure the fabrication of its chips. Crystal had to coordinate production done in the
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fabs of seven different IDMs in order to have access to the best foundry service for a
particular product and to ensure that the fabless firm was not too dependent on a single
IDM firm. The logistical nightmare that Crystal had to endure in a world without
pureplay foundries points to the great opportunity for those firms that eventually figured
out how to be pure providers of foundry services.
The pureplay foundry model succeeded not only because the trend of de-coupling
led to the emergence of a large number of fabless design houses in search of fabrication
services, but also due to the ability of pureplay foundries to capitalize on the benefits of
focus. Pureplay foundries devoted their energies to increasing the sophistication of their
wafer production rather than having their energies and R&D budgets split between
product innovation and fabrication process innovation. The pureplay foundry model
was also ideal for firms that were technologically behind because they could learn from
their customers primarily through customer feedback. While this type of learning
through customer feedback continues to this day, the feedback mechanism and more
direct demands and technology transfers were critical in the early stages to be able to
catch up to the process technology of advanced firms. For example, VLSI Technology
transferred specifications for 1.2 micron technology to help TSMC upgrade to that level
of process technology (Mathews and Cho 2000: 172).
The Taiwanese foundries with TSMC in the lead soon became world leaders in
being able to produce multiple products with multiple processes within a single fab and in
achieving extremely high production yields. Today, there are credible reports that the
leading Taiwanese foundries are among the industry leaders in process technology
(Cataldo 2001). The yearly benchmarking done by the quasi-governmental ITRI saw
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Taiwan, represented by Taiwan's foundries, at the technological frontier along with the
US and Japan in CMOS logic fabrication at .13-micron process technology (TSIA 2001).
Not taking a back seat to other leading firms in creating the generation beyond .13-
micron, TSMC has been cooperating with other leading IC firms including members of
the Crolles-2 alliance and NEC to align their next generation of process technology, .90-
micron technology (Lapedus 2002). However, it must be acknowledged that the
Taiwanese foundries recently have also been able to take advantage of the trend towards
embodying greater amounts of process technology in the capital equipment to keep up
with the technological frontier.66
The foundry model started by the Taiwanese and buttressed by the increasing
modularization of the electronics value chain has begun to spread (see Table 3.1). The
top five foundry firms come not only from Taiwan, but also from other countries, such as
the China and Korea, in which there were existing wafer fabs but no major pure foundries
until the last several years. IBM's foundry services are also beginning to give the
Taiwanese foundries competitive pressure in high-end manufacturing as a number of
loyal customers of Taiwan's foundries, such as Nvidia, have begun to employ IBM as
well. Thus, modularization can even give rise to new industrial models in old centers of
industry. New entrants in the developing world are becoming numerous.
66 This account of TSMC and the rise of the foundry model is based on Fuller, Akinwande and Sodini 2003.
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Table 3.1 Top 15 Pureplay Foundries in 2003
Source: IC Insights.
2003 Company 2003 revenue Location
(USD millions)
1 TSMC 5855 Taiwan
2 UMC 2740 Taiwan
3 Chartered 725 Singapore
4 SMIC 365 China
5 Dongbu Anam 330 Korea
6 Jazz 185 US
7 HHNEC 170 China
8 SSMC 155 Singapore
9 X Fab 127 Germany
10 ASMC 125 China
11 CSMC-HJ 120 China
12 Silterra 87 Malaysia
13 Polar Fab 85 US
14 1 st Silicon 83 Malaysia
15 Tower 65 Israel
4.1.2 AMLCDs: The Integrated Model Continues in Some Components
Not all the component production has become as de-verticalized as the ICs with
the rise pureplay foundries.6 7 AMLCDs (active matrix liquid crystal displays) thus far
continue to be assembled in vertically organized firms containing design, manufacturing,
assembly and marketing in house. One should note that a major difference between
AMLCDs and ICs is that AMLCDs are comparatively design-light components with
most of the design activities taking place at the system level rather than at the level of the
AMLCD glass. Thus, there is very little value except in the highest performance displays
to capture by solely doing design of AMLCD in contrast to IC design so one would
expect continued vertical integration. The new Taiwanese and Korean entrants usually
have received technology from the Japanese and the Taiwanese in particular do not have
67 For further differentiation between components, see Fuller et al (2003). Their paper breaks down ICs
into separate categories, and compares logic and DRAM (dynamic random access memory) ICs to
AMLCDs.
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much design capability. The Japanese tried to pursue a fab-light strategy of outsourcing
production to the Taiwanese AMLCD fabs while the Koreans and, secondarily, the
Taiwanese, are trying to do more of the design themselves. Due to the design-light
nature of AMLCDs, the Japanese could not capture much value with only design so many
are in the process of retreating from the AMLCD market with Sharp the only significant
remaining producer investing in the new generation of production equipment in Japan.
Similar to ICs, much of the process technology is embodied in the tools, easing the
technological barriers to entry for new entrants somewhat. Thus, both the new entrants
and the old dominant player, Japan, are trying to do all the functions in the chain at least
partially in-house though many of the Japanese players are in the process of exit from the
AMLCD industry altogether.
4.1.3 Twelve-inch Fabs and Further De-verticalization of the IC Component
Value Chain
With the rise of the foundries and the advent of expensive but efficient twelve-
inch wafer fabs (estimated to cost between 2.5 and 3.5 billion USD according to
Taiwan's Market Intelligence Center), the question arises about the viability of any IDMs
or firms attempting to do both design and manufacturing. The 12-inch fabs do not
possess any inherent technological difference from 8-inch fabs, but they are much more
expensive and much more efficient than 8-inch fabs with cost savings of 30-40% over 8-
inch fabs assuming 80% utilization (Asia Tech Strategy Team 2002: 11). Thus, to remain
competitive, firms must move to 12-inch fabs, but not all IDMs can actually afford to do
so. The answer according to the detailed analysis of one investment bank is that IDMs
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with large revenue streams and high profitability can meet the challenge of keeping 12-
inch production in-house where as small and unprofitable producers should outsource.
Furthermore, leading IDMs may be wary to pass on leading process technologies to
foundries that help their competitors. For example, the investment bank's analysis of
Intel notes:
Additionally by owning 12-inch fabs, Intel does not pass leading-edge
technology know-how to foundries, which produce chips for rivals such
as AMD, VIA and Transmeta. Traditionally, Intel migrates CPU
production to the newest processes and wafer-size fabs in order to drive
down die cost, while leaving previous processes and wafer-size fabs for
production of its other devices, such as flash, chipsets, Ethernet ICs,
which rely less on the most advanced manufacturing technologies (Asia
Tech Strategy Team 2002: 15).
The strategies to deal with the high cost of 12-inch fabs go beyond the stark in-
house or outsource dichotomy. Other strategies are partial ownership of fabs in
conjunction with foundries or IDMS, guaranteed access to fab capacity by investment in
foundries or swapping technology for fab space. TI, like Intel, is an IDM with high
margin, large volume products, such as TI's DSPs, but in order "to mitigate risks in
leading-edge technology, TI plans to outsource select products using. 13 micron copper
interconnect to TSMC and UMC." (Asia Tech Strategy Team 2002: 15) Mitigating risks
refers to mitigating the risks of independently implementing leading-edge process
technologies. ST Micro is taking a very similar approach to TI as they are outsourcing
some production to TSMC due to the same interest in mitigating risk even while they are
keeping much of the production in-house due to the ability to create a wide array of high
margin products. ST Micro is currently investing in a joint 12-inch fabrication facility
with Philips in Crolles, France.
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One of the leading IDMs (IPC Interviews)6 8 intent on keeping manufacturing in-
house identified three key reasons. First, to keep the knowledge of manufacturing
because once you stop you lose it irretrievably. Secondly, the IDM wants to optimize the
supply chain by achieving faster time to volume. The close interaction of design and
wafer fabrication has the potential to improve this critical metric. Thirdly, the cost of the
component to the IDM could be lower since the IDMs do not have to pay the overhead
costs and profit margins to the foundry. I find the first and third reasons rather weak. I
believe that one can re-attain manufacturing, but it is expensive. It may not be possible
for a company to re-learn IC manufacturing without some help from government. For
the third reason to hold, the differential cost between the IDM and the foundry has to be
lower than the profit margins charged by the foundry, and this is often the case. Other
IDMs, such as Motorola, will adopt what Motorola describes as an "asset-light" strategy
in which most of the production is outsourced but some production is kept in-house to
have some guaranteed production capacity. Significantly, even the foundries are trying to
jointly invest in fabs with IDMs to lower their capital burden. For example, Infineon and
UMC are building a joint 12-inch fab in Singapore.
4.1.4 ARM: IP Provider and Fabless Design Firm
To give an idea about the newness of the new modularized chain of the
electronics components industry, one need only look at ARM, one of the largest IP
providers in the IC industry. ARM's products are generally IP cores though they also sell
68 IPC Interviews were interviews conducted with electronics firms by Professors Akinwande, Sodini and
myself as part of the Industrial Performance Center of MIT's research project on the globalization of the
electronics sector. The interviews were done under the condition that firms' names would not be released
to the public.
136
fully designed chips. IP cores are blocks of design that firms can buy from the IP
providers. ARM was spun out of Acorn Computer in 1990 with a charter to create a new
microprocessor standard. It started shipping IP cores in 1991. The firm listed five years
ago. Firms need IP providers like ARM because the IC industry faces a simple fact of
widening gap between complexity of design and design productivity (Linden and Somaya
2003). In the 1989-1991 period, an advanced IC design took 100 man-years to design
circuit by circuit. In the near future, 8500 man-years will be required. Thus, IP cores are
a necessary part of both innovative and detailed IC design to bring products quickly to
market (East 2003). ARM is most famous for providing processor IP cores to be placed
in others design, but the firm also does full-fledged IC design itself( East 2003). ARM's
rise has been part of the growth of a cluster of IC design innovation around Cambridge,
UK, demonstrating how the modularized structure of the IC industry has given rise to
new clusters in new areas. These new clusters are not necessarily only in developing or
recently developed economies, such as Bangalore, India or Hsinchu, Taiwan, but can also
arise in mature industrial economies such as the UK.
4.1.5 Innovative IC Design: Broadcom
One of the most successful fabless design firms is Broadcom Corporation based in
southern California. This company founded in 1991 has produced revenues in 2003 over
$1.5 billion or over 75% of the revenue of the CPU-heavy IDM, AMD (iSuppli data for
AMD and IC Insights data for Broadcom). Broadcom was one of the first companies to
focus on fully integrated broadband communication components. Their core
technological expertise includes communications systems, algorithms and protocols
137
coupled with advanced digital signal processing hardware architectures. In addition, their
integrated circuit design expertise includes high performance RF, analog and mixed
signal circuits, such that their final integrated circuit contains most of the functionality
needed by the systems integrator.
Within the electronic component value chain model, Broadcom clearly has
significant strength in component definition and innovative integrated circuit design. The
component definition expertise is a large set of key broadband markets including wireless
networks, cable/satellite set top boxes, cable modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL) and
a number of others. Their innovative IC design expertise includes the innovation of radio
frequency, analog and mixed signal circuit design placed on the same integrated circuit as
the digital signal processing hardware which implements the communication algorithms.
Broadcom uses standard CMOS process technologies allowing them to fabricate their
designs in a variety of silicon foundries including TSMC, Chartered and NEC in Japan.
They have recently also been manufacturing at Semiconductor Manufacturing
International Corporation (SMIC) in China. Broadcom's assembly and test is also done
at companies in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.
Broadcom is one of many examples of successful fabless design houses that
concentrate on component definition and innovative IC design in specific markets. Other
examples of these types of firms are Silicon Labs, CSR (Cambridge Silicon Radio),
Mediatek, Zoran and the former S. Parthus (now part of DSP Group) dispersed across the
globe in Austin, TX, the UK, Taiwan, Israel69 and Ireland. There are a large number of
69 Zoran's CEO and CTO are in the US, but the entire team of technologists for this firm is based in Israel. I
learned about Zoran's organization from my colleague, Danny Breznitz.
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start-up fabless design houses developing integrated circuits for a variety of markets. The
barrier to entry is not financially large, however the skill sets required for world-class
component definition in specific markets coupled with innovative IC design capabilities
is a scarce resource.
The fabless model is beginning to reach into new emerging economies as
Taiwan's VIA and ALI have large design teams in Hangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing in
China. IDT has a large design subsidiary in Shanghai called IDT Newave, which was
essentially a start-up that IDT bought out for 80 million USD. Over 200 senior (more
than ten years of experience in IC design) design engineers have returned to Shanghai
alone to start firms in the last several years (Interview #269). While many of these firms
will be more oriented toward detailed rather than innovative design, they still represent a
vanguard in emerging economies as China has had little IC design activities until the
recent push by such returnee firms and the Taiwanese. Chapter Five will discuss China's
IC design activities in detail.
4.2 Product Chain
4.2.1 Manufacturing and Manufacturing-plus: Contract Manufacturers versus
ODMs
Contract manufacturers arose in the US primarily as a result of branded firms
spinning off their manufacturing to focus on core competencies, such as product
definition and marketing and distribution. For example, IBM spun off Celestica. These
firms were intended as a manufacturing resource and were not intended to do design in
competition with their branded customers. Thus, most of these firms have stuck to the
model of concentrating solely on manufacturing though Flextronics has begun to move
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towards a more design-heavy model. The contract manufacturers tend to do a wide range
of products and have a large number of plants placed globally to better serve their
customers (Sturgeon 2002).
In contrast, the ODMs arose primarily from small enterprises based in Taiwan.
The dominant producers in this sector in the initial stage were American producers. The
activities of these foreign producers in Taiwan were significant because they were
pursuing the core manufacturing activities in the production of PCs whereas they only
pursued the backend tasks of assembly and testing in the IC sector. In the late 1970s,
foreign manufacturers made up the great bulk of PC-related production in Taiwan.70
During the 1980s, the share of foreign computers manufactured in Taiwan gradually
declined from 57 percent in 1984 to 30 percent in 1990.7' By 1995, the figure was down
to 15 percent.72 Figures for the foreign manufacturing segment are no longer kept by
Taiwan's Market Intelligence Center as this segment is insignificant. However, the state
did not make any efforts to drive them out. The decline in production by these American
MNCs is attributable to their strategy of increasing outsourcing of production and the rise
of the modular value chain.
The large foreign presence was critical in several ways. Kawakami (1996) argues
that the firms stimulated the components industry, offered technological assistance to
their Taiwanese suppliers, nurtured human resources and served to demonstrate what
70 Momoko Kawakami (1996: 3), based on the Ministry of Economic Affair's Industrial Development
Bureau's Annual Report 1982-1983, argues that in 1979 the only PC manufacturers in Taiwan were
American ones aside from possible procurement from the small component suppliers implied by
Kawakami's data (1996: 16-17). However, at least one Taiwanese firm was involved in minicomputer
Chinese language input device production since 1974, IPC Interview.
71 Kawakami (1996: 6).
72 Chin-yeong Hwang (1995: 45).
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were the new products demanded by the international market.73 The very fact that these
firms were already in Taiwan also made the transition from vertically integrated
producers to brand firms outsourcing to Taiwanese OEM firms that much easier. The
logic behind the OEM relationship helps to explain how these firms were able to foster
technological upgrading outside of ERSO while they were still very small companies. As
Lee and Chen (2000) argue, these OEM manufacturing firms can leverage their
relationships with outsourcing partners to upgrade.74 The experience of Mitac, Acer and
other firms, such as the PCB (printed circuit board)-manufacturer, Compeq (called
Compaq in English until lawyers from the U.S. Compaq caught up with it), confirms this
theory of upgrading. The intensive OEM relationships with foreign, particularly U.S.
firms, and the ability of relatively small firms to enter into PC production in the early
years help to explain why the government R&D center, ITRI, did not play as critical a
role in the development and diffusion of technology as it did in the IC industry.
The Taiwanese PC producers have been heralded as shifting from OEM to ODM
production.7 5 The primary purpose of the out-sourcing firm in an OEM relationship is to
reduce production costs so OEM production tends to have low margins. Thus, the logic
behind this move to ODM is to increase margins because OEM manufacturing's low
margins.76 The addition of global logistics services seems to be a further bid to enhance
or at least preserve value as global customers demand these services from OEM/ODM
73 Kawakami (1996: 12-17).
74 Ji-ren Lee and Jen-Shyang Chen (2000) argue that firms can upgrade from OEM to ODM, but, given
Kawakami's evidence from the relationships between outsourcing firms and OEM firms in the early years
of Taiwan's PC industry, this argument should also be extended backwards to the initial stage when the
outsourcing firms had the incentive to upgrade the manufacturing abilities of local firms to at least a
minimum acceptable level.
75 Chi Schive (2000: 2).
76 Lee and Chen (2000: 7).
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suppliers.77 However, interviews conducted by the authors with the PC and notebook
manufacturers in Taiwan indicate that the move to ODM in just these products has not
been a sufficient boost to margins so Taiwanese ODM firms have sought to diversify into
a wider range of products. PC and notebook makers such as Quanta, Compal, Acer
Group-affiliated BenQ, Wistron, Arima and Inventec have expanded into cellular phone
market as these firms anticipate that this will not only be a large market, but wireless
communications will be necessary for future products as communications, consumer and
computing products converge. Their entrant into this market appears to be quite
successful as they have been able to receive orders from major branded firms.
Table 2 Global Mobile Phone ODMs and Their Customers
Source: Arcchart Blueprint, August 21, 2003
ODM Country of Models Customer Customer
Origin Country of
Origin
Arima Taiwan T100, A3618, Sony Ericsson, Japan, Sweden
T535i Toshiba
BenQ Taiwan T190, T191, C300 Motorola US
Compal Taiwan E360, E365, G60 Motorola, US, Japan
Panasonic
Dbtel Taiwan N/A Siemens Germany
GVC Taiwan R600, T200 Sony Ericsson Japan, Sweden
HTC Taiwan XDA, SPV, SX56 Orange, Siemens UK, Germany
Microcell Finland (US) T66 Sony Ericsson Japan, Sweden
(Flextronics)
Quanta Taiwan GD55, G50, CL50 Panasonic, Japan, Germany
Siemens
4.2.2 Branded Firms: Product Definition and Marketing and
Core Functions
Distribution as the
77 Schive (2000:2) and IPC Interviews with Taiwanese PC manufacturers.
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A number of branded firms have shed other functions to focus on defining
products and then creating and managing markets for these products. The epitome of this
model is Dell. In 2001, Dell finally displaced long-standing best-selling notebook
vendor, Toshiba, as the largest notebook vendor in the world. Dell has surpassed Toshiba
to become largest global notebook computer firm after Toshiba had been the largest for
seven straight years. Dell had about 14% of the market share in 2001. Dell has
surpassed Toshiba because Dell has low cost manufacturing, better service to its end
customers and direct sales to the consumer. Dell's typical inventory is 4 days while
Toshiba is 20 days. The same notebook model costs 160K Yen for Dell and 260K Yen
for Toshiba to produce and deliver to the customer (IPC Interviews).
The reason for these gaps in inventory time and cost is the decision of Dell to
outsource everything but product definition and some product design (Christensen 2001:
109). In contrast, Toshiba has been one of the firms most slow and reluctant to outsource
with only marginal outsourcing to the Taiwanese ODM notebook manufacturers.
Toshiba has emphasized the need to keep production of systems as well as components
in-house to be able to do the product definition for innovative, new products. While the
ability to create key components may give Toshiba a leg up in defining products (see the
discussion of straddling chain below), keeping manufacturing in-house appears to be a
losing proposition when up against the modularized outsourcing model used by Dell and
increasingly other manufacturers. Obviously, Dell also enjoys a first mover advantage in
terms of its use of the Internet compared to other branded PC firms, but the Dell-Toshiba
contrast reflects the larger contrast between the US brands and their Japanese rivals. The
former have taken advantage of the modularized value chain to dominate the global PC
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market while their Japanese rivals have been slow to seize the opportunity to outsource
and consequently have a much smaller global PC presence.
4.2.3 Product Design Firms
One product area where a number of design firms have emerged around the globe
is mobile phone design. These firms design the mobile phones and then sell them to
manufacturers for production and branding. The brand firm usually retains the industrial
design and sometimes insists on its own user interface. The table below shows the
geographic dispersion of these product design houses.
Table 3 Mobile Phone Product Design Firms
Source: Company websites.
Firm Name Location of Design Operations
Microcell (Flextronics) Finland
Wavecom France, US
Elektrobit Finland, US
Alphacell Israel, US
Cellon US, France, Korea, China, Canada
4.2.4 IBM and Philips as Value-added Services in the Product Value Chain
Large vertically integrated companies such as Philips and IBM have been
changing the functions they perform. They no longer see the need to keep all functions in
house. Rather, they have shed significant fractions of their manufacturing capabilities in
the last few years. They are also shedding some of their component manufacturing. For
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example, IBM no longer is manufacturing DRAM and Philips recently sold its CCD
imager manufacturing to DALSA, a Canadian image sensor company.
Large vertically integrated companies are searching to find the right combination
of functions to perform for their specific business. One very new development is the
recognition of the importance of value-added service to electronics products. For
example, Philips wants to create products where it gets in the position of making revenue
daily instead of once every 5 years when it sells products such as a television. Brand
names of major vertically integrated companies are under attack since service providers
have more name recognition than the makers of the products. In mobile phones, service
providers can demand to have their name put on a phone rather than the maker of the
phone. NTT DoCoMo uses this strategy. The brand name on the phone is that of the
service provider not the maker of the phone. Pretty soon that may be the case for a
variety of consumer products.
To deal with this new threat major vertically integrated electronics companies are
developing products with a value added service component. IBM has placed an
enormous investment in its business services group. Although it is an open question as to
whether they will tie this service to specific hardware products that they manufacture, it
appears that this opportunity is being explored by most large vertically integrated
manufacturers in the US and Europe.
4.3 Straddling the Component and Product Supply Chains
A number of companies still link the component and product chains within the
firm hierarchy. However, unlike the past, many of these firms pick and choose a few
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functions from each chain rather than being vertically integrated mammoths. A senior
manager from Hitachi is working on incubating a company within Hitachi. The product is
based on a very simple silicon chip that is an RFID tag he calls the Mu chip. Unlike other
RFID tags, such as those made by TI, this one can only transmit (no receiving capability).
Its data is programmed at manufacturing. The interesting part about this product is that it
is an entire system. A box to receive signals from a number of tags connects to a
computer system with a sophisticated database. The user can program how he wants to
use the knowledge of the location of the devices. A description of the entire product was
given to us in a set of foils. The interesting point to be learned from this story is that this
manger from Hitachi recognized that the service function must be emphasized to generate
value. The service function is becoming a new focus of attention in large vertically
integrated companies. As mentioned in the Philips and IBM examples above, they are
realizing that their brand recognition can only reap rewards if it is their brand name that
the customer is ultimately buying. Since service providers are also close to the customer
they pose a serious threat to the brand name of vertically integrated companies. This
RFID tag system requires all the functions from component design to marketing and
distribution. The manager stressed that they need not all be performed in Hitachi after its
initial development.
Other firms have pursued similar straddling strategies. For example, HP created
ink jet print heads using a proprietary technology developed at HP. These print heads are
the key components for the ink jet printer. HP sells own brand printers as well as selling
ink jet heads to other printer makers, but the intermediate steps of manufacturing printers
are not kept in-house.
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Straddling the component and product value chains does not require the firm to be
large or even established. SMaL Camera Technologies, a recent start-up in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, embarked on a strategy to protect its innovative product definition with
key components that were designed in-house. The product is a credit card sized digital
camera that has a very thin (6mm) form factor. This unique product is made possible by a
custom designed CMOS image sensor with extremely low power dissipation along with a
custom ASIC that performs the overall control of the camera. The resulting camera
electronics dissipate ten times less power compared with camera electronics made from
components available on the open market. The low power dissipation enabled the design
of a custom thin lithium polymer battery that was required to maintain the 6mm
thickness. In addition to the electronics, custom optics were required to ensure a short
focal length and allow for the ultra thin camera design.
SMaL sells the custom designed components along with the image processing
software to major brand names that may customize the product with their own industrial
design. These brand names perform the marketing and distribution on their own and may
use ODMs to perform the detailed product design and manufacturing. In this example,
three different entities are participating in the overall value chain for this product. SMaL
performs product definition along with innovative component design. The brand name
solicits an ODM, in this specific case a Hong Kong ODM to design and manufacture the
product. The brand name markets and distributes the product. SMaL has sold over
600,000 of its kits to brand name manufacturers including Fuji Axia and Logitech.
SUN is another example of a company that straddles the product and component
value chains. The introduction of Computer Aided Design (CAD) on workstations was
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championed by SUN. The workstation used the UNIX operation system and SUN
adopted a new processor technology based on the Reduced Instruction Set Computer
(RISC). SUN defined its own component but had it manufactured at a number of places
including TI. TI as an IDM worked closely with SUN and did the Innovative Design, the
Detailed Design, Manufacturing and Assembly & Test. The RISC machines were
significantly much faster than the CISC machines, which were industry standard, leading
to SUN capturing a significant portion of the workstation market.
In the micro-display CMOS backplane industry segment, the cooperation of
Tality and eMagin is an example of component definition by a product company and a
component design company jointly straddling the two value chains. eMagin, a product
company, worked closely with Tality Corporation, a design services company, to design
the CMOS backplanes that are used to power the Organic Light Emitting pixels on micro-
displays and the component (CMOS backplane) was manufactured by IBM
Microelectronics foundry. Part of the innovation came from the product company and
part of it came from the design services company. For example, Tality did not know how
organic materials behave and it learnt how they work from eMagin. This interaction is an
example of mutual learning common in the modular model rather than the unidirectional
knowledge transfer from the lead firm to the local supplier as envisioned by the GPN
theorists (Ernst and Kim 2002: 1426).
4. Conclusion: Modularity and Opportunities for Firms in Emerging
Economies
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The rise of the modular model in the global electronics industry has changed the
organization and geography of the industry profoundly. Organizationally, the vertically
integrated firm continues to exist only in a few niches and many firms concentrate on a
narrow band of expertise. This reorganization has lowered entry barriers for new firms
by lowering the costs of entry through providing external economies of scale and scope.
Advantages of market scale remain due to the fact that firms give preferential treatment
to large customers, whether in the transaction between design house and foundry in the
IC component value chain or between contract manufacturer and branded firm in the
product value chain, but in an industry of fast technical change such market advantages
can be very short-lived (Christensen 1997).
Geographically, the modularization has expanded the opportunities for parts of
the world previously on the periphery of the global electronics industry. Rather than just
the continued movement of mature products to low cost locations, modularity has offered
developing economies the opportunity to participate in segments of the industry
generating significant value. Here too, though, a word of caution is necessary. Not all
developing countries or even developed countries can easily participate in such value-
generating activities. As manufacturing itself has become more mature and,
consequently, a widely acquired skill, value generation has required greater and greater
levels of human capital. Only certain of the emerging economies, such as China, India
and Russia, rather than all or most of the developed economies have the necessary skills
to carry out the value generating activities within the global electronics industry. Due to
the different human assets that various regions offer, one witnesses in technically
demanding design skills the same spatial concentration with geographic dispersion
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observed by the scholars of GPN (Ernst and Kim 2002: 1420). To the extent that design
functions have moved from the Triad of Japan, the US and the EU, the design has
primarily migrated to greater China, Israel and Korea though India and Russia hold
promise.
How does the effect of modularity function across industries? The critical factor
is a combination of the feasibility of modularity and rapid technical change, the technical
clockspeed of the industry. Feasibility of modularity is the basic capability to
modularize, and is driven by the twin forces of ability to codify information digitally and
the availability of standards in the industry. As discussed above, codifiability and
standardization are not completely distinct from each other, but there are some industries
where the codifiability should not be a difficult, such as organic electronics, as they can
theoretically use previous generations of CAD (computer-added design equipment) to
transmit the information, but the industry is relatively young so standards have not yet
evolved. Even for relatively old industries, such as machine tools, the amount of tacit
knowledge that has not been transformed into widely available standards is still high.78
The IT industry is an industry with a rapid rate of technical change and was even
before the rise of digitization and standardization within the IT industry so the effect of
the clockspeed (measured in terms of product generation change) is absent when one
looks at feasible modularity within this industry alone. It is important to note that
78 This lack of standardization has both helped nurture and protect machinery districts in high wage
countries, such as Germany, and necessitated non-standardized production to remain in such a districts or
clusters in order to facilitate communication in the supply chain (Sabel and Piore 1984). Without
codification and standardization, a firm can only cluster or become vertically integrated as long distance
communication of non-digitized communication becomes too costly as the holders of the tacit knowledge
have to travel to the next link in the supply chain to transmit this knowledge. In the case of Germany, to
the extent that industry segments have become standardized, the German industrial districts have lost out to
Japanese mass producers of machine tools.
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clockspeed is NOT a measure of the technological intensity of the industry as some
industries with slow clockspeeds, such as commercial aircraft with its product technology
generations of 10 to 20 years (Fine 1998: 239), are technologically intensive. A number
of authors have noted the propensity of slow clockspeed industries to be more vertically-
integrated and oligopolistic (Steil et al 2002; Utterback and Suarez 1993; Christensen
1997; Fine 1998), but fast clockspeed industries are not modularized either if there are
not ways to enhance the standardization and digitization of the production chain as the
pre-digital era IT industry demonstrates. Christensen (1997) argues forcefully for the
necessity of vertical integration of non-standardized segments of the value chain.
Firms in developing economies generally face the greatest opportunities (.i.e. the
greatest options of being to avail themselves of highly modularized production chains) in
sectors where feasible modularization and clockspeed are both high. If one or the other is
not high, the scale and scope barriers present difficulties for the firms from developing
countries. Indeed, these barriers to entry are the main justification for protecting and
promoting infant industries until they grow large enough to compete i.e. have already
developed the scale and scope to compete with established firms. What the combination
of high feasible modularity and high clockspeed creates is a highly modularized
production chain that allows small firms without the internal or external (cluster-
provided) economies of scope and scale to enter the industry more easily. The table
below presents the opportunities available for firms from the developing world under
each scenario.
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Table 3.4 Level of Opportunity for Firms in the Developing World
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The question remains about what industries have high feasible modularity and
high clockspeed. The graph below using Fine's clockspeed measures (1998: 239) and
stylized facts for the industries shows where different industries fall on these two metrics.
The sectors in the circle are sectors where the opportunities are likely to be greatest.
With the increasing sophistication of computer-aided design, there should be a rightward
shift for most industries just as the IT industry experienced in the past. Also, as newer
industries age, the chances of standardization grow. For example, standardization is
beginning to emerge for some older photonics products just as it did for electronics
products in the past.79
79 Discussion with Erica Fuchs provided me information on photonics industry.
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While the industries above are only a slice of the industrial sectors, the graph does
depict a number of large industries where China and other developing countries will not
have many opportunities to use modular production chains to develop their own
industries. More importantly, it suggests that other sectors are now (autos and bicycles)
or may in the near future (organic electronics, photonics) be part of the sphere of
opportunity (the part of the industrial landscape with high product technology
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clockspeeds and high modularity) as digitization increases across the industrial
landscape.
Finally, the graph does not depict the other main implication of developing the IT
industry. Developing IT presents developing nations the ability to leverage the
technological capabilities of this critical technology to gain advantage in other related
areas (Yusuf and Evenett 2002; Miranda-da-cruz 2002; M. Tratjenberg 2002; Dahlman
and Aubert 2001; Steil et al 2002).
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Chapter Four
Paper Tigers and Hidden Dragons: Technological Development in
China's IT End Products
1. Introduction
Like many developing nations, China has had the dream of domestic
technological development. In recent decades, the proclaimed route for many of China's
firms has been the mao gongji (trade to manufacturing to technology) road to
technology. Mao gongji has been attributed to Liu Chuanzhi, one of the founders of
Legend, but has been applied to describe a range of Chinese large companies, particularly
in the technology sector. Unfortunately, this strategy appears to have failed. This section
will endeavor to explain why domestic firms have proven to be technological paper tigers
and it will contrast this failure with the little known and often disregarded contributions
of the hidden dragons of China's technological development, the hybrid and regular FIEs.
The technological failure of domestic firms has not escaped the notice of a
number of commentators in China. In 2004, twenty years after the founding of a number
of a number of the prominent technology companies, including Legend, Stone and Haier,
an opinion piece in Jingji Guancha (The Economic Observer), an influential economic
daily in China, observed that none of these companies were celebrating their 20th
birthdays despite the fact that everyone loves birthday celebrations (JJGC, July 12, 2004).
The editorial went on to explain that these firms had nothing to celebrate because they
(and China's large firms in general) had failed to become firms of international influence
and stature. What explained this failure was the inability of these firms to make the
transition from gong (manufacturing) toji (technology). The author argued that this
tragedy was due to the myth of "Made in China." Firms and analysts alike had assumed
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that manufacturing scale would somehow induce the creation of core technologies.
Instead of investing in technology, these firms concentrated on short-term profits and
telling baseless "technology tales" (ishu gushi) about their products. These technology
tales were particularly useful in securing government loans and procurement. The result
was a lack of core technology capabilities in Chinese firms. The assessment of the
Economic Observer is not alone. The famed Chinese economist, Wu Jinglian, and Liu
Xielin, the director of China's Ministry of Science and Technology's policy research
center, have both issued book-length critiques of China's firms to develop technology (J.
Wu 2002; X. Liu 2001).
What has escaped the notice of many is the increasing contribution of FIEs. With
the increased attention on outsourcing, more media attention has been focused on the
movement of skilled jobs to the developing world, including China, but less media and
scholarly attention has been focused on the positive impact these moves have had for the
technological development. Recent studies of MNC R&D in China have looked more at
how these institutions relate to their headquarters than their impact on China's
technological development (S. Chen 2004; K. Walsh 2003). Chinese commentators have
generally viewed the MNCs as being very reluctant to transfer technology or transferring
inferior technology that serves to keep China backward and dependent when the MNCs
do transfer technology. Even the bureaucratic boosters of foreign investment, the
Ministry of Commerce (former MOFTEC-Ministry of Foreign Trace and Economic
Cooperation), has criticized the reluctance of MNCs to contribute to China's
development and the dangers of MNCs displacing local innovation (Z. Wang 2003: 142-
144).
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The rest of this chapter will present evidence on the contributions of the FIEs and
the failure of domestic firms. I will show how state-determined access to capital and
procurement as well as firm operational strategies drive these outcomes in accordance
with the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter One. In IT end products, I will show that
the regular FIEs made the greatest contribution in terms of technicians trained whereas
the hybrid FIEs made the greatest contribution in terms of skills conferred on the local
workforce.
I will focus on the telecommunications equipment and computer-related products
because these are the two largest IT product segments in China. The firms in these areas
are also increasingly involved in the IT services segment so examining the hardware
firms provides some analysis of the IT services sector as well. The traditional consumer
electronics80 segment, such as televisions and other audio-visual equipment, is also quite
a large segment in China, but according to both organizations that rank technological
intensity of industry segments (OECD 2004) and my own findings, this segment is not
generally as technically sophisticated. The sophisticated integrated circuits that go into
these traditional consumer products are covered in Chapter Five.
The next section will present a framework to evaluate R&D activities because I
will use this framework as a general benchmark to compare the activities of different
firms. The third section will examine the major domestic computer and
telecommunications equipment firms in China and evaluate their technological activities.
:° With the so-called 3C (communications, computer and consumer) convergence, one could argue that it is
hard to place certain products neatly into a given category. However, in China, computer and
communications firms produce most of these new consumer products, such as PDAs. Thus, these new 3C
products are included in the scope of the study even though the traditional consumer electronics firms are
only tangentially examined.
157
Table 4.1 Production Shares of IT End Products in China (2002)
Source: Ministry of Information Industry.
Product Telecommunications Computers Traditional Software IT Other*
Categories Equipment Consumer Services
Electronics
Share of 27.9 30.7 25.8 4.8 3.2 7.6
Total
Production
in China
(%)
*This category includes a wide range of products including radar, chemicals used in electronics
and electrical machinery. This category is larger than it should be because the data did not allow
for the separation of end products from components.
The fourth section will examine the activities of a range of FIEs, both hybrids and FIEs,
involved in these product areas. This section will also provide a wider examination of
foreign and domestic R&D activity that extends beyond these product categories to
encompass the major IT-research activities in China today. However, the vast majority
of the R&D activities uncovered in China fall within these two segments so the
comparison will generally stay within these two product categories.
2. Evaluating MNC R&D
To evaluate the sophistication of R&D, it is useful to have some standard to
compare across products and activities. There are several widely used rankings of R&D
sophistication. The most common classification system is the OECD's Frascati manual.
The Frascati manual breaks R&D into three categories: basic, applied and experimental
development. In the Frascati manual, basic research is defined as experimental or
theoretical work to acquire new knowledge. Applied is defined as original investigation
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with a specific practical aim and experimental development is defined as systematic work
drawing on existing knowledge to produce new products or services (Amsden and
Tschang 2003: 556). Many US government agencies have used the Office of
Management and Budget's modified Frascati classification system breaking the stages
into basic, applied and developmental research. The US Department of Defense
(USDOD) has created finer distinctions with four categories: basic research, applied
research, exploratory research and advanced development. Advanced development is
"advanced" in that it advances the research to its final product goal, but it is the least
technically demanding of the stages. Thus, more appropriate names for this stage would
be final development or end development or design for manufacturing. I will use these
names when discussing this stage.
Another classification system is Ronstadt's (1977) system that divides R&D
centers into four types: technology transfer units, indigenous technology units, global
technology units and corporate technology units. Reddy and Sigurdson (1994) added a
fifth category, regional technology units. One problem with this classification is that they
do not deal with research and design flow that occurs across different units (see Table 4.2
below). Instead, they assume that these research units are holistic and have little
interaction with other units involved in corporate R&D. Another problem is that they do
not explain in detail what types of skills and activities each type of site contains to the
degree that Amsden and Tschang's framework (Table 4.2) does. This lack of detail and
the assumption of rigid boundaries between different types of technology units in the
Ronstadt and Reddy-Sigurdson models probably explain why the Frascati framework and
its descendants are most commonly used today.
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The current state of the art in R&D classification is Amsden and Tschang's
modified version of the USDOD classification system. Amsden and Tschang add the
category of pure science (I leave out this category for reasons explained below), but this
addition is not their critical contribution. They make an important improvement to R&D
classification by delineating what exactly makes each stage of research more or less
technically sophisticated. They identify eight metrics by which to describe each stage of
R&D: search, objective, output, measure of performance, time horizon, techniques,
qualifications/skills and size of effort. They define search as, "the purpose of a company
and institute in performing R&D," and objective as "the process or set of attendant
objectives by which that purpose is achieved (Amsden and Tschang 2003: 557)." They
assume output and performance to be somewhat self-evident and only define them
through examples in Table 4.2 of the stages of R&D. Time horizon refers to the time
frame for a given type of activity. Techniques "refers [sic] to the body of tools and
methodologies used by researchers to conduct R&D (Amsden and Tschang 2003: 561)."
Amsden and Tschang differentiate scientific and engineering techniques and deem the
former to be more sophisticated. Scientific techniques use mathematical and science-
based theories to address the more theoretical challenges while engineering uses the same
tools in an applied manner to solve specific problems related to a particular product.
Research qualifications refer to what level of education is required for the given task.
The size of the effort is partially the number of people involved with the corporate
research lab of 1500 to 2000 full-time researchers conducting mainly basic research being
the apex of R&D in terms of size. However, the size of effort is also the combination and
sophistication of the skills involved, what Amsden and Tschang refer to as "skill mass."
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Amsden and Tschang view basic research as the most sophisticated activity with the
others following in descending order of sophistication. Amsden and Tschang's typology
explains why basic research is more sophisticated than the others and offers a benchmark
against which other design activities can be judged.
Table 4.2 Amsden-Tschang Typology of R&D Characteristics (modified)
Source: Adapted from Amsden and Tschang 2003, p. 555.
Stages Basic Applied Detailed Final development
research research design (Stage 4)
(Stage 1) (Stage 2) (Stage 3)
Characteristics
Search New Differentiated Prototype Prototype for manufacture
knowledge product "on paper" in a system
for radically
new
marketable
product
Research Uncover Transform, Implement Reduce costs or uncertainties of
scientific variegate and concept as manufacturing/routine final
principles reapply known engineered design implementation for non-
with concept for new system manufactured goods e.g.
applications application software
that are
unknown or
diffuse
Output Product-based Differentiated Detailed Manufacturable/"implementable"
IP transfer to product for specific product product
stages 2 and 3 market design or
prototype
Measure of Product-based Differentiated/niche Market Market results (e.g. number of
performance IP product with IP results (e.g. rejects)
time to
market)
Time horizon Long-term Medium-/short Short-term Immediate
term
Techniques Scientific Scientific Engineering Same as 3 but includes testing
experimental techniques design and quality control
and (formulation of tools,
mathematical equations, including
techniques algorithms) simulation
Qualifications PhD BS/MS/PhD BS/MS BS/MS
Size of effort Critical skill Smaller critical Scales with Same as stage 3
mass related mass appropriate size of
to whole for exploiting niche system
product hand-me-down
range; from stage 1
specialization
and
integration
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To give more concrete examples, Amsden and Tschang also present two cases of
R&D for specific products, a communication algorithm for mobile devices and a hard
disk drive head (the component within a hard disk drive that retrieves information stored
on the disk drive). However, I believe there is a lack of concreteness in their algorithm
example. They state that the algorithm is implementation of circuit in production
prototype, but it is unclear if the final form of this algorithm is captured in a circuit or in
software, even in their example. In my mind, the communication algorithm has to be
placed within a box (such as a mobile phone) in order to be used so stages 3 and 4 would
be better conceptualized as configuring the software or circuitry to function within the
given box and design ("final tweaking") for manufacturing the mobile phone,
respectively. I have modified their example accordingly.
Table 4.3 Product Examples in Amsden-Tschang Framework
Source: Amsden and Tschang 2003, p. 560 (modified from original).
Example Basic research Applied Exploratory Final
(1) research (2) research (3) development
(4)
Communications Conceptual Development of Configuring Design for
algorithm (A) development of multiple variations software A to manufacture of the
(A) for commercial of A (software) function within the handset
application system (the mobile
handset)
HDD (hard disk Integrated and Application of new Development of Development of
drive) head concurrent materials to new new head production
research on new head prototype prototype
materials for HDD
head
Amsden and Tschang's classification provides a solid method to assess a wide
spectrum of R&D activities, but Amsden and Tschang themselves recognize that their
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framework cannot work in every case.81 However, when in doubt, this work will fall
back on the research qualifications method used by Amsden and Tschang. In cases
where the activity does not seem to line up very well with the other metrics, I will use
research qualifications to determine the sophistication of the R&D. Where Amsden and
Tschang's framework succeeds in breadth, it fails in depth. In other words, specific
knowledge of a particular technology gives one a better way to evaluate activities in that
technology area than the general Amsden and Tschang method. Precisely because I have
knowledge of specific technology metrics in semiconductor technology, I do not use
Amsden and Tschang to evaluate that sector in Chapter Five. Where appropriate, I will
bring to bear what technical knowledge I have acquired to evaluate the activities of firms
in China. I will also evaluate the activities in light of what is happening in the relevant
technology in the real world.
As mentioned in Chapter One, I evaluate China's technological progress relative
to that of other societies. For technological activities, one should always ask the question
of how many firms in how many countries have the capabilities to carry out these R&D
activities. If the answer is a mere handful of firms in a handful of countries can carry out
the activity, then that activity should be considered to be relatively technologically
sophisticated. For example, knowledge of notebook computer design for manufacturing
is limited to an oligopoly of firms in North America, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. This
activity is clearly more technically demanding than assembly of the average electronic
gadget given the limited number of firms with the capabilities to carry it out (Fuller
2005).
'1 Amsden and Tschang in their definitions recognize that not every case will fit perfectly in their
classification scheme. Indeed, their advocacy for a more finely delineated scheme relies on the problem of
pigeonholing rather than assessing activities under the Frascati three-stage approach.
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Another caveat about the Amsden and Tschang framework is the pure science
category. Amsden and Tschang themselves recognize that pure science is not effective in
fostering research and development activities when bereft of links to corporate research.
The critical corporate R&D labs are focused on basic research whereas pure science is
mainly university-based (Amsden and Tschang 2003: 556 and 564). Furthermore,
Amsden and Tschang (2003: 557) recognize that for most developing countries, the goal
is to move final development or exploratory development to "generation of at least a
differentiated product through better product design," i.e. applied research. Clearly, they
do not regard pure science in local universities as part of the corporate R&D. As laid out
in Chapter One, one requirement of technological upgrading is commercial viability.
Research conducted in universities with no commercial link to enterprises would not
meet the standard of commercial viability. Thus, under neither Amsden and Tschang's
framework nor the standards laid out in Chapter One will solely university-based pure
science be considered when examining corporate R&D. Furthermore, in China, the pure
science-oriented research has been quite weak in creating innovations that can be
commercialized through further R&D. Unlike the US, the linkage between firms and
universities (to the extent that it exists) has failed to produce many technologies (J. Wu
2002; X. Liu 2001). For these reasons, I have modified the Amsden-Tschang framework
to leave out the pure science category when judging corporate activities in China.
3. Paper Tigers: China's Gentle Giants of High Technology
Media sources around the world talk of the rise of China and naturally turn to
look for large Chinese companies to illustrate China's increasing economic prowess.
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Since China has developed so rapidly, there is an implicit assumption that large firms in
China are the prime movers of this development.82 Careful investigation of these firms
reveals them to be the gentle giants of the IT industry. They may be large by domestic
and even international standards, but they lack technological capacities commensurate
with their size. On the surface, they are fearsome competitors from the fastest growing
economy on the planet, but in reality they are paper tigers, all show and no substance.
In this section, I will first examine the technological activities of the major
Chinese brands from the vantage point of their Taiwanese design and manufacturing
suppliers, particularly in the notebook computer sector. I will then examine specific
Chinese firms in the computer and telecommunications sectors. I will describe in which
of the three ways outlined in Chapter One (incapacitation, bureaucratic goals;
disincentives) the state undermined particular firms.
3.1 The Accounts of Their Suppliers
The major Taiwanese suppliers of IT hardware to the big Chinese brands can
provide evidence about which Chinese firms actually have technology. Additionally,
these Taiwanese firms also serve major international clients so they have an ideal vantage
point to contrast the capabilities of Chinese and foreign MNC customers. Between the
interviews I conducted under the auspices of MIT's Industrial Performance Center and
my dissertation interviews in China, I interviewed all of the top ten notebook makers, top
four desktop makers, the two dominant firms in Taiwan's telecommunications equipment
companies and five of Taiwan's top seven cellular phone makers. I also interviewed
82 One refreshing recent article that runs against the grain of hyping Chinese firms is "The Struggle of the
Champions: China Wants to Build World-class Companies. Can It Succeed?" The Economist, January 6,
2005.
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small mobile phone design companies in China. Other industry participants were also
interviewed. The picture from these interviews is clear and consistent. The Chinese firms
almost without exception lack any technology and are passive recipients of off-the-shelf
parts. With the Chinese, the design firms take over all the design and often even the
manufacturing of the products. In contrast, foreign brands, even when ordering from
those suppliers with design capabilities, the ODMs (original design manufacturers), still
take an active role in technological development and design of new products.
3.1.1 Notebook Design and Manufacturing
One prominent example of this dependency on foreign technology is China's
notebook computer segment. The major laptop brands in China (Lenovo, Founder and
Ziguang-hereafter referred to as the Big Three Notebook Firms or the Big Three) are
desperately dependent on foreign suppliers of manufacturing and design of notebooks.
While outsourcing of desktops has been rightly viewed as getting rid of low value-added
manufacturing, notebook design is much more technically demanding. The higher
technical demands can be seen both from the limited number of suppliers available--only
certain firms in North America, Japan, Taiwan and Korea have the capability to make
these products-and the fact that certain firms retained or still retain some in-house
manufacturing of notebooks long after outsourcing their desktop production to outside
suppliers (IBM and Toshiba). The number of firms that have real design capabilities (i.e.
can design a new model on their own) is even smaller-IBM, Apple and HP-Compaq in
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the US, the major Japanese firms and a few of the ODMs in Taiwan83. Thus, unlike the
outsourcing of desktop production, China's Big Three's choice not to produce notebooks
has not been based on some idea of letting go of low value-added activities. Indeed,
given the low value that the Chinese laptop makers derive from their brands, the
manufacture and design of notebooks should surely be an attractive activity in terms of
capturing value. As will be shown, the promise of these activities was enough to lure
some firms to try to acquire the capabilities. Unfortunately for those hoping to develop
domestic Chinese competencies in notebook manufacturing, the efforts to capture this
technology came to naught as predicted by the Incapacitation route for domestic favored
enterprises described in Chapter One.
I will discuss the reports of specific suppliers of certain large Chinese notebook
manufacturers together. I will include some anonymous reports from company insiders
because I cannot include these comments in the company-specific section without
compromising the interview subject's anonymity. Following this discussion, I will
mention information about specific firms from public sources and sources whose identity
can be protected even when discussing a particular firm.
Reports from the Chinese firms and their suppliers confirmed the dependency of
the Big Three Notebook firms on their Taiwanese suppliers of manufacturing and design.
Unlike Dell's model of outsourcing manufacturing and some design functions to
'Taiwanese ODMs while retaining some design specifications in-house, the Chinese Big
'Three simply accepted off-the-shelf designs from their Taiwanese designers. Several
Taiwanese manufacturers that had produced notebooks for the Big Three declared the Big
83 This judgment of the capabilities of Taiwanese notebook ODMs is based on discussions I had with
Japanese buyers and Taiwanese suppliers of ODM notebook services in January 2001 and November 2002,
respectively.
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Three incapable of even making design specifications that Dell does due to their near
complete ignorance of the underlying technologies (Interviews 155, 166, 201,205, 210,
219). One could dismiss this as simply the typical Taiwanese condescension towards
mainlanders except for the fact that a former manager and consultant seconded from the
Ministry of Information Industry's CEC (China Electronics Corporation) to one of the
Big Three essentially evaluated this firm's capabilities in exactly the same terms
(Interview 247). This interlocutor also said that the other large Chinese computer makers
operated in the same manner. According to a number of interviews, to the extent that the
mainland firms had notebook production, it was the final assembly of kits of semi-
assembled notebooks produced for them by their Taiwanese counterparts. Indeed, one
firm had moved its final assembly factory from southern China to greater Shanghai
because once its suppliers of the semi-knock-down kits moved north, the firm found itself
incapable of upgrading or even managing production at such a long distance.
What has sustained many local firms is government support in the form of finance
and procurement. A remarkable confession of this widely understood but politically
sensitive fact came from a high-level executive for another of the Big Three. This
executive readily admitted his firm's reliance on Taiwanese for semi-knocked-down kits
(sub-assemblies that the final assembler essentially just has to screw together) for
notebook computers and a host of other products. This statement came as no shock even
though some firms try to give the best face to their technological dependency. What was
surprising was his lack of worry over the imminent threat from big foreign brands armed,
he conceded, with better technology, service and branding. With entry to WTO, the
restrictions on foreign-controlled Chinese sales channels would be lifted and the Chinese
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government would face international legal pressure to open up government procurement
to foreigners. Yet, in spite of all this, he was not worried. He explained his blas6 attitude
by telling me that the Chinese government is determined to continue to support local
brands despite liberalization of retail and procurement. His belief that things would
remain as they were prior to WTO was not blind faith, but based upon discussions
between local industry executives and the government. While the WTO would try to
enforce its laws, under-the-table agreements between the Chinese state and the major
domestic firms were working to continue the business as usual of extensive government
purchasing of major local IT firms' products. He emphasized that one would never see
any public pronouncements by the government on these pro-domestic policies for the
obvious reason that they would encounter foreign opposition. Nevertheless, he stressed
that these policies were all designed to keep the foreigners out. He added that a particular
concern on the part of the Chinese government was to prevent dependence on foreign
technology, especially in light of the government's drive to "informationalize" (i.e.
computerize) the government's large bureaucracy. As the empirical chapters will show,
the irony of this Chinese technonationalism is that China through such technonationalist
policies has unintentionally undermined domestic technological efforts and exacerbated
the very dependency it fears.
3.1.2 Supplier Networks for Foreign Notebook Manufacturers
Even though the local Chinese notebook brands have no design and few
manufacturing capabilities in notebook computers, another route hypothetically could be
available for development of these skills. Foreign firms could utilize local suppliers to
169
aid in the manufacturing process and through these suppliers pass on technology to the
host country. This method was a prominent part of acquiring technical skills in Taiwan's
consumer electronics and computer industries as well as earlier industries, such as textiles
(Kawakami 1996; Fuller 2002; Amsden and Chu 2003; Evans 1995). Unfortunately,
Chinese suppliers to foreign notebook manufacturers are conspicuous in their absence.
Taiwanese firms have captured the largest share in notebook manufacturing with
over 60 percent of the world market.84 The former leaders, the Japanese, are a distant
second. The Taiwanese began to move notebook production to China in the late 1990s.
The remaining large Japanese in-house manufacturers of notebooks, Sony and Toshiba,
did not move production to China until 2001-2002. Furthermore, the Japanese are not
doing much more than final assembly of these products (Interview 151 and an interview
with one of the Japanese notebook manufacturers in Japan in 2002) in China. In contrast,
the Taiwanese conduct virtually the whole manufacturing process in China. Given the
longer time they have spent manufacturing notebooks in China, the Taiwanese would be
more likely than the recent Japanese arrival to have outsourced to local suppliers.
Nevertheless, the Taiwanese firms do not make use of local suppliers and rely on
relatively closed networks of suppliers brought over from Taiwan.
To collect information on the Taiwanese notebook supplier networks, I
interviewed 11 of the 12 extant Taiwanese firms producing notebooks in China.8 5 Of the
eleven firms interviewed, I had Chinese plant visits at ten of the firms. Given that the
84 The market share depends on who does the counting. Taiwanese sources, such as MIC, place Taiwan's
market share well north of 60% whereas a recent estimate by Morgan Stanley placed Taiwan's share
slightly lower than 60%.
85 Technically, I interviewed all twelve firms, some of them multiple times, but I excluded one firm from
the interview count because the interview took place under the Industrial Performance Center's
Globalization Project before the firm had notebook production in China. Furthermore, this firm is
notoriously close-mouthed about its operations and very little data was gathered during that interview.
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notebook plants are clustered in a few industrial parks in Greater Shanghai, I was able to
gather information on the other plants in the vicinity as the firms are in close contact and
often use the same suppliers. The two exceptions to this clustering effect are Arima, a
minor notebook manufacturer located in Wujiang of Suzhou Municipality, and Quanta
located in a relatively remote county of Shanghai. The latter firm is not located in close
proximity to other notebook manufacturers although it is an approximately 30 minute
drive from the largest cluster of them all, the Kunshan National High-technology Park,
which contains half of the twelve Taiwanese notebook manufacturers (Mitac, Compal,
Wistron, Elite, Twinhead and Kapok). The other firms are all near at least one other
notebook producer. Inventec and AsusTek86 both have plants in central Shanghai. FIC,
Uniwill and AsusTek all have plants in central Suzhou City.8 7
Excellent recent survey work on Taiwanese IT production in Suzhou Municipality
shows precisely the lack of mainland suppliers in Taiwanese IT networks generally and
the relatively closed nature of the notebook supplier networks (Yang and Hsia 2005).
Surveying 28 major Taiwanese manufacturers in Suzhou, including the nine notebook
firms there, Yang and Hsia find little localization to mainland firms. They measure the
value of procurement decisions made by the local affiliates of the Taiwanese firms
relative to the total product value (the P-index). They measure the value of locally
procured parts relative to the total product value (the L-index). Yang and Hsia also
86 It is rumored that AsusTek took over the failed Legend notebook factory in Shanghai. Legend had
thought it could try to make notebooks on its own, but discovered that it really did not have ability in this
area beyond putting plastic cases on Taiwanese-produced notebook according to a Chinese government
official who has worked in transferring technology to China's national champions in this sector (Interview
247).
87 Suzhou Municipality refers to the prefecture-sized jurisdiction, whereas Suzhou City refers to the county-
level jurisdiction under Suzhou Municipality. The distinction is confusing as the Chinese character used
(shi) has been the same for both jurisdictions ever since Jiangsu Province abolished the use of the term
prefecture (the Chinese characterfu) in the mid-1980s. To differentiate the two in Chinese, additional
terms have to be added in front of the phrase "Suzhou city/municipality."
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measure the number of new suppliers' value in the total product value (the O-index). The
D-index measures the proportion of total product value imported from Taiwan. Finally,
the M-index measures the proportion of total value procured from local Chinese firms.
The results of the survey show quite a low level of mainland firm participation in
these networks. Local Chinese firms provide only 6.6% of the total value despite local
affiliates controlling most of the procurement decisions (69.4% of the total value). This
figure is even more striking when one looks at the notebook firms. For notebooks, local
Chinese firms provide only three percent of value. According to my interviews, such a
low percentage is not surprising given the fact that these local firms do simple metal
bending activities or other such low-technology operations. As my interviews suggested,
the notebook firms procure much of their components locally-53 percent of their value
from locally based foreign-invested suppliers (mainly old suppliers from
Taiwan)-without Chinese suppliers making any significant inroads.
What is surprising is how low the local Chinese procurement is relative to the
openness of the networks. While only 19 percent of value comes from new suppliers
(new to the particular network, not necessarily new firms), local Chinese firms only
capture one third of these opportunities. In notebooks, local Chinese firms capture less
than a quarter of the value awarded to new suppliers. The new suppliers appear to be
Taiwanese suppliers that expanded their customer base when they followed their main
customer(s) to the mainland.
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Table 4.4 Related indices of Taiwanese IT Manufacturers' Supply Chains in
Suzhou Municipality
Source: Yang and Hsia 2005: 22-23.
Company/product P-index L-index O-index D-index M-index
Average of the 28 companies 0.694 0.556 0.191 0.183 0.066
Coefficient of variation of the above companies 0.222 0.239 0.497 0.523 0.741
Average of notebook companies 0.62 0.53 0.13 0.17 0.03
Average of LCD companies 0.70 0.58 0.20 0.15 0.05
Average of motherboard companies 0.71 0.53 0.23 0.26 0.11
Darfon Electronics (keyboards) 0.95 0.75 0.35 0.20 0.15
Ji-Haw Industrial (cable connectors) 0.79 0.89 0.42 0.05 0.21
The low level of Chinese participation in these production networks looms larger
than the 19 percent average of the 28 firms when one factors in the value of the different
products. Simply put, keyboards and cable connectors, are low-technology low value-
added components, and they have much higher levels of value contributed by local
Chinese firms. As one goes into higher technology higher value-added components and
end products, the level of local Chinese firm participation drops. Motherboards procure
eleven percent of their production from local Chinese whereas notebooks, the highest
value product in the list, procure only three percent. If calculated in value-weighted
terms, the general M-index would be much closer to .03 than to .191.
One could argue that the inclusion of more and more technologically
sophisticated suppliers is simply a function of time. With the passage of time, one would
think that localization (the usage of Chinese suppliers) would increase. However, an
examination of the operations of Taiwanese firms in southern China does not suggest that
time will resolve this issue. Before investing in Greater Shanghai, a number of
Taiwanese firms producing desktop PCs and networking equipment set up manufacturing
operations in the Pearl River delta in southern China. I interviewed seven of the large
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Taiwanese IT operations. I did not interview one major PC manufacturing site and
several of the large motherboard manufacturers, but I uncovered no secondary sources to
indicate that these operations were different from the ones I interviewed. Indeed, Yang
and Hsia argue that the Taiwanese operations in the Pearl River Delta have less
localization (whether or not localization to mainland Chinese suppliers) than Taiwanese
firms in Suzhou (Yang and Hsia 2005: 23-24). My interviews with the PC firms that set
up in this area in the mid-to-late 1990s revealed that they did not use any significant local
Chinese suppliers. If their local suppliers were not originally from Taiwan, they were
other foreign-invested firms in the area (Interviews 170; 210; 219). These other foreign
enterprises seemed to be principally Hong Kong-invested firms except for the one firm
that had its supplier-list dictated by its customers. This firm remained in the OEM-mode
where the customer supplies the designs of the products to be manufactured. Since its
customers were primarily American, relatively more of the vendors they designated
tended to be the Chinese plants of American contract manufacturers (Interview 170). The
two largest network equipment makers from Taiwan also claimed that they were willing
to use local Chinese suppliers, but did not do so because they could not find any good
ones (Interviews 92 and 93).
The fact that five of the firms had been manufacturing in China for five years or
more without significant outsourcing to local firms suggested that the local firms would
never be significant suppliers. Even the firm that had been manufacturing for over a
decade in China and had a huge production site employing 20,000 workers in multiple
factories still had not employed local suppliers to any significant degree. What is more
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Company Date of Products Interview Significant
Production in Dates Mainland Suppliers
Pearl River (Includes additional
interviews with HQ
Delta Site and other plants)88
TW 1 1992/1993 power 2000; 2002 No
supplies (twice)
TW2 1996 network 2002 (twice) No
equipment
TW3 1996/1997 network 2002 (twice) No
equipment
TW4 1996 desktop PCs 2002 No (customer-
approved vendor
list)
TW5 1997 motherboards; 2000; 2002; No
desktop PCs 2003
TW6 1999 motherboards 2000; follow- No
up with
manager in
2002
TW7 1999 desktop and 2000; 2002 No
notebook PCs (twice)
remarkable is that this behavior comes from a firm that has a China-based operational
strategy (Interview 220). Yet even as this firm was ramping up production and R&D in
China, it was not reaching out to local Chinese firms. Production was localized, but the
local suppliers were primarily Taiwanese and Hong Kong firms.
3.2 The Chinese Computer Firms
3.2.1 Lenovo: A Legend in Its Own Mind
Lenovo, formerly known as Legend, has been at the forefront of China's
development of technology companies and of so-called privately managed (minying)
firms (see A. Segal 2002) over the last two decades. While some continue to invoke
88 The initial interview counted was the plant visit interview. The additional interviews are not always
plant visits, but they are interviews that provide information on the Pearl River Delta manufacturing
operations.
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Table 4.5 SUDDliers of Firms in Pearl River Delta
Lenovo as a private firm (Y. Huang 2003, 2005FT), quasi-private firm (A. Segal 2002; B.
So 2001) or product of successful enterprise reform (Gu Shulin 1999) that has
contributed to China's technological development, an examination of Lenovo's record of
technical accomplishments reveals a different story. Like Founder (discussed below),
Lenovo had an apparent burst of innovation soon after its founding followed by a rapid
succumbing to the disincentives to innovate. Lenovo's decline followed close on the
heels of the firm becoming firmly connected to the Chinese state.89
Lenovo did start on the mao gongji (trade to manufacturing to technology)
trajectory as a firm trading in computer parts in Beijing90. However, soon after its start,
Lenovo skipped over manufacturing straight to technology or innovation. Lenovo was the
first firm to develop and successfully promote a Chinese-language add-on card for PCs in
1985. To be exact, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) created this technology
before transferring it to Lenovo so this spurt of innovation cannot be directly attributed to
Lenovo.
Indeed, Lenovo was a by-product of CAS' Institute of Computer Technology's
(ICT) desire to create profits in the emerging market of the reforming economy that
encouraged the institute to set up a firm to sell ICT's technology. ICT created a firm,
called ICT Company, and gave the firm full access to ICT's technology resources and
freedom to use the ICT name. ICT also lent the firm 200,000 RMB and granted it full
autonomy. Eleven former employees of ICT started the firm and they then persuaded Ni
89 Despite many people calling Lenovo a private or privately managed firm, the firm's own executives
acknowledge the large state stake in the firm. As recently as 2003, the CFO of Legend Jituan (Legend
Group), the Hong Kong-listed entity, acknowledge that the state, presumably through CAS, held 65 % of
Legend Jituan Konggu (Legend Holdings) which in turn owned 57% of Legend Jituan (Bradsher 2003). In
any case, the two entities were basically the same firm using the same personnel until 2001 when the
Legend Group Holdings was hollowed out and left with only a few old timers (Interview 46).
90 Much of this history of Lenovo is based on the account of the firm in Qiwen Lu's China's Leap into the
Information Age (2000): 63-103.
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Guangnan, the inventor of ICT's Chinese word-processing technology, to join them.
This product quickly dominated the Chinese market given the poor and often complex-
character base9 1 of the foreign products.
However, soon after Lenovo's triumph ofji (technology), the firm reverted to a
path of mao (commerce) that would prove a slippery slope into technological senescence.
Commerce does not necessarily lead to this result, but in the context of Lenovo's
evolving relationship with the Chinese state, this proved to be the path to perdition. As
foreign firms were not allowed to distribute their computer products until 2003, AST, one
of the largest computer firms of the 1980s, hired Lenovo as AST's sole distributor in
China in 1987. This relationship drove Lenovo's expansion of its national distribution
network in the late 1980s. This network became a key to Lenovo's future growth.
Due to the prevailing hostile attitude towards firms outside the formal state sector
and the jealous guarding of its bureaucratic interests, Ministry of Electronics Industry
(MEI-the forerunner of Ministry of Information Industry, abbreviated as MII) did not
grant licenses for PC manufacturing to firms outside of the state enterprise system. With
its large distribution network for computers and computer peripherals, Lenovo desired to
start manufacturing its own PCs. Given the MEI restrictions, Lenovo decided to invest in
Hong Kong. Lenovo found a Hong Kong partner, Daw, and a Chinese state partner,
China Technology, to create Hong Kong Legend Technology Incorporated. China
Technology was a critical partner as this firm was able to acquire loans through the state
9' The People's Republic of China uses a simplified Chinese character system instituted after the 1949
revolution. Hong Kong and Taiwan use the traditional or complex Chinese character systems. In the initial
stages of the PC era, foreign firms employed Taiwanese or Taiwanese-Americans to do much of the
Chinese software, but these engineers usually designed software using the complex characters so it was not
very useful for the PRC market. For a Western, a useful analogy would be imagining Americans trying to
use software designed for users of the Cyrillic alphabet.
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banking system. Quickly after forming Hong Kong Legend, the new firm acquired a
small local motherboard (the electronic board, which holds chips, and is the core of the
computer) firm, QDI.
QDI had rather limited technology resources. In fact, the firm had just two
engineers and they left the firm soon after its acquisition by Lenovo. In the early days of
Lenovo's motherboard business, much of the development of motherboards rested upon
the shoulders of Ni Guangnan. By 1990, the group managed to create two R&D teams
under Ni Guangnan. The one in Beijing did localization work--creating Chinese
language software for computers-and tested of the motherboards. The team in Hong
Kong did the hardware design for the motherboards. Lenovo decided to enter the PC
market with its own brand PCs. With its manufacturing outside of China, it longer
needed MEI's approval. The firm however began to set up production in Shenzhen as a
nominal JV (joint-venture) with a foreign firm, QDI, and two domestic ones, Beijing
Legend, and Shenzhen Science and Technology Industrial Park Corporation. QDI and
Beijing Legend each had 45 percent and Shenzhen had ten percent.
Legend's motherboard business expanded rapidly. The firm became the fifth
largest motherboard supplier in the world supplying five million motherboards. Seventy
percent of the business was overseas. At the same time, the firm began to sell PCs
successfully in China, surpassing MEI's Great Wall Company as the largest Chinese PC
firm and trailing only IBM and AST in the market in 1993. Even before this, MEI
reconsidered its discrimination against this non-SOE start-up and designated the firm one
of the national computer production bases and the firm was included in the still powerful
national production plan in 1992 (Lu 2000: 91). This act heralded the beginning of
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Lenovo's entrance into the fold as a state-favored firm. Lenovo was able to endure
another three to four years of losses on top of the losses suffered in 1991 and 1992 (Lim
2002: 8). Without state support, this perseverance would have been unlikely. The
consequences for Lenovo's innovation, however, were disastrous.
Over the next several years, Lenovo's share of the Chinese computer market
increased. Lenovo moved its production site to an underdeveloped area near Shenzhen
called Huiyang and concentrated production there. At the same time, Lenovo became
more embedded in the state's patronage network. It won a bid for a large national
information technology tender in 1996. The state's direct procurement jumped from an
already substantial 21 percent to a substantial 31 percent (see Table 4.6). This may have
been the push that persuaded Yang Yuanqing, the manager in charge of the PC business,
to give the business one last try. Indeed, even after losing money for the previous five
years, the firm still slashed prices (Lim 2002: 8). In 1997, it surpassed the major foreign
providers to become the largest PC vendor in China.
Inside Lenovo, all was not well however. The chief of technology, Ni Guangnan,
wished to pursue continued investment in technology so the firm could retain its software
market for Chinese software for PCs and expand into new areas, such as semiconductors.
His emphasis on technology came into conflict with CEO Liu Chuanzhi's vision of
Lenovo as a firm that would make a gradual transition to technology. These strategic
differences came to a head in 1995 and Ni Guangnan, the engineer responsible for
basically all of Lenovo's technical achievements, was ousted from the company (Q. Jiang
et al 1999). Entering the state's favor undermined the incentives to innovate because Liu
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realized that the firm could continue to enjoy state support even while foregoing the costs
of technological development for the foreseeable future.
Even as Lenovo gained market share, the firm lost ground technologically.
Foreign software vendors, such as Microsoft, created good Chinese language programs
for PCs that completely displaced Lenovo from that market. More disturbingly, the heart
of Lenovo's technical-manufacturing nexus, motherboards, gradually lost ground. QDI
was not even a global top-ten motherboard firm by 2000. By 2001, Lenovo had to look
outside the firm for the latest motherboard technology because it had lost its capacity to
design quality motherboards. The firm was also already purchasing heavily from the
main Taiwanese competitors to QDI by that time (Interview 72).
For motherboard technology, Lenovo tried to set up a JV with one of Taiwan's
largest motherboard firms, Gigabyte. The firms set up a JV in 2001. The claimed
purpose was to jointly develop motherboard technologies. I visited the Lenovo facility in
Shenzhen where the two firms were supposedly cooperating on R&D. What I saw was a
team composed entirely of Taiwanese technical staff from Gigagbyte's factory in nearby
Dongguan assisting in the transfer of their designs to Lenovo. A discussion with one of
the senior Taiwanese managers from Gigabyte at Lenovo confirmed that Lenovo was not
taking any active part in development of new motherboard products as part of the JV with
Gigabyte. Soon after, Gigabyte, realizing that Lenovo's scheme for the JV was to receive
Gigabyte's technology without providing adequate compensation, cancelled the JV (Yi
2003)92. Outsiders correctly predicted that Lenovo would exit the motherboard business
92 The article by Yi says that Gigabyte had hoped to realize profits through saving on joint procurement
with QDI. With QDI in trouble and a declining market share, Gigabyte realized that this plan was
impossible and cut itself off from QDI. A PowerPoint presentation by the JV partners dated September 18,
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due to the loss of competency in this area (Zhang and Wan 2003: 5). Legend then sold
half of QDI to another mainland firm, Ramaxel, at the end of 2003.
At the same time that Legend could not retain its technology, it also suffered from
having a poor brand image. The whole point of having a brand is to have a brand
premium, but Legend did not enjoy any such premium when compared to the
international brands. Indeed, even compared to a second-tier brand, such as Acer,
Legend's ASP (average selling price) was much lower (Figure 4.1). Consequently, the
firm was earning very thin margins on its computers. Even according to a survey
conducted by Lenovo's own government booster, MII, Chinese perceived that local
brands had a price advantage but not a quality advantage over the foreign brands (Lim
2002: 10). In one analyst's assessment, Lenovo itself realized that it was so far behind
the foreign majors that it was not capable of improving brand perception and thus pricing
power in PC's alone. Instead, Lenovo was trying to improve its brand perception by
diversifying into an array of consumer electronics (Lim 2003: 12). What's worse,
Lenovo was earning very little profits from the computers it was selling. The state
procurement was essentially subsidizing Lenovo's losses in the commercial sector. For
the five years ending in March of 2002, it is estimated that Lenovo's EBIT (earnings
before interest and taxes) was a "razor-thin 0.6 percent (CFO Asia, February 2004)." It is
highly likely that with taxes and interest payments Lenovo was in the red over this five-
year period. Then again, like many state-favored firms, Lenovo may not have had to pay
its interest on loans from the state banking system.
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2001 also gives the impression that Gigabyte planned to capitalize on greater scale economies as Lenovo
had nothing else to bring to the table besides Lenovo's own motherboard demand and production.
Figure 4.1
Legend's ASP (average selling price) as % of Major Foreign Brands
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Behind this gradual withering of Lenovo's technical capabilities was generous
state support. In the late 1990s, the state through both government and educational
institutions purchased up to half the computers in China. Even in 2002-2003, Lenovo
was selling over one quarter of its products to state agencies and state educational
institutions and the firm was projected to continue to do so for the foreseeable future93
(Zhang and Wan 2003: 5). On top of this, some of Lenovo's corporate sales were sales to
state-favored firms with the idea that they were strongly encouraged by the government
to buy from Legend and other state-favored firms (Interviews 64, 222). For the pre-2002
statistics (Table 4.7), it is not clear if the source counted education as part of the sales of
the state. Then again, the education sales were much lower at that time as the state had
not started the major procurement drive for universities that began in 2000.
To make matters worse, Lenovo has been facing increasing competition from the
foreign brands in the PC market (Wang 2004). After the lifting of the retail network ban,
direct sales giant, Dell, was unhindered in the market. In 2003, Dell increased its
Chinese sales 45 percent and now is third behind Lenovo and Founder. Lenovo itself has
93 Zhang and Wan (2003) forecasted sales for Lenovo through 2007 and the state share (government plus
education) never dipped below 27 percent.
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Table 4.6: Identifiable State Procurement as Share of Legend's Sales
Source: "Legend Holdings: Thinking Different," Nomura Securities, October 3, 2001 and Zhang and Wan
(2003).
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003
State 13.9 21.7 31.3 28.3 27.8 25.9 25 27.4 28.2
Procurement
as Share of
Sales (%)
experienced stagnant sales in a growing market (June 3, 2004, WSJ: B3). To try to get an
end run around the increased competition, Lenovo has been expanding its presence in the
countryside, but these areas can only buy very low-priced products
(ChinaTechNews.com, August 5, 2004).
Lenovo has also been unsuccessful in expanding into new markets. As discussed
under the section concerning notebooks, Lenovo like other domestic Chinese firms has
been dependent on Taiwanese ODM firms for its notebooks. Of the Big Three, Lenovo
has tried the hardest to acquire notebook technology, but its efforts have thus far failed.
First, Lenovo tried to set up a joint-venture with Toshiba in Shanghai with the idea of
learning frorn its JV partner. Once Toshiba realized how little Lenovo actually knew
about notebook manufacturing and how much it wanted to learn from Toshiba without
adequate compensation, Toshiba grew leery of the JV project. Lenovo was stuck with an
empty notebook production line it had no idea how to run. Eventually, Lenovo sold this
factory to a Taiwanese firm, which is believed to be an affiliate of AsusTek, the large
motherboard and notebook manufacturer (Interviews 201; 247).
After the fiasco with Toshiba, Lenovo tried to learn notebook manufacturing from
one of its major suppliers of notebooks, FIC. As FIC is a larger player in desktop rather
183
than notebook manufacturing, the quid pro quo for winning the Lenovo order was to let
some Lenovo engineers come to Taiwan to learn some of the technology. The arrival of
the engineers from mainland China, the place to which all of Taiwan's manufacturing
seemed to be moving, understandably caught the attention of Taiwan's press and raised
the level of economic angst felt in Taiwan. Nevertheless, sources close to FIC laughed at
the attempts of Lenovo to learn their technology. According to their judgment from
having interacted with the Lenovo engineers extensively, the Lenovo engineers did not
understand how complex thermal conductivity problems are in notebook computers (i.e.
if notebooks are not designed well, they easily heat up and burn out) and FIC did not do
anything to help them learn these skills. In FIC's judgment, it would be a very long time
before Legend would be capable of designing a notebook computer on its own. Other
industry insiders agreed (Interviews 1 12, 247). Two years later, there is no evidence that
Lenovo has been able to do so. Given the marketing skills aimed at pleasing state
officials and nationalist sentiment alike (the technology tales referred to at the beginning
of the chapter), if Lenovo had been able to achieve competency at notebook design and
manufacturing, they would have most certainly crowed about it. Thus far, they have been
silent.
Similar scenarios have played out with D-link, one of Taiwan's largest
telecommunication equipment ODMs, and with AOL Time Warner. Lenovo constructed
a JV between D-link and Lenovo's subsidiary, Digital China (Shenzhou Shuma), to sell
SOHO (small office and home office) telecommunication equipment in the Chinese
market. However, Digital China brought nothing to do the deal except its sales network
and clearly wanted to acquire D-link's technology for use outside of the JV so D-Link
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broke the deal off (Interview 155, 171). AOL Time Warner and Lenovo were supposed
to create an Internet portal JV, FM365.com, but this venture failed as well. By Lenovo's
own admission, they misunderstood the impact that new technologies, such as wireless
LAN, would have on the viability of this operation. In any case, while this venture
lasted, AOL Time Warner was supplying all the technology in terms of applications and
portal management tools (Denlinger 2004). Finally, Lenovo announced that it was
entering the cellular phone market. Lenovo acquired an 80 percent stake in Xoceco in
Fujian because Xoceco had a license to sell mobile handsets. Despite the hoopla
surrounding Lenovo's entry into the handset business, Lenovo has a very weak R&D
team in mobile handsets (Interviews 293, 317, 322).
3.2.1.1 Lenovo and IBM
IBM has been trying to rid itself of its loss-making PC division for several years.
After a trip by CEO Samuel Palmisano to Beijing to meet an unidentified high-level
government official involved in economic policymaking in 2003 in order to receive the
state's permission to engage in talks with Lenovo (Lohr 2004), IBM approached Lenovo
with a sales proposal. Lenovo decided to buy IBM's PC division for cash and stock.
While this purchase catapults Lenovo into third place behind Dell and HP in global PC
market share, it further erodes any profitability within Lenovo because of IBM PC's poor
business performance. IBM's PC division has lost money every year since 2001. The
division lost almost one billion US dollars for the three and a half years up to June 30
2004 (WSJ, January 5, 2005: B5). What's worse is that IBM's financing of PCs, the
crucial revenue-generator that has made the PC division intermittently profitable, will
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remain within IBM even while Lenovo has responsibility and cost for designing,
producing and distributing the PCs (Santiago 2004: 2). Lenovo will also have to pay
IBM for warranties and technical-support of the computers.
Lenovo does receive outright is the Thinkpad label, but there are questions about
how much this label will be worth when attached to the Lenovo brand94. As shown
above in Table 4.8, Chinese do not think much of the quality of local brands. Anecdotal
evidence suggests the label could take a hit. Foreign buyers of Thinkpads are concerned
about potential quality issues (AWSJ, December 13, 2004: A8). Even Chinese owners of
Thinkpads have declared they will no longer buy the product FT, December 9, 2004) and
IBM's workforce in Shenzhen seems put off by the prospect of working for an inferior
domestic brand (FT, December 13, 2004: 26). Basically, analysts and competitors are
already operating on the assumption that Lenovo will not be able to maintain the market
share previously held by IBM's computers because of Lenovo's poor reputation (FT,
December 9, 2004; Santiago 2004). Recent analyst reports see the deal as actually a boon
for HP and Dell as they will be able to win over many of IBM's accounts (Santiago 2004;
Tseng 2004). A slew of analysts fear the acquisition will also prove to be a drag on
Lenovo's ability to realize profits in PCs (AWSJ, December 10, 2004: A8).
94 Lenovo is allowed to co-brand the Thinkpads with IBM for 18 months i.e. list the IBM logo on the
Thinkpads. Many reports state that the co-branding will last five years, but IBM has the option to end the
co-branding after 18 months.
186
Table 4.7 Chinese Regard Foreign PC Brands as Quality Brands
Local advantages over foreign Urban households
Price 76.1%
Quality 21.1%
Service 69.0%
Specifications 14.6%
Others 2.8%
Source: MIl Research, 2000
The one gem Lenovo has acquired is IBM's 1900-person R&D facility in North
Carolina. This facility was responsible for research and design for IBM's PCs. While
this finally gives Lenovo some technology, it follows the prototypical path of buying
foreign technology rather than spending resources on learning and creating technology at
home (R. Wu 1996; Jefferson et al 1999). Even if Lenovo is able to maintain these
assets, which is doubtful given the pressure from the major brands to steal market share,
this research center in North Carolina contributes nothing to China's technological-cum-
economic development, the object of this study. All the indicators thus far suggest that
the R&D functions are going to stay put in North Carolina. Indeed, the HQ of the firm is
moving to New York with only one top executive from the Chinese side (WP, December
9, 2004; AWSJ, December 9, 2004).
Rather than following the mao gongji strategy it claims to have followed, Lenovo
has gone from technological innovation to stagnation. When a semi-neglected firm on
the periphery of state favor, it had harder budgets that gave it some pressure to try to
create new and innovative products for the Chinese market. Once it became successful,
its incentives to continue to pursue technology were undermined by state largesse. In the
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most recent phase, Lenovo has made some feeble stabs to develop technology, but the
incapacitation engendered by state-generated soft budgets have worked to make sure
these attempts have fallen flat. Instead of moving from commerce to manufacturing to
technology, Lenovo has followed an ignominious road from technology to state-
sponsored technological disinvestment to general firm incapacitation.
3.2.2 Founder: From Innovation to State Dependency
Founder (Fangzheng) followed a trajectory quite similar to Lenovo's. The firm
started out with a bang of innovation, albeit state-sponsored innovation. The firm created
a new printing technology for the Chinese characters specific to mainland China's
market. From this high point, Wang Xuan, the founder of Founder, witnessed the firm
grow in size, but wither in terms of technological capacity and financial soundness.
Founder was one of the first and most successful of the so-called school-based
enterprises (xiaoban qiye). 95 Wang Xuan was a professor in the Department of
Electronics at Beijing96 University (Beida) when he joined a government project, Project
748. The project created a way to print Chinese characters for mass printings, such as
newspapers, or electronic publishing systems technology in industry jargon. MEI's
Project 74897 was inspired by visits to Japan following the opening of diplomatic
relations with Japan in the early 1970s. Wang created an innovative mathematical
solution to the representation of Chinese characters in computer systems that saved
95 The following history of Founder is based primarily on Lu (2000: 104-149).
96 Beijing Daxue (Beijing University), like Qinghua Daxue (Qinghua University), uses an old romanization
for its official English name. Thus, Beijing Daxue is Peking University and Qinghua Daxue is Tsinghua
University. To avoid confusion, I use the standard currentpinyin romanizations, Beijing and Tsinghua.
97 At that time, MEI was referred to as the Fourth Ministry of Machinery. MEI led the project, but other
ministries were involved in the initial planning, such as the First Ministry of Machinery (later just called
the Ministry of Machinery).
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critically on then scarce computer memory. In September of 1976, Wang's idea won
over the office in charge of Project 748, and Beijing University in conjunction with Wang
took the lead in the project.
Project 748 and its successor, Project for the Renewal of Publishing and Printing
Industry Technology and Equipment (backed by Vice Premier and Minister of the State
Planning Commission, Yao Yilin), finally resulted in a mass production model in 1987.
Throughout this time, Professor Wang and his Institute for Computer Science and
Technology (ICST) at Beijing University were at the core of the research. ICST created
both the system design and software for the electronics publishing system. MEI assigned
a MEI-owned firm, Weifang, to build the product.
Two years prior to the creation of a production-ready publishing system, Beijing
University, heeding the government's call to improve China's science and technology
system, decided to found a company to commercialize technologies created at Beijing
University. The new firm was called Beida New Tech Company. From the beginning,
ICST served as the source for Beida New Tech's source of technology. In the beginning,
Beida New Tech earned money from wholesaling computers between Guangdong and
Electronics Alley, a commercial area right next-door to Beida. The initial investment
came from Beijing University and a rural township in Beijing Municipality9 8.
ICST and Beida New Tech recognized that the technology sold by Weifang as the
"'Hua-guang" publishing system was actually ICST's. Furthermore, Weifang's machines
had seriously problems with overheating. ICST felt this problem was due to Weifang's
manufacturing process and that it hurt the image of ICST's technology. In 1988, Wang
98 Chinese directly-ruled municipalities (Tianjin, Beijing, Shanghai and Chongqing) all cover a very large
amount of territory so they have rural, agricultural areas far from the dense urban centers we commonly
associate with the municipalities of Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Chongqing.
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successfully petitioned the Office for the Renewal of the Publishing and Printing
Industrial Technology and Equipment, the government organ in charge of the printing
and publishing project, to allow Beida New Tech to go into the publishing systems
business in competition to Weifang. Given Weifang's right to Hua-guang name, Beida
New Tech changed its product name to Founder in 1991. The company's name changed
in 1993.99 By 1995, Founder's publishing system had captured 75 percent of the
Chinese market. The same year, Founder officially took over the ICST as the company
lab and Wang Xuan was made chairman of the firm.
While Founder had created a superior product to Weifang's and had created the
basic technology for both products, the firm made a beeline to the state trough following
the success of its electronic publishing system. The publishing system business is
controlled by the state as the major customers are state-owned newspapers (newspapers
are still generally controlled by state organs in China). In Founder's new lines of
business, state patronage would also be critical. Founder began to enter computer retail
in 1993 through an agreement to sell DEC (Digital Equipment Corporation) products in
China. Founder soon learned about the computer market and decided to launch its own
brand in 1995. Behind this launch was government support in terms of lucrative
contracts for the Three Golden Projects (the Golden Card Project for banks, the Golden
Gate Project for trade and the Golden Bridge Project for the telecommunications sector)
in 1994. The state hired Founder to do the systems integration work, essentially linking
the computer systems together, for these projects. The year before the projects Founder
had two million Hong Kong dollars (just .3 percent of Founder's revenue) in systems
99 Others disagree with the dating of the name change in Lu's account (Lu 2000: 123) and claim Founder as
a firm also dates from 1991 ('Founder Holdings Ltd," www.chinaonline.com July 24, 2000, downloaded on
January 17, 2005).
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integration revenue. During the second year of the project, this figure had loomed to 158
million or 1.4 percent of Founder's total revenue. Equally as important as the revenue
generated from the project was the opportunity to sell computers as part of the systems
integration package (Lu 2000: 140-141). With this government support, Founder cracked
the top ten computer vendors in China for the first time (F. Lai 1997: 12).
What has happened to Founder? It is still feeding at the government trough and
has not been able to break out to the world beyond China's state-controlled newspapers in
its previous core technology. The firm, like many other state-connected firms, has taken
the route of being the systems integrator intermediary between foreign firms with the
actual skills now demanded in integration work and the state agencies that want to buy
such services from domestic providers (F. Lai 1997: 10 and Interviews 54 and 64). With
Wang Xuan ill and possibly dying, Founder seems to be without any innovation from the
old standby of publishing systems or new products. Indeed, Wang himself in 1999
admitted as much.
Wang Xuan... finally acknowledged the company's long-standing
problems in management and operations, which he said had been
hidden by the high profits generated by early technological
achievements. Emphasizing that management reform was particularly
critical to an enterprise as it entered its maturity, he brought Li
Hansheng from H-P in April 1999 to revitalize the company...But the
financial losses abounded and began to destroy investor confidence
("Founder Holding Ltd." China Online).
Instead, state-sponsored system integration and selling low margin computers
now create the bulk of revenues for the firm. There are strong indicators that all of this
government-support is leading to widespread incapacitation within the firm. Founder
appears to have transformed from a technology creator to an asset destroyer. Revenues
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are not any higher in 2003 than they were four years earlier in 1999 and 1999 revenue
was only marginally higher than revenue in 1996.1°° Founder's publicly listed entity lost
money from 1998 through 2002 accumulating over 550 million Hong Kong dollars in
losses, which it only slightly offset by 23 million Hong Kong dollars in profits in 2003.01
Making Founder's financial picture worse is the fact that many of the losses from the
later years do not likely reflect losses from the computer manufacturing side as those
operations were moved out of the listed company and back into the Chinese parent in
1999.
By 2002, computers production and distribution outweighed the revenues
generated by the sale of systems integration services as a middleman or front for foreign
firms.'0 2 IT distribution alone was as large as the income from publishing systems and
systems integration together. PC hardware sales were eight times the SI and publishing
sales. By 2003, the PC hardware sales were ten time the stagnant sales of SI and
publishing. While all of these sources of revenue were driven in large part by state
procurement (Interviews 54, 64, 222), the revenues to be generated by being a middleman
were small as Founder's role was easily duplicated by a number of other state-favored
firms (Interviews 54 and 64) and electronics publishing systems had stagnated due to the
fact that by the mid-to-late 1990s Chinese newspapers were only buying replacement
systems. While Lenovo's PC sales to the state were at least slightly over a quarter of its
total sales, a number of sources affirmed that Founder's sales to the state were likely
100 Revenue in 2003 was 1.554 billion Hong Kong dollars and was 1,583 in 1999 (Founder Holdings
Limited Annual Report 2003: 3). Revenue for 1996 was only 1.483 Hong Kong dollars (Lai 1997: 15).
101 The financial data came from Chan and Kwong (2001) for 1998-1999, Leung (2002) for 2000-2001 and
Founder Holdings 2003 Annual Report for 2002.
102 Founder had deals with both IBM and Yahoo to allow these foreign firms to enter SI (government
procurement) and Internet services (originally closed off to foreign investors) in China.
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higher due to Founder's links to Beijing University, which in turn linked it to the
education xitong (the network or "system" of ministries and other government units
covering a single policy area). As mentioned earlier, the education system began a big
drive to purchase PCs starting in 2000 so connections to the education xitong proved very
useful to firms wanted to sell computers to universities (Interviews 222, 247, 40, 56,
104).
If Founder's good relations to the state were still in doubt, the firm was chosen as
the only computer maker to take part in the State Economic and Trade Commission's
plan to change Chinese firms into Global Fortune 500 enterprises in 1997. Founder was
one of 120 Chinese companies to take part in this Large-scale Experimental Enterprise
Group (daxing shidian qiyejituan) project (Lai 1997: 7; Founder's website at
www.founder.com).
Wang Xuan, the power behind Founder, has also held high if mainly honorary
positions within the government. He was Vice Chairman of the CPPCC (Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference), a body composed of CCP members and
members of the other legal political parties, during the 8th (1992-1997) and 10th CPPCC
(2002-2007). He served on the Standing Committee of the CPPCC for the 9th CPPCC
(1997-2002). He also served as vice-chairman of the Education, Science and Health
Committee of the 9 h National People's Congress (1998-2002), the national legislature of
China.
Founder had one good idea under state sponsorship and from that starting point
the firm has been able to generate a stream of state patronage far beyond the scope of the
original state project. This wave of government largesse has simply undermined the
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incentives and capacity to generate new ideas as Wang himself has admitted. There are
even darker clouds over Founder however. The stagnant revenue and significant reported
losses are signs that the firm has turned from being simply technological stagnant into a
financial black hole on par with many of the formally state-owned firms.
3.2.3 Pigs at the Trough: The School-run Enterprises of Qinghua University
The fact that the other two large computer firms come from Qinghua University is
not an accident. Qinghua is very proud to be justly known as the school of China's
current and future generation of CCP leaders (C. Li 2001) as well as China's foremost
university of science and technology. These firms have been able to parlay these
connections first into the computer market and then into other areas offering substantial
government procurement opportunities.
The two Qinghua enterprise groups, Tongfang and Ziguang, are large producers
of desktop and notebook PCs respectively. Each has been able to become one of the Top
Three in their respective arena in recent years. Their rise has been nothing short of
meteoric, but has not been accidental. Through their institutional parent, Qinghua
University, they are connected to the education xitong, a major source of procurement for
their computer products (Interviews 247, 56, 40, 104). This connection and state-
connections in general have proven very useful given that the government and
educational markets have been the fast-growing and use local vendors almost exclusively
according to a China-based industry expert with one the largest IT market analysis firms
(Interview 112). One of these firms receives 35% of its computer revenue form the
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educational system alone before considering government procurement by the bureaucracy
and SOEs (Interview 56).
The notebook PC brand, Ziguang, started in 1988 as a sales representative for
foreign IT companies. The firm expanded to sell scanners for foreign firms, such as
Taiwan's Mostek and Microtek, from 1992 to 1995. In 1995, the firm decided to launch
its own brand of scanners. In 1998, the firm followed with its own brand of notebook
computers and became one of the Chinese Top Three by 2000. The firm benefited from
increasing government and educational procurement (Interviews 247, 104). The firm's
IT products make up 70% of revenue.
The firm has expanded its product range from scanners, but has not expanded its
technological depth. The firm essentially buys off-the-shelf products from the Taiwanese
(Interviews 247, 248). This off-the-shelf buying is in sharp contrast to the behavior of
European, American and Japanese customers of Taiwanese ODM firms, which have
significant industrial and technical design input into the final product. Many would argue
that the value in the brand comes from the design functions of brand firms. The only
products Ziguang makes on its own are the low-end scanners, which even domestic allies
of Ziguang claim are technically easy to produce. The dependence on Taiwanese
suppliers across the spectrum of Ziguang's IT offerings is shown in the Table 4.8. The
firm likely does not have high-end products in digital cameras and networking equipment
because its Taiwanese suppliers do not have such products. In other words, their ability
to enter new, potentially higher value-added markets is completely dependent on their
Taiwanese suppliers having such capabilities.
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For Ziguang, computers and peripherals are the major source of revenue (70%)
and this segment is heavily supported by government procurement. For the rest of the
company, there is a major profit-center in selling traffic control systems integration to the
Chinese government through Ziguang's "environmental engineering center" (Interview
248). The one area that stands out as clearly unrelated to government procurement is the
"bio-tech" company of Ziguang, which has HeiMei brand of toothpaste as its main
product, but Ziguang only has a minority share (21.4%) in this Hunan Province SOE.
Given that Hunan is also a relatively poor interior province, Ziguang may have invested
in this firm as part of orders given to Qinghua to help out the poorer regions, similar to
Tongfang's actions in Jiangxi (see below).
Table 4.8 Ziguang's Dependence on Taiwanese ODM Firms
Source: Interviews 41, 247.
Product High-end Low-end
(Increasing technological
sophistication as move from top
to bottom of this table) 103
Scanners Mostek, Umax, Foxconn, Own production
BenQ (formerly Acer
Peripherals)
Digital Cameras No products in this segment Various Taiwanese firms
Notebook Computers Mitac, AsusTek Uniwill, Twinhead
Networking Equipment No products in this segment Accton
Tongfang is also heavily dependent on IT products with little to show for it in
terms of its own technologies. Tongfang was created from a bunch of non-educational
units or nascent firms within Qinghua University in 1997 and was listed on the domestic
103 It is arguable about whether Internet equipment or notebooks are harder to design and manufacture. The
manufacturing of notebooks cannot be divorced from tricky design problems involving thermal
conductivity in the products whereas network equipment manufacture is relatively straightforward. On the
other hand, pure design (divorced from the manufacturing process) of networking products is arguably
more difficult than pure design of notebooks (Interviews 247, 210, 211).
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stock market the same year. These units were involved in air conditioning systems for
buildings, data processing, Internet provision, computer manufacturing (on a very small
scale-only ten thousand units in 1997) and chemical engineering.
In 2000, the computer division accounted for 51 percent of revenue, the IT
services firm accounted for 9 percent of revenue, the chemical and ceramics division
accounted for ten percent and the "nuclear engineering" division accounted for 30 percent
of revenue (Tongfang 2000). This publicly announced distribution is likely skewed to
make growth outside the core computer firm look more impressive. Both the main firm
and the nuclear engineering firm, while bragging about Tongfang's diversification and
the success of the nuclear engineering firm placed the nuclear engineering firms revenue
at 10 percent of revenue, the chemical engineering unit at ten percent of revenue and IT
(combining services and hardware) at 67 percent of revenue with the remainder scattered
across a number of businesses such as electronic information systems for university
libraries and data processing (Interviews 56,54,53, 34, 35).
Once Tongfang was created, it grew rapidly, fueled by even more rapid expansion
in its computers sales. Total revenue increased ten fold from 1997 to 2000 from 385
RMB (over 46 million USD) to 5.3 billion RMB (640 million USD). The number of
computer units sold expanded 80-fold from ten thousand to 800 thousand in the same
period. However, there was no evidence that the firm was making any progress
technologically. Nor was it very profitable. The computer business generated lots of
cash flow, but there was no serious plan on how to build profits in this marginal business
(Interview 56). Rather, in a similar fashion to Ziguang, the firm kept expanding into new
government-protected markets.
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Looking at Tongfang's expansion, its major businesses beyond computers are
geared towards government procurement and fulfilling government missions. Tongfang
Nutech, the nuclear engineering firm, is basically creating equipment to X-ray trucks and
shipping containers for the China's customs officials. The IT services group within the
computer firm aims to do what the other IT services units of the state favored firms do in
China-act as a middleman between foreign firms with the technology and the
government units that need to purchase these services. This division concentrates at the
moment on selling to the "government" (somehow differentiated in Tongfang's view
from the other state-controlled customers), electrical power utilities (state-owned entities)
and the Taxation Bureau. The firm has won major contracts with various Chinese
municipalities to do e-government software, based on technology from its partners,
Samsung and a Hong Kong software firm. The IT service division admits it has no
technology or design capabilities at the moment, but it hopes to move from outsourcing
the design to foreign IT services firms to doing cooperative design to conducting in-
house design of the core technologies. Tongfang Optical is supposedly conducting
research and production in opto-electronics, but in actuality, the firm is simply selling a
database of Chinese academic journals it compiled to Chinese universities. The firm's
claim to do development work for new Chinese standards in conjunction with former and
current researchers in Taiwan's quasi-governmental ITRI has been refuted by the latter.
Present and former ITRI officials do not deny contact with Tongfang Optical, but they
claim that Tongfang Optical has not contributed an iota of technical knowledge to this
standard-setting process (Interviews 212, 216). Finally, there is the chemical engineering
firm of Tongfang, based in backward Jiangxi. This firm was set up in Jiangxi because
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Qinghua received an order from higher up in the government to help Jiangxi and then
passed this order onto its own enterprise groups (Interview 34).
Tongfang's one business that did not seem to be organized around government
procurement or fulfilling government-given missions, is Tongfang's data processing firm,
Tongfang Data Technology Company. This firm, however, has origins from a much
earlier period. The firm was founded as Qinghua Jishu Fuwu (Qinghua Technical
Services) in 1980-81 and signed an agreement with Unisys to do data entry for Unisys in
order to pay for the Unisys equipment the school bought. The firm had to do data entry
for Unisys for 7 years to pay for the equipment. In 1987-88, Qinghua found a second
American client, Mead (the data processing firm that would later be known as Lexis-
Nexis) in lieu of the end of the contractual obligation to Unisys. Tongfang specialized in
doing legal studies data entry for Lexis-Nexis and over the years has almost exclusively
employed high-school graduates for the drudgework of data entry. The firm's sole
advantage is the cheap cost of labor in China, but it is beginning to feel pressure from
Lexis-Nexis because the firm uses other suppliers located in the Philippines and India
that have software service capabilities in addition to data entry. This firm has begun to
add software engineers (65) in addition to its 400 data entry workers, but remains
completely dependent on doing data entry for Lexis-Nexis.
Beyond the problems of incapacitation and disincentives to upgrade fueled by
government largess, these xiaoban qiye also suffer from the bureaucratic goals problem.
The necessity to invest in a firm in Jiangxi is just one example of the interference in firm
operations by political imperatives. Insiders and knowledgeable partners of both firms
(Interview 247, 248, 33,34, 56) placed many of their firms' inefficiencies squarely at the
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door of the management structure. Party officials of Qinghua University with their own
political missions were placed in charge of managing these enterprises. Interestingly,
each business group viewed the other as having been better able to loosen the grip of
party cadres on firm management and bemoaned the fact that their own firm still suffered
under cadre mismanagement. These differing views suggest that each business group
bought Qinghua University's propaganda about the other business group while knowing
full well these pronouncements about reform for xiaoban qiye were but hollow rhetoric
for their own group. Several insiders testified that even when real profit centers were
created, mismanagement under cadre rule destroyed or dissipated the profits. For
example, the scanner business for Ziguang enjoyed gross profits on paper, but
management frittered away whatever real gross profits had been realized. Ziguang's
traffic control system was very profitable for the firm, but the cadre executives diverted
these funds to other money-losing operations. For Tongfang Optical, the firm was being
forced by the government to enter manufacturing of CD and DVD-ROM machines even
though hyper-competition in this area had already whittled away any chance of
profitability, even for the private Chinese and Taiwanese makers of these products in
southern China.
3.3 China's Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturers
3.3.1 China's Telecommunications Infrastructure Equipment
Telecommunications infrastructure equipment is the equipment that allows
telephones and mobile phones to function in vast networks. Telecommunication service
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providers buy this infrastructure equipment to run their networks. In China, the
telecommunication service providers are all state-owned firms.
Like the computer industry, the Chinese telecommunications industry is also
filled with state-supported firms that have accomplished nothing except destroy value,
such as Shanghai Bell, Datang and Julong. However, the two major Chinese firms that
are often seen as having undertaken some technological learning, Huawei and Zhongxing
Telecom (ZTE), are also in this sector. Indeed, these two also contributed to upgrading in
semiconductor design, albeit marginally (see Chapter 5). These two firms appear to be
the exceptions among state-favored firms. However, only Huawei can be seen as a firm
that may have made moves to catch up to the technological frontier in a commercially
viable, embedded manner in telecommunications equipment. All other possible
candidates were investigated and found wanting. However, even for Huawei, there are
reasons to be concerned. When one scrutinizes its activities and impressive state
connections, the achievements of this firm appears less impressive than its boosters claim
them to be.
The Chinese telecommunications infrastructure equipment firms started from the
same humble beginnings that many other Chinese IT firms started. The old state-owned
telecommunications firms established in the 1950s and 1960s lost out to foreign
technologies produced by foreign firms in the 1980s. By 1992, domestic Chinese firms
held as little as 1.1% in some products, such as central office exchanges. A number of
state-sponsored firms and Chinese majority JVs helped boost local production to 80% of
the domestic market by 1997 in certain products, such as SPC (stored program control)
switches (the primary fixed line switches). Behind this resurgence of Chinese
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telecommunications equipment production were government research programs, state
procurement and forced technology transfer by foreign partners in JVs (Shen 1999;
Telecom Asia 1998; Zhang and Igel 2001: 366).
Figure 4.2 Global Wireless Infrastructure Market (2002)
Note: China's Huawei and ZTE in bold.
ZTE, 0.6%
Fujitsu. 1. Huawe, 09
14, __
Samsung.
NEC, 2.79
Alcatel,6,
Nortel,!
rLG Electronics, 0.6%
Panasonic, 0.6%
3n, 29.5%
Motorola, 1
2.9%
Siemens, 1t7%
Source: Garner Dataquest, Stp!Gnber 2003
Given their initial success, some scholars have made claims about the triumph of
firm innovation and state policy in China's telecommunications industry, but time has
proven these claims to be wishful thinking. Shen Xiaobai's study of Julong and Shanghai
Bell praises these firms as catching up, but these claims were premature. Today, Julong
has a pitifully small market share even in the protected and state-monopolized domestic
market. Similarly, Zhang and Igel (2001) see an array of domestic and domestic-
controlled JVs in conjunction with state support as having innovated in 1990s. Indeed, in
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1997, firms, such as Julong, BISC, Shanghai Bell and Datang, all appeared to have great
promise. Unfortunately, most of these firms sank into swift decline. BISC, Julong and
Shanghai Bell were never able to generate new technologies. In particular, they were
unable to make wireless products for that new burgeoning market. Today, the wireless
equipment market accounts for over half of the total market in China. Thus, the inability
of these firms to enter this market successfully severely hampered their ability to grow
with the market.
Table 4.9 China's Major Telecommunications Infrastructure Vendors
Sources: Hoovers Online; Gartner/Dataquest; Zhang and Igel (2001).
Registration Products 1997 1997 2003 2003
Revenue Rank Revenue Rank
BISC 1990 Fixed line 1988 5 Negligible N/A****
(bought out
by Siemens)
Datang 1993 Mixed 520 6 2075* 4**
Julong 1994 Fixed line 5000 1 Negligible N/A****
(Great
Dragon)
Huawei 1988 Mixed 4189 3 31,712 1
Shanghai 1983 Fixed line 4561 2 14,350 3***
Bell (Bought out
by Alcatel)
ZTE 1993 Mixed 1997 4 17,036 2
Notes: Revenue in RMB millions.
*Datang's 2002 revenue was used for 2003.
**Datang has been used to distribute Ericsson's products and Ericsson sold 10.25 billion RMB worth of
telecommunications products in China in 2003. Including Ericsson's products, Datang ranked fourth.
Without Ericsson's products, Datang does not rank in the top ten.
***The figure represents the products of Alcatel. Before Shanghai Bell's acquisition by Alcatel, Shanghai
Bell had revenues that were only a quarter of ZTE's revenues in 2001.
****These firms were not among the top ten largest vendors and no exact data was available.
Shanghai Bell, after receiving technology from Alcatel'04 in 1983, has basically
stuck with the same system ever since. This firm essentially sold the same switch, for
104 At the start of the JV, the foreign partner was Bell Telephone Manufacturing (the Belgian subsidiary of
ITT), which would become part of Alcatel.
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twenty years straight. Shen Xiaobai makes a big deal about the transfer of Alcatel's
semiconductor design technology, but in actual fact, this technology has also stagnated.
The IC design division has also been reliant on a very old design received from abroad.
The design division has also driven away two highly qualified returnees who came to
Shanghai Bell full of missionary zeal to reform and reinvigorate it (see Chapter Five).
As for Julong, Gilboy's (2002) claims that the firm never resolved its
management difficulties appear to be correct. The firm is now a rather insignificant
player in China, even worse off than Shanghai Bell. Its market share has essentially
evaporated.
The best many of these firms could manage was to become sales channels for
foreign firms. While Datang is selling just a little over two billion RMB (the equivalent
of 250 million USD) in equipment, it has become a major sales partner for the much
larger and technologically more sophisticated Ericsson, which had ten billion RMB in
sales in China in 2003 (MFC 2003: 26). Alcatel bought a majority share in Shanghai
Bell in 2001 and merged its own Chinese operations with Shanghai Bell. This merger
was an attempt to gain greater access to the Chinese telecommunications infrastructure
equipment market, which is controlled by state-owned service companies. It is unclear if
the merger will actually increase the sales of the combined firm. Similarly, BISC's
erstwhile minority shareholder, Siemens, has bought out BISC, but the market share of
this now foreign-owned JV has not rebounded.
Datang has tried to become the center of the Chinese government's drive to create
a new "Chinese" telecommunications standard, TD-SCDMA (which was actually created
in Europe by Siemens). The government even set up a series of collaborative efforts
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between Datang and foreign firms anxious to gain access to the details of the new
Chinese standard when and if it becomes a reality. However, Datang's weak
technological capabilities were soon evident and other domestic Chinese firms were able
to barge into the collaborative foreign-domestic efforts designed by the state to support
TD-SCDMA. For example, Huawei essentially high-jacked COMMIT, a joint
development program for TD-SCDMA involving Nokia, TI and others, and took over as
the Chinese partner in place of Datang.
The relative fall of some equipment vendors and the rise of others, such as
Huawei and ZTE, points to some limited competition among the domestic
telecommunications providers. Competition has functioned on two fronts. Chinese
telecommunication service providers in the recent past have switched from more
expensive to less expensive equipment vendors among the domestic firms (Zhang and
Igel 2001: 365). There has also been competition in creating new products, particularly
wireless products. As mentioned, firms that could not generate new wireless products
lost out. They lost despite their right to sit on the same government review boards that
tested and approved foreign telecommunications equipment for the Chinese market.
Huawei and ZTE learned how to copy foreign designs while testing and opening the
equipment of foreign vendors as part of the approval process.' 05 These other firms failed
to make the most of the same opportunities for learning.
Looking at the firms that have done well, Huawei stands out as the largest and
now the most international of China's telecommunications firms with forty percent of its
105 This access to sit on these review boards was deemed to be a big boost for Huawei and ZTE's ability to
learn the technology according to interviews and a foreign telecom executive I discussed this issue off the
record with in December 2002. The telecom executive was at a lost to explain why other domestic firms
with the same rights to sit on the board were not able to capitalize on the opportunity.
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2004 sales overseas. Gilboy's explanation of Huawei's success is that this firm's
connections with the highest levels of the PRC government guaranteed success. He
suggests a tight relationship between Huawei's CEO, Ren Zhengfei, and a prominent
member of the finance xitong, probably Zhou Xiaochuan (Gilboy does not identify this
person by name but does mention some of this anonymous person's previous work as a
high official in finance). He also invokes Ren's PLA background and the seldom
acknowledged but always suspected link between Huawei and a PLA research institute.
Contrary to Gilboy's claims, there is little evidence that Huawei has a favorable
political position vis-A-vis the other domestic telecommunications firms. While Zhou
Xiaochuan is prominent, he is not anymore prominent than a host of other officials below
the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). As for PLA connections, Zhou Huan, the CEO
of Datang, also comes from a PLA background.
There are other reasons to consider the explanation of the unique position of
Huawei incorrect. Consider the second largest Chinese telecommunications
infrastructure firm, ZTE. This firm is tied to Shenzhen's government through ownership
stakes and various provincial authorities hold small strategic stakes. There are also
personal ties that link local Shenzhen officials, who are obviously concerned about local
firms, to top leaders. Shenzhen's party secretary from 1998-2002 was Huang Liman,
who has been the reputed lover and documented confidant of outgoing president, Jiang
Zemin (Nathan and Gilley 2002: 162), who gave up his final official stronghold on the
Central Military Commission in 2004. Looming larger than Jiang's dalliances is the fact
that former Jiang proteg, Li Changchun, is a recognized national leader and has become
a PSC member (Nathan and Gilley 2002). From 1998 to 2002, Li Changchun was party
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secretary of Guangdong, the province in which both ZTE and Huawei are located. Given
the patronage networks Chinese leaders accumulate through the positions they hold, it is
logical to think Li Changchun used his influence with Jiang to boost both of these firms
while provincial party secretary and as PSC member will continue to support these firms
from his former base of operations, especially ZTE since it is a locally owned SOE.
Let us now turn to Shanghai Bell, which has done comparatively worse than
Huawei or ZTE. This firm also has impressive political connections to the top of the
CCP leadership as well. Jiang Zemin's faction is called the Shanghai Gang, but this does
not mean he favors Shanghai above all else. However, Jiang's favorite, Huang Ju, has
been mayor and then party secretary of Shanghai from 1994 to 2002, and what is good
for Shanghai Bell is good for Shanghai. Huang Ju is now a member of the PSC and vice
premier of the State Council (China's executive/administrative branch). Even with
Jiang's receding from the scene, Zeng Qinghong, another prominent member of the
Shanghai Gang, is considered to be the second most powerful or even rival to Hu Jintao
for power within the PSC and the country. Zeng's career was based in Shanghai before
coming with Jiang to Beijing when the latter was suddenly elevated in the wake of the
Tiananmen Massacre. Given his ties to Shanghai and the Shanghai Gang, it is
improbable that he would not want to help out Shanghai through helping Shanghai Bell.
Finally, there is Wu Bangguo, another member of the PSC and former Shanghai mayor
and party secretary (1991-1994), but there are questions about whether his links to the
Shanghai Gang are strong.106 Obviously, this support may be lower now that Shanghai
106 Cheng Li's August 2002 piece for China Leadership Monitor (www.chinleadershipmonitor.org) argues
that Wu is a member of the Shanghai Gang, but Nathan and Gilley (2002: 102) argue that his links to Jiang
and the Shanghai Gang are tenuous. They claim Jiang only brought Wu to Beijing because senior leaders
blocked him from brining his protege, Huang Ju.
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Bell is in foreign hands, but does not suggest that Shanghai Bell has suffered from being
less well connected prior to the late 2001 takeover by Alcatel.
Gilboy also ignores the extremely prominent role of MII in procurement. The
dominant telecommunications providers in China (China Telecommunications, China
Mobile and China Unicom) are all MII-controlled firms. A number of the failed firms
have direct links to MII. MII has significant stakes in Shanghai Bell, Datang and Julong.
Technically, MII does not owned Datang (the State Asset Management Commission took
over from MII), but the boundaries between MII and the firm are still porous. Datang's
whole research organization is composed of MII research institutes. Some have
suggested the existence of complicated internal factional struggle within MII itself,
particularly in the wake of the game of musical chairs in which the heads of these three
firms swapped places in 2004 (Modoff and Goldberg 2004: 7), but Gilboy does not use
the argument of internal MII politicking as the reason for Huawei's supposed political
advantage. In any case, it is unclear how those outside of the very top of the party
hierarchy can hold sway over MII. A PLA background is all well and good, but MII pays
obeisance to the Politburo Standing Committee, not the PLA.
The most damning piece of evidence against Huawei's supposed unique position
of privilege is from Huawei's competitors. One would think, particularly in the context
of particularistic competition, that Huawei's competitors would complain bitterly about
Huawei's supposed privileged position if the firm had one. However, the competitors I
talked to did not think Huawei had an upper hand in securing government procurement.
This is not to say that they denied that government support was critical, it was just that
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they did not think the government favored certain domestic firms over others. Rather,
they all were equal beneficiaries of government support (Interviews 168, 186, 141).
The fact that the state supports Huawei is uncontroversial. Huawei's Ren
Zhengfei himself emphasizes Huawei's connections to the state as a competitive
advantage. As he puts it, albeit somewhat obliquely, "The difference between Huawei
and Western firms is simply that we at every level of management are close to our
customers [author's translation]," (R. Jiang 2003: 119) with the customers of course
being overwhelming the Chinese government-owned firms 0 7 until Huawei's very recent
success in overseas markets. Ren has also stated this fact about the crucial role of
government support in the face of large foreign competitors more bluntly, "If it were not
for the protection through the national government's policy, then [our firm] would have
been easily destroyed (R. Jiang 2003: 120)." However, Ren does not claim that Huawei
receives an advantage over domestic firms in China. In reference to Ren Zhengfei's
remark, business commentator Jiang Ruxiang notes the crucial government role for many
domestic firms, "This kind of philosophy of seeking to survive in this tiny fissure [of
opportunity] really is the situation of almost all domestic firms, they face formidable
[foreign] competitors, but they can also from 'government protection' receive a huge
advantage (R. Jiang 2003: 120)." The historical accounts of the growth of the domestic
industry also note government support but do not view it as biased towards Huawei
(Zhang and Igel 2001; MFC 2003).
Huawei and ZTE have been able to turn this government procurement into a
strategy where they create products after the leading MNCs in this sector. In short, they
107 In commenting on Ren's statement, Jiang explicitly states that customers means local units of the state-
owned telecommunication service providers (Jiang 2003:119).
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are fast followers, and widely recognized as such by their foreign competitors (Interviews
288, 226, 224). However, there are factors that mitigate their apparent accomplishment.
This fast followership does not seem to be due to hard R&D work internal to the firm
alone. As mentioned, Huawei, ZTE and other Chinese telecommunications executives sit
on the committees that approve new imported equipment for the Chinese
telecommunications market. This gives them unprecedented access to understand and
reverse engineer the products of the Nortels, Lucents, Ericssons, Motorolas and
Samsungs of the world.'0 8 Indeed, whereas Samsung used its scale and scope economies
to become a player in CDMA telecommunications infrastructure equipment, Huawei and
ZTE have leveraged access provided by government protection to learn about
competitors' technologies.
This access makes the documented IP violation foibles of Huawei that much more
embarrassing. With such privileged access, it is striking that Huawei still has been
caught red-handed violating other firms' IP in other places. For example, Huawei
photographed illegally the internal design of Fujitsu's equipment at international trade
shows and Cisco successfully sued Huawei for copyright infringement. Huawei also tried
to outsource equipment from a Taiwanese ODM, but the ODM quickly terminated the
agreement because they felt Huawei's real goal was to steal technology given Huawei's
unceasing demands for access. In contrast, ZTE has a relationship with the same firm,
but is a passive partner. In essence, ZTE slaps its name on a product designed and
manufactured by a foreign firm (Interview 94, 211). Neither picture is one of local
telecommunications firms generating much technology on their own. In terms of the
Amsden-Tschang model, they are only at best at stage 3 according to testimony from
108 Discussion with a Nortel executive, December 2002.
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internal firm sources and key suppliers (Interviews 226, 94, 149, 167, 168). Dimitri
Kessler's (2005) recent work also documents how limited and reverse engineering-
focused Huawei's R&D is.
Another mark against these firms is precisely their ties through procurement and
finance to the state. Beyond the obvious government-dominated procurement, these
firms also enjoy privileged access to the financial system. ZTE is a SOE as well as a
prominent firm in a strategic sector so it is difficult to imagine that the firm would
somehow be excluded from the generous soft loans given to other large SOEs. Gilboy
has documented Huawei's generous "illegal" loans on top of state-approved ones.
Gilboy also reports insiders' claims that Huawei has sustained losses in recent years in
contradiction of the firm's publicly released financial statements reporting profits. Thus,
even for these fast reverse engineering firms, it is not certain that they are actually
creating any value. Huawei's recent success in foreign markets appears less triumphant
when viewed in this light. The firm is primarily entering small markets ignored by the
large foreign competitors (Economist, January 6, 2005). International buyers state
Huawei's low prices as an advantage, but this is not an advantage if it is not actually
supported by lower costs of production. With the state buying 85 to 88 percent of ZTE's
production and still sixty percent of Huawei's even after the export surge, there is plenty
of financial room to sell exports under cost. Losses are easily sustainable, but they also
have the potential to turn into a sustained pattern of asset destruction just as in many
other state-favored firms.
3.3.2 Downwardly Mobile: Brands without Technological Brawn
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The mobile handset market in China stands out in that government procurement
does not play large role. This is a real customer-driven market. However, the
government has controlled access to this customer market through licensing and through
limiting foreign-owned channels of distribution. Despite these controls on foreign firms,
foreign firms have dominated the market until quite recently. In the first few years of the
2 1st century, the local handset providers made significant headway, but in 2004 they lost
share again.
Whether or not they regain market share is not the concern here because market
share is not an important benchmark of technological activity. When looking at the
technology behind the local brands, they are found wanting. TCL, Bird, Kejian and
others have gained national recognition for their brands, but as the chart below shows,
brand is only a small part of the value in the mobile handset value chain. What makes
things worse for these local brands is that the estimates below are based upon
international market averages where the big international brands compete. Firms such as
TCL and Bird simply do not have the brand cachet of Nokia, even in China, so the value
they capture is even lower than in the chain below. The average selling price of foreign
phones sold in China was 1 15 percent of the average selling price of domestic phones
(Deutsche Bank estimates).
In contrast, foreign MNCs occupy wide swathes of the value chain. The local
firms at best occupy the manufacturing, sales and distribution and brand segments. In
fact, most of the local sales channels in mobile phones in China are not owned by the
brands so the value they capture from sales and distribution is even smaller than the
values for those segments in the table above. In Table 4.11 below, the segments covered
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by the two largest mobile handset firms, Nokia and Motorola, are compared to the
prototypical mainland Chinese handset firm. Sony Ericsson, as the major MNC with the
slightest coverage across the value chain, was also included. Nokia's coverage is
Table 4.10 Breakdown of Value Chain in Mobile Handsets
Note: Margins are in percentages, not dollar values.
Breakdown USS) Vanilla Feature Smart
voice phone phone 
ASP Margin ASP Margin ASP Margin
Components 34 7 85 9 115 9
Platforms and !PR 8 20 14 26 19 30
Supply chainBoM 2 20 9 30 12 40
Software OS and GUt 4 40 8 40 12 40
Design and integration 1 1 20 33 30 46 40
EMS manufacruang 10 11 18 13 24 14
Saies and distr butior 15 15 15 1 5 20 15
Brand 6 1Q 18 25 24 35
Total 89 13 -99 18 270 22
Srce: DOTxhe an fAG estF,,"ies, B repor t r The Jent Nevaiu tuck dcnt, t, hatdw?rh " died 4 Apr. 2X13
arguably wider than it appears in the table because Nokia has significant input into the
design of key components it sources from ST Micro (IPC interviews). Interviews
confirmed that none of the major Chinese makers of handsets were successfully doing
even the final "design and integration" of their handsets and the new, small local firms
doing design and even the user interface (GUI) were essentially doing such crude designs
that they functioned as bottom feeders in the market, providing low quality phones for
low prices (Interviews 57, 135, 145, 155, 175, 187, 189, 196, 197, 224, 229, 236, 253,
291, 292, 293).
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Table 4.11 The Value Chain Coverage of MNCs and Chinese Brands
Source: Deutsche Bank and firm interviews
IMotorola INokia Sony Ericsson
Components
Platforms and
IPR
Supply chain
Software OS
and GUI
Design &
Integration
Manufacturing
Sales and
distribution
Brand
Chinese brands
Note: The solid colors denote activities done completely in the firm, the mixed colors denote
partially outsourced activities.
A number of sources testified to the lack of design conducted within local firms.
The local firms often acknowledged their reliance on foreign sources of technology
(Interviews 145, 187, 267). Foreign designers of mobile handset technology also noted
their provision of technology to local firms and the lack of any design or technology
generation ability on the part of the local firms including the largest firms, such as Bird,
TCL and Konka (Interviews 135, 175, 196, 253, 291, 292, 317 ). The major vendors
often sell complete packaged solutions including the major components and software and
guidance on how to integrate these solutions so the brand has only to assemble and sell
the products.
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Even TCL, competing with Bird as the top local vendor, has little to show for its
acquisition of Alcatel's mobile handset division'0 9. Alcatel had already sold its
microelectronics division to ST Micro, including design activities for mobile phones.
Essentially, TCL received the Alcatel name for this purchase and not much else.
Alcatel's brand was not very strong as it had less than one percent of worldwide market
share. Furthermore, its design and technology operations outside of ICs were not strong
because it relied completely on outsourcing to firms with in-house design capabilities
(Chan and Seghal 2004). Deutsche Bank cites TCL as having stronger technical
capabilities compared to other Chinese firms as it can start with chipsets and design its
own phones whereas other firms have to accept complete modules (essentially everything
but the plastic casing) from their foreign vendors (Wong, Lim and Ye 2004). However, a
number of interview subjects claim that TCL's ability to design from chipsets alone is
quite weak (Interviews 291, 293, 317).
4. Hidden Dragons: The Contributions of FIEs
4.1 General Trends of FIE R&D
In this section, I will examine FIEs to see what technology activities they are
pursuing in China. I will examine the activities of particular firms and evaluate them
using the Amsden-Tschang framework. This section will also present as comprehensive
enumeration of R&D engineers trained in hybrids and regular FIEs as possible based
upon my interviews augmented by additional sources on foreign R&D activity (Z. Wang
2001, 2002; S. Chen 2004). No outside sources were used without interview
'09 Technically, TCL and Alcatel have formed a 55:45 JV, but this JV is commonly seen as a means for
Alcatel to rid itself of its loss-making mobile handset division and eventually exit this market entirely
(ChinaTechNews.com, April 29, 2004).
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confirmation of the existence of a particular firm's R&D activity in China. The main
findings are that the regular FIEs contributed more in terms of sheer numbers of
engineers trained and the hybrid FIEs were contributed more in terms of the skills (as
measured using the Amsden-Tschang framework) they were passing on to local
engineers. I will use the terms MNC and regular FIE interchangeably in this section.
The 20 largest global IT firms are presented in the table below although the table
excludes the telecommunication service companies, such as AT&T, NTT, Telefonica and
Telecom Italia as China's telecommunications market remains closed to them. I
interviewed 8 of these 20 firms for the dissertation research and three others as part of
MIT's Industrial Performance Center's Globalization Project. For six others, I drew on
the interviews conducted by other members of the Industrial Performance Center team.
Thus, I have coverage of 17 of the top twenty firms from interview sources. For the top
ten computer equipment providers, I have directly interviewed five of the top ten firms in
China. I interviewed another firm extensively at its Japanese headquarters about its
global operations across multiple divisions. I will not identify which firms I interviewed
to help preserve the anonymity of interview subjects.
The most comprehensive and up-to-date study of the R&D activities of foreign
firms in China is Kathleen Walsh's Foreign High-tech R&D in China (2003) so this work
is a good starting point to examine the R&D activities of foreign firms. Walsh correctly
observes that there has been significant change over time with an intensification of the
R&D efforts of foreign firms in China. This development of Chinese R&D efforts fits a
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Table 4.12 Top Twenty Global IT Firms in 2003
Source: OECD Information Technology Outlook 2004
Firms 2003 Revenue (USD Firms 2003 Revenue (USD
Millions) Millions)
1. IBM 86902 11. Nokia 37670
2. Siemens 85894 12. Dell 35404
3. HP (Hewlett- 71256 13. Microsoft 32187
Packard)
4. Hitachi 67157 14. Mitsubishi 30848
5. Sony 63353 15. Philips 29947
6. Matsushita 62744 16. Intel 28527
7. Toshiba 47944 17. Motorola 26293
8. Samsung 47613 18. Canon 25760
9. NEC 41090 19. EDS 21731
10. Fujitsu. 38480 20. Sanyo 19856
Table 4.13 Top Ten Global Computer Equipment Firms in 2003
Source: OECD Information Technology Outlook 2004. Referred to in source as "IT equipment and
systems."
1. IBM 6. Dell
2. HP (Hewlett-Packard) 7. Sun Microsystems
3. Toshiba 8. Hon Hai Precision
4. NEC 9. Seagate
5. Fujitsu 10. Apple
global pattern observed by Reddy (2000), Dalton et al (1999) °10 and Shin-homg Chen
(2004) of MNC R&D spreading to developing world which traditionally was neither
home to nor offshore R&D location for "first-world" MNCs."'l There are both demand
factors pushing MNCs to locate R&D in developing countries and supply factors pulling
the MNCs to certain locations. These factors are different from the early stages of R&D
internationalization when MNCs moved R&D resources outside the home economy to
'10 Dalton et al's work describes the trends of the developed world cross investing in R&D facilities so it
fits better the internationalization mode. However, this work also uncovered the new trend of a more
dispersed R&D activities with ten percent of US R&D facilities in developing countries, such as India,
China, Taiwan, Brazil and Mexico. This is true even though the book significantly undercounts the number
of such R&D centers in China (Walsh 2003: 25).
I1l See Louis Wells (1983) for the contrast between MNCs from the developed economies and MNCs from
the developing world.
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other parts of the developed world as many of the push and pull factors dealt with the
sheer size of already developed and protected markets (Westney 1993; Dunning 1994;
Patel and Pavitt 1998; Dalton et al 1999). Chen neatly summarizes the differences in the
table below.
Table 4.14 R&D Globalization
Source: Modified table from S. Chen (2004) based on Reddy (2000).
R&D Internationalization R&D Globalization
(starting in the 1970s) (starting in the 1980s)
Demand-side Forces Need to enhance market- Shortage of R&D personnel
share in local markets abroad in industrialized economies
Host government policies Increasing demand for R&D
personnel
Increasing R&D costs
Supply-side Forces Large and protected markets Availability of R&D
with unique characteristics personnel in some developing
Proximity to market and economies
production Low-level of wages of
personnel and divisibility of R&D
into core & non-core activities
Changes in policy regimes,
including IPR in host economies
China supplies relatively cheap technical labor and can take advantage the
divisibility of R&D activities (as discussed in Chapter Three) in the lower right box, but
China's IPR regime is still quite poor according to numerous investors I talked to
acknowledge." 2 There is little evidence that the IPR regime in China drew foreign
investors. On the demand side, IT managers continually complain about a shortage of
personnel, but what they really mean is a shortage of personnel at the right price. In any
case, as Figure 1.2 in Chapter One showed, the Chinese are educating large numbers of
112 In all my interviews, I did not meet one firm that claimed that IP problems were not rife in China. The
challenge for firms is not to change the entire external environment, but to manage their business in ways to
insulate themselves from this environment. For example, Microsoft has licensed its OS to every major
computer vendor in China and has an aggressive pricing strategy for China and the developing world
generally i.e. much lower prices for the developing world.
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people. According to UNESCO, thirty-five percent of these graduates studied science
and engineering disciplines so China's education system provides a potential R&D army
for MNCs (Pack 2004: 367). The supply of trained technical workers in low-wage China
has been its major lure.
Even with a large supply of engineers, MNCs have taken time to seize this
opportunity in China. In part, this time has been necessary because local graduates still
need to be trained. For any significant task, foreign firms virtually unanimously felt local
employees still needed training. Of course, part of this problem is universal. Fresh
graduates in the US and elsewhere also require on-the-job training as foreign firms
attested. This training time aside, MNCs moved slowly during the 1990s to place real
R&D centers in China.
Walsh (2003: 86) provides a three-stage chronology of the movement of MNC
R&D activities to China: exploratory and strategic partnerships stage (early-to-mid
1990s), expansion of R&D (mid-to-late 1990s) and consolidation of R&D (late 1990s to
the present). In the initial stage, little actual R&D took place in these "show" R&D
centers. As Walsh (2003: 87) notes:
Most of these collaborations, however, involved little, if any, R&D,
comprising instead simple donations of advanced equipment (such as
computers) for training purposes, the establishment of R&D "labs" at
universities (which appeared in some cases to be little more than rooms
set up with foreign-donated equipment), or research funds for
development work conducted by joint venture or university partners to
assist in localizing foreign products. Since the main objective in many
of these agreements was to appease Chinese officials and obtain
approval for a joint venture-not to conduct R&D-it is unlikely that
much advanced technology or know-how was transferred via these
early agreements.
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My own findings concur with Walsh's assessment of these early efforts, particularly the
R&D within universities. A senior official at Qinghua, the premier science and
technology university in China, told me that the MNC "labs" there were simply donated
equipment and the ones I saw did not differ from this description. Furthermore, none of
the MNCs I talked to suggested that they conducted any serious research within the
confines of the university system.'13 In the second stage, she sees foreign firms extended
their contacts with universities, but I found little evidence of this beyond the internships
and other recruiting devices. Walsh acknowledges that recruiting rather than
outsourcing research has been one of MNCs' main motives for these activities. She
mentions that she met with one of the first groups of university researchers working for
foreign firms in 1998, but offers no evidence that this type of arrangement is widespread
beyond the internships 14. Her third stage is similar to Reddy's globalization of R&D.
MNCs have recognized the feasibility of setting up substantial R&D centers in China, a
low wage location, and have proceeded accordingly.
How many FIE R&D centers are there in China? Walsh conducted more than 36
interviews for her study, but these included interviews subjects who were not managers
of MNCs. The list of R&D centers Walsh (2003: 92) compiled on behalf of the Stimson
Center, a Washington DC-based think-tank, contains 223 MNC R&D centers in the ICT
(information and computer technology) area. Walsh concedes that this list may not be
complete and the list does contain those university "labs" and other programs that may be
simply "show" R&D centers of no real value. It is hard to evaluate the extent to which
113 Walsh states that she interviewed researchers at universities that said they were doing development for
MNCs, but she apparently had no confirmation from the MNCs.
114 Walsh (2003: 98) does concede that hiring university students means essentially that these students
come to do work in the R&D facilities not on the university campus.
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the chaff of the R&D world are included in with the wheat on the Stimson Center's list
because the names of the individual R&D centers are not yet publicly available. I
contacted Walsh last year about the possibility of viewing this list and she said the
Stimson Center had not yet decided whether to make the list public. It is not yet publicly
available as of February 1, 2005. The Chung-hua Institute of Economic Research (CIER)
in Taiwan concluded that China had 148 R&D centers across all industries, but CIER's
methodology to arrive at this figure is unknown although CIER researchers have told me
that they have cooperated with Wang Zhile, a researcher at the Ministry of Commerce.
Walsh was told by one R&D center that there were probably only 50 real R&D centers in
all of China (Walsh 2003: 92). One clear fault of Walsh's list is that she ignores the ECE
R&D centers. Walsh counts 41 US MNCs and only three from Taiwan-yet Shin-horng
Chen interviewed 38 different Taiwanese firms with R&D centers in China and he by no
means thinks his interview list is comprehensive. In my own research, I collected data on
technical personnel involved with R&D centers of 33 different FIEs. Some of these FIEs
had multiple R&D centers in China. These 33 firms do not include those interviewed
Taiwanese firms that only had limited design-for-manufacturing activities in their
Chinese plants.
Even with the supposed consolidation of the MNC R&D centers in the China,
Walsh (2003:99) finds three different types of relationships between the R&D centers and
their MNC parents. She sees a majority of these R&D centers as satellite organizations
that act as listening posts and modify products for the local market. The second type of
R&D center takes a discrete part of the R&D task from the parent corporation. The third
type (represented by a very small number of these centers) claims to be fully integrated
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and equal partners in decisions with their MNC parents. This claim of equal decision-
making seems a bit farfetched given the trend of major MNCs coordinating research
across a number of international centers. While the ECE (ethnic Chinese economy)
hybrid firms may sometimes achieve this, Walsh's data seems to be comprised of only
American and European firms." 5 My research found the former two types of R&D
centers across FIEs, but found the third category only in hybrid firms. Overall, Walsh
(2003: 99) admits to scant evidence about the performance of these R&D centers, "There
are few indicators of progress available and collection of much more detailed data is
needed to make an accurate assessment." I hope in the rest of this section to contribute to
the creation of a more detailed assessment of the R&D activities of the MNCs in China.
One overall measure, albeit a crude one given how discretely R&D can be divided
in this era of cheap global communications, is the number of US utility patents earned by
corporate researchers based in China. US utility patents are the gold standard of
technology patents because the US is still the world's largest and one of the most
sophisticated technology markets and, unlike China 116, has an effective legal mechanism
to protect the property rights that patents confer. When one looks at the US utility patent
trends in China (see Table 4.15 below), several patterns emerge. First, the hybrids
followed by the FIEs are the dominant holders of US utility patents. Three of the top five
patent holders are hybrids and only one is a domestic firm. Four of the six firms with ten
115 1 cannot be absolutely sure that only American and European firms were interviewed as the Stimson
Center has not released the firm-level data, but given the undercounting of other firms in the list compiled
by Walsh and her mentioning of specific firms, all of which are from North America and Europe, point to
the high likelihood that other firms were excluded from her sample.
116 One mark of the ineffectiveness of domestic Chinese patents as opposed to foreign ones is the absence
of a connection between Chinese patents and new product creation. Y. Sun (2002) found that there was no
statistically significant relationship between domestic Chinese patents and the ability to create new
products. On the other hand, Sun found a significant positive correlation between foreign technology
inputs and the ability to create new products. In other words, foreign technology inputs was much more
worthwhile in new product creation than holding Chinese patents.
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or more patents are hybrids. Of the firms ranked in the top ten (there are fifteen such
firms due to ties), seven are FIEs, six are hybrids and only two are domestic firms.
Hybrids account for 503 of the 650 utility patents from China whereas the FIEs account
for 103 and the domestic firms account for only 45. Even when the largest hybrid patent
holder, Hon Hai, is removed from the counting, the hybrids still have more patents (148)
than either the FIEs or domestic firms. Also, one Taiwanese firm, China Petrochemical
Development, had a significant patent presence (37 patents) in China (Floyd and Meyer
2002: 43), but was not included because I could not find data for this firm for 2002-2004
(probably due to the firm listing its patents under a slightly different English name than
the one used by Floyd and Meyer).
One significant pattern that shows the commitment of the hybrid firms to a China-
based strategy is the extent to which their portfolio collection is weighted toward China.
Only one foreign firm, Microsoft, has more than one percent of its patent portfolio in
China whereas every hybrid firm has more than one percent from China. Several large
firms, such as Hon Hai and Inventec, with significant patent portfolios from their
Taiwanese home bases that they acquired before their embracing a China-based strategy
in the late 1990s, have much larger portions from China at fourteen and forty percent,
respectively. Even Microsoft's anomalous position may be explained by the nature of the
work done in China versus what is done in the US. Microsoft is conducting hardware
R&D for its X-box game machines in China and hardware R&D generates far more
patents than software R&D. One can see this by comparing Microsoft's total patent
holdings compared to other global top twenty IT firms. Other than Nokia, which did not
make its serious push into IT until the early 1990s, all the other large IT firms generated
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many multiples the number of patents that Microsoft generated and they were hardware
firms." 7 Hardware simply generates more patents. This fact can also be seen by the fact
that IBM opened up its patent portfolio in software and it amounted to only 500 patents
out of IBM's more than 40,000 global patents. Beyond Microsoft, the only FIE firm to
have even one thousandth of its patents from China was Agere.
The patent data also confirms the predictions of the nationality of MNCs theory
that argues that firms will favor their national home base. The hybrids, a type of firm that
embraces China as part of the national home base, have a significant presence in China.
Moreover, the few patents generated by domestic Chinese firms also tend to be generated
in China. TCL was the lowest with only one third of its patents originating in China. All
the other domestic firms generated more than half their patents in China.
Unfortunately, the domestic firms simply did not generate many patents. Their
lack of learning and innovation is precisely why the hybrids have played such a
prominent role in China's upgrading. Beyond the fact that they generated only 45, only
seven of these patents were in IT products. Haier's patents were in white goods
(refrigerators and washing machines) and Sinopec's large patent portfolio was petroleum-
related. More dismally, many of the so-called leading firms of China's guojiadui (the
national team of firms championed by the state) were conspicuously absent from any
contribution. Major IT firms, such as Lenovo, Founder, Bird, Konka and Ziguang, were
absent as were television giants, Changhong and Hisense.
For the regular FIEs, conspicuous in their absence from the list of China-origin
patents were 13 major IT firms from Tables 4.12 and 4.13: IBM, HP. NEC, Samsung,
Toshiba, Nortel, Mitsubishi, Dell, Canon, EDS, Sanyo, Sun Micro and Apple. Cisco, the
117 Agere and Epson are FIEs on the list, but neither of these firms is a top twenty global IT firm.
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twenty-first largest IT firm and largest networking equipment firm in the world, also does
not have patents from China. In fact, seven of the top-ten telecommunication equipment
firms" 8 did not have any patent activity in China. Also, many large non-hybrid
Taiwanese firms do not have a patent presence in China, including TSMC, Quanta,
Compal, AsusTek and Tatung. The only non-hybrid Taiwanese firm with US patents
originating from China was Acer and that firm did not have any new patents from China
during the 2002 to 2004 period.
One final observation about the patent trends in China is that the patenting has
accelerated. Corporations received 503 patents from 2002-2004 and only 139 prior to
2002. In 1997, corporations received only 9 utility patents by Chinese researchers.
4.2 The View from the Firm: R&D Activities in Regular and Hybrid FIEs
Turning to specific foreign MNCs, firms such as IBM, Motorola and HP have
tried to be good corporate citizens in China for several decades. Indeed, most of the large
MNCs set up subsidiaries in China by the early 1990s though some of them came slightly
later, such as Nokia's entry in 1994. However, these firms did not really establish R&D
in China early on despite government pressure to do so. Even Chinese government
officials, such as Ministry of Commerce's Wang Zhile (Z. Wang 2002: 66-67), admit that
the Chinese government tried to coerce MNCs in transferring technology and that this
coercion failed to be effective. Several firms announced R&D centers relatively early, but
these centers did not amount to much. This stands true even though these firms were
doing this to please the China government. Very much like the case of Motorola's
118 According to the OECD (2004), in 2003, the top ten telecommunication equipment firms were: Nokia,
Motorola, Cisco, Alcatel, Ericsson, Nortel, Lucent, L-3 Communications, Avaya and Qualcomm.
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Table 4.15 China-origin US Utility Patents of Domestic Firms, Hybrid Firms and
Major Foreign IT Producers
Source: Floyd and Meyer (2002) and US Patent and Trademark Office (updated through Jan. 25, 2005)
China-origin
Patents as
2002-2004 Prior to 2002 Total US Fraction of
US Utility US Utility Total US Utility Total US
Patents from Patents from Utility Patents Firm Patents Utility
China China (China-origin) Type (World) Patents**
Hon Hai*
(Foxconn) 304 51 355 hybrid 2539 0.139818826
2. Inventec* 47 31 78 hybrid 197 0.395939086
3. Microsoft 37 3 40 FIE 3467 0.011537352
4. Sinopec* 29 5 34 domestic 65 0.523076923
5. UMC* 12 17 29 hybrid 2519 0.0115125
6. Winbond* 14 8 22 hybrid 761 0.02890933
7. Leco* 5 5 10 hybrid 84 0.11904762
8. Intel 7 1 8 FIE 9327 0.000857725
Nokia 6 2 8 FIE 3301 0.00242351
9. Delta 6 1 7 hybrid 293 0.023890785
Epson 6 1 7 FIE 5310 0.001318267
Siemens 6 1 7 FIE 19623 0.000356724
Philips 5 2 7 FIE 19421 0.000360435
Motorola 4 3 7 FIE 16389 0.000427116
10. Huawei 6 0 6 domestic 7 0.857142857
11. Fujitsu 3 1 4 FIE 16142 0.000247801
Lucent 2 2 4 FIE 7572 0.000528262
Acer 0 4 4 FIE 514 0.007782101
Haier 4 0 4 domestic 4 1
12. Agere 2 0 2 FIE 1377 0.001452433
ZTE 2 0 2 domestic 2 1
Matsushita 2 0 2 FIE 20846 9.59417E-05
SMIC 2 0 2 hybrid 3 0.666666667
13. TCL 1 0 1 domestic 3 0.333333333
Hitachi 1 0 1 FIE 30443 3.28483E-05
Tongfang 1 0 1 domestic 1 1
BYD 1 0 1 domestic 1 1
Seagate 0 1 1 FIE 2626 0.000380807
*The data for the "Prior to 2002" for these firms extends only to 1997. Very few corporate US
utility patents were issued before 1997 for China and none of the firms was very active (more than
one patent per year) other than UMC, which had 3 China-origin US utility patents in 1997.
**The fractions for firms that had more than one percent of their total US utility patents sourced
from China are in bold.
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semiconductor plant discussed in Chapter Five, certain firms had an interest in pleasing
the Chinese government and found that the state could be easily pleased without actually
forking over much technology.
IBM is a case in point. IBM's first business with the People's Republic of China
(IBM had done business in China in the 1930s) was setting up a computer system in
Shenyang in 1979. IBM did not however decide to set up a Chinese subsidiary until
1990. Interview sources and Wang Zhile state that CEO Gerstner came to China in 1994
and decided to make a big push into the China market. IBM set up a number of IBM-
controlled JVs with MII-owned Great Wall to produce computer products. Gerstner as
CEO went out of his way to cultivate the Chinese leadership, making 5 trips to China
between 1993 and 2000. He also organized a dinner for President Jiang with twenty top
American CEOs at the 50th anniversary celebration of the UN in New York to show that
American business was not in line with anti-Chinese rhetoric coming from the US
government. Jiang was reportedly very impressed with Gerstner's gesture (Z. Wang
2001: 208). Moreover in 1995, IBM was the first MNC to set up a research (as opposed
to development) center. However, IBM was and is not doing any basic research
connected to its products in this center. Instead, IBM is essentially sponsoring basic
scientific research completely divorced from commercial applications. This research
intentionally will not lead to creating Chinese engineers who will then work for Chinese
or foreign competitors to create product competing with IBM's own. In other words,
these Chinese scientists are safely ensconced in pure science research precisely to protect
IBM's commercial IP as people close to the project admit (Interviews 221, 276)." 9 In this
119 1 received permission to talk about IBM's R&D center by name. Anonymous insiders confirmed what I
heard from the source that cleared me to use the company's name when discussing this center.
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sense, the research is not even as commercially applicable as the examples of slider
suspension engineering of hard disk drives and conceptual development of
communications algorithms that Amsden and Tschang give to explain what constitutes
"pure science" in their framework. IBM's other research efforts have also been quite
limited and will be discussed with other firms anonymously in order to protect the
identity of the interlocutors.
The major computer firms are either not doing any R&D or are doing routine
work in China. For example, one of the global top three computer firms is doing routine
software customization for the local market (10/28/2003 telephone follow-up to previous
interviews). The firm's own managers do not pretend that this center does anything more
than final code writing for software that fits under stage 4 of the Amsden-Tschang
typology.
Another global top-three computer firm has several design centers in China, but
these centers are not very sophisticated. As one of the firm's R&D managers pointed out,
this firm only really needs and uses PhDs for the sophisticated work in its home base and
sends its routine work out to several different countries in Asia. The firm employs less
than four hundred engineers in its Chinese R&D centers and these engineers are spread
across a variety of tasks including localization, and code writing and function design (see
Table 4.16 below) for Linux and other software products and middleware solutions (the
software between the user interface software and the software embedded in the hardware)
for mobile phones. At best, these tasks are detailed product design tasks of stage 3 of the
Amsden-Tschang framework.
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The manager made clear that the Chinese teams are simply delegated routine
tasks. Each project had an "owner" team, located in the firm's global HQ. These owner
teams conceive the projects, receive approval from company executives and then execute
the projects. The Chinese teams do not have the ability to conceive of projects so they
were simply used by the leading design teams abroad to help do the grunt work of the
projects. The Chinese teams are essentially at the bottom of the firm's R&D hierarchy as
the Indians were still better at software than the Chinese teams-the need to modify
products for the Chinese market justifies the existence of the Chinese teams. The
manager noted that all of the product architecture is still controlled by operations in the
home country of the MNC because the engineers there have the broadest knowledge of
the firm's array of products and are more able to create new solutions to drive industry
standards. They also possess a cultural advantage of being in the home country of the
firm (Interview 276).
One major Japanese firm (MNC 5) employed three thousand engineers to write
code for software programs for the firm's hardware products. Given the common
characters shared by written Japanese and Chinese, the Japanese firm found Chinese
better suited to their needs than the English-speaking Indian software engineers. Like
many of the code writers for other firms, these engineers were towards the very back-end
of the R&D process, stage 4 of the Amsden-Tschang framework (Interview 296). The
design flow in software can be conceived as proceeding in 7 stages from most
sophisticated to least sophisticated as show in Table 4.16 below. This firm's software
programmers were doing code writing, the simple software writing that precedes the very
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routine testing functions. Most of the software conducted in MNCs in my sample is
simply this type of code crunching (CD/OT).
The major foreign telecommunications firms were equally concentrated on the
back of the R&D process, stages 3 and 4 of the Amsden-Tschang framework. While
some of these firms had impressively large R&D operations in terms of manpower (see
Table 4.16 Stages of Software Development
Source: Industry experts.
Stage Description
URD Concept Design
SD System Design
FD Function Design
CD/OT Code Writing
IT Integration Test
ST System Test
AT Acceptance Test
MNC 11, 17 and 19 in Table 4.17 below), they were generally doing the final code
writing for software needed for the products or detailed design on both the hardware and
software. They admitted that their teams to create new applications of known product
lines (the product architecture of Amsden-Tschang stage two) were not located in China.
The local teams were either doing the detailed design and final work on these global
products or doing the detailed design necessary to localize these products for China
(Interview 224, 236, 288, 311).
One firm (referred to as MNC 1 in the Figure 4.3), one of the largest mobile
phone producers in the world, tried to move beyond this type of work. Or to be more
precise, overseas Chinese engineers led by the ethnic Chinese head of the firm's Chinese
mobile handset division wanted to create a full-fledged center to design new generations
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of mobile handsets in China. The director felt that the firm had to create the handsets in
the market to be competitive in the market and he led to the establishment of actual
design and development work in the Beijing mobile handset research center. Before this
time, the architecture design was located in the foreign headquarters and the local
research center (founded in 1998) did little actual design. Experienced "foreign" (mainly
ethnic Chinese) engineers brought in from headquarters designed the user interface
(which fits most appropriately into stage 3). Before the director-led initiative, the only
development work done in China was to "slap on" Asian language software.
Headquarters did not interfere at first with this new local initiative and the Beijing
design center created its first phone while drawing upon the home firm's prodigious
technological resources for IP. The engineers brought in to do the user interface began to
train local engineers in this and other skills. However, the firm was hit with a huge
resource allocation problem when it decided to cut back from designing 20 to 50 products
during the period of 1999-2002 to designing just three to five products each year. The
firm essentially took back the design and development work from the Beijing team and
gave it to engineers in the home country. The firm did this despite the fact that it had
become somewhat dependent on sales of mobile phones and infrastructure equipment in
China, which made up more than twenty percent of the firm's global revenue. The lure
of the local market had not prevented it from sticking to its home base.
This reorganization of R&D spurred the director of the Chinese R&D center into
action. Through a personal connection, he received venture funding from a Taiwanese
angel investor, who had made his own fortune as a high-technology entrepreneur. The
director took a team of local and overseas Chinese from the Beijing research center and
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founded his own handset design firm in the greater Shanghai area. This firm set out to
create a mobile handset design company akin to firms such as Cellon (a Franco-American
firm), which has a large design operation in China, and Alphacell (an Israeli firm). The
major differences between those design firms and this one is this firm targets the high-
end of the market, both in China and globally, and it aims to produce its own brand. The
firm does the whole design in-house and then outsources the manufacturing. The firm
has already employed local engineers to create a series of new, cutting edge mobiles
phones. This work comprises stage 2 R&D as well as stage 3 and 4 activities.
The firm does not have the right to sell in China because it does not own a license.
This protectionist hurdle has been easily circumvented through paying a local state-
owned firm for the use of its license, a common though illegal practice. This ploy is yet
another example at how ineffective the state is at monitoring firms because the license the
firm uses is from a MII-owned firm. MII is the gatekeeper in charge of distributing
licenses and keeping a lid on competition in this sector and yet MII's own firm is
undermining this policy.
The failure of MNC 1 to pursue more substantial activities and its interaction with
other firms demonstrate the different strategies and behavior of the different types of
firms. The MNC's lack of strategic commitment to China drove the creation of the
hybrid design firm listed above, but it also spurred the firm's other local engineers into
action. A number of local engineers left the firm to set up their own design houses, but
these engineers did not have all the requisite skills. Their firms are really bottom feeders
that aim to design phones with poor capabilities and user interfaces to the lowest rung of
the Chinese market (referred to as bottom feeders in Figure 4.3). These firms are
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engaged in a ferocious competition with little profits. One of these firms received
investment (a minority share of the firm) from another foreign telecommunications giant.
This MNC (referred to MNC 2 in Figure) wanted to appease the Chinese government so
they invested, but they do not actually use the invested firm as a supplier. In other words,
the investment was just written off as the cost of doing business in China.
MNC 1 was also involved in a JV with a state-owned firm in which MNC 1 was
the minority partner. This JV was a competitor in the telecommunications field, but the
MNC needed to demonstrate a willingness to transfer technology to local firms. While it
may not have transferred the latest technology to its JV partner, third parties, who
subsequently hired away the core group of engineers trained in the JV, confirm that the
MNC did provide training in substantial design skills. Unfortunately, the management of
the JV was from the SOE parent and was typically inept. They tried to create far more
products than their team could handle effectively. The end result was they were unable to
get any products on the market before the products became out-of-date with little or no
profit margins. However, an American subsidiary of a Taiwanese firm came to save the
day (at least form the perspective of the demoralized engineers in the SOE-controlled
JV). This firm set up a major design operation in East China to design core components
and handsets. It discovered that the SOE actually had some well-trained engineers due
to its partnership with MNC 1, and it cherry-picked the good ones to become a large part
of its design team. This mass hiring further hollowed out the SOE at a time when MNC
was ignoring the JV because the MNC felt it had fulfilled its part of the bargain with the
Chinese state to transfer technology (Interviews 291-293). The transfer of human and
financial capital between these firms is shown in Figure 4.3. Although the domestic
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firms received substantial resources in engineers, technology and finance from the
foreign firms, the domestic firms were still not able to create commercial technologies at
more than a very low level.
Figure 4.3 Movements of Human and Financial Capital and Technology in
China's Mobile Handset Market
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In contrast to the regular FEs, there were a number of hybrid firms that
contributed to technological upgrading. Whereas the regular FIEs contributed by training
thousands of engineers in relative simple tasks, the hybrids contributed by training
engineers in sophisticated as well as simple tasks. The regular FIEs trained more
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engineers, but the hybrids trained their engineers in more sophisticated technologies.
Moreover, the hybrids were probably undercounted. Many hybrids are small start-ups
and relatively hard to track down. There were a number of promising hybrids
recommended by foreign venture capitalists operating in China that I was unable to
interview due to time and financial constraints.'20
Another aspect of the hybrids' contribution should be considered. While the large
regular FIEs have contributed less absolutely in terms of skills, they have also contributed
less relative to their own technological capacity. While this relative contribution is not
part of determining technical contribution as defined in Chapter One, it is important when
considering the future. Simply put, the hybrids are conducting activities involving their
highest level of skills in China. Thus, as they increase their own skill level, one can
reasonably expect their Chinese operations will employ and even help to generate these
new skills. Only a few hybrids conduct stage 1 activities anywhere in the world, but
those that do already have those activities at least partially in China. As these hybrids
advance closer to the technological frontier, the absolute level of the skills they contribute
to China will increase. In contrast, the MNCs on the technological frontier show no signs
of transferring those skills immediately to their Chinese R&D bases.
The largest hybrid in terms of R&D personnel is a Taiwanese conglomerate that
makes a range of IT components and end products. This firm has had an explicit strategy
to become a greater China rather than Taiwanese company. Beyond the sheer size of the
120 The same cannot be said for the small domestic start-ups. I went to visit the officials and firms of
almost all the major industrial, university and science parks the three main centers of China's IT industry
(the Pearl River Delta, Yangzi River Delta and Beijing). These officials were more than happy to show off
the firms they viewed as success stories. These firms were either hybrids or local firms engaged in
commerce rather than technological innovation. Venture capital firms also found few local start-ups with
technological capabilities.
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firm's research effort in China, which employs three thousand engineers, the firm's effort
is impressive because the commitment to develop sophisticated technologies in China.
This firm is one of the few firms conducting stage 1 (basic research) in China-the type
of research that relies exclusively PhDs and creates the intellectual property (IP) upon
which technology products are based (Amsden and Tschang 2003: 555). US utility
patents won by the firm's Chinese researchers are often in the basic technologies
underlying some of its key products rather than simple tweaking of established products
(USPTO). In some areas, the firm's China-based research is not simply on par with its
original Taiwan home base, but has surpassed it. Indeed, the firm rejected Taiwanese
government overtures to create a new big Taiwanese R&D base until it had already
completed its major new base in Beijing. Even researchers from Taiwan who have
downplayed the sophistication of the Chinese R&D centers of the Taiwanese concede
that this firm's telecommunications R&D surpasses the R&D in this area done in Taiwan
(Interview 278). This is true in two key technologies that are part of its push into
telecommunications. First, the firm's research into creating telecommunications
infrastructure equipment is entirely based in China. Secondly, the firm's mobile handset
design, which started out as a small unit in Taiwan, has Chinese operations that are set to
pass the Taiwanese one in size and sophistication. The overall handset design division
will be led by a Taiwanese American, who formerly worked for one of the
telecommunications giants, but this manager will be based in China not Taiwan.
According to the firm's internal plan, the 80 designers in Taiwan will expand to 180, but
the seventy designers in China will expand to 250 (Interview 317). Competitors also
confirm that this new design team will be a force to be reckoned with (Interview 293).
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A major Taiwanese computer manufacturer also has embraced a strategy of
building up "twin towers" in China and Taiwan. As part and parcel of this strategy, the
firm has cultivated China as the sole base of its software operations. Their software
operations go beyond code writing to crafting the whole embedded software system
needed for their own-designed notebook computers. Without these Chinese operations,
the firm could not design a notebook. Originally, the hardware systems were completely
designed in Taiwan leaving the firm with a clearly defined division between the software
base in Taiwan and the hardware base in China. However, recently, the firm has begun
to move hardware research to China without moving any software research back to
Taiwan. While already a third of its research engineers are in China (excluding
production engineers in Chinese plants), the fraction should increase because two-thirds
of the total engineering staff are Taiwan-based hardware engineers (Interviews 278, 237).
The other Taiwanese notebook producers have not embraced a China-based strategy and
none of them have software or hardware system design (as opposed to simple code
crunching) in China (Interviews 278, 279, 259, 255, 237, 219, 206, 205, 204, 201 and
others).
This hybrid computer firm does not pursue any basic research (stage 1) in China,
but the firm does not pursue such research in Taiwan or anywhere else in the world. The
firm has followed the classic evolutionary path of Taiwanese ODM firms building design
operations after becoming large contract manufacturers for the major international brands
(Lee and Chen 2000). Thus, it has slowly worked its way from production backwards
through the stages of research. What is critical is that the firm has as much stage 2
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research, new product development (its most sophisticated research), in China as it has in
Taiwan.
Another Taiwanese firm has quietly embraced a China-based strategy. It has
done so quietly because it embarked on this strategy after the 2000 Taiwanese
presidential election brought Chen Shui-bian, a fiercely anti-China politician, to power.
Similar to UMC, it chose to invest heavily (and illegally) in sophisticated activities in
China so it has assumed a low public profile unlike President Dai of Inventec or Guo Tai-
ming of Hon Hai, who in the late 1990s proclaimed that they were embarking on China-
based strategies. This firm's strategy is of interest because it has chosen to do its most
and least sophisticated R&D in China. On the low end, due to its heavy concentration of
plants in China, the firm does much of its design for manufacturing in its mainland
plants. On the high-end, far from its largest manufacturing base in southern China, the
firm has invested in an R&D center with 100 PhDs doing basic research on product
technologies and new product generation (stages 1 and 2). In contrast, the firm's much
larger R&D center in Taiwan only employs 170 PhDs and concentrates mainly on new
product generation and detailed design (stages 2 and 3) although there is some joint
research between the Chinese and Taiwanese facilities.
Another hybrid firm from Hong Kong moved almost all of its design functions to
China. This left a mere ten researchers in Hong Kong while employing 120 in China.
The new facility does advanced work in conjunction with the Hong Kong researchers, but
also covers the breadth of the firm's R&D from new product generation to design for
manufacture.
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Alongside of these established firms are new start-ups. In addition to the handset
design firm already discussed, there are several other promising start-ups that I
discovered in the course of my research. One of these firms is founded by the ex-director
of one of the few regular FIEs to found an IC design center in China (see Chapter 5). His
new firm develops and designs new wireless local area networks (WLANs) because the
demand for these machines is large and growing given China's small fixed line
infrastructure and the relative high cost of installation of fixed lines into existing
buildings. The team has 200 engineers and they are creating new WLAN products for a
range of MNCs to sell in China and elsewhere. The entire R&D team is based in China
and includes the founder and five engineers with whom he worked at a global top ten
telecommunications MNC before directing the IC design firm (the design firm was a
spin-off from the telecommunications firm).
A returnee from Canada has created a product design company making web
cameras. This firm has linked up with a major foreign IC (integrated circuit) producer
that wanted to find new markets for its chips. The firm designed in the chips of this
MNC and the MNC wants to help the start-up sell the cameras abroad as well as in China.
This start-up concentrates most of its activities in Shenzhen, but has eschewed the
national-grade technology park there because it feels the services for returnees are
actually very minimal, just cheap office space (I heard this lament from nearly every
start-up in every state-run park and incubator I visited although many did not turn up
their noses at cheap rent). The firm designs its own-brand products and products
marketed under some of the major Chinese brands, which do not have the capabilities to
create these products themselves.
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4.3 Overview of the Engineers Trained and R&D Activities Conducted in FIEs
Through my interviews, I have been able to confirm the size and activities
(according to Amsden and Tschang's typology) in the R&D centers listed below. In the
preceding section, I discussed the details of many of these firms. Others I have not
discussed in detail because pointing out that yet another MNC was doing code writing in
China is repetitive. The regular FIEs (marked as MNCs in the Table 4.17) R&D centers
are all top twenty-five global IT firms or top ten global firms in software or
telecommunications, except for two 1990s start-ups. I have also included Taiwanese
firms that have eschewed the China-based strategy, but are still operating some R&D in
China. Finally, I have included a category "Other Taiwan" that denotes those large
product manufacturers from Taiwan that employ a few design for manufacturing
engineers in their local Chinese plants. I estimated that there were approximately 20 such
plants with 20 engineers each although the actual plant total is probably much higher.
This category is based not only on my own observations from interviews and plant visits,
but the works of S. Chen (2004) and Yang and Hsia (forthcoming). These Taiwanese
scholars observed that many Taiwanese product plants employed design-for-
manufacturing engineers at the manufacturing site.
For the hybrids in Table 4.18, the first four firms are established firms i.e. they
had a home base in one of the ECEs before embarking on a China-based strategy. The
other four were start-ups or, in the case of Hybrid 8, a new business for an established
firm. As can be seen from the totals, far more engineers were trained by the regular FIEs
than the hybrids. When one turns to examine the activities pursued, the hybrids come out
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ahead. Only one firm among the regular firms, Microsoft, was pursuing new product
generation (stage 2) research. As mentioned, Microsoft is conducting much of its X-box
design including architectural design that constitutes new product generation. This firm's
R&D activity is one of the cases already presented. Among the hybrids, all the firms
Table 4.17 Foreign R&D Centers: Personnel and Research Activities
Sources: Interviews and Z. Wang (2001;2002).
N4C1 N. Am
N4C2 N. Am
4C3 EU
NC4 Japan
NC5 Japan
NC6 EU
NC7 N. Am
NC8 EU
NC9 Japan
NC10 N. Am
NC I 1 N. Am
NC 12 Japan
NC 13 EU
NC14 N. Am
NC 15 Japan
NC16 N. Am
1NC17 N. Am
NC19* N. Am
NC20* N. Am
NC 18 Korea
N4C21 Korea
V1 Taiwan
¥2 Taiwan
¥3 Taiwan
V4 Taiwan
Other Taiwan
Total Regular FIEs
Researchers
900
200
700
13
3000
114
300
200
1500
150
1400
48
30
30
20
60
2000
2000
400
700
200
200
100
300
75
400
15040
Products
TC/software
PC/software
TC
PC/software
IT/software
TC/software
TC/software
TC/software
consumer
IT/hardware
TC hard&soft
consumer
PC/software
software
machinery
IT/software
TC/software
TC/soft&hard
TC/ind. design
consumer
consumer
PC/software
TC/software
TC/software
TC/soft; Manu
A-T Stages
3 and 4
4
3 and 4
4
4
4
4
3 and 4
4
2,3 and 4
3 and 4
4
4
4
4
3 and 4
3 and 4
3 and 4
3 and 4
4
4
4
3 and 4
4
3 and 4
4
TC: telecommunications; IT: general information technology; Comp: components; PC: computers; Manu:
manufacturing; Consumer: consumer electronics.
241
Code Nationality
MT
M]
MT
M]
MT
MT
MT
M]
M]
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
MT
Mr
M]
MT
'TV
'TV
'TV
4.18 Hybrid R&D Centers: Personnel and Research Activities
Source: Interviews and Z. Wang (2001;2002).
Code Nationality Researchers Products A-T Stages
Hybrid 1 Taiwan 3000 Comp;TC/soft &hard 1,2,3 and4
Hybrid 2 Taiwan 1100 PC/software&hard 2,3 and 4
Hybrid 3 Taiwan 400 Comp; Manu 1,2 and 4
Hybrid 4 Hong Kong 120 Comp 2, 3 and 4
Hybrid 5 Overseas 50 TC/soft&hard 2, 3 and 4
Hybrid 6 Overseas 50 Consumer/soft&hard 2, 3 and 4
Hybrid 7 Overseas 200 TC/soft&hard 2, 3 and 4
Hybrid 8 Mixed 55 Comp;TC/soft&hard 1,2, 3 and 4
Total Hybrids 4975
TC: telecommunications; IT: general information technology; Comp: components; PC: computers; Manu:
manufacturing; Consumer: consumer electronics.
were conducting new product generation and some were involved in basic research where
a PhD is required. A better way to conceptualize this dichotomy is through presenting the
stages covered by various hybrid and regular FIEs in Figure 4.4 below. The regular FIEs
are clustered in stages 3 and 4 were much of the activity of the hybrids is in basic
research and product generation.
When one considers the domestic firms, almost none of them qualify as
contributing to technological development. TCL is a marginal contributor and has only
approximately 100 engineers engaged in product development. The firm is at best doing
detailed design according to the reports of suppliers discussed above. If the standards are
lowered further, Huawei (despite violating the standard of commercialization by selling
the majority of its products to the state) could be included. Huawei's three thousand
design engineers are at best engaged in detailed design based on other firms' products. If
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Figure 4.4
Distribution Across R&D Stages
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the standards are lowered further, we could count every Chinese firm remotely related to
IT and having a US utility patent as having contributed 100 development engineers. In
this case, Tongfang, BYD and Haier could be included.'21 Even with granting all of these
exceptions, the domestic Chinese firms would still have trained a mere 3400 engineers in
detailed design and design for manufacture. This figure is lower than the hybrids and a
mere fraction of the regular FIEs, and I have not interviewed all of the latter two types of
firms that have such design activities in China.
121 Including Haier is dubious because all four of Haier's patents were modifications of white goods
(washers and refrigerators) rather than IT products. Furthermore, a partner of Haier and Chinese
government officials familiar with the firm claimed that the firm's R&D abilities were very weak and
generally limited to testing products. Tongfang's inclusion is dubious because the firm's boundaries with
Qinghua are quite porous and this may simply be Qinghua research that was taken by or awarded to the
firm.
243
5. New Firms and Foreign Venture Capital in China
The superior upgrading of the FIEs can be connected to the financing of these
operations. For the established firms, regular FIE and hybrid alike, external financing
mainly comes from the same sources of finance they draw upon for their operations
elsewhere in the world. Thus, there is no reason to expect that these mechanisms of
finance will operate differently for these firms when they create Chinese operations.
However, the new hybrid start-ups mostly draw upon foreign venture capital. While
these venture capital firms are the same ones that start-ups in the advanced industrial
world have drawn upon for finance in the past, there is still the question of how these
venture capital firms operate when they enter China. Given that venture capital firms try
to operate locally and interact intimately with the firms they invest in, there is the
possibility that the venture firms investing in China either change their practices when
they enter the new, Chinese environment or do not enter China at all, opting instead to
monitor their invested firms at a distant. In either case, the specter of VCs failing to keep
firms on the straight and narrow arises.
Happily, the major foreign VCs operating in China do not seem to have changed
their hands-on tactics to manage their investments in an efficient manner. The main
mechanisms to monitor their investments still are the time-honored ones: 1) spending the
time to assess investment prospects 2) participating in the actual management of the firms
and 2) sitting on the board of directors of the invested firms. The emphasis the foreign
VCs still place on due diligence for potential investments and active participation of the
management of their invested companies can be seen by the co-location of the VCs and
their investments. The lead investors insist on having offices in proximity to the firms in
244
which they invest because they wish to be able to stay actively involve in the
management of these firms. One firm with an office in Shanghai claimed that it had a
three-hour rule. No investment in China could be located more than three hours by car
from the firm's office in Shanghai. In explaining this rule, the firm stressed the need to
be near by in order to help manage the invested firms and approvingly cited best practice
in Silicon Valley where co-location is also highly valued. The major firms with
significant lead investments around China invariably had offices in each major area of
investment. Many VCs have numerous local offices in China before a single investment
in the locale proceeds. This practice is in place to assess potential local investments
because they feel that they cannot accurately conduct due diligence and the subsequent
management at a distance. The foreign VCs in China also limit the number of
investments in which they take the lead because each lead investment consumes large
amounts of the lead investor's human resources to manage and monitor the invested firm.
Even the relatively small VCs had multiple offices in China if they aspired to invest in
multiple places. As for governance mechanisms, I did not uncover a single firm backed
by foreign venture capital that did not have an investing venture capitalist on its corporate
board. Just like VC practices abroad, accepting VC funds in China also meant accepting
VC participation in the firm's governance.
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Chapter Five
From California Dreaming to Silicon Success: China's Upgrading in
Integrated Circuits
1. Introduction
On a very hot and humid day in July of 1998, I unwittingly imitated those
celebrated British companions of mad dogs under Hong Kong's noon sun by making the
three and a half hour train trip from Shanghai to Wuxi clad in coat and tie. My mission
was to see first hand the fruits of China's efforts to leapfrog into advanced semiconductor
technologies. I had been forewarned by two different sources about what to expect.
Some MIT professors had made the same trip six months earlier only to find an operation
where the new fab (the fabrication facility) remained empty because the state-owned firm
charged with operating it had no idea what products to produce for the market. Later, a
Lucent employee, a Chinese returnee who was committed to helping China's technology
industry and involved in the technology transfer from Lucent to the project, reported
much the same. Nevertheless, the Lucent employee invited me out to see the infamous
908 Project for myself. I left Wuxi that evening with two convictions: I would never be
able to remove the ring around the collar from the shirt I was wearing and China's IC
industry was stillborn.
Almost three years later, I visited a respected fab manager who had worked for
US fabs and TSMC before moving to China to pursue his lifelong dream of bringing
technology to China. He was working out of a prefabricated office surrounded by fields
of mud and a very large hole out of which were rising some girders serving as hopeful
hints of the possibility of a building. Despite these bleak surroundings, the site was
bustling with activity and the international team recruited to create the new pureplay
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foundry, SMIC, was an impressive one with engineers from TSMC and UMC, the two
largest pureplay foundries in the world, as well as prominent IDMs (integrated device
manufacturers), such as TI (Texas Instruments). The firm did not yet have a fab, but
they had a viable strategy and the team to execute it. These two features put them two
moves ahead of the Project 908 firm, Huajing. Clearly, China's silicon fortunes had taken
a turn for the better.
Four years after my first visit to Wuxi, I went with some MIT electrical
engineering professors to see SMIC's fab in operation. The electrical engineers were
clearly impressed and complimented the fab manager on his success. The engineers had
started the trip pessimistic about China's prospects, but the visits to SMIC and other
firms changed their minds. After four years, at least one of my convictions still held true.
My shirt had been ruined that day in Wuxi. As for China's silicon future, the changes
wrought in those four years had shattered my firmly held conviction that China's
technological future was bleak
This chapter is the story of China's silicon success. Microelectronics (meaning
semiconductors or, even more colloquially, computer chips) was chosen because
microelectronics is commonly seen as one of value centers and technology drivers of IT
(Macher et al 1999). The sub-sectors of semiconductors examined are fabrication (chip-
making) and design. The sophisticated technology needed for semiconductor production
makes this segment of IT a good critical case for exploring routes to technological
upgrading. ICs are a critical case because FIEs are generally assumed to be unwilling or
unable to transfer the most sophisticated technologies to host countries (Song 1998). If
such firms are fostering technological upgrading in the advanced technology of
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microelectronics, then such firms may be even more willing and capable to upgrade in
other areas in the IT industry in China.
This chapter will examine the more technology intensive segments of the
semiconductor production chain (as presented in the IC industry chain in Chapter Three),
design (both detailed and innovative) and fabrication. The chapter will not examine the
assembly and testing of the ICs, often referred to as the backend of the IC production
chain, because the backend is less technologically intensive and is not the core
technology and value creation center of the semiconductor production chain.12 2
Historically, the developing world has had assembly and testing operations due to the
labor-intensive nature of the work, and these operations did not necessarily lead to the
development of the more technologically sophisticated front-end skills of design and
fabrication. 123
Using the same four types of firms discussed in the first and fourth chapters
(hybrid FIEs, normal FIEs, favored domestic firms and neglected domestic firms), this
chapter will evaluate how these firms contribute to the technological upgrading in
China's IC design and fabrication segments. To review, the process of measuring
122Interviewing Intel employees in March of 2004 re-confirmed this notion of the non-critical nature of the
backend. Intel prides itself on having "bleeding edge" (i.e. the most advanced) technology in A&T
(assembly and test), but the firm only keeps the proprietary A&T technology in-house for six months or so.
Furthermore, the A&T process technology would not be kept in-house at all except for the fact that this
effort entails relatively small capital expenditures compared to the expense of investing in fabrication
facilities. In other words, the limited technological benefit of in-house A&T is only justified by the
relatively low cost of protecting this technology by doing it in-house. Intel only creates the A&T
technologies in the US and actually deploys them to A&T factories abroad. This practice has been Intel's
SOP for many years. Unlike in fabrication, the A&T process technology and the operation of the
manufacturing facility are not intertwined and inseparable. This provides Intel the opportunity to create the
relevant A&T technology in the US but deploy this technology to operating factories in lower cost
locations, such as Malaysia, Costa Rica and China.
123 Taiwan and Korea developed their design and fabrication skills after having A&T plants in their
countries for at least a decade prior to their first fabs. Furthermore, the firms that operated the fabs were by
and large not the firms that had run the A&T plants. Other countries, such as Malaysia and the Philippines,
have had large clusters of A&T plants, but have never been able to develop much of a front-end of
semiconductor manufacturing.
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technological upgrading is a 4-step process: 1. compare the technological activities of the
firm in China to the general level of technology of that activity in China to see if these
activities represent a technological advancement upon existing activities within China 2.
compare the technological activities to the international frontier and to other LDCs to see
if China has gained any ground on the rapidly moving technological frontier 3. determine
if the technological activities are commercially viable 4. check embeddedness at the firm-
level and by searching for institutions for the continued utilization of the technology
either through new firm generation or luring of the existing firms to come to utilize this
technology in the host economy. The chapter will examine the first three and a half steps
through examining the performance of the relevant firms in design and fabrication. Both
IC fabrication and design will use process technology lithography line-widths (measured
in microns) to measure the distance to the technological frontier, but evaluating the
design technologies will incorporate additional metrics, such as design type (digital
versus analog/mixed signal), product type (e.g. DRAM) and reliance on reverse
engineering..
This chapter will argue that the domestic Chinese firms failed to contribute to
China's technological upgrading either because they did not improve the technological
content of the activities they undertook or because they did not embed these technology
activities in China, leaving the control of the technology in the hands of foreign joint-
venture partners. As for the FIEs, the chapter will argue that the hybrid FIEs pursued
embedded technological upgrading in China by pursuing technological activities that
were more advanced than the norm in China while also embedding them through the
training of local staff and to a lesser extent, training supplier firms. The regular FIEs did
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contribute to embedded technological upgrading though the number of regular FIEs
contributing was small and overall the regular FIEs did not do so as consistently as the
hybrid FIEs. In contrast to Chapter Four, the hybrids contributed by far the most trained
technical personnel. The common trend shared with Chapter Four is the greater
sophistication of the skills generated by the hybrids.
2. IC Fabrication
2.1 State Projects
The Chinese state attempted a series of grand projects to leapfrog into the silicon
age. However, what these projects lacked were participating firms that could be viable
commercial entities, independent of state largesse. Instead, the plans were burdened from
the beginning by being attached to particular SOEs and the managerial and production
efficiencies associated with this type of firm. These firms were blessed and cursed by
state beneficence. With assured state support, these firms were able to enter more
advanced semiconductor manufacturing, but the state support undermined any financial
discipline that could have forced the firms to hone their competitive advantages. Instead,
these firms were either late in achieving the goals set for them or dependent on their
foreign partners for technology or both.
The semiconductor industry can be said to have started in 1956 when China's first
transistor was created (Dewey Ballantine 2003, hereafter referred to as DB 2003: 23 fn
64). Others date the start of China's semiconductor industry from 1965 when China
created its first integrated circuit only seven years after the ICs were invented in the US
by TI and Fairchild. When the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) started its integrated
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circuit research in 1965, China was far ahead of Taiwan and Korea in ICs as neither of
these economies had any IC industry to speak of (DYBG 2002, No. 11). This period of
self-reliance (ziligengsheng) lasted until well into era of economic reforms with the first
major effort to improve China's commercial fabrication technology starting in 1991 with
the 908 Project.
2.1.1 The Chinese Semiconductor Industry's Huangpu Academy: Huajing and
the 908 Project
The Huajing Group was originally Wuxi Factory No.742, established in 1960.
The factory has been hailed as the "Huangpu Military Academy of China's
semiconductor industry," referring to the famed KMT 12 4 military academy in Guangzhou
that trained most of the military cadres of both the KMT and CCP. The factory did
indeed train much of the early personnel of China's fledgling semiconductor industry,
and, as Chinese semiconductor engineers of a certain age never tire of reminding people,
in the early 1960s China's semiconductor technology was at least as sophisticated as
Japan's. Despite these prestigious origins, Huajing as the center of the state's
semiconductor industrial policy in the 1990s was a failure.
In preparation for the 8th Five year Plan (1991-1995), the Huajing Group was
selected to be the vehicle for a project to lift China's semiconductor manufacturing up to
6" wafer technology, which was the largest wafer size at that time.'25 The government
decided upon the plan in August of 1990 so the plan was dubbed the 908 Project. The
124 KMT is the abbreviation for the Wade-Giles romanization of the Chinese name of the Nationalist Party
that ruled China prior to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) takeover.
125 Semiconductor fabrication plants (or fabs as they are often called) are categorized in part by the size of
the wafers (the round pieces of silicon on which circuitry is placed) processed in the fab. The wafers have
grown larger with successive generations of fabrication technology. The latest fabs use 12-inch (300mm
wafers.
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government spent 2 billion RMB to complete the modest goals of the project to build a
six-inch fab (fabrication facility) with .8 to 1.2-micron process technology, which even at
the time was not the technological frontier in process technology, and a modest monthly
output of 12000 wafers (DYBG 2002, No. 14: 2). Despite the modesty of the goals, the
project took 8 years to complete, and when it was finished, the fab remained virtually
empty as Huajing had no idea how to operate the fab as a commercial enterprise.
The resulting problems from this long delay in ramping up the project were
manifold. By the time the plant came on line, the technology was very backward as
eight-inch fabs were already mainstream. The capacity was also quite small so it was
hard to earn back the initial investment. According to one internal report from MOST,
massive losses hinder the advance of the entire Huajing Group (DYBG 2002, No. 14)
though the losses might have been partially recouped when Huajing started to rent the fab
to the ECE firm, Central Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (CSMC).
The primary foreign partner for the technology transfer was Lucent Technologies.
Lucent was very eager to sell more telecommunications infrastructure equipment in
China and participating in this technology transfer project seemed to be a good way to
curry favor with the owner of the customers of this telecommunications equipment, the
Chinese state. Lucent not only provided process technology, but also provided a design
library so Huajing could design its own products. Lucent did not take a stake in the firm
nor promise to be a major customer.
Unfortunately, even with Lucent's help, things did not go as planned.
Engineering professors from MIT who visited in January of 1998 reported that the firm's
own engineers had no idea what products to design despite access to the design library.
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The fab was essentially empty because there were no products to produce. In the summer
of 1998, a Lucent employee heavily involved in the technology transfer reported much
the same dilemma.
Happily, there was already a glimmer of hope for the fabrication operation.
CSMC, a Hong Kong-registered firm with strong links to a Taiwanese semiconductor
firm, Mosel-Vitelic, had appeared and proposed to rent the fab in order to convert the fab
to use as a foundry for low-end products suitable for the technology of the fab. Huajing
agreed to this proposal in 1998 and operations commenced. In 1999, CSMC took formal
ownership of the fab through the establishment of CSMC-HJ, a 51% CSMC owned joint
venture. By 2002, CSMC had taken control of another fab line, a five-inch line, from
Huajing (according to company materials given to the author in July of 2002). A planned
national champion had become a subsidiary of an ECE firm. Hardly what the central
state, especially the technocrats at Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI), had envisaged
when they embarked on the 908 Project back in 1990.
What happened to the design library Huajing received from Lucent? Later
evidence bears out the early pessimistic reports from the MIT engineers and the Lucent
employee that the design library was never effectively used to design products. Huajing
Group has a wide array of low-end products, but these are all very low-end and low profit
items. Huajing's well known and relatively large (by Chinese industry standards) design
house, Semico (Xike), is also regarded as a typical reverse engineering design house
among technology people familiar with the Chinese industry (Interviews 8, 266, 312).
Furthermore, in 2002, China Resources, a Hong Kong red chip126, bought a controlling
126 Red chips are Hong Kong-listed firms with links to the Chinese government. China Resources is linked
to the Ministry of Commerce (MOC).
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share of Semico. Huajing also did not contribute much from spinning off or diffusing
technology in China. A former Huajing employee, who subsequently received training
abroad in a large IDM, remarked that a lot of Huajing's designers had left the firm to set
up their own fabless design companies in Wuxi, but these engineers are just doing the
same thing they did ten years ago, reverse engineering of low-end designs. He was
emphatic that there was no way these ex-Huajing employees could do contemporary,
large scale design know as System-on-a-Chip (SoC), where many functions are integrated
into the chip design requiring very large and complicated designs (Interview 312). In
short, Huajing did not manage to make much of the assets that Lucent gave the firm,
many of these assets eventually left Huajing's control and the firm also failed to diffuse
technology to others.
From a technonationalist perspective, precisely the perspective used by the
Chinese state, the failure of Huajing was a failure on two fronts: 1) Chinese-controlled
technology did not get much closer to the technological frontier in the IC industry and 2)
the selected national champion was not strengthened. However, this study does not
denigrate the transfer of assets to "foreign" control if foreign control enhances the
capabilities of Chinese or the industrial infrastructure in China. On these grounds,
Huajing was a modest success though a success in way not envisioned by the government
and perhaps even excoriated by some more strongly nationalists elements inside and
outside the government. The takeover of two fabs by CSMC while using the same
engineers that were originally in Huajing offered these engineers the opportunity to learn
how to operate more efficiently and to learn the foundry business, albeit with relatively
backward process technology. As one former Mosel-Vitelic and CSMC manager
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observed, CSMC uses the same engineers from Huajing, but they are under better
management (Interview 7).
The reason this success was so modest as compared to the latter foundries, SMIC
and Grace, was the inability of the government to get the six-inch fab up and running at
the time when six-inch fabs were still relatively close to the technological frontier.
Having a fab with old process technologies would only attract an investor who was
seeking to do low-end fabrication because that is all the fab would be adequate to handle.
Thus, Huajing attracted the new Mosel-Vitelic affiliate, CSMC, to start a foundry
business rather than a top-tier foundry. Mosel-Vitelic is a small IDM rather than a
pureplay foundry. The expertise the firm had to offer in terms of running a pureplay
foundry business was quite limited. Furthermore, in 1998 the image of China in the IC
industry was poor so there were not droves of Taiwanese engineers willing to come over
to impart their knowledge to the locals, but just a few top personnel. Nevertheless,
CSMC did at least manage to come up with a business plan that filled the fab with orders
and taught Chinese engineers how to run a foundry business using a six-inch wafer line.
Thus, only with CSMC, did the fab begin to function as a commercial enterprise and the
fab was still one of China's first two six-inch fabs.
The hybrid FIE, CSMC, accomplished embedded technological upgrading where
the domestic champion, Huajing, could not. CSMC was the first foundry in China with a
six-inch, .8 to 1.2-micron fab that competed in the open marketplace. Therefore, the firm
did upgrade over China's existing fabrication technology. The technology was ten years
behind the technology frontier in 1998, but this gap was smaller than the gap between
China and the global frontier in the reform era prior to CSMC (see Table 5.3). The
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process technology employed at CSMC was embedded in the local environment due to
the use of local engineers to run the process with only handful of Taiwanese executives in
the firm at any one time.
Why is CSMC a hybrid FIE rather than a regular FIE? CSMC is a hybrid FIE
because the firm clearly is conducting a China-based operational strategy on all three
criteria outlined in the introduction: self-description, weight of operations and ethnicity of
the firm's management/owners. CSMC explicitly proclaims its desire to serve the
growing manufacturing base of China. All of the firm's fabs are in China. Finally, the
firm is clearly an ethnic Chinese-owned and managed firm with its managers and owners
being ethnic Chinese from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Examining the balance of
operations, the firm's operational resources are based almost entirely in the PRC despite
registration in Hong Kong. Although CSMC is financially connected to Mosel-Vitelic
through that firm's Hong Kong affiliate, CSMC is operationally independent because the
firm is in a completely different line of business, foundry manufacturing services
(provision of chipmaking for other firms) than Mosel-Vitelic, which designs and
produces its own DRAM. Outside of China, there are only sales offices.
Since 1998, CSMC has maintained its strategy of being a low-cost fab following
far behind the technology frontier. Even when the recent moves to enter into .35-micron
production through the purchase of equipment from Agere and technology from
Chartered are successfully implemented, CSMC will trail approximately ten years behind
the technology frontier as the lead firms first implemented production-ready .35-micron
technology in 1994 (Mathew and Cho 2000: 136). Nevertheless, CSMC narrowed the
technology gap that China had with the advanced industrial world and even today it is
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unclear if any domestic firms have control over production-ready .35-micron technology.
Without the entry of other leading hybrids, SMIC and Grace, CSMC might still be
China's leading firm in terms of the level of embedded technology. This fact is quite
surprising given CSMC's strategy of following far behind the frontier whereas the
China's state-sponsored firms (HHNEC, Shanghai Belling, ASMC and Huajing) all have
or had plans to try to catch up to the frontier. Like the tortoise and the hare, these
ambitious state firms aspiring to be close followers of the leading international firms have
discovered that they have been beaten by the plodding, pragmatic CSMC with its dull
strategy of providing low-cost foundry services at a distant from the frontier. CSMC's
success only dims in the bright light of the success of the hybrid FIE fast followers,
SMIC and Grace, which have beat the Chinese state firms at their own ambitious strategy
of catching the technology frontier.
One positive but unintended consequence of the failure of Huajing's fab and the
subsequent takeover of operations by CSMC was the gradual inflow of talent from
Taiwan. Nasa Tsai, president and one time chairman of Grace Semiconductor, came to
China via CSMC. Tony Liu of Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation
(ASMC) also spent time at Huajing before moving on to head ASMC. As for locals,
many moved on to other firms after receiving some training in conjunction with CSMC.
As put in the MOST internal report, Huangpu Military Academy has an alternative
meaning to the one suggesting it is the cradle of China's IC industry. Just like the
Communists who left the Huangpu Military Academy and fought a civil war with their
KMT classmates, engineers have left Huajing for competitors (DYBG 2002, No. 14).
However, most of the outflow appears to be to other Chinese-owned fabs rather than to
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the cutting edge FIE foundries because the latter tend to prefer fresh university graduates
to train to their system as opposed to engineers from SOEs, who generally have
institutional baggage from their previous employers. 27
2.1.2 The Big Statist Push: The 909 Project
With the advent of the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996-2000), the Chinese
government embarked on a second major effort to catch up to the technological frontier,
dubbed the 909 Project as it followed the 908 Project. MII112 8 and Shanghai Municipality
created the Huahong Group with shares distributed between the two government entities
in a 60:40 split. Huahong was charged with the task of being the Chinese SOE that
would hold a majority share in the 8-inch JV fab that was the centerpiece of the project.
Then, NEC was selected as the JV partner and technology source. For the JV, Huahong
NEC (HHNEC), Huahong put up 500 million USD for 71.4% of the equity and NEC put
up 200 million USD for 28.6% of the equity. In 2002, HHNEC already had a staff of
800 (DYBG 2002, No. 11). The goal was to create a commercial 8-inch fab with .5-
micron technology.
909 Project was expensive. The total expenditure was 10 billion RMB or 1.25
billion USD. This was three times what Taiwan spent during its whole ramp up stage and
127 The leading FIE foundries, Grace and SMIC, both targeted fresh university graduates, and considering
the personnel problems I uncovered at two SOE fabs, it is not difficult to understand why. The two SOEs
had engineering practices that were inefficient and downright negligent. One firm told a graduate student
who went there to help them improve their productivity that they did not really have any idea about their
throughput and often had to guess (Interview 263). The director of the other firm's fab became so fed up
with what he termed the bad corporate culture of his firm that he wrote a memo to his employees to explain
how fabs were supposed to operate based on his experience in managing fabs for US and Japanese firms in
the US. His main point was that professionalism meant doing one's job for the company to the best of
one's ability and putting the company's interest first, attitudes he saw lacking in his SOE.
128 MII was created form merging MEI and MPT in 1998. See footnote 132 for details.
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Huahong could have bought its own fab for this amount. This technology was later
upgraded to .35-micron though one report mentions some .24-micron capacity (DYBG
2002, No.11). The firm also has incurred heavy losses through operations. In 2001, the
firm lost 80 billion RMB (6.4 billion USD) alone. This huge lost more than made up for
the nominal profits of 30 million RMB in 1999 and 3.5 to 5 billion RMB in 2000 (DYBG
2002, No. 11: 7).
Naughton views the 909 Project as a move away from what he dubs China's
critical technologies approach to technology policy. According to Naughton, China
during the reform era prior to the 9th FYP (Five Year Plan)'29 pursued a very rigid state-
planned form of techno-nationalism in which the state carried out plans to develop
indigenously various technologies deemed critical for economic and security reasons.
These plans were carried out by state-run institutions, research units as well as SOEs, and
eschewed foreign cooperation (Naughton 1999). Contrary to Naughton's claims that the
909 Project represented a major break from China's statist, critical technologies
approach, the internal analysis by MOST officials (DYBG 2002, No. 11) suggests a mere
shift in tactics from a state-planned approach in the 908 Project to a JV approach in the
909 Project with technonationalist, state-driven plans forming the strategic backbone of
the project. According to MOST's report, the goals set out for HHNEC were three-fold.
The first goal was to establish an independent IP portfolio in the IC industry to break the
control that America and other leading countries had over IC technology. The second
goal was to use China's huge market to create an internationally competitive IC giant.
This goal is the one that clearly shows how little China broke with their past
129 Naughton does not explicitly state that the 9th FYP was the turning point, but he does date the change in
attitude from that period.
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technonationalist ambitions in promoting the 909 Project. The idea of using the large
market to create a competitive IC industry is one that continues to be promoted by local
and central government officials alike. The third goal was to train a large group of
specialists in IC technology, industrial technology and management of the IC industry.
Discussions with sources familiar with Huahong confirmed these technonationalist
ambitions (Interviews 12, 114).
The goal to create Chinese IP was understandable given the international context
of the 909 Project. Undoubtedly, the technology export controls of Cold War-era
COLCOM and the subsequent though weaker Wassenaar Agreement heightened China's
sense of vulnerability and dependency in this area. In the latter half of the 1990s, the
ability of China to import US capital equipment for 8-inch fabs was still much in doubt
due to the stringent American interpretation of the Wassenaar Agreement and was one of
the reasons that China chose NEC over competing bids by IBM and Rockwell. The
ability of Motorola to import 8-inch equipment in the late 1990s was the first sign that the
US was beginning to relent, given the looser interpretation of the Wassenaar Agreement
by other major IC capital equipment manufacturers.'3 0 While the first goal was
understandable given the international context and the third goal was one shared by
technoglobalists and techno-nationalists alike, the goal of creating a state-owned national
champion in the IC industry shows how little the Chinese state had departed form the
earlier thinking on technological development.
130 There are persistent rumors that Motorola imported more advanced equipment than US export controls
of the time allowed in the late 1990s or 2000, probably due to Motorola correctly anticipating the loosening
of the export controls.
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MOST officials in an internal report conclude that the 909 Project failed to
achieve any of the three goals. The MOST team still concludes that the 909 Project did
much better than the original self-reliance model would have. They estimate the self-
reliance approach would have used 15 years to achieve the technological jump that
HHNEC achieved in 5 years i.e. an 8-inch fab with .35/.25-micron technology and 20,000
wafers per month (DYBG 2002, No. 11: 6). This estimate may be correct, but there is
some doubt as to whether HHNEC actually has this level of technology. Customers of
Chinese wafer fabs with knowledge of HHNEC's operations argue the firm does not
really have operational .25-micron technology and doubt that the firm actually runs
20,000 wafers per month (Interview 266). Nor do the MOST researchers explain how
they arrived at the estimation of 15 years though it is easy to understand that developing
the technology internally would have taken much longer than the importation of
technology from Japan. Still, the MOST officials correctly note that the technology
really remains in hands of the Japanese and no Chinese IP has been created.
The fact of Japanese control of the technology was confirmed by three sources
very familiar with the firm and the situation is even bleaker than the MOST officials'
account because the technology captured by HHNEC is narrower than the MOST
officials realized. The first source was two managers familiar with HHNEC and the
HuaHong Group. They were interviewed in 1998 early in the HHNEC's history
(Interview 12). Their concerns that China would not be able to control the technology
might have been relieved through later technological transfer as it is reasonable to expect
technology transfer to take some time. Unfortunately, such technology transfer to
Chinese hands did not happen as later sources stated. One source very familiar with
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HHNEC's internal management stated bluntly in 2002 that the technology remained
firmly in Japanese hands through management of the training process. The Japanese
made sure to train the Chinese engineers in specific tasks in order to retain knowledge of
the whole process of fabrication in Japanese hands. No Chinese engineer learned much
about the process outside of his narrow specialty and the Japanese made sure not to train
anyone capable of managing the integration of these tasks (Interview 114). A potential
customer of HHNEC reported in 2003 that HHNEC not only did not have the level of
technology it reported to have, at least not in a stabilized ready-for-manufacturing state,
but when conversing with HHNEC's engineers about the .35-micron technology that he
needed to fabricate his chips, it became evident that the Chinese engineers could not
actually run the process with the technology on hand. As the Chinese engineers
explained to the potential customer, the technology necessary to run the .35-micron
technology remained in Japan and the Chinese engineering staff did not have access to
this technology. To verify that HHNEC could actually fabricate the chip he wanted, the
customer would have to confer with Japanese engineers in Japan. Even though .35-
micron technology was far from the frontier in 2003, the Japanese still resisted turning it
over to Chinese engineers (Interview 273).
The MOST researchers view the creation of a national champion as a failure
given HHNEC's losses, but they have a more mixed view of the training of technical
personnel. They believe the firm has trained lots of technical personnel citing 45000 man
hours spent training the Chinese personnel and the expenditure of 10 million RMB to
send engineers to train at IMEC, the EU semiconductor research center in Leuven,
Belgium. On the negative side, the MOST officials point to a lack of trained Chinese
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managers within HHNEC. What would be amusing if it were not so sad is the conclusion
drawn by the officials from MOST that one of the major problems with the Huahong
Group is that the group is run by a bunch of government hacks or as they more politely
phrase it, "As for Huahong Group's managerial staff, most are originally government
officials who now are involved in the work of management. Talented people with real
skills in modern enterprise management are rarely seen (DYBG 2002, No. 11: 7)." They
also note that the Chinese face great difficulty in entering the core operations of the firm.
The MOST evaluation of the training at HHNEC may not be harsh enough as reports
from interlocutors suggest that even the training of the engineering staff was strategically
limited by Japanese partners to ensure that the process technology did not fall into
Chinese hands (Interviews 114, 273).
Judging HHNEC by the standard of embedded technological upgrading, the firm
has failed. Even if the firm does have 8-inch wafers running at .25-micron process
technology, a large improvement over previous fabs in China, the firm has failed to pass
this technology onto local employees or local suppliers, the key criteria for the test of
embeddedness at the firm level. Instead, the process technology remains firmly in
Japanese hands and there is no evidence that this control has or will change over time
(Interviews 12, 114, 273).
Internal analysis by MOST officials viewed the history of China's semiconductor
industry as broken into three periods (the early reform years, the Huajing and HuaHong
projects), with three different respective models (the self-reliance, foreign-domestic
cooperation and foreign-domestic joint-venture models). They came to the blunt
conclusion that all three models failed bluntly stating that, "The three kinds of models led
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to the same basic result (DYGB 2002, No. 11: 5)." Despite the failures of three different
types of government support, the MOST officials see no way out for HHNEC except for
more government procurement. Their main suggestion for how the Huahong Group can
turn around HHNEC is for the firm to rely IC card sales to the government as part of its
National Management Systems Project. More dangerously, they suggest the firm needs
"to lift up its financial capability and expand its cash flow," which given its SOE status
means spending more of the state's money on this dubious venture (DYBG 2002, NO. 1 1:
7). The fact that the officials involved in technology policy still view the problem in part
as one of insufficient investment lends credence to Steinfeld's idea (Steinfeld,
forthcoming) that Chinese managers have a distinctly different view of what the market
or hard budget constraints are actually supposed to do.
2.1.3 Other State-owned IC Firms
Before Huajing's completion, foreigners had already invested in China's IC
fabrication segment. These firms were generally technologically backward JVs with
SOEs. One of the firms (ASMC) was briefly majority foreign-owned, but it too has been
a technologically backward captive' 3 ' fab.
Philips established a JV called Philips Semiconductor Corporation in Shanghai in
1989. To lure Philips to invest, Shanghai's government had to navigate China's labyrinth
of competing bureaucratic interests. Shanghai's decision to court foreign investment
grew out of neglect by the central government in the area of high-technology
development. This JV was in planning ever since the Shanghai government decided to
131 Captive refers to that fact that fab serves only one customer rather than having many customers as in the
pureplay foundry model.
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promote high technology in its new technology park, Caohejing, in the late 1980s. MEI
was much more interested in its own industrial base in Wuxi, what is now called Huajing,
than in developing Shanghai because MEI's Sichuan Research Institute for Solid State
Circuits had a large branch center in Wuxi (Simon and Rehn 1988: 137). ME'132
continued its neglect of Shanghai's IC industry because the ministry did not own
Shanghai's IC firms. 3 3 The classic tiao tiao kuai kuai (vertical ministerial authority
versus regional authority) problems became severe enough that Shanghai's Institute of
Metallurgy, officially an institute of the Chinese Academy of Science, had to create a
second institute in order to participate in the Caohejing project (Simon and Rehn 1988:
144 fn 62).
Shanghai turned to foreign investment as the only way to gain access to the
technology that it badly needed for its outdated IC manufacturing plants (D. Simon and
D. Rehn 1988: 137). While the Pudong New District had not yet received the preferential
policies that put it somewhat on par with the SEZs, Shanghai already was one of the
Open Coastal Cities (OCCs) as of 1984 although Caohejing was not granted the national
Economic Trade and Development Zone (ETDZ) status that 11 areas in the other 13
OCCs received. In 1985, after a year of intense lobbying by Shanghai Mayor, Wang
Daohan, Shanghai was able to receive approval from the State Council for Caohejing to
be a national level project and a key base of China's electronics industry. However,
132 MEI and MPT (the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications) merged in 1998 to form the Ministry of
Information Industry at the 9 th National People's Congress following the 15th Party Congress in the fall of
1997. In 1988, MEI and the Ministry of Machine building were merged after a proposed attempt to merge
MEI and MPT was successfully opposed by MPT (Simon and Rehn 1988: 170).
133 Despite all the talk of Jiang Zemin's leadership being leadership by a Shanghai clique, Jiang followed in
line with MEI's policies when he was in charge of MEI earlier in the 1980s. Nor in the late 1980s after
leaving the post of minister at MEI and taking up the offices of mayor and then party secretary did Jiang
actively affect any change in MEI's neglect of Shanghai.
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problems remained with MEI intent on concentrating on its project in Wuxi in
cooperation with the Jiangsu provincial government and Shanghai working on its own
project (Simon and Rehn 1988: 138-139).
In the familiar manner of competition between vertical and regional chains of
command in China, regional lobbying had opened up more space to preferential policies,
but the goal of coordinating amongst rival authorities, in this case Shanghai and MEI,
remained out of reach. Simon and Rehn view the proliferation of IC industry projects
essentially as the resolution of jurisdictional conflict and competition by allowing a
number of bases to spring up, but they appear too optimistic about this being a final peace
if one rife with potential coordination problems (D. Simon and D. Rehn 1988: 139).
The Philips JV started operations in 1994. The firm was majority controlled by
foreign interests with Nortel buying a 34% stake in the firm in 1995 leaving Philips with
38% and Chinese state banks with 28% in 1995. At that time, the name was changed to
ASMC. The firm planned to fabricate mainly chips for TVs and most of these were
exported (whether in TVs assembled in China or otherwise is unclear).
The firm had quite old technology from its foreign partners. It had a five-inch
line using 3-micron bipolar, CMOS and powerMOS'3 4 technologies and, by 1998, a six-
inch line for .8 to 1-micron CMOS technology (ICE 1998: Section 5, pp. 10-11). The
latter technology was roughly in-line with Huajing's technology and lagged ten to twelve
years behind the global frontier. Philips has been the major consumer of the fab's chips,
accounting for upwards of 85 percent of production in 1995 (Geppert 1995). The firm's
two older fabs still lag far behind the frontier and the firm's model as essentially a captive
134 CMOS stands for complimentary metal oxide semiconductor and powerMOS stands for power metal
oxide semiconductor. These are two semiconductor technologies.
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fab is not a very promising one as it leaves the captive foundry completely dependent on
one firm's orders.'3 5
Nortel eventually sold its shares to Shanghai Belling, another SOE in 2000,
leaving majority control in Chinese hands. This transfer of control may be the reason
why the Philip's appointed executive, Jon Macro, left, and ASMC hired Tony Liu,
formerly at CSMC. With Philips no longer in de facto control, there are doubts about
whether it will still be an important customer.
Recently, ASMC announced that it had built and started pilot production of an 8-
inch fab and then received a technology licensing agreement with Jazz, an American
foundry specializing in niche process such as bipolar and silicon germanium. However,
it is unclear how far this project has proceeded as little news is forthcoming from ASMC
or Jazz about the project. In sum, ASMC at best is a fab that lags substantially behind the
frontier and is attempting to make the difficult move from a captive fab to a pureplay
foundry with niche processes.
Does the limited success of ASMC have anything to do with the peculiarities of
its main JV partner, Philips? In other words, is Philips so stingy about technology or
abusive of JVs that ASMC had no hopes of evolving into a competitive foundry because
of Philips? Such an explanation appears unlikely because Philips' other big Asian JV
:founded in the late 1980s is none other than TSMC. Philips provided technology and the
freedom for TSMC to pursue its foundry model, and Philips was richly rewarded by
TSMC's tremendous success. The case of TSMC does not suggest that ASMC's failure
135 See discussion of the problems faced by Taiwan's captive DRAM fabs in Fuller et al 2003.
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to grow beyond a technologically backward, captive fab has to do with Philips' manner
of dealing with JVs and its proprietary technology.
ASMC's technology was on par with CSMC's so on those grounds the firm
should have been deemed to be contributed as much to China's technological upgrading
as CSMC did. However, it is unclear if ASMC's technology is actually embedded in
China, especially for the period when the foreign interests owned a majority share. As a
captive fab to Philips, much of the technology to run the fab may have remained in
Philips' control just like in the HHNEC case. After the fab went to Chinese majority
ownership, Philips had even less incentive to transfer technology to a firm it did not
control, especially given the fact that the Chinese owner was a competing firm, Shanghai
Belling. Probably not coincidentally, the highpoint of ASMC's technology relative to the
global technology frontier occurred in 1998 when the firm was still controlled by foreign
shareholders. The fact that ASMC has not been successful in branching out to serve other
firms beyond Philips suggests that the firm has not captured much technology within the
firm unlike Philip's other foundry JV, TSMC. Thus, ASMC may have technology
roughly on par with CSMC's, but it fails to meet the requirement of having that
technology embedded in China, the same failing as Huahong NEC. At best, ASMC
achieved some upgrading of questionable embeddedness and only achieved this modicum
of success when under foreign control.
Shanghai Belling is another major IC fabrication firm in China. This firm was a
joint-venture between Shanghai Bell, a local state-owned telecommunications equipment
manufacturer and Alcatel, Shanghai Bell's erstwhile joint-venture partner, through their
own JV, Shanghai Bell Alcatel. This IC firm mainly supplied chips to Shanghai Bell
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with 85% orders coming from Shanghai Bell as of 1995 (Geppert 1995: 39). This
dependence did seem to change much over time according to sources familiar with the
firm (Interviews 141, 147, 267). Unfortunately for Belling, Shanghai Bell ran into
trouble in the mid-1 990s as other Chinese telecommunications equipment vendors, such
as Huawei and ZTE, grabbed market share from Shanghai Bell (see Chapter Four).
These problems may have increased with Alcatel's selling of its microelectronics division
to ST Micro though this author was unable to find any evidence that Alcatel's
microelectronics division placed orders directly with Belling other than the orders made
for Shanghai Bell Alcatel's equipment for the Chinese market. Consequently, Belling
suffered the loss of its own customer base though not before the firm was the first IC
producer to list on China's stock markets. This loss of customers is perhaps the reason
that Shanghai's Huahong Group was made the controlling shareholder on July 7, 1999
with 38.45%/o f the firm's shares through a transfer of capital to Shanghai Bell Alcatel
(www.huahong.com.cn and UBS Warburg). The firm has tried to branch into design of
ICs, but thus far this venture has not been successful (Interviews 141, 149).
People who have worked at the firm reported its production process to be a
disaster. The firm never really knew what its production yield would be and just took a
rough guestimate. Nor did the firm's engineers want to let outsiders see their production
performance data despite the outsiders being at Belling in order to help Belling's process
technology (Interview 263). This practice stands in stark contrast to TSMC's data
processing that allows its customers in far away places like Boston to receive real time
data on their wafers being processed at TSMC's Taiwanese fabs. In 2003, Shanghai
Belling remained a very small capacity 4-inch fab (7000 wafers per month) with very old
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technology (1.2-microns)136 and few customers due to the fact that it was an orphaned
captive foundry for a struggling SOE.
The other main SOE was another JV with NEC, SGNEC (Shougang NEC).
Shougang or Capital Steel is a very large steel manufacturer located in western Beijing
that tried to diversify into many other industries during the 1990s (Steinfeld 1998). This
firm from the start was not aiming for the frontier of technology and had an old six-inch
fab. The firm began the assembly of ICs in 1994 and fabrication of ICs in 1995. The
firm currently uses six-inch wafers and claims to have .35-micron technology, which
would place it ten years behind the technology frontier though it is highly unlikely the
fab's technology is that advanced.137 Like HHNEC, the firm is dependent from orders
from its Japanese partner. There is still a significant presence of Japanese personnel at
the firm suggesting that the firm's technology is still in Japanese hands. Furthermore,
given the reliable reports of the lack of technology transfer of.35-micron process
technology and below at HHNEC, it is highly unlikely that NEC would transfer
technology to its Chinese partner at this older fab before it transferred technology to
Chinese partners at HHNEC because the latter is a newer fab and a higher priority in the
eyes of the Chinese government. Engineers of this firm had hoped to use a new
Shougang affiliate, Shougang High-tech, to start an eight-inch fab (Interviews 32, 191),
but, as will be discussed below, this endeavor did not come to pass.
2.3 The Hybrid FIEs
2.3.1 Catching the Frontier: SMIC
136 DB (2003: Figure 10) though DB overstates Belling's condition because it includes Belling's 8-inch fab,
which as will be discussed further on in the text, was not to be.
137 Though the firm claims to use .35-micron technology given the optimistic claims HHNEC makes it is
likely that SGNEC also inflates its technological prowess.
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Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) was founded in
April of 2000. Given the failure of major state-supported projects, including projects
involving foreign technology, the notion that a foreign start-up could succeed where the
state-supported firms had failed seemed dubious. While the plan was to take advantage
of the modularity of the IT industry by focusing on the fabrication (chip-making) part of
the semiconductor industry, the pureplay foundry model developed in Taiwan, this model
already had two Taiwanese behemoths dominating the market. Surely, the established
rivals would quash the Chinese start-up if it tried to compete head-to-head with them. If
the start-up were to survive, the firm would simply have to relegate itself to some small
niche market. Thus, went the conventional thinking on the new start-up in 2000 (TCNA,
Dec. 11, 2000). Two years after its founding, SMIC started production of wafers at a
technological level quite close to the international frontier. SMIC's emergence forced the
Taiwanese foundries to invest in China-based operations only shortly after the industry-
leader, TSMC, was vocal in dismissing China as a suitable place for foundries (TT, Jan.
1, 2002: 17).
The success story of SMIC can be demonstrated on both technological and market
share grounds. On market grounds, SMIC has become the fourth largest pureplay
foundry surpassing the older and more established Korean firm, Dongbu Anam. SMIC
even does well when compared to all firms that compete in the foundry market (this data
includes firms that produce their own designed devices, the integrated device
manufacturers (IDMs), as well as offering foundry services for other firms' chips). In
this larger group of firms, SMIC still ranked sixth ahead of Hynix, another Korean firm
that has offers extensive foundry services. SMIC's revenue exploded at an annual rate of
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630 percent while the industry grew 13.9 percent during 2003, SMIC's first full year of
production (SS, March 17, 2004).
Table 5.1 2003 Top Five Pureplay Foundries
Source: M. LaPedus, "China Moves up in ure-play Foundry Rankings for '03," SS, March 17, 2004.
2003 Rank Company 2003 Revenue 2002 Revenue % change
I TSMC $5.855 billion $4.655 billion 26%
2 UMC $2.74 billion $2.154 billion 27%
3 Chartered $725 million $485 million 49%
4 SMIC $365 million $50 million 630%
5 Dongbu Anam $330 million $260 million 27%
Table 5.2 Top Global Foundries (includes pureplay and IDM)
Source: M. Lapedus, "Chartered Passes IBM in Foundry Rankin s; SMIC Grows," SS, March 17, 2004.
2003 Rank Company 2003 revenue 2002 revenue % change
1 TSMC $5.855 billion $4.655 billion 26%
2 UMC $2.74 billion $2.154 Billion 27%
3 Chartered $725 million $485 million 49%
4 IBM $555 million $760 million -27%
5 NEC $425 million $320 million 33%
6 SMIC $365 million $50 million 630%
7 Hynix $340 million $245 million 39%
8 Dongbu Anam $330 million $260 million 27%
Moreover, SMIC is adding capacity and has not completely equipped the capacity
of its current fabs so the firm has plenty of room to gain further market share. The firm
acquired Motorola's underused fab in Tianjin in late 2003. SMIC's 12-inch fab in
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Beijing, called Beijing Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (BJSMC), started
production at the end of 2004. These two fabs alone may have added 20,000 wafers per
month by the end of 2004 at the same time that the Shanghai fabs ramp up to near full
capacity at 89,00 wafers per month (Wallace 2004), almost double SMIC's 2003 year-
end production of 49,000 wafers per month (SMIC SEC Form F-I, February 11, 2004).38
Before even adding the other planned fab to start production in 2006, SMIC will have
capacities of 90,000, 45,000 and 35,000 wafers per month in its Shanghai, Beijing and
Tianjin fabs, respectively (Wallace 2004). This represents almost three and a half times
the capacity the firm had at the end of 2003, capacity which SMIC like competitive
foundries in Taiwan (Keller and Pauly 2003: 147) has been able to run at near full
utilization (SMIC SEC Form F-1, February 11, 2004). Unlike many IC firms, SMIC has
thus far been scrupulously on target in scheduling its ramp up of operations so this
schedule may very well be met.'3 9
What SMIC has done on the technological front has been even more impressive.
The firm has utilized two sources of technology, partnerships with foreign firms and
ethnic Chinese engineers (in this case a mix of returnees from the US and Singapore and
Taiwanese), to nip at the heels of competitors on the leading if not the bleeding' 40 edge of
technology. SMIC employs .13-micron technology in its Shanghai fabs and plans to use
.11 -micron technology in its new 12-inch fab in Beijing. This technology is just a year
behind the international technology leaders and even further ahead of the domestic
138 The former Motorola fab's capacity is reported to be 12,000 (DB 2003 Figure 10) though SMIC hopes
to increase utilization to 35,000 wafers per month by the end of 2005 (Wallace 2004).
139 Controlling for the release date of information, SMIC's estimates about ramp up has erred by a quarter
or so whereas information from Grace, its main competitor, has erred by a year or more. The sorry history
of delays and false claims in the history of Huajing and Huahong make SMIC look even better.
140 Intel likes to refer to it latest technologies as the "bleeding edge" presumably to set its technology apart
from other firms, such as TSMC, that have technology arguably hovering about the technology frontier in
IC fabrication technology.
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competition. This partnering for technology and drawing overseas Chinese talent follows
the well-known Taiwanese model (Mathews&Cho 2000; Fuller et al 2003). SMIC has
technology partnerships with a number of international firms, including erstwhile
competitor Chartered, Toshiba, Fujitsu, TI and Infineon. The firm also has deals to gain
access to the IP libraries of a number of IP vendors/IC design houses, such as Virage,
Accent and Shanghai-based Verisilicon. The firm has even cooperated with Europe's
premier semiconductor technology research center, IMEC, to co-develop advanced
semiconductor technologies. Both Chartered and Toshiba have taken small stakes in the
firm in return for the technology transfer (DB 2003: 96). Chartered's investment may
have been made on non-business considerations given that the firm is a known
Singaporean government-linked company (GLC) via its major shareholder, the state-
owned Singapore Technologies. Singaporean GLCs have been very active in trying to
promote the Singapore-China economic relationship through investment by Singapore
Technologies-linked enterprises.
The leap made in technology in IC fabrication in China with the coming of SMIC
can be seen in the chart below. The chart only counts technology that can be deemed
embedded in the Chinese environment. In this case, the embeddedness is determined by
the existence of a large number of Chinese process engineers taking part in the process
and in managing the process. In contrast to HHNEC, Chinese are in real positions of
technological knowledge in SMIC and the firm is training more local engineers all the
time. SMIC is not hiding its knowledge in some offshore center of research like NEC
and there are no reports that SMIC is trying to limit the knowledge of its local workforce.
Given that SMIC's operations are entirely China-based, limiting the knowledge and
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technical prowess of the local workforce would not make any sense. CSMC also
contributed to China's embedded technological upgrading as the firm basically relies on
local engineering talent to run its fab, but that firm's strategy is the low-tech route in
which it takes trailing edge technologies and becomes a low-cost distant follower of the
market leaders. Thus, the real leap toward the frontier still came with the advent of
SMIC and Grace though as we shall see Grace is much further behind. Motorola tried to
localize, but the firm never really got the fab up and running regardless of the nationality
of the engineers running the plant. Due to the failure to ramp up a fab in China, Motorola
is discounted.
Table 5.3 China's Gap with the World IC Fabrication Frontier
Source: Dewey Ballantine 2003; Mathews and Cho 2000; ITRI/IEK 2002.
Year China (embedded) Years Behind World Frontier
1979 25 to 30mm wafers 16 years
1986 5-microns technology 14 years
1995 3-microns 19 years
1998 .8-microns (CSMC) 10 years
2002 .13-microns (SMIC) 1 year
The table has several features that are important to note. First, CMOS
(complimentary metal oxide silicon) fabrication process was used as the standard for the
chart from 1986 onward because this technology has been the mainstream fabrication
technology since at least the 1980s. Secondly, the early data uses wafer sizes instead of
lithography micron-widths as the measure since that was the only data available for both
China and the US. 14 ' Finding the exact data on lithography technology for that period
would not change the assessment that the Chinese industry was far behind the US
141 DB (2003: 23 fn 64) quotes a Technical Assessment Report sponsored by the US government in 1979
that cites a gap of 16 years for 1979 and gives the technology in terms of wafer diameters. More tellingly,
the report also mentions that the Chinese firms often processed broken wafers because of the shortage of
materials.
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industry in 1979. The table also uses figures for in-production lithography as the concern
in this work is to examine commercializable technology rather than technology achieved
in a research lab without regard to cost or production practice.
Even if bipolar technology, a process technology often used for niche analog
chips, were used, the result would look similar. In bipolar technology, a FIE, SIM-BCD,
has led the major breakthrough in catching the frontier. SIM-BCD started production of
1-micron bipolar in 2002. In comparison, the technological frontier was .35-micron
technology and the Taiwanese were only at .8-micron technology (DB 2003: Figure 10;
ITRI/IEK 2002). In this niche product, the catch up is not as dramatic, perhaps in part
because this technology is not a mainstream foundry technology and not a specialty of
ECE firms. Instead, certain IDMs, such as Analog Devices, have maintained control over
the cutting edge in this area.'42
SMIC has been able to gather a corps of leading IC fabrication engineers drawn
from the top foundries and American IDMs to come China, but what has been missed in
much of the commentary on the rise of the new China-based foundries has been the
training that these engineers provide to local recruits. While some commentators assume
that the new foundries are and will remain dependent on overseas talent because of the
dearth of experienced local engineers in this area (DB 2003: 15; Woetzel 2003:52), the
whole point in setting up fabs in China is to take advantage of the skilled educated if
inexperienced workforce in China. China creates as much as 15 times the number of
engineering graduates as Taiwan does every year (Woetzel 2003:52). While employers
coming from Taiwan's IT industry generally report that these graduates have not had the
142 Analog Devices (ADI) has a long relationship with TSMC as a foundry partner and was an investor in
TSMC's US affiliate (Wafertech), but ADI keeps analog products in-house and gives TSMC orders for
digital products. Interview with Analog Devices manager, August 2001.
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same exposure to technology that their Taiwanese counterparts have had, the employers
also feel that the young Chinese technologists are educated and training can make up for
the lag between their educational experience and the educational and workforce training
opportunities available to Taiwanese engineering students. Localizing the staff is a
strategic goal at all the foreign-invested pureplays in China as localization is their key
competitive advantage given the lower wage rates for comparable engineers to
competitors abroad (Interviews 14, 20, 123, 181, 182). SMIC has a slogan "yi lao dai er
xin" (one old one brings along two new ones) to describe its emphasis of experienced
engineers training many local staff (DYBG 2002, No. 12). The firm hopes to be able to
use veteran staff to train twice as many junior staff. This process appears to have worked
thus far as the firm has three front-end fabs and one backend fab up and running, and
almost double the local engineering staff compared to overseas engineers as of August
2002. Combining local and returnee engineers together, well over two-thirds of the
engineers including managers are natives of the People's Republic. Localization of
engineering talent in SMIC is well underway.
Table 5.4 SMIC's Localization of Engineering Talent
Time August 2001 August 2002
(DYBG No. 12) (Interview source)
Local 650 700-800
Engineers
Overseas 393: 240 470 from Taiwan; 150
Engineers Taiwan; 120 returnees (some from
(managers/senior US; 30 Italy; 3 Chartered); a few
engineers) Japanese foreigners
Total Staff 1043 2600
In general, the foreign-invested foundries in China have emphasized the need to
train local talent as the basic competitive strategy because these local engineers are
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cheaper than bringing in expatriates even when training costs are included (Interviews 14,
20, 123, 181, 182). Engineers have been running back and forth between SMIC and
Grace, the two main competitors for engineering talent in China's foundry industry.
"Engineers look at brand. Thus far, SMIC has better brand so engineers go there," as
another employer in Zhangjiang High-tech Park (Interview 137), home to both SMIC and
Grace, put it. This interlocutor was uncertain which firm if any would win out in this
battle for talent, but the prospect of engineers' talents not being captured by the firms that
train them appears less likely now that SMIC has successfully listed and Grace is
preparing to do so as well. With listings on foreign boards, these foundries hope to
follow the Taiwanese model of retaining engineers through stock bonuses. These
bonuses are regarded as so critical to success in Taiwanese foundries that two Taiwanese
scholars of high-technology industry insisted that TSMC's real strategy in placing a fab
in Shanghai was to delay the listing of SMIC and Grace on the grounds that no one would
be interested in SMIC's IPO if they could instead buy the stock of the leading foundry
that also had a new and compelling China strategy. These scholars thought in the spring
of 2003 that SMIC would collapse due to the loss of its team if the firm could not list
within a year. Fortunately for SMIC, the firm was able to raise 937 million in its listings
on the New York Stock Exchange and in Hong Kong in March of 2004.143
One major concern of the foundries in China has been IP protection. They are
concerned less about losing intellectual property (IP) to customers than they worry about
customers losing faith in SMIC's ability to protect their IP. The main reason for this
143 Some have claimed that SMIC raised only $714 million (M. Clendenin "Imminent IPO Set to Fund
SMIC Billion Dollar Capex," EET, March 9, 2004), but this figure is the figure of money that went to
selling shareholders rather than money that went to the firm itself. The total sum raised between the two
types of sellers was $1.712 billion with almost $59 million in IPO fees (SMIC SEC Form 42484).
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concern is the fact that IP is most easily expropriated during the transfer of designs from
the design houses to the foundries because all the necessary data is encapsulated in a
GDS-II digital file. China does not have a good reputation for IP protection and,
alarmingly, mask-level data (essentially the data that dictates what circuits are engraved
into which level of silicon) is not protected under Chinese IP laws (Interview 273). The
hybrid foundries recognized that meeting the concerns of foreign customers, precisely the
sophisticated customers they were targeting, required them to try to reassure the
customers that the IP would be protected. Meeting concerns for IP protection was also a
major initial stumbling block in the development of Taiwan's foundries' development,
and if the Taiwanese foundries had not risen to the challenge, then the foundry model
would have most likely failed. Executives at China's hybrid foundries frankly admitted
that if they could not assure protection of customers' IP, they would fail (Interviews 181,
182).
SMIC has clearly met this challenge as the firm has been able to lure an
impressive list of international clients to become major SMIC clients. The firm's main
customers have been technologically sophisticated foreign firms, such as ISSI, Fujitsu,
Samsung and TI (Texas Instruments). One major coup that SMIC pulled off was luring
Broadcom, the leading wireless technology fabless design house and erstwhile loyal
client of TSMC, to fab in SMIC's facility in China.
SMIC has run into IP problems on another front. The customers apparently trust
the firm, but TSMC, a competitor, has sued SMIC for IP violations. Given the number of
ex-TSMC employees at SMIC, undoubtedly there was at least some leakage of tacit
knowledge embodied in TSMC's human capital i.e. the engineers. The fact that TSMC
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uncovered someone within their firm, whom they accuse of being a SMIC spy,
undoubtedly made life more difficult for SMIC, but it also suggests that TSMC is now
taking SMIC seriously as a competitor, enough at least to throw legal obstacles in its
path. TSMC had already earlier talked seriously about suing SMIC or China for illegal
subsidies under WTO statues (Lin 2003b). This legal war against competitors is a time-
honored tradition in high-tech. For example, Intel sued Taiwan's VIA repeatedly once
VIA became a major threat in the PC chipset market. Unfortunately for TSMC, given the
licensing agreements SMIC has with many other firms, TSMC's allegations did not have
the technology coverage, that Intel's lawsuits against VIA's main product line had. At
least one commentator noted that Taiwanese firms suing others for IP violations was the
pot calling the kettle black given the none too legally tidy history of the foundry model in
Taiwan (SS, March 26, 2004). In the end, the matter was settled out of court with SMIC
paying TSMC 1785 million over six years to end all of its legal actions (WSJ, January 31,
2005).
To consider another competitive metric, SMIC has already displayed signs of
becoming a serious global competitor through its capital expenditure. In the first quarter
of 2004, the firm made a quarterly profit, which is quite a good performance given that
the firm did not really go into volume production until 2003 (SS, April 26, 2004). SMIC
is also set to be in the top five in capital expenditure in 2004 (see Table 5.5) trailing only
TSMC and UMC among pureplay foundries. Both Grace and SMIC will invest more
than other pureplay competitors, such as Chartered and Dongbu/Anam. Being able to
invest in new fabs is one of the critical competitive metrics in the pureplay foundry
business as it will be hard for new pureplays to compete with TSMC and UMC if they
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only have limited capacity to offer potential customers. To quote one analyst who argued
in defense of SMIC's aggressive fab building and situating some new fabs in Beijing,
"... SMIC has no other choice but to expand its fab capacity-if it truly wants to be a big
player. In today's foundry market, the larger players must offer a range of services,
processes and options-such as 200- and 300-mm capacity-in various locations to
satisfy the customer base (Lapedus 2003b)." This expansion contrasts with Huajing and
HHNEC's profligate use of capital that resulted in few gains in fab capacity.
Despite SMIC's technological prowess and growing market share, one has to
examine the firm's ownership and financing to determine if this growth has any
sustainability. Simply put, is SMIC a SOE by another name with the majority of its
financing deriving from soft budget constraint sources connected to the Chinese
government? The answer is no. SMIC is still FIE with majority of control outside of
Chinese government hands. SMIC does in fact have low-interest financing from the
Chinese government, but this fact in and of itself is not remarkable as SIA, the
industry lobby of the US semiconductor industry, points out that TSMC, Taiwan's and
the world's leading foundry, still receives more in tax subsidies from Taiwan's
government than taxes it pays to the government (DB 2003: Figure 13). Historically,
China is not any different from virtually any other nation that decided to develop a
semiconductor industry by lowering the barriers to entry through subsidies (Mathews and
Cho 2000). 44 Nor is SMIC unique as an object of subsidized loans. Both the foreign
firms, such as Grace, and obviously the domestic ones and Chinese controlled JVs have
144 This support is not just a matter of history in the East Asian NICs. Recently, a Korean Development
Bank-led consortium of banks extended one billion dollars of low-interest credit to Korea's sole pureplay
foundry, Dongbu. See "Dongbu set for Billion-dollar Bail-out, Says Report," SS, April 9, 2004.
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Table 5.5 2004 Top Semiconductor Capital Spenders
Source: IC Insights.
Forecasted Top 25 2004 Capital Spenders*
.004 20(3 2004 04103 9ak Company Head quarters 20 (SM,(S ) Oxlqt.da0et
I Samsung South Korea 3,650 4,100 15.
2 Intel U_S. 3,650 3,800 4%
3 UMIC Group Taiwan 739 2,120 1877.;
4 TSOMC Taiwan 1 .080 2,000 85%o
S SMIC Ctina 492 1,950 296%.E~'
6 ST Europe 1 .221 1,600 31 o
7 Inrineo n Eu rope 856 1,585 7a9ll°
8 Sony Japan 1.200 1,520 27%>.
9 AMD UL. 586 1,500 1 s6%°S
10 Microi US 1.075 1,450 35%.
I I Tsh iba Japan 1,050 1,430 36%s
12 Renesas Japan 00 1,400 75S'o
13 Ti UE.S 800 1,300 63>
14 Mlatushita J apart 500 1,230 146/o.
I S NEC Japan 850 1,200 41 .V
16 Nanya Taivvan 600 1,140 90o-
17 Hynix S3rut h Korea 600 1,100 83%.
18 1BM U_S_ 850 92J5 9gc
19 Grace Chna 575 800 39f.
20 Phitiiips Europe 343 730 1 1 3°%.
21 Cha rteredl Singqapore 221 700 217°>
22 Elpida Japan 750 600 -20%. 
23 Pow erc hip Teaivwanr 470 600 28%.
24 Oonrgbu/Antar South Korea 260 570 1 19°S1
25 Futiit Japan : 375 475 27%.<
-- TosT 25 Total  - 2... 3 523 35.825 522%.
Others - 5,582 7.435 33%./
- Ttalt 2 9.105 43.260 490%.
' IncI.Jes~ joi ni ven[re pericng
received subsidized loans from the Chinese government. Given the amount of money
Huajing and HHNEC have lost over the years, most likely these two firms have been
allowed to write off much of their debt so their effective subsidization has been much
higher than SMIC's.
The real issue is whether the majority of funding and control are coming from
China's state-run banking system and thus presenting the danger of undermining any
incentives for performance through soft budget constraints. The large majority of
SMIC's shares are held by private entities with small shares owned by companies
connect with the Chinese and Singaporean governments. Dewey Ballantine's study states
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that Shanghai Industrial Holdings, a Shanghai municipal firm, is the largest shareholder,
but their report's own data shows that is not correct so the report must have meant that
Shanghai Industrial is the largest shareholder with a known quantity of shares as one or
both of Walden and Goldman Sachs have larger shares145. Indeed, at least prior to the
IPO, Goldman, Walden and H&Q Pacific combined owned 52% of the firm (DB 2003:
Figure 25). Assuming that other entities of the PRC government held undeclared shares
and the other known or suspected shareholders (Hon Hai, Toshiba, SMIC's management,
Chartered) had minimal shares, the ownership of the PRC government could be no more
than 42.7% of the total shares based on the ownership shares compiled by Dewey
Ballantine though subsequent SEC filings proved that this was not the case (see below).
After issuing ten percent of the firm's equity to Motorola in return for the purchase of
Motorola's Tianjin fab, the total possible Chinese government equity would be no more
than 32.7% and that figure is too high as it assumes the other shareholders, including
management, hold virtually no shares in the firm. The board of directors has only 2
directors out of 8 with a firm connection to organizations linked to the Chinese state,
Shanghai Industrial Holdings and Beijing Jade Bird (Beijing Qingniao), as shown in the
table below. There are no representatives of the central government units on the board
unless one considers the Beijing University-affiliated company, Jade Bird, to be an organ
of the central state as opposed to a Beijing SOE.'4 6
'45 Dewey Ballantine 2003, Figure 25 states that the combined holdings of Walden and Goldman are worth
$467 million compared to Shanghai Industrial's $183 million so, mathematically, either one or both firms
has to have a larger holding in the company at least prior to the IPO unless non-cash equity is very large.
14 6 Determining the lines of authority of a xiaoban qiye (university-run enterprises) such as Jade Bird
illustrates how hard it is to distinguish between the formal and functioning lines of authority among state
units. In theory, Jade Bird is under Beijing University, which is under the central government's MoE
(Ministry of Education). In reality, Beijing university's enterprises operate in the city of Beijing so they are
more much interested in cooperating with local officials to promote Beijing Municipality's economic
283
A review of SMIC's debt situation shows a growing amount of Chinese
government-issued debt, but this Chinese government-issued debt is growing smaller in
relation to overall debt and equity issued even before the effect of the IPOs in New York
and Hong Kong are factored into the equation. The debt as of October of 2003 stood at
$480 million from both central and Shanghai state banks and the equity stood at $1090
million. From this two to one ratio, the cash from equity and non-Chinese state debt
ballooned to $1.635 billion and the debt from Chinese state banks rose to $765 million
Table 5.6 SMIC's Board of Directors
Sources: SMIC SEC Form 42484, March 12, 2004; www.smics.com.
Board Member Primary Affiliation
Richard Chang, Chairman SMIC
Lai-xing Cai Shanghai Industrial Holdings (Shanghai
government)
Ta-lin Hsu H&Q Asia-Pacific (VC)
Yen-pong Jou Global Growth Fund and International Equity
Income Fund
T. Kawanishii Elected by other directors; SIP Consortium
(Japanese research institute); formerly of Toshiba
Henry Shaw Asiavest Partners (VC)
Lip-bu Tan Elected by other directors; Walden (VC)
Yuan-yuan Wang Beijing Beida Jade Bird Co. (Chinese SOE);
Beijing University
(Clendenin 2004) so the ratio of state debt to cash from equity and foreign debt remained
stable at one third of the total. Once the equity raised from the IPOs is figured in, the
amount from Chinese state banks falls to one quarter of the total. Thus, neither control of
the firm nor the majority of its funding come from Chinese government sources.
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prospects than the firm's formal line ministry (MoE) is. In practical terms, it is likely that Jade Bird is
participating in SMIC through its cooperation with Beijing Municipality in promoting Beijing's IC base as
both Beijing municipality and Jade Bird are involved in SMIC via the Beijing-based SMIC joint venture,
BJSMC.
On March 12, 2004, SMIC released its next SEC filing with information on the
holdings in the firm after the IPO. The break down is presented in the chart below. The
main point of interest is the holdings by government-affiliated firms. Beijing Beida Jade
Bird, a firm run by Beijing University and thus a form of SOE, and Shanghai Industrial
together own 14.8 % of the firm. Equity held by the firm itself was still 28%, and with
the affiliated companies of the non-state shareholders the shares add up to almost half the
total at 41.2%. 147 There are two small shareholders that may have Chinese state
connections, Shanghai International Shanghai Growth Investment and Anfu Holdings,
though both of these firms had less than one percent even before the IPO (SMIC SEC
Form 42484: 35-26). Thus as of March 12, 2004, the total possible post-IPO state
holdings were forecast at below 16.8%. In comparison to the SOEs involved in the IC
industry, such as Huajing and Huahong, SMIC is neither under the control of nor
anywhere as close to dependent financially upon the Chinese state.
SMIC meets all three criteria of having a China-based operational strategy. SMIC
is foreign registered and invested firm. Foreign investors exercise majority control of the
firm. The firm's headquarters and top management are in China. Indeed, the vast
majority of the firm's operations and personnel are in China with only small sales offices
abroad. The firm has a pronounced and public China-based strategy of serving the IC
147 Straight addition of all the post-IPO holdings reveals ownership of 117%, which is mathematically and
legally impossible. However, the firm notes that the holdings of the company of 45% may overlap with
holdings by finns represented on the board excluding Shanghai Industrial as represented by Lai Xing Cai,
(SMIC SEC Form 42484: 131 notes 6). By implication, this company and affiliated holdings do not count
the other large shareholders because the discrepancy would be too large if any one of these large
shareholders shares were included. Thus, the straight addition double counts the affiliates of directors of
the pre-IPO board, which are listed separately at 13.2%, and then counts again the holdings of current
private board directors, which represent Vertex Management, Vertex Israel II, Walden Pacven and
AsiaVest for an approximate total of 3.8% of shares (the exact total is difficult to estimate because the
holdings of firms with less than 1 percent are not listed in percentages). Subtracting the double and triple
counted portions, one arrives at 100% (SMIC SEC Form 42484: 32, 35-36, 130).
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Table 5.7 SMIC's Shareholding Distribution after the IPO
Source: SMIC SEC Form 42484, March 12 ,2004.
Shareholder Post-IPO Shareholding Majority Chinese State-
Percentage owned?
Shanghai Industrial 10% Yes
Holdings Ltd.
Motorola 7.8% No
Global Growth Fund and 5.8% No
International Equity
Income Fund
Beijing Beida Jade Bird 4.8% Yes
SMIC 28% No
Shareholders on the Board 13.2% No
(excluding shareholders
above)
Other Shareholders 13.7% No (at most, state share is
(includes Anfu and less than 2 percent of the
Shanghai International) 13.7%)
Shareholders from IPO 16.7% No
Total 100%
industry from its fabs based in China.
by ethnic Chinese.
Finally, the firm is managed and partially owned
2.3.2 Grace: The Other Hybrid Foundry
Grace is another hybrid FIE and is following the same model as SMIC though
Grace lags behind SMIC in technology and revenue thus far. The firm's development
shows the contribution of hybrid FIEs to upgrading is not a one-firm wonder. The
comparison with SMIC also highlights the weakness of government connections in
determining success among hybrid FIEs because Grace's better connections have not
given the firm any competitive advantage over SMIC.
Grace has the potential to be a major player in the pureplay foundry market. The
firm is essentially following the same model as SMIC by bringing over experienced
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engineers from the Taiwan and the US to manage and train the local engineering
workforce. The firm has been slower to ramp up than SMIC due to what appears to be a
more precarious funding situation, but when its two fabs are fully outfitted, Grace will
have enough capacity to compete as one of the top five pureplays in the world with
100,000 wafers per month. SST, an American flash memory design house, had plans to
buy 12000 wafers per month from Grace by the end of 2004 (SS, March 8, 2004).
Despite the relatively slow ramp up compared to SMIC, the firm is training local
engineers. 'The firm had 160 overseas managers and 400 local engineers by end of 2003.
Other reports claim Grace had 150 Taiwanese engineers much earlier (SST, April 2002).
Thus, the firm has been embedding the technology it has in the local economy by training
local engineering staff in a manner similar to SMIC if smaller in scale due to grace's
smaller size of operations.
The firm also has .18-micron technology from SST, which puts it behind only
SMIC among China's fabrication facilities (SS, November 21, 2003). Grace received its
original .25-micron technology from Oki and sent many young engineers to be trained in
Oki's facilities in Japan. Similar to SMIC, the firm has made deals to boost the IP
offerings it can provide customers. The firm has procured Shanghai-based Verisilicon's
.18-micron IP library and Toshiba's embedded microprocessor IP (Grace's website:
www.gsmcthw.com). The firm's major clients are Sanyo and SST.
Grace has kept mum about its ownership structure and has not disclosed the
investors in its first two rounds of funding. For example, it is unclear whether or not Oki
has a stake in Grace. In total, SST has invested 83 million USD in Grace through the first
two rounds of investment (SS, March 8, 2004). Winston Wang, son of the Formosa
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Plastic's Wang Yongqing, owns the Cayman Islands holding company that owns Grace,
Grace Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation. Presumably, he does not want to
disclose the ownership of this holding company because it is owned by Taiwanese
investors close to the Wang family who would rather not have a confrontation with the
Taiwanese government over illegally investing in semiconductor facilities in China.'4 8
At least one insider alluded to the fact that Grace had received investment from Winston
Wang's siblings' firms, VIA and FIC (Interview 14).
Grace also shows that good government connections are not the determining
factor of success if your firm's strategic plan is not based on government procurement.
Nevertheless, Grace like SMIC has been consistent in wanting to compete in the world
pureplay foundry market rather than trying to rely on government procurement, like
Shanghai Belling has done. If one had to predict based solely on government pedigree
which foundry start-up would excel, one would have picked Grace because this firm
combined the Wang family, a wealthy Taiwanese family with significant investments in
China, with Jiang Mianheng, former head of the Institute of Metallurgy in Shanghai (the
main research institute for Shanghai's semiconductor) and son of former (then current)
president of China and chairman of the CCP, Jiang Zemin. Some have said that Jiang
Mianheng had a major holding in the company, but it appears that the Shanghai
government-owned firms, rather than Jiang himself, have a minority stake in the firm,
possibly about ten percent. Shanghai's stakes in Grace -affiliated Shanghai Honghe
Electronics and Shanghai Honglian Electronics, both located in Shanghai's Pudong New
District where Grace Semiconductor is located, are both approximately ten percent so a
148 As of 2002, Taiwan legalized investment in 8-inch wafer fabs in China, but the Grace investments were
made two years prior to the legalization.
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similar stake in Grace seems likely. Someone very familiar with Grace's inner working
said that perhaps they had given Jiang personally some shares, but these shares did not
add up to much (Interview 14).'49 In any case, Jiang's involvement in the firm has not
led to Grace beating SMIC to the market even though the two firms were founded
approximately the same time and initially all of the attention was on Grace due to the
connection to Jiang Zemin.
SMIC's foreign investment, even prior to the IPO of more than 900 million USD
and using a high estimate that assumes 1/3 of equity is Chinese state-owned, almost
equaled the total known debt and equity of Grace, which has a total worth at 1.6 billion
USD. Using these metrics, SMIC's low-ball pre-IPO foreign investment stood at 1.3
billion USD. SMIC has parlayed this ability to lure foreign investment into building fabs.
In contrast, Grace still has to scrounge for investment despite the initial more favorable
treatment in terms of lending by the Chinese state. 150 Jiang's involvement at best ensured
149 DB (2003: 97) arrives at the ten percent figure from looking at the Chinese holdings in two other
enterprises, Honghe and Honglian. which were called Grace Technology and Grace Fabric in the Wall
Street Journal article (R. Flannerty, "Chip-plant Venture Discussed by Firms in China, Taiwan," WSJ 21
August, 2000), cited in DB. However, the WSJ article clearly states that the ten percent stakes are owned
by two companies associated with Jiang, Shanghai Alliance Investment (Shanghai Lianhe) and Shanghai
Simtek, and not by Jiang himself.. In "Jiang Zemin's Son's Telecommunications Kingdom," from March
11, 1999 of Lianhe Zaobao (United Morning News at www.zaobao.com), it is noted that Jiang manages
Shanghai Alliance and is on the board of Shanghai Information Investment (SII), but emphasizes that these
-are SOEs in which he has no stake. However, the article approvingly tells how Jiang who used to be
unable to get his phone calls answered by the Shanghai mayor's office ten years ago (This is a joke because
it refers to back when Jiang Mianheng's father was mayor of Shanghai though the article's dates on when
Jiang Zemin was mayor are slightly off because by 1989 he was already Shanghai Party Secretary) has now
used his political influence to overcome bureaucratic inertia in order to found a new telecommunications
company, Shanghai Simtek, with the other two firms as shareholders. Thus, Simtek and Shanghai Alliance
are SOEs rather than Jiang's personal firms. One further note is that Shanghai Information Investment is
actually a subsidiary of Shanghai Shiye, the parent company of Shanghai industrial Holdings that owns
shares in SMIC. The existence if not the size of the stakes of the Shanghai government's holdings in
Honghe and Honglian were confirmed by a list of firms in the Shanghai Pudong Kangqiao Industrial Zone
at www.shec.gov/cn/introduce/pdkqq/e 1 5.htm, which listed both firms as having joint Shanghai and
Taiwanese ownership.
150 The difference in the ability to attract foreign investment may have had to do in part with the principal
players on each side. While Winston Wang came from a rich family, he was and perhaps is still partially
estranged from the paterfamilias, Wang Yongqing, due to Winston's sexual peccadilloes in the mid-1990s,
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more favorable treatment by the state in the first few years of both aspiring foundries. As
late as 2003, Grace's debt to Chinese state banks at 830 million USD was almost double
that of SMIC's state debt at 480 million USD (Clendenin 2004 and DT, July 15, 2002),
but the Jiang connection to Grace had not completely cut off its bitter rival, SMIC, from
support. On the contrary, there were rumors that the new loans to SMIC at the end of
2003 were a sign that the state had decided to cut off Grace from further support.
Beyond the difference in the ability to lure foreign investment, the lack of weight
government connections have in determining firm success is related to the common
business strategy of the two firms. They wanted to be globally competitive foundries.
Thus, they could not rely on government procurement of IC cards used by the Chinese
government for IDs as their mainstay of their business. The reason was not just because
of their strategy of serving a global customer base, but also because the government's IC
cards were generally designed using older generations of technology, such as .35-microns
technology, that were not the technologies SMIC and Grace needed to perfect in order to
be competitive global foundries. These two firms' fabs from their starts were
manufacturing at more advanced technologies than.35-micron. 1' 5 Indeed, only 25% of
and, more importantly, his former venture in ICs, Nanya, a DRAM firm, did not do well under his tenure.
Similarly, his main executive at Grace has been Nasa Tsai, who came out of Mosel Vitelic, a Taiwanese
IDM, and served at CSMC briefly. Tsai has not had experience at cutting-edge foundries, such as TSMC
and UMC. In contrast, Richard Chang of SMIC founded WSMC, a pureplay in Taiwan that he later sold to
TSMC, and had served for a long time at TI, a firm renowned for its cutting-edge process technology. His
VP of manufacturing, TY Chiu, had run several fabs for TSMC and had also worked for a long time in US
IDMs. From an investors' point of view, the SMIC team just appears more likely to be able to run a
foundry operation due to the foundry experience of the team.
151 For SMIC, the most mature technology used was .35-micron and the mature technology has overall been
accounted for a little over 21% of products for both 2002 and 2003 while .18-micron and below have risen
from 4.75% in 2002 to almost 44% for 2003 (SMIC SEC Form 42484: 46). Grace claimed to have no
product offerings above .18-microns for 2003 (www.gsmcthw.com).
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the orders from leading fabless firms were using .35-micron and above process
technology. 152
Like SMIC, Grace is clearly a hybrid FIE as its operational strategy is China-
based despite being a FIE. The firm meets all three criteria of being a hybrid. The
headquarters and the vast majority of its operations are in China. The firm's professed
strategy is to be a China-based pureplay foundry firm. Finally, the owner-management is
ethnic Chinese.
2.3.3 The Taiwanese Pureplay Foundries
Reacting to the creation of SMIC and Grace, the Taiwanese pureplays re-
evaluated what if any role China could have in their strategic plans. Prior to SMIC and
Grace, neither firm considered China a suitable place to invest in IC fabrication (IPC
Interviews). With the re-evaluation forced upon them by the emerging competition,
UMC in the guise of Hejian (its Chinese affiliate's name) began to adopt an increasingly
China-based operational strategy. In other words, UMC began to act more like a hybrid
FIE. In contrast, TSMC, as a regular FIE with little interest in adopting a China-based
operational strategy, dragged its feet before investing in China and still shows no signs of
regarding its fab in China as a critical core asset.
The Taiwanese pureplays' behavior towards investing in China demonstrates the
split in strategic thinking between firms in Taiwan. UMC has played a resentful second
fiddle to TSMC ever since TSMC surpassed UMC, a struggling IDM at that point, in
sales in 1994 on the back of the successful pureplay foundry model that TSMC invented.
1:52 The figures for fabless design were FSA's (the Fabless Semiconductor Association) figures for 2003
from Grace's website, www.gsmcthw.com, and are a good proxy for leading fabless firms because low-end
low-tech design firms from the developing world are not members of FSA nor are low-tech design firms
the target clients of SMIC and grace based on the author's interviews with company sources.
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The relations between the chairmen of the two firms are notoriously bad due to the
rivalry. TSMC as a primarily Taiwan-based firm has done spectacularly well while UMC
has always tried to play catch up. Due to its lead position and performance, TSMC can
and does charge about a thirty percent premium over UMC on wafers.'53 Naturally,
TSMC should be more comfortable with its current strategy of using Taiwan as its main
operational base than UMC because the returns on that strategy have been so much
greater. In fact, TSMC has had only two major foreign investments, and one of them, the
Singapore JV with Philips, was due to arm-twisting by TSMC's large shareholder,
Philips. UMC has had 2 ventures in Japan and two more in Singapore though two of
these four ventures have ended due to decisions by UMC's partners. Clearly, UMC has
been searching for a way to best TSMC by internationalizing its operations.
When one examines the two firms' activities in China, UMC's pro-China strategy
stands in sharp contrast to TSMC's criticism of China's prospects. While UMC was
quietly planning its 8-inch fab investment in China by 2001, TSMC continued to criticize
China's policies and China's IC industry prospects from the beginning of serious interest
in China as a new base of foundries brought on by the announcements of Grace and
SMIC (DB 2003: 13 fn 37). TSMC continued to be critical even after TSMC received
permission to build a fab in China. While UMC was so eager to set up operations in
China that it did not wait for Taiwan's government to make the decision to legalize the
investment of eight-inch fabs, TSMC has pursued a course of antagonizing China's
53 I first heard this fact about TSMC's price premium from a knowledgeable Chinese American (Interview
179) who returned to do academic and entrepreneurial work in greater China after a very successfully
career in academia and Silicon Valley in the US. As a chip designer and a venture capitalist investing in
fabless design houses, he is well placed to know what goes on at the foundries. His claim is also backed up
by recent data on the average selling prices for wafers of the various firms. TSMC does indeed enjoy
roughly a thirty percent margin over UMC with the firm charging 1420 dollars per wafer versus UMC's
1100 (UBS Warburg, "Update form SMIC Investor Lunch," February 24, 2004).
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government by threats of suing China and publicly blaming China for a potential glut of
capacity even after agreeing to invest there (Lin 2003b). UMC can be said to be tending
towards an partially China-based operational strategy where as TSMC at best has been
forced to incorporate China as a small component in its operations by the force of
investor opinion in Taiwan. This split mirrors what one finds in Taiwan. Firms that do
not tend to envision China as strategically important to their operations (i.e. firms without
a China-based operational strategy) will not be the firms in the lead to contribute to
China's technological development.
UMC's fab in Suzhou has been up and running since mid-2003. More
importantly though less well known, UMC has been very active in creating an IC design
base in Suzhou and Shanghai. UMC has called on the fabless firms in which it has
equity-holdings, such as Faraday, as well as other long-term fabless clients, such as
Realtek, from Taiwan to set up operations in Suzhou. Like the Suzhou fab itself, these
firms do not consist of a bunch of transplanted Taiwanese engineers, but rather are
Taiwanese managers in charge of training local engineers (Interview 155). This design
cluster has been so successful that the Suzhou government has argued with the central
government to give it the coveted National IC Design Center designation since their
design base is much more developed than some those areas with the actual designation. 5 4
UMC itself has a very active R&D team in China. In fact, UMC is one of the leading
firms with US utility patents from their Chinese operations. From 1997-2001, UMC's
Chinese operations have received 17 patents, which may seem quite small, but puts the
154 Conversation with Suzhou IC Base officials at Chinese Semiconductor Industry Association conference
in Shanghai in March of 2003. I have personally visited all seven national bases and only Shanghai and
Beijing are clearly more developed than Suzhou's cluster. Shenzhen has some sophisticated designers
within several systems houses, but these design teams were there before any national designation was given
and are not really part of the core idea of fostering a cluster of fabless design houses.
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firm behind only two other firms in China (D. Floyd and P. Meyer 2002).'55 Through
2004, UMC was the fifth largest patent holder (see Chapter Four).
In contrast, TSMC has no US utility patents from Chinese operations. Its Chinese
fab only began operating in the final quarter of 2004. The firm also has no plans to
promote a design cluster near its plant.156 Indeed, if TSMC had been serious about
promoting such a cluster, it would not have situated its plant so far away from the city
center where the design firms are. TSMC's plant is in Songjiang County, which is so
removed from Shanghai's center that it used to be part of Jiangsu Province. The only
other location TSMC considered, Kunshan, is also a bit removed from Shanghai and like
Songjiang is thus far strictly a manufacturing base. Both Songjiang and Kunshan offered
TSMC very lucrative packages of incentives.' 57 Whatever the reason for its locational
decision, TSMC has not been ambitious in its plans to develop the IC industry in China.
The idea proffered by the economists from the Taiwanese think tank about TSMC
coming to China just to hurt SMIC looks plausible when TSMC's actions in China are
considered. TSMC may train local engineers to carry out fab activities just like its
counter-parts at Hejian, Grace and SMIC, but the firm does not appear to have any deep
commitment to creating a technologically deep fabrication or fab/design cluster in China.
2.3.4 Motorola
155 I suspect that these patents might be probably from UMC's Faraday affiliate because this part of UMC
has been active in the Shanghai area for a number of years.
156 TSMC has announced plans to open a design service center, but this center is aimed to simplify the
design to fabrication transition rather than the creation of entire new designs, the work of UMC-affiliated
design companies (EET, March 29, 2005).
157 Some Taiwanese businessmen reported that they heard that TSMC received up to 7 years of tax-exempt
status, which far exceeds the three years authorized by the central government.
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The other big WFOE (wholly foreign-owned enterprise) fab project was
Motorola's fab in Tianjin. This fab was announced in 1995 (Geppert 1995: 42) although
planning for it started even earlier. Given how dependent Motorola became on the China
market, this investment represents something of a critical case. China should have had
significant leverage in terms of market access to gain technology from Motorola, and,
yet, Motorola's fab never contributed much to China's technological upgrading under
Motorola's control.
Motorola needed to ensure its access to the Chinese market because Motorola had
a large lead in mobile phone sales in the rapidly growing and large Chinese market
whereas its share was declining rapidly everywhere else. Almost equally enticing, China
was investing heavily in telecommunications infrastructure, an area in which Motorola
also had products. This classic dependence of the MNC on the host government's power
over market access should have given China significant leverage in being able to wrest
some technological contributions from Motorola. A former Motorola executive who was
extensively involved in many of the negotiations with the Chinese government over the
course of the 1990s admitted that Motorola's calculation in putting the fab in China was
due to its need to please its Chinese in order to keep the market open to Motorola's
products. MEI was especially keen to receive semiconductor technology. To play the
good MNC, Motorola decided to place a fab in China. Unfortunately for Motorola, the
ministry most critical for success in telecommunications was Ministry of Post and
Telecommunications (MPT), a ministry that could care less about semiconductors as it
was outside of MPT's purview. Still, placing a fab in China looked good to Chinese
officialdom from the point of view of contributing technology to China, especially at a
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time when numerous Chinese scholars of industry were denouncing Motorola's
"hegemonic" control of the mobile phone market (CASS, various years). Moreover,
Motorola lucked out because the reorganization of the ministries in 1998 placed MPT
under control of MII (the former MEI) so the officials Motorola had most pleased could
return the favor. However, this reorganization also gave MEI more leverage because if
Motorola did not deliver, the unhappiest officials would also be those officials in charge
of regulating the markets Motorola would most like to participate in,
telecommunications. More alarmingly, the Chinese legal system being what it is,
Motorola would have no legal recourse if it wished to challenge MII (Interview 236).
Despite the leverage, China never really received the level or amount of
technology one would have expected. The idea that market access concerns give
officialdom leverage is not incorrect, but in this particular case, other variables
intervened. Motorola spent a long time training Chinese engineers in the US only to have
them jump ship to other before they were sent back to Tianjin (IPC Interview). Thus, the
ramping up of the production was painfully slow. Moreover, Motorola's semiconductor
division has had problems for years and in the last few years had announced a fab-light
strategy i.e. outsourcing more to foundries. Before going fab-light, the firm had been
proclaiming that it would concentrate its Asian IC production in Tianjin and move
production out of Japan, but the firm ran into political difficulties in other countries as
well. A recent analysis viewed Motorola's problem as having old fabs in places where it
also did not want to upset the government, such as France and Japan, by closing fabs.
The only solution was selling the new fab in China because selling it would not mean
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closing it i.e. the fab had enough value to be kept up and running (Jelinek 2003). Thus,
selling the new fab would not affect relations with that host government i.e. China.
While Motorola did have special circumstances and did in some sense try to
transfer technology to Chinese hands, Motorola's difficulties were not the only
intervening variable that affected the access for performance trade-off. The Chinese state
could have been stricter with Motorola about ramping up the plant. From bringing in
equipment in 1998/1999 to the plant's sale in 2003, the plant managed to ramp up to a
trickle on the basis of not very large capacity (12000 wafers/month). The trickle of
production may have been due to Motorola's internal difficulties, but the fact that the
capacity of the plant's capacity was so small shows how little the Chinese government
held Motorola to any performance targets. One needs only to eyeball the number of
pieces of capital equipment in the fab to know the approximate level of production so this
information was not something hard to uncover if MII had wished to learn about it.
Instead, Motorola moved very slowly and still retained all of its privileges in China 58 .
Boosting capacity had nothing to do with physical limitations of the plant itself, SMIC is
busy bringing in more equipment to the same plant to triple the plant's capacity.
2.3.5 Other FIEs
There are also a number of FIEs that are not contributing much to China's
technological development as they are brining over older fabs. Essentially, they are
158 For those who wonder what if any weapons MII had at its deposal, the Ministry had two very powerful
weapons; 1) it has licensing power over what foreign firms may sell cellular phones in China and has only
granted licenses to 11 foreign firms 2) it still controls China's telecommunications service providers in
China so it could easily influence their purchasing decisions. Of these two, obviously, the licensing power
was a much more formidable cudgel to bang Motorola over the head with, but this threat was never voiced
by MII as far as I have heard.
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bringing the same technology as CSMC with better initial processes, but starting five
years after CSMC started production. A number of these firms are essentially old six-
inch fabs from Taiwan being moved to China to receive a new lease on life. Ningbo
Sinomos (NSSI) and ADT are two firms that fit this type. NSSI is actually an old TSMC
fab that has some connection to executives at Grace though when I asked Nasa Tsai of
Grace, he vehemently denied any connection. NSSI also appears to be the same fab that
Tsai was rumored to have tried to broker a deal with a research institute in Beijing to be a
joint-venture partner. The deal in Beijing fell through and the fab was eventually set up
in Ningbo. The attempts to situate this fab in a number of different Chinese cities were
confirmed by an interlocutor working for a quasi-governmental agency in Taiwan
(Interview 277). ADT was (and at least officially still is) operating in Taiwan's famous
Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park, but in reality the fab left in Hsinchu is an empty
shell. Meanwhile. the firm is building a second fab in its new location of Zhuhai, the
SEZ (special economic zone) next door to Macau (Interview 251). Although the buyers
intended to move this fab to China even before it was legal to move six-inch fabs to
China, a quasi-governmental agency in Taiwan actually helped the Taiwanese buyers
with advice and research on which Chinese city to re-locate the fab according to an
interlocutor at the Taiwanese quasi-government agency. On Semiconductor's fab in
Sichuan also fits the model of offshoring old fabs to China though in this case the firm is
American, a spin-off from Motorola.
These firms all have the same strategy of prolonging the life of trailing-edge
technology by moving the equipment to China. In this respect, these fabs resemble
CSMC more than SMIC. These firms still marginally meet the criteria for technological
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upgrading because they are more advanced than the majority of fabs in China, but given
the small size of most backward fabs in China, the technology used in these six-inch FIEs
may not be above the average of China if the technology is counted on a per wafer rather
than a per fab basis. For example, SMIC may already have the same level capacity of ten
or more small four-inch fabs (or approximately half the older fab output in China). In
any case, these recent six-inch fab investments are not the center of China's developing
IC industry whether measured in technological or output terms.
From the perspective of China's development, these investments offer one
encouraging sign. These firms are all located outside of the large technology metropolis
of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen and relegated to second or third-tier (in the case of On
Semi in Leshan, deep in China's interior) locations. The fact that these fabs locate
outside of these centers of the IT industry suggests that China's large centers of
technology have developed enough to become at least somewhat choosy about what
activities they try to lure to invest in their jurisdictions.
3. Design in China: From Reverse Engineering to Innovation
A few years ago, IC design activities as done in the advanced industrial world
were virtually nonexistent in China. Outside of university labs, China's major activity
related to design was buying imported chips, and then reverse engineering (copying the
design by copying the circuitry). By 2002 and 2003, a number of commentators not only
recognized China's growing design talent, but predicted China would succeed more in
design than in fabrication (DB2003; Lin-liu 2002: 16; Woetzel 2003: 52; D. Ernst
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2004). i59 As with many phenomenon, there has been a lag time between the emergence
of the phenomenon and the recognition of it even though the Chinese design industry
really began to take off in 2000.
3.1 Metrics of Evaluation
This section presents data on the differential technology upgrading performance
of firms in China. Several metrics were used to evaluate firms. First, firms were
evaluated on technical criteria, such as the process technology to which they designed the
ICs as measured in microns and the part of the design process they carried out
themselves. Secondly, they were evaluated on whether or not they were engaging in
actual design work. Much, perhaps most of the IC design work performed in China is not
design work at all but simply reverse engineering. Firms engaging only in reverse
engineering were not counted as contributing to upgrading.
3.1.1 Technical Metrics
For process technology, the smaller the lithography, as measured in microns, the
more sophisticated the technology. Lithography widths as a measurement of
technological sophistication cannot be compared across process technologies, such as
bipolar versus CMOS (complimentary metallic oxide silicon), but within a given
technology, they are a good measure of design sophistication. For design, one good
159 A number of these commentators make the dubious argument that China has the engineering talent for
design but not for fabrication (see Woetzel 2003). If they offered any evidence that Chinese engineers are
trained in EDA tools but not in fabrication processes, I would be able to accept the argument, but no proof
is offered and anecdotal evidence from recent engineering graduates I have met suggests that fabrication
process training is available. In any case, the situation for fabs and fabless design houses hiring these
recent graduates is the same. These employers report that the graduates have good basic electrical
engineering skills but need significant training (Interviews).
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measure of technological sophistication is the process technology lithography to which a
chip is designed. The same principle holds as for process technology-
the smaller the lithography the more sophisticated the design. Design can also be
measured down the design chain (as shown in Figure 5.1 below). Generally speaking the
front-end activities are more sophisticated than the back-end activities.
Given the technical backwardness of the IC design industry in China over the last several
decades, to see improvement in the technical activities in China one should not set the bar
for these metrics very high. Additionally, other metrics that are often used, such as gate
count controlling for IP cores purchased or digital versus analog and mixed signal
design'60, are of much more value to differentiate average from sophisticated design
rather than trying to differentiate crude from average design. Furthermore, in the case of
gate counts, many firms in China are reluctant to reveal their gate counts to outsiders
fearing that this information will reveal too much information about their products to
their competitors.
Setting the bar high to distinguish the current design activities as closer to the
international technology frontier than the design activities of the recent past (1999), a
good standard is CMOS 16 1 process technology at .8-microns. The very few design teams
not engaged in reverse engineering five years ago were using .8-micron and larger
process technologies (Interviews 4, 5 and 11 and visit with major local design firm in
1998). Since the mainstream design activity of five years ago was reverse engineering
rather than real design at .8-micron, moving to actual IC design at .8-micron from reverse
160 Generally speaking, digital designs are less technically complex than analog and mixed signal designs.
161 CMOS technology is the standard used here because this technology is the most common technology of
the firms interviewed as well as the most common process technology globally. Forty-four of the firms
used CMOS technology.
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Figure 5.1 IC Design Process Flow
Source: Adapted from Chang and Tsai 2002.
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engineering still represents a movement toward the technological frontier. Likewise,
layout (marked physical level design in Figure 2) skills were fairly common even five
years ago, but most of the other design skills were lacking. Thus, firms that do more than
layout in the IC design flow will be considered as contributing to technological
upgrading.
302
Ii
i4-----I V-41- I"""'~
·f ·
I i j
!- 
To set up a harder test for this paper's prediction that foreign firms are
contributing more to technological development than domestic firms, the bar for foreign
firms will be set higher. Foreign firms must have process technology of at least .35-
microns, several generations in advance of .8-microns. Furthermore, firms that appear to
be at best marginally technological upgrading will be counted if they are domestic firms
and disqualified if they are foreign firms. These measures make the test more robust.
There was data on CMOS process technology for 44 firms. Two firms used only
bipolar or bi-CMOS technology. Four others declined to reveal their process technology.
The table below presents the foreign and domestic firms and their ranges of process
technologies. The process technologies of known reverse engineering outfits were
recorded as the nominal process technologies they reported.
Table 5.8 Process Technologies of Foreign and Domestic Design Firms
Unit: Lithography line-widths in microns.
FIEs (28 firms) Domestic (16 firms)
Average Range of (2 firms) .5 to .18 (13 firms) (1 firm) .8 to .35 (6 firms)
Common Design Metrics
High .8 (1 firm) 1.5 (1 firm)
Low .13 (5 firms) .13 (1 firm)
Note: This table includes data from firm interviews through September 2004. The process
technology profiles of firms interviewed prior to 2004 were updated during August and September
of 2004.
3.1.2 Reverse Engineering
In some areas of industry, reverse engineering is an activity that may be illegal
but is a crucial step in industrial learning. In these industries, reverse engineering means
taking apart products to learn how they are put together. Reverse engineering and
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engineering activities are hard to separate and use much the same skill set.' 62
Unfortunately, reverse engineering in IC design is not this type of activity. Reverse
engineering means peering into another firm's chip circuitry and copying it, but copying
the circuitry alone does not really lead to a more profound understanding of how the
circuitry works in order to build an improved product. A better analogy would be
photocopying a book in a language one does not understand. One has replicated the
book, but one would not be able to write a single sentence in that language. This analogy
may be somewhat extreme, but reverse engineering chips does not by itself cultivate the
skills needed to do real chip design because chip design and chip reverse engineering are
separate and distinct activities as a number of advanced chip designers with knowledge of
China's reverse engineering tendencies pointed out (Interviews 179, 115, 252, 273). One
foreign chip designer who had worked with several of the foreign design start-ups in
China and was actively involved in recruiting designers reported that he soon discovered
that engineers with experience in the local firms only had experience with reverse
engineering. This particular experience had two implications: 1) they were not actually
experienced or trained in design work and 2) they had bad habits in that they would rather
fall back on ripping off competitor's chips than create their own designs. Consequently,
the designer decided to avoid hiring any more designers with "experience" in the local
firms and to hire only fresh university graduates who had not been tainted by years of
reverse engineering (Interview 273).
162 I would like to acknowledge the contribution of a group of scholars at IDE (Institute of Developing
Economies) in Chiba, Japan to this distinction between reverse engineering in other industries and IC
design. One scholar of the automotive sector in Japan and China in particular pointed out how reverse
engineering was critical to building the design skill set in China's motorcycle industry. This traditional
benign view of reverse engineering is also in expressed Industrial Technology Development in Malaysia:
Industry and Firm Studies (Jomo, Felker and Rasiah 1999: 6).
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Testimony by Semiconductor Industry Association's (SIA) Darryl Hatano to
USTR (United States Trade Representative) also illustrates the difference between
Chinese reverse engineering and reverse engineering in which the engineer peeks at a
design and subsequently engages in actual design work. "Reverse engineering a chip to
design an original and better product is allowed under layout design laws. However, in
these [Chinese] cases, the chips were essentially photocopies of the US design, which we
know because they included the US company's part number etched in a submask level
and unused circuits that the US firm had place on the chip to reserve space for future
product development (DB 2003: 110)."
Reverse engineering may not only hinder developing design skills, but also have
technological limits. In the 1980s, circuitry was still not very dense so one could project
a chip on the wall and copy the circuitry. TI engineers touring a Korean fab reported
stumbling upon Korean engineers doing just that to a TI chip. Of course, the Korean
firms invested heavily in R&D after learning the basics from reverse engineering
(Mathews&Cho 2000), but there is a danger that reverse engineering firms may lose even
that option as circuitry becomes denser. As one well known designer and former chip
design professor at a major American research university near Silicon Valley explained,
below between .5 and .35-microns, reverse engineering bandits can no longer even trace
the light through the circuitry so it is impossible to copy someone else's chips without the
mask data, which explains why fabless firms need to trust their foundries so much
(Interview 179). Other engineers I discussed this matter with concurred though one
designer claimed below .35-micron it was still possible though much more difficult
(Interview 273). Thus, the rampant reverse engineering in China is not only illegal and
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undermining the practitioners' own ability to develop design skills, but also probably an
activity with little time left.
The divide between the hybrid FIEs and the other firms in IC design is even wider
than the divide in fabs because of the reverse engineering. After interviewing numerous
designers and venture capitalist familiar with the IC design sector in China, it is clear that
the local firms are focusing on reverse engineering, even the large local firms that have
received financial help and state procurement.163 The testimony of the foreign venture
capitalists is particularly reliable because many of these firms are concentrating solely on
what they call the "two-less strategy," meaning investing only in fabless design and
wireless product design. Thus, these firms are scouring China for promising design
houses in which to invest. They are particularly concerned with assessing the
technology, including technology embodied in the firm's human capital, of these small
fabless firms because technology is the only asset they have. By local standards, the
large fabless firms are 100 million RMB (roughly 12 million USD) revenue firms, and as
of 2002, there were only five such local firms. My own sample of domestic firms was
intentionally biased toward larger firms because these firms are the ones with the
resources to at least attempt design. By all accounts, the two-to-three person firms that
form the bulk of the 400 or so design houses that MII claims exist in China are
completely dependent on reverse engineering. As one designer explained, these firms
have no access to capital so they really cannot afford a design team large enough to do
any design (Interview 273; DB 2003: 11).
163 There is one large, private design firm in China, but this firm is also dependent on reverse engineering
(Interviews 273, 155).
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Given the illegal nature of the activity, trying to determine which firms were
conducting reverse engineering as the mainstay of their activities required finding reliable
sources outside the firms studied to assess firm practices. A few firms were quite open
about the fact that they were only reverse engineering even though I never broached this
sensitive topic directly in interviews with design operations. For most firms, interviews
with upstream suppliers, such as suppliers of EDA tools, the many venture capitalists
who concentrate on the technology sector and make it their business to assess firms' real
technology capabilities and returnee designers who were attempting to recruit local talent
provided extensive information on the extent of reverse engineering in the firms under
study. I also had the opportunity to take three electrical engineering professors from elite
microelectronics programs in the US to various companies to help assess their
capabilities. These short visits with the engineers were not conclusive on their own, but
served to point out certain companies to investigate further.
The small private firms I did visit (firms with less than ten designers) were by
their own admission doing reverse engineering (Interviews 198, 254). In one of these
firms, I noticed upon entering what looked suspiciously like a big blown up photo of the
circuitry of presumably some other firm's chip. After discussing the firm's history for
awhile, I was surprised by the manager's honesty when he admitted that the firm was
only doing reverse engineering and that he knew this route was not the way to grow a
sustainable enterprise but he could see no alternative for the time being given the small
size of the firm and the tight capital constraints.
He was not the only forthright manager. At one of the large telecommunications
systems firms in China, the manager also surprised me by admitting in the course of the
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interview that his firm was doing reverse engineering (Interview 186). This firm is just
the type of firm that one would consider having sufficient resources to try the more risky
but rewarding path of creating IP through design. However, being a SOE with soft
budget constraints and the ultimate end-market being the iron rice bowl of other SOEs,
the telecommunications service firms in China, which apparently do not care if the firm is
violating the IP of foreign firms, there is little incentive to go the high-risk route.
Here I will measure the deleterious effects of running a reverse engineering
design house on the overall contribution to China's technological upgrading by
subtracting the number of reverse engineering firms from the total number of firms
contributing to technological upgrading for different categories of firms. I call this metric
the Industrial Environment Impact Index. If the reverse engineering firms are more
numerous than the contributing firms, then the impact on the industrial environment
would most likely be negative and this negative impact would be reflected in the negative
sign in the resulting index.
Measuring the technological upgrading of the FIEs and local firms was done by
measuring what types of design these firms did in China compared to the moving
international frontier and to China's own general level of design technology. In the
recent past, the Chinese level of technology was abysmally low with the vast majority of
design really just reverse engineering of foreign chips. Thus, any true chip design
undertaken in China could be considered to have contributed to China's technological
upgrading in chip design as China's design capability was essentially nil just a few years
ago. However, many of the firms interviewed actually were using relatively sophisticated
designs that were much closer to the technological frontier (measured in the ability to
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design to narrower lithography line-widths commensurate to the narrower micron widths
of the lithography technology as shown in Table 5.3) than one would have expected
given the low base that these firms from which the design segment started. This
accelerated catch-up to the technological frontier is almost entirely due to the transfer of
skills through returnee start-ups and ECE subsidiaries with marginal contributions from
either local firms or other FIEs.
3.2 The Evaluations
The overall evaluations for which firms were contributing to technological
upgrading are summarized in Table 3 below. Of the six domestic firms deemed to be
contributing, at least two firms were only making marginal contributions because reverse
engineering constituted a large part of their activities. Only 2 of the 13 domestic firms
that were not contributing were also not proven reverse engineering firm. One firm was
essentially reselling an IP core it received for free from MII (Ministry of the Information
Industry). The other had received technology transfer from a MNC a decade ago and had
been producing the same chip for the last ten years. In contrast, only two of the 31
foreign design houses were reverse engineering. In addition, of the five foreign hybrid
firms deemed not to be contributing, three would have been considered contributing if
they were judged by the less strict standards of the domestic firms.
The regular foreign firms were few in number so one may question the validity of
the findings for them, but the fact that fewer foreign firms were interested in establishing
design operations in China is in itself telling and conforms with the prediction of
behavior of the non-China-based OS of the regular FIEs. With the vast majority of IC
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design work still in Japan, the EU and the US, these firms are underrepresented in
China's design operations. This under-representation suggests a relative lack of interest
or ability to run technology activities in China, precisely the prediction made by
differentiating regular FIEs as less willing or able to pursue upgrading in host countries
such as China. Beyond the regular FIEs interviewed, I only located two other active
design operations of regular FIEs in China and one of these had just started. There were
several other "backend" facilities, but informed interview subjects had confirmed that
these other facilities were simply layout shops.
The hybrids contributed by far the most in terms of training engineers in real
design skills. Twelve hundred of the eighteen hundred engineers trained were trained in
hybrids. The domestic firms trained almost five hundred engineers, but forty percent of
these came from one firm, a firm that may be in the process of shutting down its design
operations. When one looks at the negative impact of reverse engineering vis-A-vis the
positive impact of the contributing firms (the Industrial Environment Impact Index), the
results show the positive impact of the foreign firms and the negative impact of the
domestic firms. Among the FIEs, the hybrids had a large positive impact whereas the
regular FIEs, given their small numbers in China, had only a marginal positive impact.
Also noteworthy is the fact that none of the regular FIEs were conducting reverse
engineering as their main activity. This may reflect both their higher level of skills and
the more stringent legal environments in these firms' home bases.
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Table 5.9 Contributors to Upgrading by Firm Type
Source: Company interviews.
Firm Types Contributors Total IC Reverse Industrial Total
to Upgrading Designers in Engineering Environment Firms
Contributing Firms Impact
Firms Index
Hybrid 21 1204 2 +19 26
FIEs
Regular 2 108 0 +2 5
FIEs
Domestic 6 488 11 -5 19
Firms
There were two cases that demonstrate the key factor is not the registry per se, but
the capital source of the firm. There was one FIE with very close ties to the Chinese state
both in terms of procurement and financing. This firm was counted as a local firm as it
had a strong link to local finance rather than foreign finance despite its foreign registry.
Similarly, one local firm had received a large amount of foreign VC-investment with the
plan that the firm would soon be re-created as a foreign enterprise. For the time being,
the firm was still a local firm in terms of registry, but its capital source was clearly
foreign. This latter case is somewhat weaker than the FIE with strong links to the
Chinese state because this local firm with foreign finance was a temporary organizational
form along the way of creating a new FIE with foreign registry. The VC made it clear
that this investment would not be tenable if the local firm remained local due to the
common fear shared by all foreign VCs that they could not retrieve their investment from
local firms.' 164
13.3 Limited Upgrading in Regular FIEs
164 Recent reports indicate that the deal to reorganize this firm as a foreign entity has fallen through, but
more information is needed to assess the impact of these purported changes.
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The foreign-finance firms that have failed to contribute to China' technological
learning in themselves are noteworthy because their failures shed light on the
environment in which these firms operate. This thesis argues that regular FIEs are less
likely to upgrade than hybrid FIEs. Looking over the failures to upgrade, the normal
FIEs are over-represented as 3 out of 5 failed to contribute whereas only 5 out of 26
hybrid firms failed to contribute.
The two regular FIEs that failed to technological upgrading demonstrate how
problematic the Chinese operations or any operations in the developing world are in the
strategies of MNCs. The American firm reported that the original idea of the firm was to
have joint development projects between Beijing and the US design sites. However, the
company became concerned about the problem of protecting IP when coordinating these
trans-Pacific design activities. The manager on-site claimed that the concerns over IP
were really concerns over export controls (presumably the US interpretation of the
Wassenaar Agreement) and not solely concerns over IP leakage, but this claim makes
little sense given the ease with which other interviewed firms were able to coordinate
design functions between the US and China and the lack of any complaints on the part of
US industry interest groups about exports controls on this front. More likely, the firm
itself was concerned about controlling the leakage of IP from the Chinese office to China
due to the limited recourse the firm had under Chinese law to punish and seek
compensation from violators of its IP. In any case, the design office in Beijing ended up
conducting very little design activity due to the firm's internal firewalls as the
headquarters simply would not transmit the necessary data to the Chinese operations
(Interview 142). This firm had the potential to contribute much to China's technological
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development because the firm had a heavy emphasis and great expertise in analog
designs, design skills particularly lacking outside of the Triad of the US, the EU and
Japan. The sophistication of the US firm's technology and the absence of almost any
design activity in its Chinese "design" office illustrate the often yawning gap between
what normal MNCs can offer and do offer to developing host economies.
The Japanese design division of a systems producer did not have cumbersome
firewalls between its Japanese and Chinese operations, but the local design activities
were at best limited to peripheral customization of designs for local buyers of older
generation product. The firm was adamant about not training the local staff to design the
more recent generation of products (Interview 133). In this particular case, the firm itself
cannot be said to have regarded silicon design as the core technology of the firm, but
instead was an auxiliary technology supporting the firm's core technology of creating
end-products and optical components. Nevertheless, the firm was careful to prevent
much of this auxiliary technology slipping into Chinese hands. The firm had no plans to
expand the activities of the design portion of the local operations.
These two MNCs were at best training a handful of designers in older
technologies. In both cases, the design activity was at a distant remove from the firm's
core technology. These characteristics contrast sharply with activities in the headquarter
countries employing thousands of people and creating the core technology products of the
firms.
One of the regular FIEs was a regular FIE operation subsequently sold to an ECE
firm. This firm failed to contribute to China's technological learning due to special
circumstances beyond the control of the ECE firm, which originally may have planned to
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develop a second substantial base in China. The ECE firm bought Nortel's Shanghai
design center. Nortel shed this 70%-Nortel-owned asset at the same time that Nortel sold
its share in a local IC fabrication plant, ASMC. The Taiwanese IDM was hoping that this
asset could serve as the critical base for the firm to develop telecommunications ICs, an
area in which the firm had little experience. In other words, the ECE firm at least had the
conception that this China-based subsidiary would take the lead in developing a new and
potentially valuable product line. Unfortunately, they did not realize how little value this
asset actually had. Nortel had owned this firm in conjunction with the Shanghai
government and the design subsidiary functioned much like a traditional SOE. Many of
the managers were assigned by the government and the recently departed chief of
operations left the now-Taiwanese subsidiary to head the Shanghai Semiconductor
Industry Association, a de facto government-run organization, a sure sign that the
departing chief was a government bureaucrat, a suspicion later confirmed by interview
sources.
After the Taiwanese took over, they discovered that the subsidiary had very little
actual capability to design telecommunications ICs or anything else for that matter. The
manager brought into right this listing if not sinking ship was very frank about the low
capabilities he had found within the company. Furthermore, the company's slow
turnaround had driven off the new young engineers that the Taiwanese IDM had
recruited. This firm failed to contribute to technological upgrading, but probably due to
its historical background as a peripheral operation to a MNC rather than due to the ECE
firm's own effort and strategy. Indeed, from interview accounts, it appears that the firm
had entertained high hopes that this new subsidiary would be developed into a large and
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valuable part of the firm creating technology in a whole new and lucrative product area
for the firm. The failure appears to have less to do with any lack of the ECE firm's
commitment to a China-based operational strategy than the lack of commitment to such a
strategy on the part of Nortel (Interviews 6 and 132).
Although the hybrid FIEs have led the way in setting up design operations in
China, regular FIEs are beginning to follow suit. This author has confirmed reports of
the preparation to establish design centers by Korea's Samsung and Germany's Infineon.
Cirrus Logic of Austin, Texas has design activities in three Chinese cities, Shanghai,
Beijing and Shenzhen. However, an examination of Cirrus Logic's recruitment page in
April of 2004 suggests that the Beijing operation concentrates on testing the ICs rather
than actual design work, and the most skilled works remains in Austin with all the
postings requiring master's degrees and above in electrical engineering being in Austin
despite the design offices Cirrus Logic maintains in Tokyo, Seoul and Taiwan as well as
China. Among fabless firms, Cirrus is the largest North American firm with confirmed
design operations in China. In contrast to Taiwan's extensive activities in China, none of
the top 25 global fabless firms, other than the Taiwanese firms, has design operations in
China.'65 The two North American design operations interviewed were both design
operations of IDMs, and both Samsung and Infineon are IDMs. Other IDMs have
operations in China, but these operations have nothing to do with designing the silicon.
For example, Intel, the largest semiconductor firm in the world, has "design" operations
in China, but these operations aim to aid telecommunications equipment firms present in
165 There were 5 Taiwanese firms in the global top 25 fabless firms for 2003 according to IC Insights. The
other 20 firms were all North American except for one Israeli firm, Zoran, which has its HQ in the US but
its technical team in Israel according to Danny Breznitz of MIT.
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China to be able to fit Intel chips into their product designs by providing reference design
and support rather than actual chip design (Interviews 282, 320).
This preponderance of IDMs among the few non-ECE MNCs in China's design
segment suggest that perhaps for these firms the barriers to setting up and running design
operations in China or the developing world generally are significant enough to
discourage smaller firms which do not place China or another developing host country
near the center of their operational strategy. India's situation also suggests possible
barriers to small firms setting up operations abroad because the design operations in India
are predominantly subsidiaries of IDMs, such as Intel, TI and Cypress. The large scale of
some of these operations, such as Intel's in Bangalore, help make amends for the lack of
returnee start-ups in India.
3.4 The Success of Hybrid FIEs
3.4.1 Returnee Hybrids
The firms that were contributing the most to design in China were the hybrid
FIEs, both Taiwanese firms and returnee start-ups. Given their generally brief histories,
the returnee start-ups generally are not yet large firms. However, there is one hybrid that
has become quite large. This firm, Newave, started in 1997 in Shanghai when it was very
unclear that China had a future in this industry. The three founders, a Hong Kongese, a
Taiwanese and a mainlander Chinese returnee, simply took a gamble that China's
homegrown engineering workforce could be trained to be effective designers as well as
cheap ones. The firm has grown to employ approximately 120 designers and has world-
class design facilities according to two MIT electrical engineering professors who visited
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the facility. The business model for Newave was to design older telecomm chips in
scaled .5-micron CMOS processes. For example, a typical CODEC 166 designed using
switch capacitor technology is fabricated in 1.25-micron processes. By redesigning these
in shrunk technologies (.5-micron), there is a cost reduction and this is the advantage of
Newave. These designs employ rare and highly valued mixed signal expertise. Thus,
though the design is for a rather old process technology, it is still quite cutting edge
design. Since mixed signal designers are so rare, even in the US, globally very few firms
have taken on such a business model (Interviews 149, 180).
While the administration of Caohejing High-tech Development Zone claims
responsibility for the success of this firm, they are at loss to explain how they contributed
beyond the standard provision of incentives such as tax breaks and subsidized office
space (Interview 119). The firm itself reports having very little to do with the zone's
officials beyond filing the requisite paperwork. In fact, the firm contributed more to its
greater environment than vice versa. The firm has established a tradition of sending its
experienced, Silicon Valley managers to the good Shanghai technical universities, such
as Fudan, to teach classes. The managers actually jokingly complained that they do more
actual teaching than some of the paid EE professors at Fudan. This activity is more than
simple altruistic charity work. The firm is able to contribute to the quality of the
engineering graduates of Shanghai, which is a public good, but the firm's managers are
able to privatize part of this public good by using the classes as an opportunity to recruit
the best and brightest young engineers to work at the firm. This connection to the local
university system reminded one Silicon Valley veteran of the relationship between
166 CODEC stands for COmpressor/DECompressor and refers to any technology for compressing and
decompressing data.
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designers in commercial firms and local universities and community colleges in Silicon
Valley where they started to teach design classes in the 1970s.
The skills and capabilities of Newave made it valuable enough an asset that IDT,
a US IDM, bought the firm for 80 million USD in 2001. The strategy is for Newave to
continue to develop its lines of chips, a product line in which IDT has little to offer.
Thus, Newave functions as an independent division of IDT in China. Newave in turn
benefits not just from the cash but also from the IDT sales channels globally. This model
is quite different from the MNCs that decided to set up some design activities in China
because in this instance the MNC, IDT, found a functionally independent and
sophisticated design operation in China and bought it to expand the firm's portfolio.
Thus, the non-China-based strategy of IDT did not impact the growth of the capabilities
of the local design activity since those activities were completely independent of IDT
during the development of those capabilities. Now that the capabilities are developed and
are not intimately connected to or dependent upon the capabilities of the foreign
(meaning non-China) operations of IDT, this MNC has an interest in allowing this China-
based asset to continue to grow and enhance its capabilities. The Newave management
claims that IDT is not a barrier to Newave's growth. The main barrier to that growth is
how quickly Newave can train local engineers to do sophisticated mixed signal design
(Interviews 149, 180). Newave's most important contribution is to lead the way in
showing that designing ICs in China is a viable strategy as the firm's three founders
arrived 8 years before the wave of returnees started to show interest in China.167
167 Interview 141 has been heavily involved in the recruitment of overseas Chinese engineers and noted that
the interest to return really began to pick up noticeably in 1999/2000.
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Eleven other returnee start-ups have also begun serious design activities in China
and design activities much more sophisticated (measured in micron-widths) than the local
firms were generally doing even if one takes the reversed engineered "designs" of the
local firms as real design work. This judgment is not based solely on interviews with the
firms and with VCs knowledgeable of the local IC industry. A number of these firms
have already been recognized as technologically strong even innovative by industry
media, analysts and competitors.
Verisilicon is copying the Taiwanese created model of a fabless design house that
serves foundries and their clients by providing technologies to help fabless firms design
their products. This model is called the design service or ASIC foundry model.'68 The
two main Taiwanese foundries have several of these firms with Faraday being the main
supplier to UMC's fabless clientele and Goya and Global Unichip being the main design
service firms for TSMC. Faraday has been in Shanghai for several years, probably in
hopes of winning contracts from the fabs in the area, but Verisilicon has won the key
orders as it supports both SMIC and Grace.
Comlent is a firm that wants to design the RF (radio frequency) chips for mobile
handsets. RF design is very complex and is a rare skill found mainly in North America
and Europe (Fuller 2005), but the firm is busy ramping up its capabilities in RF design in
Shanghai by brining experienced RF designers to train local engineers (Clendenin 2003).
This firm has enough promise that it has attracted personal investment from what one
PRC newspaper dubbed "The Stock King of Taiwan's IC Industry," Cai Ming-Jie, CEO
168 Design service firms and ASIC foundries are not exactly the same but there is overlap between the two
activities and the terms are often used interchangeably.
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of Mediatek and Faraday, two large Taiwanese design houses (Ding, ESJB, June 28,
2003).
Another firm, Vimicro, has become the first Chinese firm to be allowed to enter
the Mobile Industry Processor Interface (MIPI), an international alliance for mobile
technologies. This alliance has only one firm from Taiwan, Mediatek, despite Taiwan
being the second largest IC design producer after the US.16 9 More impressively, Vimicro
has a joint R&D facility with Microsoft to develop multimedia technologies with Vimicro
researching the multimedia chips. Another firm, AAC, is concentrating on analog
technologies, which as mentioned earlier is an area of design lacking in China and even
Taiwan.
3.4.2 Location of Sophistication Design Activities
The question remains as to whether these firms were dependent on sophisticated
design done outside of China while doing the routine, EDA (electronic design
automation) tool-pushing design work in China. If all of the sophisticated design was
done outside of China, then these firms could not really be said to have a China-based
operational strategy. Routine design has a large presence in China and given the cheaper
labor costs, it makes eminent sense to place this routine work in China. However, the
division of labor is not so simple. Technologically advanced fabless firms, such as
Broadcom of the US, keep their routine and innovative design functions in-house and,
thus far, in the home country. Similarly, these eleven returnee design houses are not
169 From MIPI's website at www.mipi.org though it should be noted that one other member, Anyka, has a
significant presence in China.
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dividing their functions so neatly between recognized centers of innovation, such as
Silicon Valley, and recognized centers of sweat, such as China. Rather than taking
China's place in the global technological ladder as given, these firms share Newave's
strategy of trying to build technological competencies in China.
There are significant pull reasons to set up such operations in China given the
cheap and plentiful supply of engineers (see table below) that give this strategy a strong
economic justification (D. Ernst 2004:1). These pull factors can not account for the fact
that these firms are investing in the development in China of the type of sophisticated
technical skills found in places such as Silicon Valley. Rather, the most cost effective
way to take immediate advantage of the cheap engineering resources of China would be
to employ these engineers to do tool-pushing after a minimum amount of training in the
use of these EDA tools, which is basically the model used by the Japanese firm discussed
above.
Not one of these returnee design houses is doing such a rigid division of routine
design in China and advanced design abroad. Seven of these firms have no design teams
abroad at all (Interviews 124, 140, 159, 252) and the three other returnee firms
(Interviews 135, 184, 189, 253) had significant advanced design work (relative to the
firm's spectrum of design activities) in China. These eleven firms all shared the same
basic strategy of Newave. They wanted to enhance employee skills through extensive
training. This strategy also makes economic sense as these firms can then take advantage
of the substantial wage gap with the centers of innovation to pad the profit margins in
order to make up for the initial training costs. These firms recognize that the key to this
strategy is to retain employees just as Newave has, and they recognize the key
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Table 5.10
Source: D. Ernst 2004, "Internationalization of Innovation: Why is Chip Design Moving to Asia," East-
West Center Working Papers, No. 64.
Annual Cost of Employing a
Chip Design Engineer* (US-$), 2002
Location Annual Cost
Silicon Valley 300,000
Canada 150,000
Ireland 75,000
Taiwan <60,000
South Korea <65,000
China 28,000 (Shanghai)
24,000 (Suzhou)
India 30,000
*= including salary. benefits, equipnment. office space and other infrastructure.
Sources: PM(C-?Sierra Inc. Burnabv. (analda (ir Silicon Valley. ('anada, Ireland. India):
pltIs interviews 4 Taixvan, .Suth Korea. C hina)
to retention is to offer adequate compensation through stock bonuses 170 on top of wages
and through providing further opportunities for the engineers to enhance their skills.
In theory, stock bonuses are not allowed under Chinese law as Chinese citizens
have not been allowed to own foreign stock. This law was recently changed to allow
ownership of foreign stocks. The fact of the matter is that FIEs have been giving their
PRC employees stock options and bonuses for quite some time without running into any
difficulties. In fact, the previous illegality of these options actually gives the firms
increased leverage over employees because these options were exercised through foreign
accounts that the companies rather than individual Chinese employees managed. Thus, if
170 Depending on the firm, these are stock bonuses or stock options. Regardless of which type, both were
illegal for foreign firms to reward employees until recently.
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the employees leave without the consent of the employer, these accounts were forfeited
and the employees had no recourse to the law because what they have done was illegal.
A further examination of the three returnee start-ups with foreign design
operations reveals a shift over time towards more operations in China. One firm that
designs CMOS image sensors for digital cameras originally had a large design operation
in the US alongside its Chinese operation with plans to shift the work towards China
(Interview 189). However, an ex-employee still on good terms with the firm reported
that within a year of the first interview a substantial shift of the resources to China had
taken place with the Silicon Valley operations basically turning into a sales office
(Interview 254). Another firm designing the RF chips for mobile phones has planned all
along to move the handful of engineers and the CTO, all originally form the PRC, back to
the PRC from Silicon Valley to join the local design force of 20 plus engineers (Interview
253). An inspection of the firm's recruitment page on April 19, 2004, confirms that the
firm is hiring technical staff solely for its Shanghai operations. The firm is also hiring for
a few positions in Taiwan, but these positions are for liaisons with their foundry and
packaging partners and their Taiwanese mobile handset-producing customers rather than
design positions. 1 7 1
The third firm is designing baseband ICs for handsets. This firm has the largest
group of engineers in the US at 30, compared to more than 300 engineers in its Shanghai
headquarters (Interview 135, 184), but the firm claims to be doing much of the required
design work and embedded software in China and views the core of operations in China.
171 As discussed in Chapter Three, design firms and product firms often have to work together to achieve
the designing in of the chips to the end products. This particular segment has yet to be fully digitized.
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A look at the firm's recruiting page on April 16, 2004 confirms these claims as the firm is
recruiting for nine positions in the US, but has openings for 26 types of positions in
China and many of these positions are for more than person. More significantly, the
Chinese positions are not just for routine design work as the firms seeks engineers with
rare skills, such as RF circuit design, and seeks to fill several positions with technical
PhDs. RF circuit design is at the heart of the wireless technologies that firms such as this
one are trying to develop (Fuller 2005).
3.4.3 Taiwanese ECE Hybrids
The Taiwanese firms that have contributed to China's technological development
in contrast to the non-ECE MNC firms, which are mostly defined by their absence, have
tried to utilize China's human resources as part of their core strategy. Among ECE
firms, VIA has gone the furthest in incorporating China-based design operations as part
of its base of operations as measured by the Chinese engineers employed in VIA's core
activity, IC design. Several years ago, this author thought that VIA's Chinese processor
market answer to Intel's Intel Inside campaign, the zhongguo zhi xin campaign ("China's
chip" though this pun also sounds like "the heart of China"), was unintentionally ironic.
The firm had its processor design in Texas and was having difficulty remaining in the
processor business. Furthermore, the processor business was a sideline of VIA's
mainstream PC chipset business located in Taiwan and the firm had no real technology
activities in China. VIA has since proven how sincere its advertising campaign really was
by ramping up to a workforce of 500 designers between its Beijing and Shanghai offices
and has plans to expand to 2000 within two years (Woetzel 2003: 55). One report
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predicated VIA would have a larger workforce in China than in Taiwan by the end of
2004 ("VIA Tech to Have More Employees in Mainland than Taiwan," TENS April 29,
2002). To put some perspective on these numbers, 500 engineers is equivalent to almost
one percent of the total US IC design workforce (with a high estimate of 50,000) (D.
Clarke 2004) and 500 engineers would be a quarter of VIA's total workforce in 2001 and
2000 engineers would be equivalent to the whole 2001 workforce, both engineers and
other staff (Plunkett 2002). 500 engineers would be at least ten percent of India's total
design workforce of 5000 (Clarke 2004) and between three and seven percent of China's
design engineers depending on the estimate.'72
This author confirmed that 6 (Mediatek, Realtek, Faraday, VIA, ALI and Holtek)
of the top ten fabless design houses in Taiwan in 2002 had design operations in China by
2002 and the other large Taiwanese firms may have Chinese design operations though
tracking them down is difficult because they often change their names upon setting up
shop in China. Both fabless design firms and Taiwanese IDMs with design operations in
China had ambitious plans to expand their engineering bases, but more importantly, their
design teams in place were already working in conjunction with design teams in Taiwan
and elsewhere to co-design chips. In other words, these teams were part of the firm's
core R&D operations rather than shunted off to do peripheral work (Interviews 61,
121,150, 155, 172, 173, 174, 190).
One dramatic example of the increasing centrality of Chinese operations to ECE
firms' operational strategy in IC design is Firm T. Firm T was the creation of a major
Taiwanese fabless design firm. That firm bought a CDMA mobile handset chip design
172 Hsieh (2004) cites Applied Materials estimate that China's IC design industry has grown from 1200
engineers in 1998 to 15,000 in 2003 and Clarke (2004) cites 7000 in 2003 using iSuppli's estimate.
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division from an American IDM to create Firm T. However, after purchasing the
division, the Taiwanese firm did not leave the whole design staff in the US as Taiwan's
VIA did when it bought the Centaur processor division of IDT. Nor did the mother firm
move the operations to the headquarters in Taiwan. Rather, the mother firm decided to
bypass Taiwan completely and co-develop Firm T's products in the original US base and
in a city in Greater Shanghai area. The firm sent 20 to 30 engineers from China to be
trained in the US operations. Now, there are 65 engineers in China and 100 in the US.
The manager of the Chinese operations was blunt about his intent to move more design
work to China because of the large wage gap with the US, but the US operations will
continue to be based in San Diego, the cluster of CDMA design in the US due to the
presence of Qualcomm and Nokia's CDMA design operations. While the US operations
are not going to disappear, this Taiwanese firm decided to forgo Taiwan completely to
build a large Chinese operations rather than transferring the new technology to Taiwan to
be absorbed and learned at headquarters. The ramp up to 65 engineers in China took only
a year and a half after the initial purchase of the US division by Firm T's mother
company (Interviews 291, 292).
Measured by the number of designers as well as the design content, some of these
firms have large design bases in China. At least four hybrid firms had ramped up to over
100 engineers. To put this in the historical context of the development of Taiwan, the
second largest center of design activity after the US, Faraday, a top-ten Taiwanese fabless
design firm, had only 40 employees in 1996 and then grew to 100 in 1997. ALI, a
current Taiwan top five and global top thirty design firm, had only 200 employees in
1997. VIA, which would quickly grow to become a global top ten fabless firm, had only
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180 total employees in 1997 (ICE 1998). Using 1997 provides a telling comparison
because Taiwan's industry was already well developed by that point with 15% of the
global market (A. Lu 2003: 3) so one would expect its firms to be global players even at
that point in time. Since the employment figures were for total employees, a share of
these employees were not design staff so some of the firms with over 100 designers in
China may actually have larger design staffs than their Taiwanese counterparts had 6
years earlier.
China's total design workforce has exploded over the last seven years. In 1998,
China had 1200 designers and as of 2003 China has 15,000 designers according to
Applied Materials' estimates (C. Hsieh 2004: 2). The growth has been spectacular even
if the lower estimates of current designers by iSuppli, 7000 designers (Clarke 2004), are
used. While this figure is much smaller than the US figure of 40,000 to 50,000 designers
(Clarke 2004), the US dominates the world design industry with approximately 70% of
fabless design production.173 Byron Wu of iSuppli predicts that with the growth of fabless
design in China, greater China (mainland China's fabless industry plus the already
developed Taiwanese fabless industry) will overtake North America in total size by 2008
and much of this growth will be from China rather than the already large Taiwanese
fabless industry (B. Wu 2003). Moreover, the experienced returnees have snowballed
into a critical mass with over 200 experienced electrical engineers (defined by
interlocutor as engineers with over 10 years of experience) having returned to the
Shanghai area alone. This influx of talent has allowed China to start to set up branches of
the major professional associations that are active among ethnic Chinese in the American
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'
73B. Wu (2003: 21) claims 7000.
high-technology sector, such as Shanghai's branch of CASPA (Chinese American
Semiconductor Professionals Association) (Interview 252, 269).
3.3 The Local Firms
There were six local Chinese firms that were doing real design work. Two of
these firms are major telecommunications equipment firms based in Guangdong
Province. As rumored, both firms were designing chips for their equipment. However,
the claims made by many in China that these firms were creating the core silicon
technology needed in the telecommunications equipment they produced are exaggerated.
Interviews with the firms' microelectronics departments themselves revealed that these
firms were designing peripheral chips while still buying the core chips from foreign firms
such as TI and Agere (Interviews 102, 169). One of the suppliers of key chips also
revealed that these firms were buying the key technology from them and other foreign
firms (Interview 226). Still another interlocutor, who happened to be a big booster of
China's IC sector as well as well -known academic and entrepreneur in Shanghai,
pointed out that the firm considered to be the more advanced in its design was really
doing the architecture but not the actual circuit design. Often, the architectural level of
design is considered the more complex and innovative task, but in this case, the circuit
design itself was the more technically difficult task and the firm was outsourcing that task
(Interview 122). These two firms were doing design work, but it was rather peripheral
and marginal, shining only in comparison to reverse engineering. Finally, one of these
firms is rumored to be in the process of closing down its design operations according to
insiders (Interview 308).
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Another local design house that may have contributed to China's technological
upgrading was a rare combination, a returnee start-up that received investment from local
private entrepreneurs (the only such fabless company the author came across in China).
This firm was attempting to sell relatively technologically simple RF chips for consumer
electronics goods. If the firm is truly developing RF chips in China, the firm is
contributing a rare skill set to China's engineering pool, but there is one major reason to
be wary of this firm's claims. The firm's investor is none other than the one large private
fabless design house in China, which itself is notorious for reverse engineering. There is
the distinct possibility that the start-up funded by this firm may follow the same strategy.
Even if this firm actually succeeds in developing its own RF technology in China,
the institutional constraints under which this firm operates may not be solely domestic.
The firm has already expressed the desire to seek foreign VC funding for its second
round of funding and has already been in touch with some foreign VCs (Interview 290).
Indeed, originally, one VC tried to arrange for this firm to be a subsidiary of Comlent, in
effect becoming invested indirectly by foreign VC funds (Interview 262). Thus, the
possibility remains that the firm has already adjusted its behavior in line with the
expectations of foreign capital. Rather than taking the reverse engineering route, the
firm, realizing that it has to have some technological capabilities to receive foreign VC
funds, may be developing those capabilities with the initial seed money from the local
private firm.
For the local firms, the firms that have not been able to access the state financial
system have had no recourse except to pursue the reverse engineering strategy due to lack
of funds to invest in time-consuming and expensive design work. At best, these firms
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have competed on offering the cheapest knock-offs to the local private market firms, a
business that hardly offers healthy profit margins to develop capabilities to escape this
poverty trap. Only one of the top ten local firms is a private firm that has been able to
generate enough reverse engineering revenues to grow. The other large local firms are all
connected to the state. These firms receive financing from the state, but perhaps more
critically, they gain access to state patronage. The one local firm that escaped from the
inequities of this system by linking up with foreign venture capitalists and foreign
technologists reported that it had tried to compete with the state-linked firms in the IC
card market (IC cards are cards with chips that carry adjustable information used for such
things as telephone cards and transportation cards in China) but had to resort to supplying
a state-linked firm with chips because it could not get into the state's procurement
channels (Interview 285). The margins were very low since it could not sell directly to
the state and it decided to try to develop alternative businesses. Without the infusion of
foreign technology and capital, this firm would probably have failed or remained a very
small operation, the fate of most private design firms in China.
Due to the application of IC cards for use as transportation and telephone cards
and even as a form of insurance card in China (transportation, telephony and social
service being controlled by the state), these cards are mainly used in state-run services
and thus have become the state's major way to channel government procurement to
favored local IC design houses. MII has even implemented the Golden Card Project,
which promotes the use of such cards in various services industries with procurement of
these cards channeled to the local favorites.
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The other main avenue of procurement is for firms designing chips for
telecommunications infrastructure equipment. As the telecommunications service
providers are all state-run, this area has become another path for government
procurement to the IC design segment though less by design than default. The local
telecommunications equipment firms are favored in the awarding of contracts, but this
favoritism appears to have no direct link to the design activities going on in the
telecommunications equipment vendors. They do not appear to receive or lose
government contracts on the basis of the level of their own IC content in their equipment.
In other words, the promotion of IC design was only indirectly promoted by this state
procurement and perhaps was not even a goal of the telecommunications chip
procurement. As of 2001, the local firms were still the largest because the ECE firms
were not counted as Chinese firms and the relative youth of the returnee start-ups. Of the
top ten, only two were returnee start-ups, Trident and Newave, and only one was a
private local firm. The other seven were state-owned and all of these firms sold IC cards
or were themselves part of telecommunication equipment vendors that were the design
firm's main customer.
State procurement in itself is not a poor policy if granting these economic rents
generates technological learning, but there is no evidence that the firms receiving
procurement have done anything but continue to reverse engineer foreign products. One
foreign-trained manager looking for design talent found designers from these firms to
have no real design expertise at all. He went on to say that if he sourced from a fab to
which one of the design houses was associated, he would make sure to mislabel his
layouts. By mislabeling the layouts of the designs, he would ensure that if the fab passed
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on his layouts to the design houses they would be have great difficulty deciphering what
the functions of the actual layout really was, such difficulty that the reverse engineering
firm would be better off blowing up pictures of the circuitry (the standard practice of
reverse engineering firms that have no connections to fabs). Having worked for a
number of fabless firms in China, the same interlocutor reported that the government
officials were easily fooled into believing almost anything is high-technology because
they have a limited understanding of IC design. Thus, the 863 Plan, a major S&T
initiative under MOST to encourage innovation in China, has funneled small amounts of
money to support research to both foreign and domestic firms, but these officials will
support just about anything you tell them is high-tech (Interview 273). A number of
other interlocutors agreed that MOST and MII did not have the capabilities to discern
which firms were undertaking innovation. Thus, the funds from these ministries were
readily available to undeserving firms (Interviews 302, 305, 307, 310).
The support for domestic firms through procurement dwarfs the S&T research
funds available to design firms, but distribution of state procurement similarly lacks a
mechanism to weed out those firms that do not generate any technology. Indeed, there is
no evidence that there is even any attempt to measure their performance beyond the fact
that the design firms deliver the ICs ordered. As part of the 909 Project, the state gave
support to seven design houses including SSMEC (Guowei) in Shenzhen and HuaDa in
Beijing (DYBG 2002, No. 11:5).174 One firm, Huada, has been at the center of state IC
design plans since its founding as China Integrated Circuit Design Center in 1986. The
fact that the same firms have been receiving state support since the 909 Project and others
174 Some of these seven firms were established under the 909 Project and others were established during the
8th Five Year Plan or even earlier.
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have benefited from sate telecommunications procurement (Shanghai Belling and Datang
Microelectronics) despite no major technological accomplishment to show for it suggests
that the criterion is politically rather than economic or technological. The other newer
state-linked firms appear to benefit from local state support, such as Zhao Ri in Beijing
and Fudan in Shanghai, on the grounds of being local enterprises rather than any
technological accomplishments. All of these firms are actually SOEs, but as we shall see
below, the state procurement now extends to other firms that have been able to enter the
state's favor.
The state procurement extends to orders from state-owned enterprises for some
new state-linked firms. Beijing Municipality appears to be the main source of this type of
support. Through municipality-owned SOEs, such as Beijing Oriental Electronics, the
city has recently promoted two design houses that are nominally not state enterprises.
One is BLX, a design house with ties to Institute of Computer Technology in the Chinese
Academy of Science, and the other is actually a FIE that has turned sour under the state's
benevolence.
BLX is the type of firm that would be called minying (privately managed) as it is
not officially a SOE and is at least nominally managerially separated from CAS or any
other state organ. Many other technology companies are often placed into this category,
including Legend and Huawei. However, minying is a term with no legal standing.
Moreover, the assumption that minying firms have no connection to the state is false.
Like Legend and Huawei, BLX is championed by the state though here the state is
primarily the municipal government rather than the central government. In this case, it is
hard to differentiate where CAS' influence as a national influence ends and the influence
333
of Beijing Municipality begins, as the interested parties are all located in the capital,
which also happens to have an important and large regional government.
Whatever its exact ownership category, BLX is reliant on orders from state-
owned firms and these orders have no economic justification. BLX is trying to make
server processors. The first generation, 32-bit Godson-1, were based on the MIPS
instruction set, but were not strictly compatible because they avoided using key
instructions that would have run afoul of MIPS patents. The Godson-2 is 64-bit 500-
MhZ processor for servers that supposedly do not use the MIPS instruction set.
However, these processors are actually using quite old technology and are more costly
the Intel's most current processors. In the marketplace, these chips would go unsold, but
in Beijing's politically determined marketplace, Dawning and Legend, firms with ties to
CAS, purchase them for their servers, which in turn on purchased by the agencies of the
state. As one VC manager remarked when asked about this firm and Arca, a firm
discussed below, "I can buy cheaper from Intel and Motorola so why buy from [these
guys]?" He also noted that the higher priced local CPUs were performance-wise far
behind the international lead vendors. The same investor noted that new firms, "...need
government support but not too much government support." He went on to explain that
for these two firms, the government procurement is the main market and this venture
capitalist did not see how this support would do much other than undermine the
incentives to innovate in an economic efficient manner (Interview 262). There is no
evidence that these firms have been able to expand their markets beyond the state
procurement of servers. These firms have thus not passed the basic test of commercial
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viability because they have no products even attempting to compete in the
marketplace. 175
The other firm that shows the expanding patronage for IC design by the Chinese
state is Arca. This firm is also the prime example of how nominally foreign firms can
also become linked to state finance and thus have their incentives to create technology
undermined. Returnees from the US founded Arca and the firm had a core of
experienced engineers returning from the US to do the design work. At least one VC run
by an experienced entrepreneur and well-known electrical engineering professor thought
very highly of Arca's potential and was considering investing in the firm. Then, he
became disillusioned as he found that the founders became too enmeshed in the state's
propaganda about its supposed high technology triumphs. As he put it, the founders of
the firm began spending too much time making speeches to bureaucrats in Beijing about
how great their technology was and neglected the actual work of creating the technology
(Interview 179). A source close to the firm reported the firm's technology was very
backward compared to international competitors in CPUs (central processing units)
(Interview 243) and the customers of the firm reflect this backwardness. Rather than
being able to compete in open commercial markets, the firm has relied on purchases by
local state enterprises, such as Beijing Oriental Electronics. Thus, this firm fails on the
basic test of creating a commercially viable product just as BLX failed.
One could argue that these various efforts to provide state procurement to Chinese
design houses just need time to reach fruition. While BLX and Arca are relatively new,
the history of procurement and other funds to support favored IC firms has a much longer
175 There are recent rumors that BLX has lost its state patronage.
335
history. Unfortunately, even Huada, which as almost 20 years of state support backing it,
has little to show for its efforts and still relies on government largesse. The other firms
that received support from at least the 909 Project onward also do not have original
technology products competing in the marketplace after at least eight years of state
support. Clearly, continued state support is not predicated on the individual firm's
performance in creating competitive technology products. Consequently, the firms
perform accordingly poorly in upgrading their technological capabilities, living down to
the low expectations set for them.
4. From Puppeteers to Stage Managers: Assessing the Extent of Change in the
Chinese State's IC Industrial Policymaking
Dewey Ballantine's study of China's IC policy argues that the state has shifted
industrial policy from one based on using Chinese state-owned firms to one that mimics
Taiwan's IC industry in using private enterprises with a passive minority investment from
the state to develop the industry. There are certain facets of the current argument that fit
with this argument. SMIC certainly does not resemble the firm created out of the 909
Project, HHNEC, because it is private even while also receiving tax breaks and some
loans from the state. Central and local governments have provided support for SMIC as a
way to boost the development of the IC industry in China. However, there are also many
continuities with the past that suggest there is not suggest a clean break with the previous
attempts to use state enterprises to drive industrial development. Local experimentation
and competition has opened space for the FIEs to operate in this sector, but these
opportunities do not mean the abandonment of the dream of state-driven success in
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silicon. Furthermore, the Chinese state began to accommodate WFOEs in ICs much
earlier than Dewey Ballantine recognizes. Motorola's wholly owned fab was being
prepared since 1995 and in 1984 the first wholly foreign owned assembly and test plant
was set up in Shenzhen.
The state loans to SMIC and Grace are not the only signs of shifts away from
state-owned firms as the core of China's industrial policy. An examination of internal
reports from MOST presents some signs that the government may want to distance itself
from state-sponsored firms in the IC industry. MOST officials reviewing the failures of
the 909 Project have proposed a model of"the government provides the stage, the firms
sing the arias [zhengfu datai, qiye changxi ]" instead of the state-owned enterprises taking
the lead. Their interpretation of the perceived success of a disparate group of countries
(Taiwan, the Soviet Union and India) sees the need for government policy to provide a
platform of incentives and investment measures to "innovate [new] organizations,
managerial systems and operational models (DYBG 2002, No. 11: 8)." Their calls for a
new approach to funding the industry makes clear how great a departure the platform
model is from previous state-owned efforts.
The MOST officials even grasp some of the potential of modularity in that they
conceive of concentrating in one narrow area of operation first, but they then see this as
the opportunity to create a base from which to expand into upstream and downstream
functions. While the wording concerning the subject of this expansions is vague (is it the
industry or the individual firm), the mention of two firms that have this potential strongly
suggests that the officials have in mind a slow emergence of a vertically integrated giant
rather than the emergence of a segmented but complete industrial value chain as has
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emerged in Taiwan (DYBG 2002, No. 11: 9). Instead of direct financial support, the
officials advocate support for financial measures to provide for the raising of private and
foreign funds through capital markets. Indeed, the officials view capital markets as the
tonic to ameliorate the overinvestment in and inefficient use of industrial capacity
brought about by state investment in competitive industries.
Most surprising given MOST's institutional interest, the researchers call for state
support to firms with R&D and production capabilities and not to MOST research
institutes and higher education institutions because they are far removed from the
demands of the marketplace (DYBG 2002, No. 1 1: 9) or as they put it, "They emphasize
scientific research, ignore products. They emphasize scientific papers and ignore
patents." They envision placing the government research institutes into large firms and
then supporting the firms with state funds for R&D. While this strategy does not throw
their MOST comrades out on the street, it certainly lowers the scope of bureaucratic
influence of MOST assuming that the firms themselves are not under MOST control.
This assumption is a solid one given the general movement to remove firms from
ministerial control and the fact that the MOST officials mention large firms rather than
firms controlled by MOST. In China's IC industry, none of the large domestic firms are
under MOST's direct or indirect control.
Another MOST report echoes the call for a government-provided public service
platform, but combines this proposal with one of trying to limit the influence of foreign
firms in the industry by removing their preferential policies and recognizing IP through
utilization rather than creation (a ploy to avoid paying for foreign IP) (DYBG 2002 No.
14: 9). Finally, a third report which examines SMIC and correctly recognizes it as a new
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and very international way to build a semiconductor industry in China, still calls for the
government to provide strategic guidance, which follows a call to mimic the incentives
and guarantees provided to the IC industries in Japan and Korea (DYBG 2002, No.12: 7).
Even for reformers, the desire for the government to remain in firm control is strong.
Discussions with MIII officials involved in policy formulation for the
semiconductor sector also show some shift in policy. These officials conceded without
prompting that their past large-scale projects, namely the 908 and 909 Projects, failed
because of a lack of understanding of the end-markets in which these technologies would
have to compete. These officials recognized that the used of state-managed projects
would not resolve the problem of the lack of knowledge of the markets, but they also
insisted that these projects had contributed to the technological development of China
while presenting little evidence of this supposed contribution (Interview 74, 78).
On the other hand, MII does not seem to have dropped support for large-scale
investments in semiconductors. While ASMC's 8-inch fab construction could have been
driven by local Shanghaiese officials, one former Shanghai Science and Technology
Commission official who still operates within a state-sponsored technology organization
in Shanghai, insisted that the push behind the recent wave of state-owned fab-building
was due to the influence of Beijing in the Huahong Group, the group which controls
Huahong NEC, Shanghai Belling and, indirectly via Shanghai Belling, ASMC. This
interlocutor claimed that the local government was not very interested in building the fab
planned by Shanghai Belling and now being completed by Huahong NEC, but was forced
to do so because of central government influence within the Huahong Group (Interview
268). This claim has some factual evidence because the Huahong Group has been split
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between the Shanghai government and MII with MII controlling 60% of the shares
(Naughton 1999: 13 fnl 1). Furthermore, Shanghai Municipality has already done well
by recruiting SMIC, Grace and TSMC to the municipality so Shanghai does not have a
clear incentive to support the building of more state-owned fabs. Building more state-
owned fabs might actually hurt the fabs already in place because they could add stress to
the critical supplies of electricity and clean water that these fabs need to run. One
foundry manager reported that Shanghai Pudong's supplies of water and electricity were
better than Taiwan's, but that once SMIC and Grace each had two full fabs running on
top of Huahong NEC, the supplies might be stretched by further fab-building without
requisite investment in the necessary infrastructure (Interview 20).
Another piece of evidence that lends credence to the charge that MII has not
abandoned state-owned firms as the core of semiconductor industrial policy is the forced
adoption of Shanghai Belling's eight-inch fab project by HHNEC. Shanghai Belling had
aspired to build an 8-inch fab just as HHNEC did and ASMC was doing. Belling wisely
realized that a foreign partner would be needed as a technology source, especially as the
firm decided that it would try to pursue a niche technology route in order to avoid
competition with established foundries. The problem was Shanghai Belling wanted to
maintain majority control (Interview 260). Consequently, no foreign partner was found.
However, MII did not want this project dropped so they forced Shanghai Belling to drop
the plan and hand it over to a reluctant HHNEC, which had its hands full with managing
the one foundry it already had (Interview 289). This fab project then was able to find a
partner, Jazz Semiconductor.
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Much more important than any major shift in national policy towards allowing
private and foreign firms to play a larger role in China's IC industry have been the moves
of local state actors. Shanghai encouraged the investments of SMIC and Grace in 2001.
In contrast, when I talked to the firm in charge of Beijing's main fab project in the
Northern Semiconductor Base in late 2001, the Beijing Municipal Government had given
the funds to start this base (approximately 850 million USD) to a local SOE, Shougang,
to build a Shougang majority-owned 8-inch fab under the control of Shougang's SGHT
(Shougang Hi-tech Corporation), a new corporate entity created for this project
(Interview 32). However, the fab was unable able to find suitable partners with only
several quite small Chinese-American design houses, Alpha&Omega and Joshua,
interested in investing in the project. This fab project, dubbed Huaxia, was never able to
start due to the lack of foreign technological partners.
In the meantime, SMIC had moved in equipment and was about to start
production in its first Shanghai fab. In 2002, Beijing started to discuss with SMIC about
the possibility of SMIC setting up a fab in Beijing. These talks led to the rug being
pulled out from under the Huaxia fab project as the Beijing government took back 650
million dollars from Shougang's own project and routed it to the SMIC project prior to
August of 2002. This left the managers who were trying to set up the Huaxia fab with
only 200 million USD to invest, far too little to buy equipment, even used equipment, for
an 8-inch fab (Interview 191). Shougang still benefits because Shougang is the large,
minority, passive stakeholder in SMIC's Beijing fabs, which are grouped together as a
SMIC subsidiary, BJSMC, but due to the need to keep up with Shanghai's rapid progress,
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Beijing sacrificed control in exchange for rapid progress led and majority-owned by a
FIE.
The fab project also undermined the idea of having the Northern
Microelectronics Base in Badachu in the western parts of Beijing near Shougang's steel
operations. This location was the planned location for the Huaxia fab and the location of
SGNEC's older six-inch fab. SMIC reportedly did not like this site so they insisted on
moving to the Beijing Economic Technology and Development Zone in Yizhuang, which
is also functionally a high-technology development zone (HTDZ) (DB 2003 Appendix 1:
16).176 This zone had been trying to attract a fab for some time and had been involved in
the talks between Grace and other Chinese government institutes involved in plans to set
up the old six-inch fab sold by TSMC. That fab eventually settled in Ningbo across
Hangzhou Bay from Shanghai. The Yizhuang zone is much more appealing than
Badachu simply by virtue of its close proximity to Beijing's city center. Given the
support of the Beijing government for the SMIC project, wherever the firm had settled in
Beijing they would have enjoyed preferential tax treatment so such incentives are
unlikely to have been a factor in the move. The move to Yizhuang underlined the shift
from control by Badachu-based Shougang to the FIE, SMIC.
Support for design activities also shows a mix of policies supporting either state-
led or private-led development. With the exception of Arca, the procurement support for
design houses is aimed solely at the SOE design houses (if BLX is considered a SOE).
176 Officially, only part of the Beijing Economic and Technology Development Zone (BDA) is a HTDZ
(High Technology Development Zone), the part known as Yizhuang and under the rubric of Beijing's
Zhongguancun Science Park, but as reported in DB (2003: Appendix , p. 16), the incentives of this HTDZ
are applied to all of BDA. This practice is quite common throughout China and is another way incentives
spread beyond their planned boundaries. At least some of the time, this expansion of incentives is done by
illegal collusion between investors and local officials in which the firms are registered in the relevant zone
but are in fact located outside of the zone, a fact known by the local officials who register the firms.
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Even the one large domestic private firm does not have a share of this procurement
support. On the other hand, small grants under Torch and the 863 Plan, two S&T
initiatives, provide support to all types of firms deemed high-tech. Finally, the seven
nationally designated IC Design Parks welcome investment by foreign design houses and
provide tax benefits and subsidized services, such as EDA tools, to all comers. At least
one of the national design centers still revealed an ill concealed technonationalist streak.
One of the officials in charge policy development of this park, which was avidly courting
Taiwanese investment, denounced the reliance on Taiwanese investment and declared
that China would never progress technologically if it continued to rely on investment by
Taiwanese or other overseas Chinese not to mention real foreigners (Interview 87).
In general, the IC industry may be the one sector under study in this work in
which the old dichotomy between state-owned and consequently state-favored and
private and consequently discriminated against or at least neglected by the government
still holds for the domestic firms. Given the large scale of investment in IC fabs, until
quite recently, there would have been few private firms with the financial wherewithal to
invest in the sector by themselves. In contrast, the state sponsored a number of SOE IC
fabs. Thus, path dependency of scale makes it more likely that the next projects would be
centered around the existing SOEs with existing fabs rather than to target private firms
with no fabs regardless of their links to the Chinese state. In design scale is not very
important so there is less built-in scale path dependency. Thus, Arca and the arguably
privately-managed (minying) BLX'77 have been able to enter new procurement channels
177 A number of companies that have merged form state research institutes have taken on the privately
managed (minying) or even private (siying) mantles, such as Legend, which came out of CAS, and Huawei,
which came out of a military research institute in Xian. BLX is as minying as these two firms though all of
them have quite strong links to the state, through their mother institutes and other channels.
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of the state. As for the one large private firm, as the exception to the rule, it has managed
to reverse engineer many commercial products for the local electronics industry
(probably learned form the original Taiwanese JV the design house in Hangzhou from
which it emerged) so it has developed a business model that is both viable and not geared
toward maintaining relations with state actors to keep the orders of IC cards for state
agencies rolling in. The other private firms have suffered in capital-deprivation from the
state's neglect.
The overall policy direction is two-fold: openness to FIE investment and policy
inducements applicable to all firms while at the same time expanding state-owned
enterprises continue to receive support from the central government. The central
government's State Council Circular No. 18 in 2000 effectively cut the VAT from 17%
to 3% for IC fabricated or designed in China although this policy will be challenged by
the US in the WTO court. These incentives were available to both foreign and domestic
firms. Indeed, at least half of the VAT subsidies went to FIEs (JJGC July 19, 2004: 33).
Local governments are even more interested in foreign investment in this sector as a way
to develop quickly and without the need of large investment of local state funds.
Nevertheless, the central government's desire to back state-owned projects cast a
technonationalist shadow over the more technoglobalist policy incentives, such as the
VAT, and local initiatives. Even MII recognizes that interaction with private and foreign
interests can be beneficial, but the old statist proclivities die hard. In the wake of
dropping the VAT incentives in the face of a US lawsuit in WTO court, China has
redoubled its industrial policymaking efforts rather than abandoning them. Early reports
of the new policies have the state planning to spend as much as 10 billion RMB
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(approximately 1.25 billion USD) to support domestic industry through 2010 (JJGC, July
17, 2002; ASWJ, November 26, 2004: A7; Fuller 2004). Central and local government
actors have learned new technoglobalist methods to develop the IC industry, but
technonationalism still lurks as the guilty conscience of the central government prodding
and cajoling it to support Chinese state-owned projects even in the face of successful FIE
investment.
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Chapter Six
Conclusion:
The Sustainability of China's Peculiar Path and the Scope for the
Global Hybrid Model of Development in the Developing World
How sustainable is the China's peculiar path to technological upgrading? This
chapter will answer this question by looking at the extent of institutional embeddedness
of China's IT activities. There is much evidence that China now has the institutions
necessary to encourage activities that will utilize the accumulated technical resources. In
other words, there is evidence that the technological upgrading is institutionally
embedded. When we talk of technical resources, we primarily mean the accumulated
human capital.' 78 Institutions to encourage the continued use of this human capital are
necessary to ensure that these resources continue to contribute to economy over time.
Demonstrating that China has such institutions begs the question of the
sustainability of the institutions. Here, the question of alternative institutional paths is as
important as the viability of the institutions themselves. The reason these alternatives are
so critical is that the current path China has taken is default one rather than desired
course. China's political elite has not given up its techno-nationalist dreams even as it
has tolerated technoglobalist successes of the hybrid-led development. The logic of
178 From the previous empirical chapters, we have shown that the activities of firms in China have created a
large increase in the quality and quantity of technical knowledge among China's engineering (i.e. an
increase in China's human capital). This technical knowledge does not reside in individuals alone. Some
of the technical knowledge conceivably is knowledge lodged in a particular firm or other institution rather
than an individual. Nevertheless, the history of innovation in IT strongly suggests that most of the
knowledge is captured by individuals. This explains why environments where the knowledge workers
circulate, such as Taiwan and Silicon Valley, have shown much stronger performance in the diffusion and
creation of knowledge in recent decades than those where the knowledge workers are locked into a
particular firm, such as Japan or arguably pre-1990 Route 128. To quote Angel's (2000: 125) study of
Silicon Valley, "The technological dynamism and forms of flexible manufacturing observed in Silicon
Valley are predicated upon fluid employment relations and various efficiencies in job search and inter-firm
worker mobility that facilitate the rapid deployment of specialized knowledge, skills, and experience
among firms in the local labor market." If most of the knowledge did not reside in the workers' heads, then
all of this labor mobility would have be for naught (see also Fosfuri 2001).
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central-local relations opened the space for these technoglobalist successes, but they
became the main driver of technological upgrading only because the state's techno-
nationalist projects failed. On top of the ideological problem China's foreign-driven
strategy presents to China's leadership, there is the structural issue of China's financial
institutions limiting the potential of China's private entrepreneurs. The malfunctioning of
the formal state financial system forces entrepreneurs to adopt the foreign route if they
wish to succeed. The irony of course is the short-term political costs of thoroughly
reforming the financial sector prevent China from realizing what would be a major gain
in the eyes of techno-nationalists, the creation of a set of dynamic domestic technology
firms. The hybrid-driven model has emerged as the default option only because China's
domestic political institutions (including the state banking system) have thwarted the
dreams of state bureaucrats and private entrepreneurs alike.
This chapter will examine the institutions for continued use of the accumulated
technical resources, the possibilities for alternatives to the hybrid-model and the policy
implications for other nations of China's peculiar path of hybrid-driven development.
1. Institutional Embeddedness
The final test of the embeddedness of the technological upgrading (see Chapter
One Section Three) is the ability of the local environment to retain technical resources for
continued use even if the firm undertaking the upgrading leaves. What guarantees the
continued use of these accumulated technical resources is an institutional framework
supportive of luring in foreign firms or encouraging new firm creation. First, I will
discuss the specific supportive frameworks for IC fabrication, design and IT hardware
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R&D. Then, I will describe the primary institution that support continued used of the
accumulated technical resources across the IT sector, foreign venture capital.
1.1 Sector-specific Institutions
For fabrication, China's main institutional hurdle in the past was the controlled
investment environment for foreign ventures. Local competition has dissolved the
remaining serious hurdles to investment by FIEs. These hurdles may have been as much
perception as reality as Motorola was allowed to invest in a WFOE fabrication facility in
1995 and Motorola's plan had been on the table since the early 1990s. On the other hand,
during the 909 Project's selection of an appropriate partner for Huahong, foreign firms
assumed that this project would be the only post-Motorola chance to enter the Chinese
semiconductor industry. 179 Since 1998, the flood of foreign investment has proven these
fears wrong. The number of new areas where new fabs have begun operation is growing
with Nanjing, Suzhou, Ningbo, Hangzhou and Beijing's BDA joining Tianjin, Shanghai,
Wuxi and Beijing's Badachu as areas with foreign-owned fabs. Other Taiwanese firms
are joining the movement to China, such as Powerchip, which recently announced the
relocation of one of its 8-inch fabs to China. Even the interior has begun to seize some
179 This author volunteered for USITO (United States Information Technology Office) in the summer of
1998. A number of American IC firms complained vociferously that US technology controls had kept an
American firm from winning the right to participate in 909 as Huahong's JV partner. These firms were
quite upset because 909 seemed the only plausible right of future participation in China's IC industry for
most of these firms. However, it is unclear if they thought it was the last chance to participate or the last
chance to participate in a JV funded primarily by the Chinese state. In other words, these firms were
looking for an investment option that gained favor with the Chinese state without too much of a burden on
their own bottom line and they may have regarded 909 as the last chance to do this. There is no evidence
that the Chinese state would have blocked a WFOE from investing in semiconductor fabrication so barring
misperceptions on the part of American companies regarding the regulatory environment (highly
implausible given Motorola's fab and the information provided by USITO and other US business
organizations in Beijing), the only logical explanation is that American firms wanted to invest on the cheap
via 909. They simply discounted investing alone as a desirable option when claiming 909 was the last
chance.
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opportunities. On Semi, a Motorola spin-off, has a six-inch fab in Leshan, Sichuan.
Behind this geographic spread are central and local government openness to these new
foreign-invested projects and recognition by the foreign firms of the feasibility of such
operations. Existing investment incentives in combination with the competition between
localities has opened up the investment environment at the same time that established
firms are busy training the requisite human capital. Despite foreign complaints about
government support for domestic industry, some of the policy support for fabrication has
granted foreign fabs equal treatment with local firms as long as the FIEs are producing in
China. In fact, foreign firms received at least half of the tax rebates of State Council
Circular No. 18 in practice.' s°
"Soft" sociological institutions have formed alongside of the rules and policies of
the political institutions, to support each segment of the IT industry. These soft
institutions are actionable industry information and industrial clusters. The industry
information comes in two forms. Foreign firms with successful operations in China
provide templates or models for potential investors that reduce the uncertainty of
investing in China. There is also the information feedback from investors to local and
central authorities on how to meet the demands of the IT industry.
In IC fabrication, the establishment of running fabs by SMIC, Grace and UMC
(Hejian) and TSMC has served as a demonstration effect that running sophisticated fabs
in China is possible. These ventures provide a template that helps to overcome those
180 Despite the vociferous complaints of the Semiconductor Industry Association of the US, the level of
rebates was quite small, at most around 25 million US dollars or less than one third of one percent of
China's domestic semiconductor production (Fuller 2004). Nevertheless, foreign firms have garnered half
of these subsidies (JJGC, July 19, 2004, p. 33). China agreed to drop the Circular No. 18 policies when
faced with a pending WTO judgment declaring these tax rebates in violation of TRIM (trade-related
investment measures). However, the state is busy preparing new policies to replace the old ones. These
new policies may involve a substantial amount of money, running into the hundreds of millions or even
billions of US dollars (Fuller 2004; CJ July 20, 2004: 98-99; ASWJ, November 26, 2004: A7).
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fears by foreign investors of entering into an alien environment. The fabs have also
provided a template of infrastructure provision for the state authorities to emulate as the
latter begin to realize the demanding infrastructural needs of IC fabrication, especially a
constant uninterrupted supply of electricity and very clean water.
Similarly, the success of IDT Newave and Vimicro in IC design demonstrated
that China was a viable location for IC design. MNCs are also well aware of their
competitors' activities in China and the movements of R&D operations to China were
visible to competing firms. The demonstrable increase in real R&D activities since the
late 1990s as noted by Walsh can in part be attributed to such templates (Interviews).
There is not the same type of public goods provision models for IC design and R&D as
there is for IC fabrication.
There is also the formation of industrial clusters that afford the external
economies of scope through co-location, such as a large common pool of engineering
talent to recruit from and the concentration of supplier services. The greater Shanghai
area (inclusive of Hangzhou, Suzhou and arguably Ningbo and Wuxi as well) has six 8-
inch fabs up and running and at least two more that will begin production this year
alongside of a number of six-inch fabs. Powerchip is also planning to move an 8-inch fab
to Shanghai. The capital equipment makers of the advanced world, such as Applied
Materials and Lam Research, have recognized this cluster effect by setting up their main
China offices in the heart of Shanghai's silicon industry, Zhangjiang Park. The other
potential cluster is in Beijing-Tianjin where the big base of SMIC is right alongside of the
highway that leads to TEDA (Tianjin Economic Development Area) where SMIC's fab
purchased from Motorola is located.
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Clusters exist for IC design and other R&D activities as well. The Beijing-Tianjin
area has become a cluster of wireless R&D with similar clusters in Shenzhen, Shanghai
and Hangzhou. In IC design, Shanghai and Beijing followed by Shenzhen and Hangzhou
have substantial clusters of designers.
What is not clear is the future potential of these industry clusters as innovation
clusters. These clusters enjoy the effects of co-location in terms of a pool of engineering
labor to recruit form and an infrastructure of suppliers, but it is less clear that any of these
clusters enjoy any other substantial advantages from locating in an established cluster of
innovation. I have not uncovered evidence that suggest firms in one industry cluster
generally outperform those in other parts of China due to the type of advantages that
innovation districts confer, such as rapid generation and flow of industry knowledge.
Simply put, the co-location of production in China is at an early stage so it is premature
to confer the status of innovation cluster on these newly formed clusters of production.
What can be said is that there are enough firms of a given segment in certain places in
China that the new entrants in these areas will not have to create an industrial
infrastructure from scratch, the difficult task that faced Newave when it was founded in
Shanghai in 1997.
There is one partial exception to the lack of innovation clusters. The extensive
links between universities and firms that is common in clusters of innovation, particularly
Silicon Valley, is also beginning to form in Shanghai and Beijing in the area of IC design.
As mentioned in Chapter Five, some firms in Shanghai are beginning to send their
leaders out to universities to teach in order to provide practical design education to the
university students in a manner reminiscent of similar practices in Silicon Valley. In
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Beijing unlike Shanghai, I did not come across firms sending managers to teach in local
universities, but there were a number of university research centers that had joint research
projects with firms though this research was for product creation rather than advanced
basic research. The research collaboration between universities and the firms is not as
strong yet, but this gap may also be due to the weakness of research capabilities of the
universities and/or the technological learning stage the firms generally find themselves in.
These firms are not trying to create the new technologies, but instead they are learning to
master the latest generation of technology so they can get ahead in the commercialization
of the next generation of products. Thus, they are not generally interested in advance
research as of yet. The universities on the other hand are not generally capable of much
advanced research at this stage either. In this sense, the industry looks again much like
Taiwan of a few years ago. Even today Taiwan's universities are not doing much
cutting-edge research and the link between design firms and universities on research
remains weak.
1.2 Foreign Venture Capital
Beyond the soft sociological institutions discussed, the critical institution needed
to generate new firms is venture capital willing to back China technology ventures.
Domestic venture capital suffers from connections to soft budget state finance so foreign
venture capital is the main way to fund technology entrepreneurship. The foreign
registration of the hybrids allows foreign venture funds easy invest and exit opportunities.
A large number of important VC firms from the US, such as Intel Capital, IDG, WI
Harper and Draper Fisher Jurvetson, are investing in Chinese start-ups from offices in
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Hong Kong or the mainland itself. The Taiwanese and Hong Kongese VCs, such as
Investar and Acer Venture Capital, are very active as well. Foreign VCs had already
invested over 5 billion USD in China, and foreign and JV firms combined for over six
billion in investment as of 2003 (see Table 5.10). Given that some of the foreign VCs
operating in China do not disclose the amount of their capital investment and that these
firms were not counted in the amount invested, the real investment in China is larger by
perhaps several hundred million assuming the non-reporting firms invest the average
amount of the reporting firms. In early 2004, the Carlyle Group announced plans to
invest over one billion US dollars in China over the following eighteen months. By the
first half of 2004, foreign investment had clearly taken the lead in provision of venture
funds in China with 85.44 percent of all venture money coming from foreign firms
(Dongfang Zaobao, July 28, 2004).
The VC firms active in China, like their counterparts in the US and Taiwan, are
very interested in investing in fabless design firms, and 57% of all VC investment in
China has gone to the IT industry (Zero2ipo 2003). The legal environment has become
more transparent and predictable for these investments through the new regulations
announced in 2003 to clarify and streamline the process of foreign VCs setting up
investment operations in China (Kuzmik and Tan 2004). Moreover, the local
governments understand that VCs are critical to encouraging innovation. They are
actively welcoming foreign VCs to their locales. In several instances, local officials have
even asked me for advice on how to lure more foreign VCs to their locales. With great
interest from the foreign venture capitalists and government officials alike, the foreign
venture finance needed to create new ventures is in place in China.
353
Table 6.1 China's Venture Capital Cumulative Investments 2003
Source: http://www.zero2ipo.com.
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With a large amount of domestic investment in domestic venture capital firms,
one might think that domestic venture capital would be able to take over the role of
funding entrepreneurial finance. Taking over this role from foreign venture capital would
spell the end of the hybrid-driven model as the entrepreneurial finance would be domestic
rather than foreign. Unfortunately, the domestic venture capital firms generally suffer
from the same soft budget constraints of other firms directly or indirectly tied to the state
(White et al forthcoming).
In 1985, China established its first venture capital firm. From that time until the
late 1990s, explicitly government-managed funds dominated the domestic venture capital
industry.18' While the late 1990s heralded the supposed beginning of CVCs (corporate
venture capital) alongside of the previous government venture capital firms, the majority
of the CVCs are supported by funds from local governments and their performance has
181 The National Research Center of Science and Technology for Development under the State Science and
Technology Commission (the forerunner of MoST) started in 1984 to conduct research on 'New
Technology and China's Countermeasures." The research center suggested developing venture capital at
this time. The following year, SSTC and the Ministry of Finance jointly founded China's first venture
capital firm, China New technology Venture Investment Corporation (White, Gao and Zhang forthcoming:
31).
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ranged from lackluster to disastrous. The three CVCs among the top twenty VCs in
terms of Chinese investment (the other 17 were foreign venture capital firms) (White et
al: 39) were all local state-organs backed by the governments of Shanghai, Shenzhen and
Guangdong Province respectively. The creation of corporate entities was supposed to
foster better performance compared to the GVCs where government organs or SOEs
owned and managed the funds. However, the actual differences between most CVCs and
the GVCs were not large. Whereas the government directly owned the GVCs, for the
CVCs, the major shareholders of the CVCs if not always SOEs were still government-
backed firms. In other words, the links to the state still existed with the advent of the
CVCs.
The actual performance of the state-backed CVCs also was poor. Two of the
three largest government-backed CVCs, Shanghai Venture Capital and Shenzhen Venture
Capital have essentially left the field of entrepreneurial finance (Interviews 323, 86, 116,
260, 261). Shenzhen Venture Capital took most of its assets and ploughed them into
China's volatile stock markets. The result was disastrous as the firm destroyed 80% of
the value of its funds, losing approximately 200 million USD out of 250 million USD in
funds. The management team was fired, but the problem was the management team had
no incentive to perform in the first place. They were simply given the government's
money and told to invest with none of the returns going to the management team of local
bureaucrats. With neither the skills nor the incentives to make asset-enhancing
investments, the team decided to gamble in the stock market (Interview 323).
Since being founded in 1999, Shanghai Venture Capital Company has essentially
outsourced its funds to investment management firms. Shanghai Venture Capital quickly
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realized that without incentives or ownership, these investment management firms would
simply abuse the funds so the VC now requires the investment management firms to have
a majority ownership stake. Yet, these reforms are less impressive upon close inspection.
The transition to majority ownership by management is not complete and the investment
management firms are all directly tied to Shanghai Municipality bureaus or research
units. Thus, these investment management firms themselves suffer from the same soft
budget constraints that other Chinese government-linked businesses do. The investment
management firm charged with investing in IT firms has abandoned this mission to invest
in Shanghai's real estate market. The investment considerations are driven by local
concerns about building up a complete industrial chain in Shanghai rather than profit-
maximization. 182 The firms in which Shanghai's state VCs have invested are firms
targeting state procurement rather than viable commercial enterprises (Interviews 268,
260, 261).
The one domestic CVC that foreign venture capitalists regard as competent and
that has successfully led the funding of commercial enterprises is Legend Capital.
However, much of Legend Capital's success suggests this firm is the exception that
proves the rule. Legend Capital manages funds for Legend Holdings and some foreign
investors. However, by the initial agreement with Legend Holdings, the management
team of Legend Capital owns the firm and only makes money by managing the invested
funds for a profit. This firm is not actually part of Legend Holdings and has no safety net
to fall back on if it fails to invest the funds properly. More tellingly, Legend Capital has
mimicked the foreign VC strategy to a tee, seeking only to invest in foreign firms with
182 Furthermore, if Chapter Three is correct, co-location of the entire industrial chain is irrelevant to
Shanghai's goal of industrial development.
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commercial rather than political business strategies. In a sense, Legend Capital is an
institution based on round-tripping investment (Chinese outward investment that returns
to China). Legend Capital invests in offshore companies, which then take the invested
funds and invest in technology activities in China.
Unfortunately, none of the other VCs founded by domestic firms not directly
linked to the state, such as the VCs funded by Ancai and Wanxiang, have exhibited the
success or the foreign-invested strategy of Legend Capital. These other firms have not
yet successfully invested in a firm showing demonstrable commercial success whereas
Legend Capital has done so. Domestic and foreign VCs alike acknowledge that Legend
stands out among the domestic VCs for successful commercial investments (Interviews
208, 323,275, 262, 265).
Legend Capital's investments for its first fund were primarily foreign-invested
firms. Six of the nine invested firms in which Legend Capital was the lead investor were
hybrid FIEs. Of the three from which Legend has already successfully exited, two are
hybrid FIEs and one has been bought by a SOE. For Legend Capital's second fund
where four foreign investors joined Legend Holding in providing the investment money,
only two of the eleven invested firms can be construed as local, potentially state-linked
firms.'8 3 As the second fund dwarfs the first fund in size (75 versus 35 million USD) and
the investment in any firm were capped at 5 million USD in the second fund, the large
majority of the funds are flowing to FIEs. These FIEs are all China-based firms.18 4 With
183 These two are Suzhou Xingheng, a lithium battery firm with technology from China Academy of
Sciences, and Zhejiang Guangyuan, which has invested in TV broadcasting operations of Railcom, a SOE.
184 Legend has invested in one FIE, Berkana, that is not China-based, but Legend was not the lead investor
fobr this firm. Berkana in fact has no operations outside the US and Korea and is a Silicon Valley-based
start-up that Howard Yang of Newave and Montage (see Chapter Five) introduced to Legend Capital. As
Legend Capital has no offices outside of China, this investment was its only investment in a firm not based
in China.
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more of the targeted firms and investment funds flowing to FIEs over time, Legend
Capital's own self-articulated strategy of investing in foreign-registered, China-based
firms appears to be reaching to fruition.
Table 6.2 Legend Capital's Successfully Completed Investments
Source: Legend Capital.
Company Business Strategy Legend's Exit
Sinocom Beijing's largest software The firm listed on Hong
outsourcing firm (export- Kong's main board in
oriented) 2004.
Joyo.com Mimic Amazon's Amazon bought the firm
bookselling on the Internet for 75 million USD in
strategy for China. 2004.
CNC (China Netcom) Broadband service operator. Bought by China Netcom
(SOE) in 2003.
With few successful domestically managed funds, another option might be to
have foreign managers manage local funds. Unfortunately, this innovation has been tried
and has failed because of the conflict between the political goals of the owners of the
majority of domestic funds (China's local governments) and the profit-maximizing goals
of the foreign VCs. When Jiangsu Province (the province bordering Shanghai to the west
and north) decided to avoid the errors of other state managed funds by bringing in a
foreign VC to manage its funds, even other state-run funds praised this strategy as a smart
one. Jiangsu Province hired Fuxing (Fortune), a Taiwanese venture firm, to manage its
300 million RMB (approximately 36 million USD) in funds in 2003. Fuxing itself was
quite excited as it saw this as a potential way to garner a number of similar deals from
other state funds if the Jiangsu fund was properly managed.
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Problems soon emerged. Jiangsu Province placed many restrictions on where and
how the funds could be invested because of the political incentive structure in place for
the provincial leadership. The provincial leadership viewed these funds as another
mechanism to boost the short-term growth in Jiangsu and, consequently, help their
political careers given the heavy weight local economic performance plays in evaluating
the performance of local leaders (NFZM, November 3, 2003). Fuxing regarded these
demands as not only in violation of the original agreement to allow Fuxing to manage the
fund, but also as severely constraining the ability to make sound, profit-making
investments. Consequently, Fuxing gave up managing the fund in 2004 and Jiangsu has
not been able to find a replacement (Interviews 323, 262, 261).
From the fifteen VC funds (9 foreign and 7 domestic ones) I interviewed in
China, one can see the overall patterns. The 9 foreign ones, with one exception, have
increased the size of their investments in China since their inception and have focused on
commercial technology enterprises. The one exception was really more of a corporatized
angel investor because a wealthy Hong Kong businessman founded the firm with his own
private funds. The founder decided to pull back on investing in China and concentrate on
Silicon Valley. By that firm's own executives' estimation, the firm suffered from a lack
of the requisite skills given that a wealthy tycoon rather than an experienced venture
capitalist led it. Thus, this firm was ill equipped to act as a lead on investments, which it
tried to do in China, and was better suited to tag along behind experienced VCs, its
strategy in the US (Interviews 99; 179; 253). In contrast, among the domestic VCs,
Legend Capital was the only firm that eschewed investing in state-connected firms
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concentrating on state patronage. The other six domestic VCs either concentrated on
state favored firms or were simply not investing in entrepreneurial ventures at all.
The failures of most domestic VCs to fund commercially viable firms suggests
that domestic venture funds will not soon displace foreign venture capitalists as in
funding China's technology entrepreneurship. However, we must still ask ourselves
whether there are other alternatives to the hybrid-led development.
2. Domestic Alternatives to Hybrid-led Development?
There are two main potential domestic alternatives to hybrid-led development.
One would be the reform of the state banking system into a financial system with much
greater efficiency in the allocation of credit. The other would be the rise of a private
domestic banking system alongside of the state one that would push the state system to
reform or at least displace foreign venture funds by providing domestic sources of capital
for technology entrepreneurs. Neither of these alternatives are likely to come to pass in
the near to medium term.
The state financial system essentially keeps China's domestic savings from
flowing to dynamic entrepreneurs who currently create the foreign-invested China-based
firms. Sustaining the state financial system is the well-documented political imperative
to support asset-destroying firms in order to avoid the short-term economic pain and
concomitant large political costs of pulling the plug on such firms. These problems are
exacerbated by the many different government organizations that have access to funds in
the state banking system without any responsibility for them (OECD 2002; Tenev et al
2002; Lardy 2002; Wu Jing-lian 2004; Li Jian-ge 2004). This asset destruction is
360
supported by the massive savings that the Chinese people shovel into the state banking
system for the lack of alternative legal investment options.
While some had hoped that centralization of funds would improve the system by
preventing various state agencies from misusing funds'85, the evidence suggests that to
the extent that the centralization embarked upon in the later years of the Jiang Zemin era
succeeded in wresting control of funds from local governments, it did not actually
ameliorate the efficient use of funds. Rather, the central government had its own political
pet projects upon which it lavished state funds in an equally inefficient manner (V. Shih
2004). Furthermore, one Chinese academic who has served as an advisor to local
governments in the dynamic Pearl and Yangtze River Deltas confirmed that local
governments still have many informal mechanisms to bring pressure to bear on local
bank branches to lend to locally favored projects despite the strenuous attempts to reign
in credit in the past year (March 2005 informal interview; discussion with Victor Shih).
With political motivations aligned against change and China's prodigious savers
docilely channeling most of their funds into the state banking due to the lack of viable
legal alternatives, one could expect little to change in state-run financial system. State-
favored firms would continue to consume assets and worthy entrepreneurs without the
right connections would still be left out in the cold. There appears to be a potential crack
in the system. The potential fissure recognized by one of China's foremost economists,
Wu Jing-lian, and many others is the entrance of foreign banks (mandated by China's
WTO accession agreement) into the domestic market in 2006 that ends the monopoly of
the state banks on deposits. As Wu Jing-lian (CJ, August 5, 2004: 40), echoing many
others, puts it, "The only reason China's low efficiency growth is maintained, under the
185 See for example, Melloan (1998) and Hajari (1998).
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context of high savings, is due to the state monopoly on the banking system and the
control of the exchange rate. The minute either of these conditions no longer holds, the
financial system's every kind of failing and their resulting black holes of capital will
manifest themselves." With foreign banks entry into the domestic banking system,
Chinese funds could go directly to Chinese bank accounts in foreign-owned banks and
then be lent back to Chinese entrepreneurs instead of round tripping out and back into
China. Even if the foreign banks decided to lend only to those firms that pursued a
hybrid strategy in order to ensure their ability to retrieve their returns, the pressure placed
on the domestic state banks to pursue profits instead of politics could cause the state
banking system to bite the bullet and reform. Of course, the implosion of the state
banking system would also be a distinct possibility in the wake of the entry of foreign
banks.
Neither of these routes to reform is likely to happen because there is an important
caveat to these WTO-driven reform scenarios. These scenarios assume that the foreign
banks will actually be allowed to operate in the liberalized coastal areas designated in
China's 2001 WTO accession agreement. This is not likely to happen for several
reasons. First and foremost, China's leaders do hear and heed the warnings of Wu Jing-
lian and others. Wu after all is a member of the Development Research Center, the think
tank attached to China's highest executive organ, the State Council. With such dire
warnings, the leadership is not likely to allow the foreign banks to operate freely since it
may bring down China's financial house of cards. On top of this, foreign banks have
found regulations curtailing their operations even in those areas of China's banking
system supposedly already open to foreigners, such as banking in foreign currencies.
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Most likely, the Chinese government wishes to comply with the letter of the WTO
without actually implementing truly effective liberalization. In any case, the regulatory
burden on foreign firms has been so heavy that even prior to further liberalization,
foreign banks are withdrawing from the already nominally liberalized foreign currency
banking market (EIU Country Finance China 2003: 16-17; Fan Jian-jun 2004). The
foreign banks' share of this market in China has halved from 15 % in 2001 to 7.4% in
2002 and the total assets foreign banks own in China have fallen from 2% of the assets
held by the banking sector in 2001 to 1.1% in 2003 (Fan Jian-jun 2004).
Another economist of the State Council's Development Research Center, Fan
Jian-jun, expands on these regulatory arguments about why the big bad wolves of foreign
banking, as he dubs them in the title of his report, are not really that scary after all. He
argues that excessive regulations make the competitive advantages of the foreign banks
ineffective. Instead of pushing their domestic competitors to reform or perish, the foreign
banks themselves will find that China is an inhospitable clime (shui tu bufu) for their
type of operations. These regulations are even more burdensome for foreign banks than
domestic ones because the foreign banks have to comply with the 1994 Foreign Financial
Institutions Management Regulations in addition to all domestic regulations. He does not
say that these excessive regulations probably keep foreign banks out by design rather
than by accident, but all the political incentives point in that direction.
One of the most critical regulations is the control of interest rates by the state.
The state has been controlling the interest terms of loans, and the interest caps make it
difficult for foreign banks to use their superior ability to monitor risk to their advantage
because they are constrained from charging risky borrowers more interest. Thus, they
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will have to severely restrict their scope to the few creditworthy and safe borrowers in
China. In terms of banking deposits, the regulations on interest rates will also restrict the
ability of foreign banks to offer a variety of deposit mechanisms and interest rates to
attract different types of savers. The ability of foreign banks to offer a wide variety of
investment products for depositors is precisely another inherent strength of the foreign
banks. Thus, the regulations on interest rates cut the competitive legs out from under the
foreign banks.
Fan also points out that the foreign banks have no guarantor whereas the domestic
state banks have the state always willing to bail them out. Thus, the state banks will be
able to offer overly attractive terms that make no economic sense. Instead of all the
domestic savers and borrowers moving to foreign banks, the foreign banks will be unable
to attract nearly anyone to lend to or borrow from them given their market-dictated but
less attractive terms. In light of what was said above about controls on interest rates, this
argument on guarantees makes no sense unless one considers the effective rather than
nominal interest rates. Firms can borrow from state banks knowing that they will not
have to pay them back with the state supporting the whole system whereas borrowers
from foreign banks presumably borrow assuming that they will have to pay back the face
value of the interest. Thus, foreign banks will not attract borrowers because they offer
effectively higher interest rates and will not attract depositors because they do not have
the backing of the state. If there were no capital controls, foreign banks could easily
bring in money to reassure local depositors that bank runs would be stopped. With the
continuation of capital controls (there are no international agreements to end China's
capital controls and even the IMF has begun to think they are necessary for the near-to-
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mid-term--see Prasad et al 2005 IMF Policy Discussion Paper) for the foreseeable
future, foreign banks cannot take money out of China at will. The result is that foreign
banks would have to bring in money in advance of any bank run and keeping this money
in China waiting around for such an event would be prohibitively expensive given all the
excessive regulation. If they do it, they will have one more cost dampening their
competitiveness. If they do not do it, their credibility among local savers will be weak.
Under these conditions, the foreign banks could not even effectively serve the
underserved private entrepreneurs neglected by the state banking system. With few
depositors and the burden of regulation of interest rates, it would be hard for foreign
banks to lend extensively to the many private entrepreneurs who are underserved in the
current system. To serve many of them, the foreign banks would have to bring in money
from abroad, something they would be reluctant to do given China's capital controls.
With the interest regulations, the foreign banks would be reluctant to serve any but the
least risky for an additional reason beyond risk management under a capped interest rate.
The private firms underserved by the state have not had the opportunity to build up a
large amount of tangible assets precisely because they have severe capital constraints.
Firms with few tangible assets are always considered higher risk because they can
practice strategic default on creditors i.e. borrowers can credibly threaten to default
because the creditors will get close to nothing if they do. 186 Thus, the very neglect by the
state banking system results in the lack of accumulation of tangible assets by private
firms. This lack of tangible assets in turn affects their ability to obtain credit in the
context of caps on interest rates because no one wants to lend to what are perceived to be
186 I would like to thank Tony Marciano of the Sloan School of Business for this insight.
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high-risk borrowers at low rates of interest. In effect, what the state banking system has
done is make all neglected firms look higher risk than they actually are.
What about the possibility of the private, relatively efficient domestic financial
institutions displacing the formal state network? The likelihood of this happening barring
a major overhaul of the state banking system is unlikely. Competitive foreign banks are
hard pressed to compete against the state banking system as shown above, but domestic
firms not tied to the state would face an even harder situation in trying to build up a
banking business in competition with state-financed banks. The few nominally privately
managed banks, such as Minsheng, are effectively linked to the state.' 87
There are informal finance mechanisms in China, but they are generally local and
small-scale in nature so they do not generally fund major industrial enterprises.
Furthermore, they are not in the business of funding technology-intensive enterprises or
other high risk, low tangible asset businesses (K. Tsai 2002; IFC 2000). In this respect,
China is not very different from Taiwan where informal finance flourished, but did not
make investments in technology-intensive firms (Amsden and Chu 2003; Mathews and
Cho 2000; Fuller 2002).
Could informal domestic financial mechanisms displace foreign VCs in funding
entrepreneurial finance? Empirically, there is little evidence that domestic technology
firms of whatever variety have access to much informal finance. Of the 80 domestic
firms interviewed, only two that relied on informal financial mechanisms gathered
enough capital to pursue serious technological activities. In each case, the founders of
these firms received funds from friends. While there is nothing wrong with using one's
personal contacts as a source of funds, it does suggest that the institutionalization of
187 Correspondence with Victor Shih, April 2005.
366
informal finance is very limited. Without such institutionalization, those with capital are
limited to lending to their circle of acquaintances and this limits the scope of investment
and entrepreneurial activity. Up to the present, it appears unlikely that such personal
connections will be able to offer the scope and quantity of investment that the foreign
VCs offer. At best, they will be a supplement to the foreign VCs.
3. The Broader Applicability of the Global Hybrid Model
Even though the evidence above suggests that China will sustain its hybrid-led
model of development for some time to come, does China's peculiar path to development
offer a model to be emulated by other developing countries? While one should always be
conscious of the dangers of what Peter Evans (Evans 2004) calls "institutional
monocropping," the practice of imposing idealized standard blueprints on the Global
South, one should also try to learn what successful practices in one developing country
might have to offer to others. The global hybrid model offers large potential benefits for
two sets of countries: those countries with existing transnational technological
communities and those with potential for such communities.
Before examining these two sets of countries in detail, one other criterion must be
established. Those developing countries that have been able to find a successful
developmental policy that eschews reliance on foreign capital are unlikely to benefit from
adopting a hybrid-led model. All else being equal, retaining all the returns on domestic
investment at home (i.e. few payments of economic rents to foreign sources of capital) is
beneficial to healthy sustainable development. Japan in the 1950s and 1960s or Taiwan
until the present time represent superior models of development to China's global hybrid-
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model because they captured virtually all the economic rents from their domestic
investment and growth. Capturing these rents allowed them to plow even more funds
back into developing the economy. Yet, as discussed in Chapter Two, most developing
countries do not seem to have the institutional capacities to marshal and invest domestic
capital as Japan, Korea and Taiwan did in their respective heydays. For many in this
much larger group of developing countries, trying to mimic Japan or Taiwan would
probably cause as many developmental problems as it solved (M. Khan 2000).
Moreover, it would cause them to miss the potential institutional upside of foreign
investment.
India is the developing country with the largest transnational technology
communities other than China. One could object that at least India does not need to
mimic China's reliance on foreign finance due to its healthy domestic financial sector.
Indeed, a number of scholars have pointed out that India's financial sector (Khanna and
Huang 2003; Huang 2003) and its legal system (discussions with Martin Kenney and
Adam Segal) are more conducive to fostering domestic technology activities than
China's. However, my own interviews with foreign venture capitalists (Interview 265;
272) with some exposure to India and the work of Kenney and Dossani (2002) suggest
that even India's institutional infrastructure for entrepreneurship in terms of finance and
law is incomplete. Thus, foreign VCs still play a significant role in the industry and
represent as much as two-thirds of the total venture investment in India (Kenney and
Dossani 2002). While the large presence of foreign VCs in India suggests that India has
not been closed to such investments, even in India's high-technology sector, the
"regulation raj" has made it somewhat difficult to foreign firms to invest (J. Johnson
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2005). Thus, India could arguably benefit from further opening to foreign investment in
conjunction with the renewed interest of expatriate Indian technologists in setting up
businesses back home. Indeed, the Indian government has precisely been attempting to
open up further to foreign investment to spur development (J. Johnson 2005).
India is not alone in having a large expatriate technology community. Russia
graduates as many engineers per year as India and many of them are making their way
abroad. I have encountered them not only in US centers of innovation, but even in
Taiwan's technology cluster, Hsinchu. Institutionally, post-socialist Russia is regarded as
falling far from the ideal of financial transparency and corporate governance. 188 Even
those who defend Russia as performing far better than its many international critics
claim, concede that a few oligarchs with political connections dominate Russia's business
world (Shleifer and Treisman 2004). Given this institutional background, it is not hard to
see that Russia too might be able to benefit from local and expatriate Russian
entrepreneurs setting up technology firms that draw upon the financial institutions of the
advanced countries rather than the home country.
There are more developing countries training large populations of technologists
than just India, Russia and China and they are not necessarily the countries that usually
come to mind when thinking about technology talent. Mexico and Poland are both in the
global top ten in terms of training engineers (AeA 2005). Even Armenia has a cluster of
talented computer scientists and electrical engineers that has begun to draw investment
from Silicon Valley (Grimes, WSJ April 2, 2004). Whether or not these countries have
large communities of technologists already abroad, they have the potential to create such
188 See for example the recent concerns about the continued influence of the oligarchs in Russia's economy,
Neil Buckley "With his eye on keeping control, Putin misses a moment for economic reform," Financial
Times, April 15, 2005.
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communities given their existing pool of technological talent. The existence of
transnational technology communities is of course only half the equation. The other half
is the use of foreign financial institutions. If these countries have relatively inefficient
financial sectors, then using foreign financial institutions in combination with
entrepreneurs of the particular country's transnational technology network offers great
opportunities for development.
One could even speculate that perhaps technologists from the former Soviet block
could create something akin to the ethnic Chinese transnational community. For the
ethnic Chinese technology community encompasses groups hailing from distinctive and
separate countries, but they also have a shared ethnicity. Likewise, Russian or Slavic
language speakers more broadly hailing from the former Soviet bloc may be able to form
a similar transnational community despite their different national identities. The potential
geographic scope of impact would not then be limited to just Russia or Poland or
Armenia alone and would aggregate the power of technologists hailing from disparate
parts of the former Soviet bloc.
The global hybrid model can also be fruitfully applied to countries that have not
yet produced large communities of technologists but have some potential to better utilize
the technologists they have produced. The hybrid-led path offers insights about how to
treat such technologists as a national resource. For example, there is the cautionary tale
of Singapore. Historically, Singapore has supported sending students abroad to earn
advanced science and engineering degrees, but has also insisted that they return to
Singapore on completion of their degrees. This policy has prevented Singapore from
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taking advantage of the ethnic Chinese transnational community despite the country
being ethnic Chinese-dominated and very friendly to foreign-investment (BGS 2001).
As a bellwether for policy in Southeast Asia, Singapore's example has been
followed by other ASEAN members, such as Thailand. Thailand currently also has a
policy of bringing back scientists and engineers upon completion of their degrees' 89 and
the financial system is wracked with inefficiencies (Doner and Ramsay 2000; Rock
2000). Thus, it has ample opportunity to benefit from using foreign finance and to
encourage a transnational technology community to develop if the government changes
its policy towards students abroad.
Southeast Asia is not alone in mismanaging its talent because of fears of a brain
drain. Indeed, the continued fears of many developing countries'90 about potential brain
drains to the developing world, echoing fears expressed by China, Taiwan and Korea
earlier, may be misguided. These brain drains can be transformed into brain trusts that
bring technology from abroad back into the local economy. Even countries without large
populations of engineers, such as Thailand, can still benefit from better utilization of the
engineering talent they do have.
Admittedly, the hybrid-led route still leaves some parts of the developing world
out in the cold. Obviously, those many developing countries with a very low level of
educational attainment unfortunately will have few opportunities to take advantage of the
hybrid-led model of development. This acknowledgement of the limits of the hybrid-led
strategy does not negate the fact that many nations could benefit from changing policies
t;o allow hybrids opportunities to contribute to their economic development.
189 I would like to thank Apiwat Ratanawaraha for pointing out the existence of these Thai government
policies regarding technologists.
190 For these concerns in Latin America, see Solimano and Pollack 2004.
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The task of development has never been easy. Globalization as currently
constructed probably adds to those difficulties. The critics of the Washington Consensus
are correct in not wanting to entrust development to MNCs, but even in this globalized
world, there are new ties that can bind nominally foreign firms to the development
projects of various host countries. Even as globalization constrains some of the old
developmental paths, new opportunities have arisen in the form of the hybrid FIEs. We
should seize these opportunities.
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